Facts:

The case pertains to the Main (Written) Examination of Civil Judge conducted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. Out of 1195 candidates, only 9 cleared the exam. Unsuccessful candidates challenged the entire selection process, alleging discriminatory and malafide practices, and sought the quashing of the result.

Issues:

Whether there were discriminatory or malafide practices in the selection process and evaluation method.

The appropriateness of disclosing Main Exam marks before viva-voce.

The validity of the plea for re-evaluation by an Independent Expert Committee.

Held:

Justice Sikri critically examined the selection process and evaluation method, concluding that the procedure was 'uniform.' The method of evaluation, with one evaluator examining and marking one question in all answer scripts, ensured uniformity. Adequate security measures were in place, and no discriminatory or malafide practices occurred.

Considering the strict marking but non-discriminatory nature, the court discusses the remedy of moderation. The court distinguishes the use of scaling and moderation, favoring the latter to remove the effect of examiner variability. It refers to Sanjay Singh's case, where scaling was considered inappropriate for Judicial Services Examinations.

Justice Sikri's report suggests alternatives for awarding grace marks. The court adopts Alternative II, awarding 20 marks in Civil Law–I and 10 marks in Civil Law–II. The court rejects the plea for 50 grace marks, emphasizing the need for reasonableness.

The court acknowledges the need for viva–voce and rejects the alternative plea for re-evaluation by an Independent Expert Committee. It cites the delay in filling vacant posts and the absence of provisions for re-evaluation in the Recruitment Rules.

Regarding the plea to disclose Main Exam marks before viva–voce, the court rejects the practice, stating it may invite bias or favoritism, affecting impartial evaluation during the viva–voce.

The court directs the respondents to award 20 grace marks in Civil Law–I and 10 grace marks in Civil Law–II to all candidates, prepare fresh results of the Main (Written) Examination of Civil Judge, and complete the selection process within a stipulated period.

Facts:

Appellants were appointed on an ad-hoc basis in the Ambedkar Nagar Judgeship.

Initial appointment for a period of three months extended from time to time.

Advertisement for direct recruitment in 2001 led to writ petitions and a subsequent selection process.

Selection process canceled, appellants continued in service on an ad-hoc basis.

Committee recommended regularization in 2012, and the District Judge regularized appellants' services.

Successor District Judge annulled regularization orders in 2014, leading to termination in 2017.

Issues:

Validity of the regularization of ad-hoc appointments.

Cancellation of regularization orders by the successor District Judge.

Violation of principles of natural justice.

Applicability of amended Rules in 2016 with a cut-off date of 31.12.2001.

Held:

The appellants are entitled to regularization under the exception carved out in the Umadevi case.

The cancellation of regularization orders without giving an opportunity of being heard violates principles of natural justice.

The amended Rules in 2016 with a cut-off date of 31.12.2001 should have been considered by the High Court.

The appellants are entitled to reinstatement with continuity in service, but not entitled to back wages.

Facts:

There were 72,825 vacancies for the post of Assistant teachers.

43,077 were appointed, and 15,058 were undergoing training.

In pursuance of interim orders, a total of 66,655 teachers were appointed.

Contempt Petitions filed in 2018 alleged non-compliance with State representations.

Issues:

Discrepancy in the State Government's calculation of 66,655 appointments.

Alleged violation of Supreme Court orders in not appointing Contempt Petitioners.

Incorrect representation by the State regarding qualified persons' appointments.

Held:

The exercise of selecting eligible candidates resulted in 12,091 individuals, subject to verification.

The list of these 12,091 candidates, including Contempt Petitioners, was published.

Out of 12,091 candidates, only 391 were appointed due to various reasons, as detailed in the Affidavit dated 01.10.2016.

The State published additional advertisements to consider any candidates left out.

The reasons for not appointing all 12,091 candidates were on record from October 2016 onwards.

No grievance was raised until the matter was disposed of in July 2017, granting permanency to those appointed.

The grievances were raised almost a year after filing the contempt petitions.

The court observed that the challenge was raised more than a year after the final Judgment.

The State Government clarified that no fresh appointments were made after 2016, and all appointments adhered to the court's orders.

Decision: The Contempt Petitions were directed to be closed, as the court found nothing wrong in the process undertaken by the State Government in compliance with various interim orders passed by the Supreme Court.

Facts:

The appellant purchased a fire and special perils policy, including coverage for spontaneous combustion.

The factory was closed, and upon reopening, the appellant reported damage due to spontaneous combustion.

The respondent-insurer repudiated the claim, citing non-occurrence of fire as stipulated in the policy.

The appellant filed a complaint with the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC).

Issues:

Whether the insurer waived the condition of delayed intimation by appointing a surveyor.

Whether the insurer, having not mentioned delay in intimation in the repudiation letter, can raise it as a defense.

Held:

The appointment of a surveyor does not automatically waive the conditions of the insurance policy, as per the decision in Sonnel Clocks.

The insurer cannot introduce new grounds, such as delayed intimation, at the consumer complaint stage if not mentioned in the repudiation letter.

The NCDRC erred in rejecting the claim based on delayed intimation.

The appeal is allowed, directing the respondent-insurer to pay the assessed amount with interest.

Facts:

The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, particularly the last seen together theory and an extra-judicial confession, to convict the appellants under various sections of the IPC, Arms Act, and Explosives Act. The trial court acquitted the accused, citing doubts in witness testimonies and inconsistencies in evidence. The High Court reversed the acquittal, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Reliability of the last seen together theory.

Credibility of the extra-judicial confession.

Adequacy of circumstantial evidence to establish guilt beyond doubt.

Time gap between last seen together and the alleged time of death.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, emphasizing the importance of a complete chain in circumstantial evidence cases. The court highlighted the unexplained contradictions in witness testimonies, the time gap between last seen together and the alleged time of death, and the questionable extra-judicial confession. The judgment reinforced the need for a conscientious approach in cases based on circumstantial evidence and reiterated the principle that extra-judicial confessions are weak pieces of evidence. The court held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt beyond doubt, leading to the acquittal of the appellants.

Facts:

The appellant was appointed on an ad-hoc basis as a Junior Engineer in 1987. The appointment was made after a selection process and without the concurrence of the U.P. Public Service Commission. The appellant possessed the required degree, and despite various representations seeking promotion, the promotion was denied. The issue revolved around the relaxation of the service condition and the appellant's entitlement to promotion.

Issues:

Validity of the appellant's appointment without the concurrence of the U.P. Public Service Commission.

Entitlement of the appellant to promotion based on the relaxation of the service condition and possession of the required degree.

Held:

The Court held that the appellant's appointment, while irregular, was not illegal. It emphasized the distinction between irregular and illegal appointments. The irregularity did not bar the appellant from being considered for promotion. The Court referred to the Constitution Bench judgment, stating that continuous officiation after appointment must be considered for determining seniority. The relaxation provided in the office memorandum dated 11.03.1994 was crucial, and the appellant was entitled to promotion immediately after its issuance. The Court declared the appellant's entitlement to promotion from the date his junior with the required degree was promoted.

Provides the final order allowing the appeal and quashing the previous orders.

Facts:

Appellants are defendants in the suit T.S. 10 of 2000.

Plaintiffs filed the suit for a declaration of title, recovery of possession, and mesne profits.

Trial Court dismissed the suit on 19.08.2002.

First Appellate Court allowed the appeal on 30.06.2006.

Defendants challenged the judgment before the Guwahati High Court in R.S.A No. 45 of 2006.

The appeal was listed for hearing on 21.01.2015, but the counsel for the appellants was absent.

Issues:

Whether the High Court is justified in dismissing the second appeal on merits in the absence of the learned counsel for the appellants?

Held:

Order 41 Rule 17(1) read with its explanation clarifies that the Court cannot dismiss the appeal on merits when the appellant remains absent on the date fixed for hearing.

The Explanation to sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 was added in 1976 to eliminate conflicting views among different High Courts regarding the court's power to dismiss an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant.

The High Court cannot go into the merits of the case when there is non-appearance of the appellant.

The Court set aside the impugned judgment, remitting the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

The opportunity for the appellant to convince the appellate court of sufficient cause for non-appearance is lost if the appeal is decided on merits without representation.

Facts:

The Respondent, a Grade II Police Constable, tendered her resignation on 1 June 2017, accepted on 12 June 2017.

The Respondent attempted to withdraw the resignation on 13 July 2017.

The Director General of Police rejected the withdrawal, relying on Rule 35A of the Special Rules of Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services.

High Court allowed a writ appeal, setting aside the dismissal of the writ petition, directing the State to reinstate the Respondent with continuity.

Issues:

Validity of the acceptance of resignation.

Interpretation of Rule 35A regarding the withdrawal of resignation after acceptance.

Applicability of the provisions of Section 50 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016.

Held:

Rule 35A clearly outlines that resignation can be withdrawn before acceptance. Once accepted, withdrawal is not permitted. The appointing authority can accept the resignation from a date before the expiry of the notice period.( Para 8)

The acceptance of the resignation on 12 June 2017 was valid. The withdrawal attempt on 13 July 2017, a month later, was legally inconsequential.( Para 9)

The High Court's conclusion allowing withdrawal within the notice period was contrary to Rule 35A.( Para 10)

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. No costs were awarded.( Para 11)

The Respondent was allowed to apply afresh for appointment in the future, subject to selection and in accordance with the law.( Para 12)

Facts:

The appellant sought reservation in the sports and game category for admission into the MBBS course. Despite submitting the necessary material, the appellant was denied due priority in admission. The appellant promptly approached the High Court.

Issues:

Whether a meritorious candidate, who diligently pursued their legal right without delay, could be denied admission due to the cut-off date of 30th September being passed.

Held:

Under exceptional circumstances, if the court finds no fault on the candidate's part and the fault lies with the authorities, the court can, in rare cases, direct admission in the same year by increasing seats. However, this should not exceed one or two seats and must occur within one month from the cut-off date. No admission should be ordered beyond 30th October. The court may cancel the admission of a candidate at the bottom of the merit list after giving an opportunity for a hearing. If no admission relief can be granted in the same year, the court can direct admission in the next academic year, possibly by increasing the number of seats.

Decision: The right to equal and fair treatment, a component of Article 14, is crucial. Denial of admission to a meritorious candidate, even without fault on their part, violates fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21. The court rejected the view that compensation is the only remedy and affirmed the possibility of admission relief in exceptional circumstances. The court emphasized the importance of prioritizing and expeditiously disposing of such cases.