Insurance Law – Fraudulent Claim – Fire in Godown – Arson – Respondent raised a claim of Rs. 28.20 crores attributing fire in its godown on 25.03.2011 to a short circuit — Insurance coverage enhanced shortly before the incident from Rs. 15 crores to Rs. 19 crores and an additional policy for Rs. 17 crores obtained — Truth Labs forensic report established presence of kerosene, a known fire accelerant, at the seat of fire through GC-MS analysis, ruling out accidental cause — Forensic examination of electrical infrastructure found no evidence of short circuit or electrical malfunction — Held: Fire was the result of deliberate human intervention engineered for unlawful gain [Paras 4, 5, 13, 14, 18].

Fraudulent Claim – Fabricated Supplier Invoices – Surveyor's Report – Surveyor's report disclosed material discrepancies between VAT returns submitted by alleged suppliers and those filed with the Commercial Taxes Department — Alleged suppliers found to be non-existent or unrelated to claimed transactions — Invoices produced found to be fabricated — Accounts and records manipulated to inflate the claim — Respondent failed to rebut these findings with credible material — Held: Policy conditions violated — Repudiation warranted [Paras 6, 16, 17].

Fraud – Principle that Fraud Vitiates All Solemn Acts – No Partial Relief – Fraud vitiates all judicial and solemn acts — Once a claim is founded on fraud, the entire edifice of the claim collapses and no relief can be granted — There is no concept of partial or equitable relief in cases tainted by fraud — Quantification of loss cannot override the foundational requirement of a genuine and bona fide claim — Insurance contract cannot be used as an instrument of unjust enrichment — Held: NCDRC fell into error in awarding Rs. 3.33 crores merely because some loss was shown to have occurred [Paras 20, 21, 22, 23].

SIT – Directions for Criminal Investigation – Fraudulent insurance claims involving staged incidents have serious ramifications on the integrity of the insurance system and public confidence — Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, directed to constitute a Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police — SIT to conduct comprehensive investigation into the incident and persons involved — Investigation to be completed within three months — Report to be submitted before this Court in a sealed cover [Paras 25, 26, 27].

Decision: Civil Appeal No. 6100 of 2024 allowed — Impugned order of NCDRC set aside — Claim of respondent repudiated in toto — Appellant-Insurance Company absolved of all liability — Amount deposited before the Registry to be refunded with accrued interest within two weeks — SIT directed to be constituted by Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad — Matter listed on 21.07.2026 — Civil Appeal No. 10019 of 2024 dismissed.

Maternity Benefit – Adoptive Mothers – Age Limit of Three Months – Constitutional Validity – Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 restricts maternity benefit of twelve weeks only to women adopting a child below the age of three months – Petitioner, an adoptive mother, challenged the provision as violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution – Held: The age limit of three months has no rational nexus with the object of the statute; women adopting children above three months are similarly situated as those adopting children below three months insofar as their caregiving roles and responsibilities are concerned – Classification is under-inclusive and unconstitutional – Section 60(4) read down to extend maternity benefit to all adoptive mothers irrespective of the age of the adopted child [Paras 6, 63, 78-92, 166-168].

Constitutional Law – Article 14 – Permissible Classification – Under-Inclusiveness – The distinction created between women adopting a child below three months and those adopting a child aged three months or above fails to disclose any reasonable differentia – The differentiation has no rational nexus with the object of the legislation, which is to dignify motherhood and support the welfare of the child – The classification is under-inclusive as it excludes similarly situated adoptive mothers from the benefit – The need for emotional bonding, family integration, and caregiving does not diminish with the age of the adopted child – Held: Classification palpably arbitrary and violative of Article 14 [Paras 63-92, 166(a)].

Article 21 – Reproductive Autonomy – Adoption – Right to Dignified Motherhood – Reproductive autonomy is not confined to biological reproduction alone – Adoption represents a conscious and meaningful exercise of the right to create and nurture a family and falls within the broader spectrum of decisional autonomy under Article 21 – The impugned provision, by imposing an age limit, denudes adoptive mothers of the ability to meaningfully exercise their right to motherhood with dignity – Held: Restriction on maternity benefit based on age of adopted child violates the right to reproductive autonomy and dignified life under Article 21 [Paras 106-116, 166(c)].

Best Interest of the Child – Adoption – Principle of Paramount Consideration – The principle of best interests of the child, enshrined in the JJ Act, CARA Regulations, and international conventions, is a continuing obligation that persists throughout the integration of the child into the adoptive family – Denying maternity benefit based on age of adopted child adversely affects the welfare of the child by depriving them of adequate parental presence during the critical initial period of adjustment – Provision fails to account for the needs of children with disabilities and children adopted by single mothers [Paras 118-130, 166(b), 166(d)].

Workability of Statute – Adoption Process – Statutory Timeline – The adoption procedure under the JJ Act and CARA Regulations mandates a minimum timeline of approximately 61 to 133 days before a child can be declared legally free for adoption – By the time the adoption process is completed, the child would invariably exceed the three-month age limit contemplated under Section 60(4) – The provision is thus rendered largely illusory and incapable of practical implementation – Held: A beneficial legislation must be capable of meaningful realization; a provision that renders the benefit unattainable defeats the social purpose of the statute [Paras 131-145, 166(e)].

Maternity Benefit – Historical and International Framework – The right to maternity protection is a basic human right recognized under UDHR, ICESCR, ILO Conventions, CEDAW, and CRC – Motherhood encompasses biological, adoptive, and commissioning mothers equally – The purpose of maternity leave, namely physical recovery, emotional bonding, and family integration, is common to all mothers, though the first component is absent in adoption – Exclusion of adoptive mothers of children above three months disregards these dimensions of modern parenthood [Paras 20-55].

Paternity Leave – Social Security – Need for Recognition – The Court noted the absence of adequate paternity leave provisions in the social security framework – The presence of both parents during the early formative years of a child is indispensable for the child's emotional and psychological development – Paternity leave helps dismantle gendered roles, encourages shared parenting, and promotes gender equality – Court urged the Union to enact a provision recognizing paternity leave as a social security benefit with duration responsive to the needs of both parent and child [Paras 155-165, 169].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, read down to remove the age limit of three months – The provision shall now be read as entitling a woman who legally adopts a child (irrespective of the child's age) or a commissioning mother to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over to her – Union urged to bring forward paternity leave legislation.

Contract of Guarantee – Corporate Guarantee – Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Liability of Guarantor – Ship Repair Charges – Defendant No. 1, a granite exporter, executed a corporate guarantee dated 25.04.1998 undertaking to pay US $1,00,000 to the plaintiff-ship repair company out of freight payable to the vessel owner – Defendant No. 1 contended that the document was merely a freight-payment arrangement and not a guarantee – Held: A conjoint reading of the letter dated 22.04.1998 and the corporate guarantee dated 25.04.1998 clearly establishes an independent undertaking satisfying the requirements of Sections 126 to 128 of the Contract Act – Defendant No. 1 had expressly assured payment and its own witness acknowledged the document as a conditional guarantee letter – Defendant No. 1 liable to pay the suit amount [Paras 14–25].

Essentials of Contract of Guarantee – Section 126, Indian Contract Act, 1872 – A contract of guarantee is an undertaking to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a third person in case of his default – The surety's liability is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor and the creditor may proceed against either without exhausting remedies against the other – Past consideration and forbearance to sue the principal debtor constitute valid consideration for a guarantee – A guarantee is a separate and independently enforceable contract [Paras 15–21].

Estoppel by Conduct – Charter Party Conditions – Defendant No. 1 contended that the guarantee was subject to Charter Party conditions requiring freight to be paid to the vessel owner and that no amendment was made thereunder – Held: Defendant No. 1 itself had acted upon the arrangement by processing RBI approval and issuing remittance instructions to the Bank without insisting on amendment – Having acted upon the letter dated 25.04.1998, Defendant No. 1 is estopped by conduct from pleading that Clause 30 of the Charter Party was unamended [Para 26].

Dominus Litis – Non-Impleadment of Vessel Owner – Necessary and Proper Party – Order I Rule 10(2) CPC – Defendant No. 1 urged that the vessel owner ought to have been impleaded – Held: The plaintiff being dominus litis is entitled to choose the parties against whom relief is sought and cannot be compelled to implead a party against whom no relief is claimed unless such party is a necessary party without whose presence an effective decree cannot be passed – The failure of defendants to implead other potentially liable parties cannot defeat the plaintiff's claim [Paras 27–32].

Banking Law – Erroneous Remittance – Third-Party Procedure – Order VIII-A CPC – Bank's Liability – Canara Bank, despite receiving clear written instructions and Form A-2 from Defendant No. 1 to remit US $1,00,000 to the plaintiff, erroneously transferred the amount to the vessel owner – Bank could not rely on the Charter Party Agreement, to which it was not a party, to justify the erroneous remittance – Held: Once clear instructions were issued by its customer, the Bank was duty-bound either to comply or seek clarification and could not unilaterally remit funds contrary to the mandate – Bank liable to indemnify Defendant No. 1 under the third-party procedure – Third-party decree against the Bank affirmed [Paras 34–36].

Pleadings – Evidence Beyond Pleadings – RBI Approval Plea – The Bank's contention that remittance required prior RBI approval was not raised in the pleadings – Held: No amount of evidence can be looked into in the absence of proper pleadings – The plea does not merit acceptance; moreover, Defendant No. 1's own communication (Exhibit P13) showed that RBI processing was being undertaken – Bank ought to have withheld the amount and awaited further instructions rather than remitting to the vessel owner [Para 33].

Decision: Both appeals dismissed – No order as to costs – Concurrent findings of the Single Judge and Division Bench of the Madras High Court affirmed – Defendant No. 1 liable to the plaintiff; Defendant No. 2 Bank liable to indemnify Defendant No. 1 under the third-party decree.

Service Law – Recruitment – Law Officer – Multiple Choice Examination – Ambiguous Question – Ninth Schedule and Judicial Review – Both Candidates to be Accommodated – Question No. 73 in the recruitment test asked which Schedule of the Constitution is immune from judicial review on grounds of violation of fundamental rights – The recruiting body treated Option 'B' (Ninth Schedule) as the correct answer; the third respondent answered Option 'D' (None of the above) and was penalised 1.25 marks by way of negative marking – Single Judge upheld the recruiting body's answer key relying on Article 31B and the continued validity of Ninth Schedule immunity as affirmed in I.R. Coelho – Division Bench held Option 'D' to be legally correct on the ground that Ninth Schedule immunity is not absolute and is subject to the basic structure test – Held: When Judges of the High Court are themselves at variance on the correct answer, it cannot be expected of mere law graduates to arrive at a definitive answer by interpreting constitutional provisions across several decades of judicial pronouncements – Both answers may be treated as correct; both candidates deserve to be accommodated – Municipal Corporation directed to create a supernumerary post and appoint the third respondent; the appellant already in service to be treated as senior [Paras 10–11].

Decision: Appeal disposed of – Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh directed to accommodate both the appellant and the third respondent by creating a supernumerary post – Upon appointment of the third respondent, the appellant to be treated as senior.

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Premature Exercise of Inherent Powers – Section 482 CrPC – Forgery and Cheating – FIR alleged criminal conspiracy by respondents-accused to grab ancestral property and misappropriate bank deposits of the complainant's father by forging his signatures on nomination documents and sale deeds – High Court quashed the FIR holding that ingredients of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery were not made out and that the allegations were speculative – Held: High Court prematurely quashed the FIR when investigation was in full swing and the questioned documents had already been forwarded to the State Forensic Science Laboratory for handwriting examination – Impugned order set aside [Paras 14–18, 24].

Inherent Powers – Quashing of FIR – Handwriting Expert Report Pending – Section 482 CrPC – Where allegations of forgery are set out in the FIR and the Investigating Agency has forwarded disputed documents to a handwriting expert, an order quashing the FIR without awaiting the expert's report is wholly unjustified – Once the Court was apprised that analysis of the signatures on questioned documents was ongoing at SFSL, there was no justification to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC – Proof of forgery would evidently depend upon the outcome of the comparison to be conducted by the handwriting expert [Paras 16–17, 20].

Forensic Evidence – SFSL Report – Forged Signatures Established – SFSL reports dated 27th June, 2024 and 31st August, 2024 established that the signatures on nomination documents and bank closure documents were facsimile stamps and did not match the admitted specimen signatures of the complainant's father – Investigation further disclosed that respondent No. 1 undervalued the property using false circle-rate documents, paying Rs. 32,04,000 as stamp duty instead of the legally payable Rs. 67,91,241, causing a loss of Rs. 35,87,242 to the Government exchequer [Paras 11, 21].

Precedent – Applicability – Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI – High Court's reliance on the said judgment to quash the FIR was neither relevant nor applicable to the facts of the present case – Since the handwriting expert's report had not yet been received at the time of quashing, it was premature to record any finding on falsification of documents and forgery – Prosecution of the accused persons could not be stifled at the threshold [Paras 19, 22].

Prima Facie Case – Criminal Misappropriation – Allegations that respondents fraudulently posed as nominees of the complainant's father and usurped deposits from his and his deceased wife's bank accounts constitute, prima facie, the offences of fraud and criminal misappropriation – Material collected by the Investigating Officer was amply sufficient to proceed against the accused [Para 23].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgment and order dated 8th January, 2024 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Cr. MMO No. 50 of 2023 set aside – Investigating Officer directed to conclude investigation and file report under Section 173(2) CrPC / Section 193(3) BNSS before the Court concerned at the earliest – If report already filed, trial Court to proceed as per law – Observations restricted to disposal of present appeals and shall not bear upon rights and defences of parties at appropriate stage.

Criminal Law – Bail – Transfer of Trial – Professional Misconduct by Advocates – Violation of Fundamental Rights – Petitioners, toll plaza employees, arrested in connection with a scuffle, were denied legal representation due to violent boycott by local Bar members – Supreme Court held continued custody unjustified and violative of Article 21 – Directed immediate release on bail and transfer of trial to Delhi to ensure fair trial and legal representation – Condemned hooliganism by advocates and called for disciplinary action [Paras 14–17, 19].

Bail – Unjustified Denial – Article 21 – Petitioners remained in custody for over two months despite allegations arising out of a minor scuffle during discharge of official duties – FIR did not disclose grave circumstances warranting denial of bail – Held: Continued incarceration amounts to violation of personal liberty under Article 21 [Paras 15–16].

Access to Justice – Right to Legal Representation – Boycott by Bar – Resolution passed by local Bar preventing representation of accused and acts of violence against advocate who filed bail application created atmosphere of fear – Resulted in denial of effective legal remedy – Held: Such conduct strikes at the root of fair trial and administration of justice [Paras 8–10].

Transfer of Criminal Proceedings – Ensuring Fair Trial – Article 32 – In light of hostile environment and inability to secure legal representation, proceedings transferred from Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh to Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi – Held: Transfer necessary to uphold fairness and integrity of judicial process [Para 17].

Professional Ethics – Misconduct by Advocates – Court strongly deprecated acts of violence, arson, and intimidation by members of Bar – Observed that legal profession has been tarnished – Directed Bar Council of India to take appropriate action [Paras 14, 19].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Petitioners directed to be released on bail forthwith – Criminal proceedings transferred to Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi – Directions issued to ensure safety of petitioners – Bar Council of India to take appropriate action against erring advocates – Petition disposed of.

Criminal Law – Murder – Conviction under Sections 302 and 498A IPC – Dying Declaration – Eyewitness Testimony – Conviction Upheld – Appellant-husband convicted for pouring kerosene on his wife and setting her on fire, causing 80–90% burn injuries resulting in death after three days – Trial Court acquitted the appellant on the ground that the bathroom was too small for the incident, family witnesses were inconsistent, and the dying declaration was unreliable given the extent of injuries – High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant – Held: High Court justified in reversing the acquittal; appeal dismissed [Paras 1–25].

Dying Declaration – Reliability – Medical Certification – Fit State of Mind – Deceased recorded statement (Exhibit P-12) at 2:00–2:30 a.m. with medical endorsement certifying fitness to make a statement – Attending doctor (PW-11) examined the deceased and permitted police to record her statement after satisfying himself that she was conscious – Though OPD slip mentioned self-inflicted burns, PW-11 could not identify who recorded that entry – Contrary oral evidence of PW-7 and PW-16 suggesting unconsciousness held unreliable – Held: Burn injuries being superficial though extensive, the deceased was conscious most of the time and capable of making the dying declaration; absence of nurse at the time of recording does not invalidate it [Paras 13–19].

Eyewitness Testimony – Daughter as Eyewitness – PW-3, the sixteen-year-old daughter of the appellant and the deceased, deposed that she witnessed her father bring kerosene, pour it on her mother and set her on fire – Her testimony was consistent and unrebutted – No material on record to suggest why she would falsely depose against her own father – Held: Testimony of PW-3 clinchingly proves the commission of the offence by the appellant [Paras 10–11].

Circumstantial and Medical Evidence – Recovery of Kerosene Tin and Matchbox – Post-Mortem – PW-4 (post-mortem doctor) confirmed death due to septicaemia resulting from 85–90% superficial burn injuries – Recovery of kerosene tin, matchbox and burnt cloth from the scene of incident proved through Recovery Memo (Exhibit P-1) and neighbour PW-6 – Cumulative evidence of eyewitness PW-3, dying declaration, medical evidence of PW-4, PW-10 and PW-11, and physical recovery unequivocally establish the appellant's guilt – Held: Trial Court erred in acquitting on slight discrepancies; conviction by High Court confirmed [Paras 20–24].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Sections 302 and 498A IPC affirmed – Appellant directed to surrender forthwith to undergo the remaining part of the sentence.

Criminal Law – Section 319 CrPC – Summoning Additional Accused – Standard of Evidence – "Strong and Cogent" Standard – Complainant (PW-1) sought summoning of two additional persons, Rajendra and Mausam, as accused on the basis of alleged conspiracy – Trial Court rejected the application holding that evidence of PW-1, PW-6 and PW-7 was materially inconsistent and did not meet the standard for summoning under Section 319 CrPC – High Court affirmed the rejection – Held: The power under Section 319 CrPC is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly, but the standard is "strong and cogent evidence" and not proof beyond reasonable doubt – Trial Court misdirected itself by applying a higher-than-necessary standard, conducting a virtual mini trial, and fragmenting the evidence rather than assessing its cumulative weight – Appeals allowed [Paras 6–12].

Evidentiary Threshold – Three Stages of Judicial Scrutiny – Section 319 CrPC – Court explained three distinct levels of evidentiary threshold applicable at different stages of criminal proceedings – Prima facie standard at the charge-framing stage requires only reasonable ground to believe involvement – "Strong and cogent" standard at the Section 319 stage requires reliable and reasonably persuasive evidence without demanding proof beyond reasonable doubt – Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest standard applicable only at the conviction stage – Held: At the Section 319 stage, minor inconsistencies in witness accounts do not automatically negate the overall reliability of evidence; the court assesses only whether a reasonable inference of involvement exists [Paras 6–7].

Section 319 CrPC – Scope of Pre-Trial Scrutiny – Limits on Trial Court Discretion – Trial Court erred in relying on absence of jail records and minor discrepancies in hospital admission details and FIR as grounds to reject the Section 319 application – Such issues go to credibility at trial and cannot be examined threadbare at the pre-summoning stage – Trial Court further erred by treating each inconsistency in isolation rather than assessing the cumulative weight of all testimonies – Oral evidence alone, if credible, may suffice; insistence on documentary corroboration at this stage is unwarranted – Held: Court overstepped the intended scope of pre-trial scrutiny; testimony on oath by three witnesses including the complainant is sufficient to meet the strong and cogent evidence standard on the facts of this case [Paras 9–11].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of the Trial Court and High Court set aside – Rajendra and Mausam directed to be produced as additional accused and proceeded against in accordance with law – Copy of order directed to be sent to the Trial Court through the Registrar General, High Court of Allahabad.

NDPS Act – Section 50 – Personal Search – Third Option – Non-Compliance – Accused apprehended carrying bag containing 11 kg 50 grams of charas – Trial Court convicted and sentenced accused to 10 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1,00,000 – High Court acquitted accused holding that Investigating Officer offered accused a third option of being searched before a police officer, which is impermissible under Section 50 – Section 50 mandates only two options: search before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer – Offering a third option vitiated the entire trial – Held: High Court committed no error – Appeal dismissed [Paras 1-19].

NDPS Act – Section 50 – Mandatory Compliance – Strict Construction – Where both a bag and the person of the accused are searched, Section 50 is attracted – Failure to apprise accused of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate renders recovery suspect and conviction unsustainable – Concept of substantial compliance not acceptable – Compliance with Section 50(1) is mandatory and requires strict observance [Paras 16-18].

Prosecution Case – Credibility – Recovery by Chance – PW-8's testimony that only a traditional weighing scale was available at his shop directly contradicted prosecution's claim that an electronic weighing scale was used for weighing the contraband – This additional infirmity rendered the prosecution case doubtful and untrustworthy – Prosecution failed to establish recovery beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 15, 18].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Acquittal of respondent-accused upheld.