Facts:

The Respondent, a Grade II Police Constable, tendered her resignation on 1 June 2017, accepted on 12 June 2017.

The Respondent attempted to withdraw the resignation on 13 July 2017.

The Director General of Police rejected the withdrawal, relying on Rule 35A of the Special Rules of Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services.

High Court allowed a writ appeal, setting aside the dismissal of the writ petition, directing the State to reinstate the Respondent with continuity.

Issues:

Validity of the acceptance of resignation.

Interpretation of Rule 35A regarding the withdrawal of resignation after acceptance.

Applicability of the provisions of Section 50 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016.

Held:

Rule 35A clearly outlines that resignation can be withdrawn before acceptance. Once accepted, withdrawal is not permitted. The appointing authority can accept the resignation from a date before the expiry of the notice period.( Para 8)

The acceptance of the resignation on 12 June 2017 was valid. The withdrawal attempt on 13 July 2017, a month later, was legally inconsequential.( Para 9)

The High Court's conclusion allowing withdrawal within the notice period was contrary to Rule 35A.( Para 10)

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. No costs were awarded.( Para 11)

The Respondent was allowed to apply afresh for appointment in the future, subject to selection and in accordance with the law.( Para 12)

Facts:

The case involves a matrimonial dispute where the husband, a U.S. citizen practicing as a Dentist, filed for custody of the children after the wife, also a U.S. citizen and a Dentist, refused to return to the U.S. with the children from India.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of Indian courts in guardianship matters, the habitual residence of the children, and the best interests of the children.

Held:

The Family Court held that the Indian Courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Guardianship Petition due to the parties being U.S. citizens, and the children residing in India in breach of immigration laws.( Paragraph 4.7)

The High Court, in Habeas Corpus proceedings, directed the wife to return to the U.S. with the children, emphasizing the children's right to be brought up by both parents in the U.S.( Paragraph 5.1)

The parties agreed to the following directions, including joint application for U.S. passports, the wife's return to the U.S., shared parenting, and financial support by the husband.( Paragraph 7)

Facts:

The case involved the calculation of Premium FSI charges for a construction project in Chennai. The initial planning permission was granted on 01.07.2009. The government introduced the "Premium FSI Scheme," and the developer submitted a revised plan seeking additional FSI under this scheme on 04.05.2011. The application was returned for defects on 10.02.2012, and after rectification, the government granted approval on 29.05.2012. The dispute arose regarding the calculation of Premium FSI charges based on the guideline value.

Issues:

Whether the Premium FSI charges should be calculated based on the guideline value as of the application date (04.05.2011) or the approval date (29.05.2012).

Held:

The court held that no right accrued to the builder until approval was granted. Regulation 36 mandated approval from the government for Premium FSI, and the crucial date for determining charges was the approval date. The court set aside the Division Bench's decision and allowed the appeal, stating that the charges should be based on the revised guideline value in force from 01.04.2012.

Conclusion: The judgment clarified the importance of the approval date in determining Premium FSI charges, emphasizing that no legal right accrues until the government sanctions the revised plan. The court upheld the authority's right to calculate charges based on the guideline value in force at the time of approval.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that six heavily armed individuals (A-1 to A-6) killed the victim in broad daylight. The incident occurred between 12 and 12:30 p.m. Eyewitnesses PW-1 and PW-2 were present at the scene, and a written complaint was prepared by PW-1 and scribed by PW-4, leading to the registration of an FIR.

Issues:

The trial court acquitted all accused, but during the appeal in the High Court, three accused (A-1, A-3, and A-6) passed away, and the appeal abated concerning them.

The High Court set aside the trial court's judgment, finding A-2, A-4, and A-5 guilty of offenses under various sections of the IPC.

Held:

The primary question was the reliability of eyewitness statements (PW-1 and PW-2). Both witnesses provided nearly identical accounts with no major contradictions. The complaint was immediately dictated by PW-1 to PW-4, who confirmed its authenticity. The medical evidence corroborated the prosecution's narrative.

Medical evidence supported the eyewitness accounts, with corresponding firearm entry wounds and a time of death aligning with the incident. The injuries mentioned by the doctor were consistent with the weapons carried by the accused. The medical evidence fully supported the eyewitnesses' version.

The court addressed minor variations and contradictions in the statements of PW-1 and PW-2. However, these did not significantly impact the core of their evidence. The strained relationship between the parties was acknowledged, but the immediate recording of the complaint minimized the possibility of false implication.

Facts:

The appeal revolves around the entitlement to disability pension for an Air Force Officer who retired in the natural course, with a disability of less than 20%.

Issues:

Whether disability pension is payable when an Air Force Officer superannuates with less than 20% disability.

The applicability of rounding off principles as per Circular dated 31.1.2001 and the Order dated 10.12.2014 in "Union of India and Ors. Versus Ram Avtar."

Held:

The Court examined Defence Service Regulations Pension Regulations for the Air Force, 1961, specifically Regulations 37(a) and (b). It clarified that disability pension is admissible only if the disability is assessed at 20% or above and is attributable or aggravated by Air Force service.

Referring to Circular dated 31.1.2001, the Court noted Para 8.2, which stipulates that no disability element shall be payable for disabilities less than 20%. Rounding off principles were found applicable only when the disability is more than 20% but less than 80%.

The Court set aside the Armed Forces Tribunal's order, emphasizing that the petitioner was not entitled to disability pension due to the disability being less than 20%. The principles of rounding off did not apply in this case.

The appeal is allowed.

FACTS:

Written and oral tests conducted for the post of Junior Lecturer in Mathematics.

Results published by the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (Appellant).

Last selected candidate (Mr. G.V. Ramakrishna Sagar) chose not to join the post.

Respondent No. 1 filed a claim for appointment after a delay of four years.

Original Application dismissed on grounds of delay by A.P. Administrative Tribunal.

Writ Petition filed by Respondent No. 1 before the High Court.

ISSUES:

Interpretation of Rule 6 (amended) and Rule 7 of Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission Rules.

Validity of the claim for appointment by Respondent No. 1 after the delay.

HELD:

The amended Rule 6 specifies that the list of candidates approved/selected shall be equal to the number of vacancies.

Fallout vacancies due to relinquishment and non-joining shall be notified in the next recruitment.

The waiting list provision for one year has been eliminated after the amendment.

Rule 7 emphasizes that selection must adhere to the existing Rules.

Respondent No. 1, being a non-selected candidate, cannot claim selection based on the unamended Rule 6.

The High Court was not justified in granting relief to Respondent No. 1, ignoring the amended Rule 6.

The appeal is allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011.

The appellant contested an order of the Rent Control Tribunal and appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The primary issue revolved around the legislative competence of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature in enacting Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act.

Whether Section 13(2) providing for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from orders passed by the Rent Control Tribunal is within the legislative powers of the State.

Held:

The State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. Therefore, Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act is declared ultra vires the Constitution of India, null and void, and of no effect. (Para 89) [1127-E]

The analysis of legislative powers under Article 246 highlighted that while the State Legislature can enact laws related to land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant, it cannot legislate to confer appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. Entry 64 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List expressly debar the State Legislature from legislating with respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Para 54) [1121-B-C]

The Supreme Court, established under Article 124, does not have a provision for direct appeal from an order of a Tribunal constituted under state law. Articles 262(2) and 348 further demonstrate that matters pertaining to the Supreme Court fall exclusively within the legislative domain of the Union Parliament. (Para 41) [1118-F-G]

Article 323B(3)(d) does not empower a State Legislature to expand the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by enacting a provision for further statutory appeal to the Supreme Court from an order of an Appellate Tribunal. (Para 55) [1121-D]

Section 13(2) providing for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court is not ancillary or incidental to the power of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature to enact a Rent Control Act. It overtly transgresses the limits of its legislative power. (Para 49) [1120-C]

While Article 136 of the Constitution grants discretionary power to the Supreme Court to interfere in appropriate cases, Section 13(2) mandates the Supreme Court to consider an appeal, which goes beyond the legislative competence of the State. (Para 57) [1121-E]

The second proviso to Article 200, which requires the Governor to reserve a bill for Presidential consideration if it derogates from the powers of the High Court, is not attracted in the case of Section 13(2) since it does not derogate from any power of the High Court. (Para 68) [1123-B-F]

The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate. The High Court's interference is restricted to cases of patent error of law, perversity, arbitrariness, lack of jurisdiction, and usurpation of powers. The writ jurisdiction cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum. (Para 86) [1126-G-H; 1127-A-C]

Facts:

The prosecution case revolves around the appellant receiving a phone call from the second respondent, her daughter's husband, reporting the alleged suicide of the victim-deceased. Upon reaching the scene, the appellant discovered the deceased's body, which had been bathed and buried by the second respondent and his relatives. Subsequently, injury marks were observed on the body. A chargesheet was filed against a friend of the second respondent, and during the trial, the appellant moved an application under Section 319 to summon the second respondent based on her substantive evidence.

Issues:

The summoning order for the second respondent. The trial court had allowed the application under Section 319, but the High Court set aside this order.

Held:

During the appellant's cross-examination, she provided details about the harassment her daughter faced from the second respondent. The trial court, after a careful evaluation of evidentiary material, summoned the second respondent, considering the incident's occurrence within the matrimonial home. The High Court's interference was deemed unjustified, as the evidence met the threshold required for summoning under Section 319.

The trial court's order was based on the principles outlined in the Constitution Bench's decision in Hardeep Singh, and reasons were provided, including the reliance on Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The High Court's dismissal of the order on the pretext of exploring the cause of death was criticized. Section 319 empowers the court to proceed against a person appearing guilty based on emerging evidence during the trial.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial court's order for summoning the second respondent was valid, while the High Court's interference was unsustainable.

Facts:

The appellant, a judicial officer of the rank of Additional District and Sessions Judge, challenged his compulsory retirement order dated 03.05.2016 under Rule 56(C) of the U. P. Fundamental Rules. The order was based on charges related to his acquittal of an accused in a criminal case and subsequent vigilance inquiries. The appellant's service records, including Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs), were scrutinized at various levels.

Issues:

Whether the order of compulsory retirement was justified based on the judicial officer's acquittal in a criminal case.

Whether the judicial officer's service records and punishment of censure warranted compulsory retirement.

Held:

The Court held that the vigilance inquiries and scrutiny of service records, including the punishment of censure, were conducted properly. The adverse remarks and the appellant's disposal of work were considered, and the Full Court's decision to recommend compulsory retirement was deemed justifiable.( Paragraphs 8 and 9)

The Court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review in cases of compulsory retirement, restricting interference to instances of arbitrariness, capriciousness, malafides, or overlooking relevant materials. It underscored that principles of natural justice have no application in such cases.( Paragraph 11)

The judgment stressed the high standards of integrity expected from judicial officers, highlighting their role as pillars of the justice system. It asserted the necessity for strict judgment standards in assessing judicial conduct.( Paragraph 13)

In conclusion, the Court found no grounds for interference with the order of compulsory retirement, thereby dismissing the appeal.( Paragraph 14)