Criminal Law - Rape – Consent under Misconception – No Deceit Proven – Conviction under Section 376 IPC Set Aside – Allegation that appellant concealed existing marriage and had sexual relations with complainant – Evidence showed complainant and her family were aware of appellant's first marriage – Held: Since no concealment occurred, consensual physical relationship cannot amount to rape under Section 376 IPC – Conviction under Section 376 IPC set aside [Paras 4–8, 11].

Bigamy and Fraudulent Marriage – Sections 493 and 494 IPC – Conviction Upheld – Sentence Modified – Appellant entered into second marriage during subsistence of first marriage – Conviction under Sections 493 and 494 upheld – However, considering appellant had already undergone three years of incarceration, sentence modified to period already undergone [Paras 9–10].

Appeal Partly Allowed – Sentence Reduced – Conviction under Rape Reversed – Supreme Court held that physical relationship without concealment of marital status does not constitute rape – Conviction under Section 376 IPC set aside – Convictions under Sections 493 and 494 IPC sustained with modified sentence [Paras 10–12].

Criminal Law – Obstruction of Public Servant – Quashing of FIR – SHO allegedly obstructed a process server from serving court summons/warrants – Process server was allegedly humiliated, detained, and punished within the police station – Administrative Civil Judge filed a complaint under Section 195 Cr.P.C. – Chief Metropolitan Magistrate erroneously directed police investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. instead of directly taking cognizance – Held: Magistrate ought to have issued process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. instead of directing investigation – Use of Section 156(3) for non-cognizable offence under Section 186 IPC, without proper complaint, was a serious error [Paras 12–14, 48].

Criminal Procedure – Section 195 Cr.P.C. – Bar on Cognizance – No cognizance of offence under Section 186 IPC can be taken without written complaint by concerned public servant or administrative superior – Registration of FIR or investigation by police not barred, but cognizance by court without such complaint is void ab initio – Even a police report cannot substitute as complaint under Section 195 Cr.P.C. for Section 186 IPC – Held: Trial and conviction without such complaint is without jurisdiction [Paras 15–17, 43–48, 60].

Interpretation of Section 186 IPC – Nature of ‘Obstruction’ – Obstruction under Section 186 IPC need not involve physical or violent force – Any voluntary act that impedes a public servant’s lawful duties qualifies – Held: Prima facie, allegations of detaining the process server and denying him permission to execute court process constitute obstruction under Section 186 IPC [Paras 19–31].

Procedural Law – Police Investigation vs. Cognizance – Section 195 Cr.P.C. does not restrict police from registering FIR or conducting investigation – Bar applies only when Magistrate intends to take cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. – However, after investigation, cognizance still requires proper complaint under Section 195 Cr.P.C. – Held: Police investigation not barred, but court cannot proceed without statutory complaint [Paras 51–58].

Severability of Offences – Whether Offence under Section 341 IPC can be split from Section 186 IPC – Court holds that where offences are committed in same transaction and are inseparable, bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C. applies to both – However, where distinct offences arise, severance is permissible – Held: Each case must be decided on facts; courts must ensure no evasion of Section 195 bar through verbal manipulation [Paras 34–42].

Judicial Directions – Judicial Errors in Procedure – Twelve-year delay in prosecution due to procedural missteps – Court criticises prolonged litigation and failure to uphold court dignity through correct legal route – Emphasises need for courts to act swiftly and properly when judicial dignity is at stake [Paras 17–18].

Decision: Petition disposed – Petitioner allowed to raise bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C. before trial court if chargesheet is filed – Registry directed to circulate judgment to all High Courts [Paras 60–61].

Service Law – Departmental Proceedings – Misconduct in Sanctioning Loans – Class IV employee working as messenger alleged to have acted as middleman in loan disbursements and accepted bribes from customers – Disciplinary proceedings conducted with full opportunity, and loanees deposed against him – Held: Charges proved based on preponderance of probabilities; findings of Inquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority based on evidence and cannot be interfered with lightly [Paras 4–5, 10–11, 14].

Judicial Review – Scope in Disciplinary Matters – Interference limited to cases of procedural irregularity, violation of natural justice, or manifest perversity – Respondent participated fully in inquiry, no violation of natural justice pleaded – Held: High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence and setting aside punishment on sympathetic grounds [Paras 6, 13–14].

Disciplinary Authority – Acceptance of Inquiry Report – Recording of Reasons – When Disciplinary Authority agrees with Inquiry Officer’s findings, no detailed reasoning required – Held: No illegality in imposition of penalty merely because reasoning is concise – Law reaffirmed from Boloram Bordoloi and SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava [Para 13].

Leniency and Proportionality – Punishment Modified by Appellate Authority – Appellate Authority already showed leniency by converting dismissal into removal with superannuation benefits – Held: Respondent’s plea for further relief unjustified, especially when misconduct stood proved and admission made in response to show cause [Paras 5, 11.2, 14.3].

Error in High Court Reasoning – Misreading of Records – Chargesheet vs. Show Cause – Single and Division Bench of High Court misread the nature of proceedings, treated preliminary show cause as chargesheet – Held: Conclusions drawn by High Court factually incorrect and legally unsustainable [Paras 12, 14.1].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders of Single and Division Bench of Patna High Court set aside – Order of Appellate Authority dated 07.12.2012 restoring punishment of ‘removal from service with superannuation benefits’ stands restored [Paras 15–16].

Criminal Law – Bail - Terror Offences under UAPA – Bail Considerations – FIR registered under various provisions of UAPA, Arms Act, and IPC against 17 accused – Accused no.11 (Saleem Khan) allegedly involved in meetings of AL-Hind, which is not a proscribed organization – Accused no.20 (Mohd. Zaid) allegedly connected to banned outfits and active on the dark web – Held: Bail to Saleem Khan upheld as association with non-banned group did not disclose prima facie offence – Rejection of bail to Mohd. Zaid upheld in view of material linking him to banned organizations [Paras 3–11].

Criminal Procedure – Bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. in UAPA Cases – High Court exercised discretion based on nature of allegations, status of trial, and material evidence – Held: High Court’s assessment in granting bail to one accused and denying to another based on factual matrix was justified – Supreme Court refused to interfere in exercise of discretion [Paras 7–12].

Fair Trial – Delay in Trial under UAPA – Five and a Half Years in Custody – Accused remained in custody for over 5½ years with no commencement of trial – More than 100 witnesses yet to be examined – Held: Right to fair and speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 – Trial Court directed to complete trial within two years – Liberty granted to cancel bail if delay is caused by accused [Paras 10, 13].

Decision: Both appeals dismissed – Bail to Saleem Khan (accused no.11) not interfered with – Bail refusal to Mohd. Zaid (accused no.20) upheld – Trial Court directed to conclude trial within two years with cooperation from prosecution and defence – Liberty to seek bail cancellation in case of delay tactics [Paras 13–14].

Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings – Dismissal of Bank Officer – Violation of Natural Justice – Dismissal Quashed – The appellant, a retired officer of Vijaya Bank (now merged with Bank of Baroda), challenged his dismissal on grounds of breach of natural justice, specifically for non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry report, failure to comply with Regulation 6(17) of the Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981, and non-disclosure of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) recommendation that influenced the punishment – The Supreme Court held that while non-supply of the preliminary inquiry report did not cause prejudice, the failure to question the appellant on adverse circumstances under Regulation 6(17) and the reliance on an undisclosed CVC recommendation amounted to serious procedural violations – The dismissal order and High Court’s judgment upholding it were quashed – However, due to passage of time and the appellant's age, only limited relief in the form of gratuity-equivalent lump-sum was granted without full terminal benefits or back wages [Paras 1–6, 18–31, 44–73].

Preliminary Inquiry Report – Not Relied Upon – No Violation of Natural Justice – Held that the preliminary inquiry report need not be supplied if it was not relied upon in the final inquiry report – The appellant was allowed full cross-examination and the report was not used against him – No prejudice was caused [Paras 18–30].

Mandatory Procedure – Regulation 6(17) of Vijaya Bank Regulations – Failure to Question Charged Officer – Inquiry Vitiated – The Court held that Regulation 6(17), which mandates that the Inquiry Officer shall generally question the charged officer on the adverse circumstances if he has not examined himself, was not complied with – Such questioning is a mandatory procedural safeguard and failure to comply invalidated the inquiry – No requirement to show prejudice where natural justice is violated [Paras 31–56].

Natural Justice – No Need to Prove Prejudice – Violation of Procedural Safeguards is Sufficient – The Court reiterated the settled principle that where a rule of fair hearing is violated, especially under Article 14, prejudice is presumed – The High Court erred in requiring the appellant to show specific prejudice from non-questioning and non-disclosure – Violation itself is sufficient [Paras 1–6, 44–45].

Disciplinary Authority – CVC Recommendation Not Supplied – Punishment Based on Undisclosed Material – The disciplinary authority altered the proposed penalty of compulsory retirement to dismissal solely on the basis of the CVC’s advice – The report was not furnished to the appellant – The Court held this to be a violation of procedural fairness and set aside the dismissal on this ground as well [Paras 59–64].

Claim of Privilege – CVC Recommendation Not Protected – Must Be Disclosed – The Court rejected the bank’s claim that the CVC recommendation was privileged – Held: The document was not related to affairs of the State or national security and its disclosure was necessary for a fair hearing – Reliance on such undisclosed material is impermissible [Paras 65–70].

Relief – Dismissal Set Aside – Limited Monetary Relief Ordered – The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order and quashed the High Court’s judgment – Considering the appellant’s age and time lapse, he was granted a lump sum equal to gratuity without interest – No full back wages or terminal benefits were allowed – Interest at 9% p.a. payable only if the amount is not disbursed within eight weeks [Paras 72–73].

Decision – Dismissal Quashed – High Court Judgment Set Aside – Appeal Allowed – The appeal was allowed and the High Court’s judgment confirming the dismissal was set aside – The Court directed limited monetary relief and left the question of continuation of disciplinary proceedings after superannuation open – No costs awarded [Paras 74–76].

Civil Law - Contempt Petition – Delay in Compliance with Supreme Court’s Order – Compensation in Lieu of Contempt – Petition filed for non-compliance of the Supreme Court’s order dated 17.01.2018 directing the Bank to release outstanding dues to the petitioner within three months – Although the Bank eventually made the payments in 2019, there was significant delay without valid justification – Supreme Court held that the delay did not constitute wilful or contumacious disobedience, but acknowledged the prolonged non-payment and denied claim for pension, granting a lump sum compensation of ₹3,00,000 to the legal heirs of the deceased petitioner – Contempt proceedings closed with liberty barred for future litigation upon compliance [Paras 1-21].

Contempt of Court – Delay in Compliance – Mens Rea Essential – No Wilful Disobedience Found – Despite clear direction from Supreme Court to disburse outstanding dues within three months (order dated 17.01.2018), the Bank delayed payment until 2019 – Supreme Court held that while delay is apparent, it was not deliberate or wilful – Administrative hurdles post-merger and legacy record issues cited as mitigating factors – Contempt not established [Paras 13-18].

Contempt Jurisdiction – New Claims Cannot Be Entertained – Pension Claim Rejected – Petitioner sought pensionary benefits during contempt proceedings – Supreme Court ruled that contempt is not a forum to raise new claims or seek substantive reliefs not granted earlier – Since no such relief was sought or adjudicated in the civil appeals, the claim for pension was rejected [Paras 10, 19].

Compensation – Delay in Retirement Dues – Lump Sum Relief Granted – Noting that the petitioner had retired in 2006 and dues were paid belatedly despite long-standing favourable orders, the Court directed payment of ₹3,00,000 to the widow of the deceased as compensatory relief to bring finality to the matter – Interest at 8% imposed for default in payment within eight weeks [Paras 20-21].

Decision: Held: Contempt not made out – Petition disposed with direction to pay ₹3,00,000 to widow of petitioner – Pension claim rejected – No further litigation to be entertained upon compliance [Paras 21-22].

Tenancy Law - Jurisdiction – Civil vs. Revenue Court – Declaration under Section 143 UPZALR Act – Appeal Allowed – The appellant-landlord filed a suit for possession and arrears of rent for land let out in 1970 for a petrol pump (non-agricultural use) – Respondents contended the land was agricultural and civil court lacked jurisdiction – Though declaration under Section 143 was finalized in 1986 (during appeal), First Appellate Court and High Court ignored this – Held: Civil Court had jurisdiction as land was always used for non-agricultural purpose and declared as such during litigation – Subsequent developments must be considered in appeal proceedings [Paras 1–5, 11–15].

Estoppel – Tenant’s Conduct – Use of Land for Commercial Purpose – Tenant Estopped from Denying Nature of Land – The respondent tenants had obtained various permissions and used the land exclusively for setting up a petrol pump – Held: Having utilized land for commercial purpose, tenants cannot later claim it to be agricultural to dispute jurisdiction or avoid eviction [Paras 2, 7–8, 15].

Declaration under Section 143 and its Registration – No Duty on Landowner – Procedural Irregularity not Fatal – Respondent’s argument that declaration was ineffective due to non-registration under Section 145 rejected – Held: It is the duty of the Assistant Collector to register the declaration free of cost – Landowner cannot be penalized for procedural lapse by public authority [Paras 9, 17].

Appeal as Continuation of Proceedings – Relevance of Subsequent Events – First Appellate Court and High Court Erred – The courts below failed to consider the final declaration under Section 143 during the appeal period – Held: Courts must consider changes affecting jurisdiction that occur during pendency to avoid multiplicity – Case remanded to First Appellate Court for decision on merits [Paras 15–18].

Final Decision – Appeal Allowed – Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside – Case remanded to First Appellate Court to decide appeal on merits within six months [Para 18].

Labour Law - Daily-Wage Workers – Perennial Nature of Work – Right to Regularisation – Appeal Allowed – The appellants served the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission as daily-wage workers for over three decades in Class III/IV roles such as peons and drivers – Despite continuous employment and ministerial needs, the State repeatedly denied sanction of posts citing financial constraints – Supreme Court held that the refusal was arbitrary, ignoring functional necessities and long service – Held: Workers performing permanent functions cannot be denied regular status under the cover of temporary labels – Orders of High Court set aside – Appellants directed to be regularized with full arrears and benefits [Paras 1, 6–10, 15–20].

Public Employment – Arbitrariness in State Action – Rejection of Sanction Proposals – Invalid – The State’s rejection of the Commission’s 1991 and 1999 proposals for creation of posts was unsupported by cogent reasons – Held: Generic financial excuses without examining institutional need, continuity of service, and admitted reliance on workers cannot stand judicial scrutiny – Administrative refusal must pass test of reasonableness under Article 14 – State’s rejection of proposals quashed [Paras 6–8, 15–17].

Applicability of Umadevi (2006) – Distinction Between Illegal and Irregular Appointments – Misapplied by High Court – High Court relied on Umadevi to deny regularization – Held: The case involved irregular engagement, not illegal appointment – Supreme Court clarified that Umadevi does not shield State from addressing perennial functions with permanent posts – Precedents in Jaggo v. Union of India and Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad reaffirmed to prevent prolonged ad-hocism – Regularisation justified [Paras 11, 19–20].

Vacancy and Comparator Analysis – Evidence of Available Vacancies and Selective Regularisation – Ignored by High Court – Appellants presented RTI replies and court filings showing vacant Class-IV posts and earlier regularisation of similarly situated workers – Held: Non-consideration of these materials by High Court amounted to jurisdictional error – Selective regularisation offends equality under Article 14 [Paras 10, 14, 19].

Structural Changes – No Bar to Relief – Commission Merger Irrelevant – During pendency, the Commission merged into U.P. Education Services Selection Commission and new outsourcing policy was adopted – Held: Successor body liable for past liabilities – Administrative reorganisation cannot defeat vested rights or ongoing proceedings – Relief cannot be denied on that ground [Para 12].

Relief and Directions – Supernumerary Posts – Regularisation with Arrears – Appellants directed to be regularised from 24.04.2002, the date of the High Court’s initial direction – Supernumerary posts to be created accordingly – Full arrears to be paid with interest – Directions issued for recalculation of pension, benefits to retired/deceased appellants, and sworn compliance affidavit by the State – Clear timelines imposed for execution [Para 19].

Final Decision – High Court Judgment Set Aside – Supreme Court allowed the appeal – Refusals by State declared unsustainable – Regularisation, arrears, and future entitlements granted – Matter concluded with binding operational directions to secure justice for workers exploited through long-term ad-hocism [Paras 15, 16, 19, 20].

Civil Law - Deemed Export Benefits – No Entitlement under FTP – Change in Law Not Attracted – The appellants, Nabha Power Limited and Talwandi Sabo Power Limited, sought compensation under Article 13 of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) on the ground that withdrawal of deemed export benefits under Para 8.3 of the Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) 2009–2014 constituted a “Change in Law” – The Supreme Court held that the appellants were never eligible for the said benefits as essential preconditions under the FTP were not satisfied – Notifications issued by DGFT were held to be clarificatory and not legislative in nature – Further, Press Release of 01.10.2009 was not binding and did not amount to a Change in Law – Appeals dismissed as devoid of merit [Paras 1, 40–44, 57–77].

Change in Law – FTP Notifications – Press Release dated 01.10.2009 – No Binding Effect – Appellants contended that the withdrawal of fiscal incentives post-bid through DGFT notifications and the 01.10.2009 Press Release amounted to a “Change in Law” under Article 13 of the PPA – Held: Only duly notified statutory instruments such as the Notifications dated 11.12.2009 and 14.12.2009 constitute law under the PPA – Press Releases and DGFT circulars are administrative in nature and not binding orders – No Change in Law occurred as claimed [Paras 40–44].

Deemed Export Benefits – Entitlement under Para 8.3 FTP – Eligibility Conditions Not Satisfied – Appellants claimed eligibility for deemed export benefits under Para 8.3 for power plant components procured under ICB – Held: FTP conditions require that benefits apply only to "goods" which are movable and manufactured in India – Assembled thermal power plant is immovable and not "goods" – Further, supply not proven to be under ICB at IPP or EPC stage – Appellants failed to meet five essential FTP preconditions for deemed export benefits [Paras 57–74].

FTP Circulars – Legal Character – DGFT Notifications of 2011 and 2012 Not Legislative – Appellants contended that clarificatory circulars amounted to Change in Law – Held: Notifications were interpretative and did not alter existing law – Even if treated as change in policy, appellants were ineligible for benefits on substantive grounds – Circulars did not create or remove legal entitlements [Paras 75–77].

Restitutionary Relief – Compensation under Article 13 of PPA – Relief Denied – Appellants sought compensation for increased project cost due to post-bid withdrawal of fiscal incentives – Held: Since appellants failed to establish occurrence of Change in Law or entitlement under FTP, no restitution or tariff adjustment is warranted under the PPA – No compensation payable [Paras 78–79].

Final Decision – Appeals Dismissed – Supreme Court upheld findings of the State Commission and APTEL – Deemed export benefits under Para 8.3 of FTP were unavailable – Withdrawal of incentives did not qualify as Change in Law – Appeals dismissed as devoid of merit – No costs awarded [Paras 80–82].