Service Law - Armed Forces – Medical Fitness –Misdiagnosis HIV and Dismissal - Appeal against the dismissal of the appellant from the Indian Army due to a misdiagnosis of AIDS - Medical report wrongly diagnosed neuro tuberculosis as AIDS defining illness, leading to discharge under Rule 13 (3) of the Army Rules, 1954 - Incorrect application of medical guidelines and overlooking of CD4 cell count criteria - Appellant discharged at 27 after 8 years of service. [Paras 1-2, 7, 8]

Medical Diagnosis and Procedure – Wrongful Diagnosis of AIDS – Held – The Court found significant lapses in the medical diagnosis process, including a failure to properly assess the appellant's condition in line with the prevailing medical standards and guidelines. The Court criticized the lack of proper examination by a neurologist and the reliance on outdated guidelines, leading to a wrongful diagnosis of AIDS. [Para 7-8, 10-11]

Policy and Guidelines – Application and Interpretation – Analyzed – The Court scrutinized the application and interpretation of various guidelines and policies related to the medical discharge of armed forces personnel, particularly those who are HIV positive. The Court noted a shift in policy over time, focusing on the change in criteria from solely an HIV positive diagnosis to the inclusion of CD4 cell count. [Para 3, 7-9, 14-16]

Rights of HIV Positive Individuals – Discrimination and Stigma – Discussed – The Court addressed the issues of discrimination and stigma faced by individuals diagnosed as HIV positive, especially in the context of employment and social treatment. It emphasized the need for sensitivity and adherence to scientific standards in dealing with such cases. [Para 25, 28]

Compensation – Award for Wrongful Discharge – Granted – The Court awarded compensation to the appellant for wrongful termination of service, psychological trauma, and financial losses incurred due to the incorrect medical diagnosis and subsequent discharge. The Court also directed the grant of pension as if the appellant had continued his service until retirement. [Para 23-27]

Compensation and Pension - Award of Rs.50,00,000/- compensation for wrongful termination, unpaid leave encashment, and non-reimbursed medical expenses - Entitlement to pension as if continued in service and retired as Havaldar, without any promotions - Consideration of allowances/increments for pension computation. [Paras 23, 26]

Setting Aside of AFT Judgment - Supreme Court sets aside AFT's judgment, allowing the civil appeal - Acknowledges inability to fully compensate the appellant’s ordeal but hopes for financial compensation to act as a balm. [Paras 27-28]

Civil Appeal – Eligibility for LPG Distributorship – Interpretation of Advertisement Terms – interpretation of an advertisement for LPG distributorships and the eligibility criteria related to the location of the distributorship. [Para 2-7, 14-15]

Advertisement Interpretation – Location Specification for Distributorship – The Court examined the specifics of the location as mentioned in the advertisement for LPG distributorship and whether the appellant's offered land for the showroom fell within the advertised location as per the Unified Guidelines. [Para 16-26]

Principle of Advertisement and Public Representation – Held – An advertisement constitutes a representation to the public, and the issuing authority must adhere to its terms. The Court emphasized that the terms of an advertisement are binding and cannot be altered to the disadvantage of the applicants. [Para 24-25]

Decision – Reinstatement of Appellant’s Candidature – The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Division Bench, reinstating the order of the Single Judge, which had directed HPCL to proceed with the appellant's candidature for LPG distributorship. The Court held that the appellant’s offered land for the showroom, located within the Haripal block, complied with the advertised location as per the Unified Guidelines. [Para 28-30]

Civil Appeal – Interpretation of Contract Terms – Arbitration Clause – The Supreme Court deliberated on whether the arbitration clause from a primary contract was effectively incorporated into a subsequent Letter of Intent, thereby governing the dispute resolution mechanism for the parties involved. [Para 5-7, 16-17]

Contractual Reference to Arbitration Clause – Held – Determined that a mere general reference to another contract does not imply the incorporation of the arbitration clause from the referenced contract into the Letter of Intent. Specific reference to the arbitration clause is required for such incorporation. [Para 8-11, 22]

Jurisdiction of Disputes – Addressed – Concluded that the explicit stipulation in the Letter of Intent, which confines the jurisdiction of dispute resolution to the civil courts of Delhi, overrides the arbitration clause referenced in the primary contract. The Court held that the intent of the parties was clearly to resolve disputes exclusively through civil courts in Delhi. [Para 12-14, 20-21, 23]

Decision – Reversal of High Court Order – The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Delhi High Court, holding that the arbitration clause was not incorporated into the Letter of Intent and thus, the dispute resolution should proceed through civil courts as per the explicit terms of the Letter of Intent. [Para 24]

Property Law – Partition and Settlement – Joint Family Property –  a dispute concerning the ownership of properties arising from a joint Hindu family. The appellants contested the High Court's decision which allowed the respondent's claim on the Kamla Nagar property and dismissed the appellants' claim on the Malcha Marg property. [Para 1-4]

Kamla Nagar Property – Ownership and Settlement – The Court held that the Kamla Nagar property, initially joint family property, became the sole ownership of the appellants following an oral settlement in 1979. This settlement involved a payment of Rs. 55,000/- by the appellants for the share of ACK in the property, signifying the transfer of ownership to the appellants. [Para 5-12, 19-21]

Malcha Marg Property – Exclusivity of Ownership – Affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that the Malcha Marg property was exclusively owned by the respondents. There was insufficient evidence to prove that the property was purchased with joint family funds, thereby excluding it from being part of joint family property. [Para 13, 17-18]

Judgment – Restoration and Upholding of Lower Court's Decision – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment regarding the Kamla Nagar property, thereby restoring the Trial Court’s decision which recognized the appellants as the exclusive owners. However, the judgment related to the Malcha Marg property was upheld, maintaining the respondents' sole ownership. [Para 22]

Criminal Law – Freedom of Speech and Expression – Obscenity and Decency – In an appeal challenging the FIR registered for alleged obscene content in a web-series, the Supreme Court delved into the nuances of Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act. The Court examined whether the use of profane language in the web-series constituted obscenity or sexually explicit content warranting prosecution. [Para 3-47]

Background and Appeal – Obscenity in Web-Series ‘College Romance’ – Allegation against appellants for publishing obscene and sexually explicit content in a web-series episode titled ‘Happily Fd Up’. High Court dismissed their petition to quash the FIR under Sections 67, 67A of the IT Act – Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court judgment and quashed the FIR. [Para 2, 4, 34, 49]

Obscenity Test – Applied – In applying the test for obscenity, the Court considered the context and overall impact of the language used in the web-series, distinguishing between mere profanity and obscenity. The Court emphasized the need for a material to be lascivious, appeal to prurient interests, or tend to deprave and corrupt, for it to be obscene. [Para 35, 37]

Sexually Explicit Material – Definition and Interpretation – The Court interpreted the scope of ‘sexually explicit act or conduct’ under Section 67A of the IT Act, concluding that the content in question did not fall under this category. The judgment clarified the distinction between content that is explicitly sexual and that which merely contains vulgar language. [Para 44-47]

Decision – Quashing of FIR – The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered against the creators of the web-series, holding that the content did not meet the legal threshold for obscenity or sexually explicit material as per Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act. The judgment underscored the protection afforded to artistic expression under the right to freedom of speech and expression. [Para 48-50]

Criminal Law – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Assets Disproportionate to Known Sources of Income – The Supreme Court considered the appeals of Puneet Sabharwal and R.C. Sabharwal against the judgment of the Delhi High Court. Both appellants were charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for possessing assets disproportionate to their known sources of income. The bench analyzed the evidence, including the orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the framing of charges by the Special Judge, Delhi. [Paras 2-4, 6, 24]

Standard of Proof – Distinction between Criminal and Income Tax Proceedings – The court emphasized that findings in income tax proceedings are not conclusive for criminal cases. It noted that while income tax returns and orders can be admissible as evidence in criminal trials, their probative value must be independently assessed in relation to the criminal charge. This distinction stems from the different objectives and standards of proof in tax and criminal proceedings. [Paras 29-31, 33, 41-42]

Criminal Trial – Conduct and Standards – It was highlighted that the framing of charges in a criminal trial does not require the court to conclusively determine the guilt of the accused but to assess whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The judgment reaffirmed that criminal proceedings must be based on strong suspicion founded on material evidence, and all defenses and contentions should be reserved for the trial. [Paras 43-44]

Decision – Dismissal of Appeals – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of Puneet Sabharwal and R.C. Sabharwal. The bench found no merit in the arguments presented for discharging the appellants from the charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It directed an expedited conclusion of the trial, emphasizing that the observations made were solely in the context of the discharge proceedings. [Paras 46]

Criminal Law – Defamation – Freedom of Speech – Court examined the legality of FIR of offences under Sections 153A, 500, 501, 504, 34, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) against the appellant, the director of an e-newspaper, for allegedly publishing defamatory content. The bench evaluated the applicability of these provisions in the context of freedom of speech and the threshold for constituting offences of defamation and incitement. [Paras 2, 8-10, 22-24, 26-28]

Test of Cognizable Offence – evaluated – considered whether the contents of the news report published in the e-newspaper Parvatjan constituted a cognizable offence warranting investigation. The court scrutinized the allegations within the FIR and the legal requirements for the offences alleged. [Para 22-24, 26-31]

Freedom of Speech and Expression – upheld – affirmed the importance of freedom of speech, emphasizing that not every offensive statement qualifies as defamation or incitement to disharmony under the IPC. The Court delineated the boundaries between lawful expression and criminal conduct. [Para 14-17, 26, 28-30]

Decision – Quashing of FIR – The Supreme Court quashed FIR No. 31 of 2020, finding no substantial basis for the alleged offences. It held that the news article in question did not meet the criteria for offences under Sections 153A, 500, 501, 504, 34, and 120B of the IPC, thereby safeguarding the appellant's right to freedom of speech. [Para 33-34

Late Payment Surcharge Dispute – Request for payment of Rs.1376.35 crore as LPS by Adani Power Rajasthan Limited (APRL) from Rajasthan Discoms under PPA-2010 – Applicant relies on Article 8.3.5 of the PPA-2010 – Main appeal related to additional payment claims under PPA-2010 due to change in law was previously disposed of [Paras 2, 4].

Judicial History – The Supreme Court's 2020 judgment in the main appeal held APRL entitled to compensation due to change in law but capped interest for late payment surcharge at 9% per annum – Contempt proceedings in 2022 led to direction for payment of principal amount with capped interest, without addressing LPS specifically [Paras 3-7, 67].

Application Dismissed – The Court ruled that the Miscellaneous Application for LPS is not maintainable as the main judgment had conclusively dealt with issues around LPS – Emphasized on the improper use of Miscellaneous Applications to alter or modify concluded judgments – Costs imposed on the applicant for multiple hearings [Paras 8-23].

Electricity Act, 2003 - Payment of Late Payment Surcharge (LPS) - The Supreme Court deliberated on the claim of Adani Power Rajasthan Limited (APRL) for a Late Payment Surcharge (LPS) from the Rajasthan Discoms, as per the Power Purchase Agreement dated 28.01.2010. The main issue revolved around the non-payment of LPS by the Rajasthan Discoms, following a change in law clause under the agreement.

Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and Late Payment Surcharge – Discussion – The Court focused on the interpretation of Article 8.3.5 of the PPA and its application, considering the context of late payment for electricity supplied by APRL under changed conditions due to non-availability of domestic coal and subsequent reliance on imported coal. [Para 3, 4, 66, 67]

Judicial Review and Interpretation – Limited Scope – The Court reiterated its limited scope in reviewing and interpreting contractual obligations under a Power Purchase Agreement, emphasizing on the specific clauses and the context of their execution. The court also reviewed previous judgments and APTEL's findings on the matter. [Para 5, 6, 14, 20]

Decision – Dismissal of Application – The Court dismissed the application filed by APRL seeking LPS, noting that the issue had been addressed in the earlier judgment, and no grounds for review or reinterpretation were established. The Court further imposed costs on APRL for the miscellaneous application. [Para 23]

Decision – Imposition of Costs – The Court imposed a cost of Rs. 50,000 on the applicant (APRL) to be remitted to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee, citing the multiple listings of the application and the need to discourage such repetitive and non-meritorious litigation. [Para 23]

Civil Law – Adverse Possession – Inadequate Pleadings and Proof –Court, in this case, clarified the legal principles governing the claim of adverse possession. The Court emphasized that such a claim requires adequate pleadings and proof, including the establishment of continuous, peaceful, and open possession adverse to the true owner for over twelve years. [Para 9, 12-16]

Evidence – Adverse Possession – Necessity of Specific Pleadings and Clear Proof – It was held that for a successful claim of adverse possession, the claimant must specifically plead and prove certain essential elements. These include demonstrating the exact time from which possession commenced, that it was known to the true owner, and that it was open and uninterrupted. The Court found that the appellant failed to establish these crucial facts. [Para 13, 16]

Probate and Letters of Administration – Importance in Claiming Rights Based on Wills – The Court discussed the necessity of obtaining probate or letters of administration to claim rights based on wills, particularly in Chennai. The judgment underscored the legal requirement of these formalities to establish rights under a will. [Para 8, 16]

Dismissal of Appeals and Extended Time for Vacating Property – Court dismissed the appeals due to failure to establish adverse possession but granted the appellant until 31st March 2025 to vacate the property, conditional on filing undertakings on oath by the appellant and his adult family members [Paras 16-18].