Facts:

The case pertains to M/S. FIBRE BOARDS (P) LTD. shifting its industrial undertaking from an urban area and claiming exemption of capital gains under Section 54G of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee claimed exemption on the entire capital gain earned from the sale proceeds of its erstwhile industrial undertaking situated in a notified urban area.

Issues:

Whether the advances made for purchasing or acquiring new assets exceed the capital gain made by the assessee.

Applicability of the General Clauses Act in the context of omitted and re-enacted provisions.

Interpretation of Section 54G regarding the utilization of capital gains within the assessment year.

The High Court's construction of Section 54G and its implications.

Held:

The court held that the advances made by the assessee for purchasing or acquiring new assets did exceed the capital gain made by it. Therefore, the assessee is entitled to exemption under Section 54G.

On the applicability of the General Clauses Act, the court determined that Section 24 of the General Clauses Act would apply, and the notification declaring Thane to be an urban area would continue under and for the purposes of Section 54G.

Regarding the interpretation of Section 54G, the court clarified that the assessee only needs to "utilize" the amount of capital gains within the assessment year. Advances paid for the purpose of purchase or acquisition of assets constitute utilization of capital gains.

The High Court's construction of Section 54G would render a vital part of the said section nugatory. The court set aside the High Court's order and reaffirmed the assessee's entitlement to exemption under Section 54G.

Decision: The court allowed the appeals, setting aside the order passed by the High Court and confirming the assessee's entitlement to exemption under Section 54G.

Facts:

The Aadhaar Card Scheme, implemented by the Government of India, involves the collection and compilation of demographic and biometric data of Indian residents. This data is intended for various government purposes, including the distribution of foodgrains, fuel, and other benefits. The scheme faced legal challenges, particularly regarding its potential infringement on the right to privacy under the Constitution of India.

Issues:

Whether there exists a fundamental right to privacy guaranteed under the Indian Constitution, especially under Article 21.

Held:

The Court recognized the conflicting precedents on the existence of the right to privacy under the Indian Constitution. While earlier judgments cast doubt on its existence, subsequent decisions asserted it, either implicitly or explicitly.

Given the importance and complexity of the issue, the Court referred the matter to a larger bench for authoritative determination. Interim directions were issued, including the non-mandatory nature of obtaining an Aadhaar card and restrictions on the use of Aadhaar data.

Facts:

The case involves the determination of ratable value for lands and buildings assessable for property taxes under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Municipal Corporation framed its own Bye-Laws in 1994, providing principles for such determination.

Issues:

The applicability of Bye-Laws framed by the Municipal Corporation in 1994.

Treatment of assessments pending appeal or remanded back for fresh determination.

Transfer of appeals to the Municipal Taxation Tribunal.

Remand for further determination of additional questions raised in the writ petition.

Held:

The Bye-Laws framed by the Municipal Corporation in 1994 govern assessments made after their enactment. Court judgments like Balbir Singh's case and P.R. Chaudhary's case are no longer applicable in such cases.

Assessments pending appeal or remanded back for fresh determination, especially those before 2003, are subject to Section 116G(2), allowing the assessee to request a decision based on the annual value of the property.

Appeals pending before the District Judge are to be transferred to the Municipal Taxation Tribunal for disposal based on the annual value if requested by the applicant.

The case is remanded back to the High Court for determination of additional questions raised in the writ petition, which were not adjudicated upon earlier due to the application of Daruwala's case, which has been set aside.

Facts:

The respondent sent a statutory notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, and filed a winding-up petition against the appellant company for non-repayment of a loan.

The Company Judge appointed an Official Liquidator who took possession of the appellant company's assets and sought to sell them through public auction.

The auction process was challenged on various grounds including improper valuation, lack of publicity, and procedural irregularities.

The High Court dismissed the appeals and review application filed by the appellant, confirming the sale and handing over the assets to the respondent.

Issues:

Whether the objections raised by the appellant were properly considered.

Whether there were irregularities in the auction process.

Whether the judgments of the Company Judge and the High Court should be set aside.

Held:

The objections raised by the appellant were not properly considered, and the conduct of the Advocate who represented the appellant before the Company Judge was without basis.

The auction sale was conducted without proper publicity and without fixing a reserve price, which cannot be sustained in law, especially considering the discrepancy in valuation reports.

The entire auction process is vitiated, and the Company Judge failed to ensure the properties were sold at a reasonable price.

The valuation report should have been disclosed to secured creditors and other interested parties before the auction sale, which was not done, rendering the sale and confirmation order liable to be set aside.

The appeals are allowed, and the judgments of the Company Judge and the High Court are set aside. The Official Liquidator is directed to recover possession of the properties and proceed with a fresh auction following proper procedures.

Facts:

The appellants, in this case, had rendered service in Kurukshetra University/Punjab University prior to their employment in Maharshi Dayanand University (M.D. University). The question at hand was whether their previous service in other universities could be considered as qualifying service for pension entitlements in M.D. University.

Issues:

Whether the service rendered by the appellants in Kurukshetra University/Punjab University qualifies as qualifying service for pension entitlements in M.D. University?

Whether the distinction made between directly appointed employees and those absorbed/allocated is justifiable in terms of pension benefits?

Whether the conditions specified in the memorandum dated December 24, 2001, regarding the transfer of employer's share of the CPF, are reasonable?

Held:

The court found that the appellants' service in Kurukshetra University/Punjab University qualifies as qualifying service for pension entitlements in M.D. University. This ruling was based on the principles enunciated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Indian Constitution, which prohibit discrimination in matters of employment and recognize pension as a recognition of past service.

The court held that the distinction made between directly appointed employees and those absorbed/allocated is unjustifiable. It emphasized that all employees had served without a break and therefore should be treated equally in terms of pension benefits.

Regarding the conditions specified in the memorandum dated December 24, 2001, the court found them reasonable. It noted that the appellants had expressed willingness to fulfill these conditions, including the transfer of employer's share of the CPF, to avail the pension benefits.

Decision: The court allowed the appeals, directing that the appellants are entitled to count their services rendered in Punjab University/Kurukshetra University as qualifying service for pension, subject to fulfilling the conditions specified in the memorandum dated December 24, 2001. The benefit would be applicable prospectively from the date of issuance of the said memorandum. Additionally, any shortfall in the amount payable towards contributory provident fund would be adjusted by the respondents without insisting on its refund from the appellants.

Facts:

Laxmi Fibres Ltd., the appellant, was under liquidation, represented by the Official Liquidator.

A.P. Industrial Development Corporation and A.P. State Financial Corporation were respondents.

The question was whether the Official Liquidator could adjudicate and quantify the claims of statutory corporations when permitted by the Company Judge to stand outside the liquidation proceeding.

Issues:

Whether the Official Liquidator had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of statutory corporations standing outside the liquidation proceeding.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Official Liquidator does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of secured creditors like statutory corporations when they have been permitted to stand outside the liquidation proceedings by the Company Judge.

Amendments made in 1985 to the Companies Act introduced limitations on the powers of financial corporations to safeguard the rights of workers for distribution of their wages as a pari passu charge.

These limitations did not change the status of state financial corporations as secured creditors.

The control of the Company Judge and the Official Liquidator should extend only to ensuring the effective achievement of the purpose of protecting workers' dues, as outlined in Section 529A of the Companies Act.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals without any order as to costs, as the reasons provided in a previous judgment concerning a similar case were deemed applicable here.

Facts:

Ram Narain, the petitioner, was sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Nathi Lal on December 21, 1976.

Narain filed an application to declare his juvenility, which was accepted by the Juvenile Justice Board, determining that he was a juvenile at the time of the offense.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner, having been sentenced to life imprisonment for an offense committed when he was a juvenile, is entitled to the benefits under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

Held:

The Court acknowledged the petitioner's application seeking release from prison, citing his spending of more than 10 years in jail and the Juvenile Justice Board's declaration of his juvenility.

The Court referred to the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, particularly Section 7A, and cited relevant legal precedents to support the petitioner's entitlement to the Act's benefits.

The Court held that the petitioner should receive the benefit of the Act since he was a juvenile at the time of the offense. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court were set aside. The petitioner was directed to be released forthwith.

Facts:

The assessee failed to pay excise duty on time, leading to the Revenue suspending the facility of clearing goods by paying duty every fortnight.

The Revenue directed the assessee to pay duty on a consignment basis for a period of two months.

During this suspended period, the assessee utilized Cenvat Credit for duty payment, which was objected to by the authorities.

The Revenue imposed 24% interest per annum for the delayed payment, considering the utilization of Cenvat Credit during the suspended period as non-payment of duty.

Issues:

Whether the utilization of Cenvat Credit for excise duty payment during the suspended period, when the facility for installment payments was withdrawn, was permissible under Rule 173G(1)(e) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944?

Held:

The tribunal erred in concluding that payment through Cenvat Credit was impermissible during the suspended period.

Rule 173G(1)(e) allows for the forfeiture of the facility to pay dues in installments for two months but doesn't explicitly prohibit payment through Cenvat Credit .

Both Rule 173G(1) and the MODVAT Scheme allow for duty payment through Cenvat Credit, even when the facility for installment payments is withdrawn .

The appellant's payment in cash later didn't estop them from arguing the validity of using Cenvat Credit during the suspended period .

The court set aside the tribunal's decision, affirming that duty payment through Cenvat Credit was permissible during the suspended period .

Decision: The court ruled in favor of the appellant, holding that payment of excise duty through Cenvat Credit was permissible even during the period when the facility for installment payments was suspended.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S. Tata Chemicals Ltd., is involved in the manufacture and sale of soda ash.

The dispute arises regarding the inclusion of the cost of gunny bags used for packing soda ash in the assessable value of the soda ash for excise duty calculation.

Issues:

Whether the cost of gunny bags used for packing soda ash should be included in the assessable value of the soda ash for the purpose of levying excise duty under the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Held:

Dipak Misra, J., asserts that if there is an established arrangement between the assessee (seller) and the buyers for the return of packing material for reuse during the relevant period, the packing cost should not be included in the assessable value. The existence of a choice mentioned in documents indicating such an arrangement is crucial.

V. Gopala Gowda, J., emphasizes the necessity of determining whether the gunny bags used for packing soda ash were durable, returnable, and covered by an express arrangement between the appellant and its buyers. He argues that the absence of an express arrangement for the return of gunny bags, especially when their cost has already been included in the sale price of soda ash, would not justify their exclusion from the assessable value.

Due to the difference of opinion between the judges, the matter is referred to a larger bench for further consideration.

Decision: The decision of the Court is pending until the matter is reconsidered by a larger bench.