Arbitration Law – Estoppel by Conduct – Consent Decree from Arbitral Award – Interim Measures Sought – Held Maintainable – Parties jointly appointed arbitrator and secured a consent decree in terms of the arbitral award which was not challenged – Respondents later opposed execution by claiming award was nullity under Section 92 CPC – Held: Respondents are estopped from challenging validity of award after accepting its terms and benefiting from decree – Plea of non-arbitrability cannot be raised after approbation and reprobation of the award and decree [Paras 2-20].

Civil Procedure – Section 92 CPC – Maintainability of Suit – Decree Passed in Appeal on Basis of Arbitration Award – Finality of Consent Decree – Suit originally rejected under Section 92 CPC – During appeal, parties opted for arbitration and secured decree based on award – Decree unchallenged – Respondents’ subsequent plea that award was a nullity is contrary to their conduct and cannot be permitted – Consent decree has binding effect and respondents’ objection rejected [Paras 9-14, 19-20].

Doctrine of Election and Estoppel – Change of Stand Not Permissible – Respondents Precluded from Contesting Arbitral Award After Accepting It – Respondents originally maintained that suit was maintainable, later invoked arbitration, accepted award, and secured decree – Subsequent denial of award's validity is impermissible – Cited authorities affirm that party cannot approbate and reprobate to the detriment of the other – Equitable estoppel applied [Paras 14-18].

Execution – Consent Decree Execution Permissible – Revival Allowed – Commercial Court and High Court erred in denying relief based on challenge to validity of award – Appellants allowed to revive execution proceedings (Misc. Case No. 122 of 2023) as they were withdrawn only to seek interim relief under Arbitration Act – Supreme Court sets aside impugned orders and permits execution to proceed [Paras 20-21].

Decision: Order of Commercial Court dated 24.05.2024 and High Court judgment dated 30.08.2024 set aside – Appellants permitted to revive execution proceedings in Miscellaneous Case No. 122 of 2023 – Execution to proceed on merits – Civil appeal allowed – Parties to bear their own costs [Para 21].

Matrimonial Law - Divorce – Irretrievable Breakdown – Article 142 of Constitution – Divorce Granted – Appeal against High Court’s judgment which set aside divorce decree granted by Family Court on grounds of cruelty – Parties have lived separately since 2010 with no prospect of reconciliation – Supreme Court held that the marriage had broken down irretrievably – Noted that husband remarried in 2017 and couple had no subsisting matrimonial relationship – Held: Divorce decree granted under Article 142 of the Constitution – Permanent alimony of ₹1.25 crore awarded to wife and son [Paras 2-9].

Cruelty – Grounds for Divorce – Acts of Third Party – Not Attributable to Spouse – Family Court granted divorce based on rude utterances of wife’s father – High Court correctly held that such conduct could not be attributed to the wife – However, long separation and failed reconciliation attempts warranted exercise of constitutional power [Para 3.7].

Permanent Alimony – Lump Sum Payment – ₹1.25 Crore Awarded – Instalments Directed – Appellant had not provided financial support for years – Considering financial status and circumstances, permanent alimony of ₹1,25,00,000/- awarded – To be paid in five quarterly instalments – Any default would recall the order and forfeit amounts paid [Paras 8-11].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s judgment dated 24.08.2018 set aside – Marriage dissolved by Supreme Court in exercise of powers under Article 142 – Permanent alimony of ₹1.25 crore to be paid in five equal quarterly instalments beginning 15.09.2025 – Default would result in recall of this order and forfeiture of amount already paid [Paras 9-12].

Taxation Law - CGST – Section 6(2)(b) – Issuance of Summons – Scope of “Proceedings” – Petition Dismissed – The Supreme Court held that issuance of summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act is only an inquiry mechanism and cannot be equated with initiation of “proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b). Proceedings commence only upon issuance of a show cause notice. The Court further clarified that “subject matter” refers to the tax liability or contravention alleged in a show cause notice, not issues raised in summons. Dismissing the petition, the Court upheld the validity of summons and issued guidelines to prevent overlapping investigations by State and Central authorities [Paras 56-62, 74, 78-90, 96-100].

Meaning of “Proceedings” – Limited to Show Cause Notice and Adjudication – “Proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b) refer only to adjudicatory steps beginning with show cause notice, not searches, seizures, or summons – Evidence gathering does not constitute “proceedings” – This interpretation avoids undermining cross-empowerment under GST [Paras 55-67, 72-73].

Subject Matter – Interpretation – “Subject matter” in Section 6(2)(b) equates to the tax liability, deficiency, or contravention alleged in a show cause notice – It must be ascertained from charges and reliefs sought in the notice, not from summons – Overlap arises only when both authorities pursue identical liability or contravention [Paras 78-90].

Cross-Empowerment under GST – Enforcement Powers – Both Central and State authorities are empowered to conduct intelligence-based enforcement actions irrespective of administrative assignment – The authority initiating enforcement must carry the matter to its logical conclusion – Circular dated 05.10.2018 clarifies this principle – Parallel inquiries not barred unless they crystallize into identical show cause proceedings [Paras 34-50, 75-77].

Guidelines – Avoiding Duplication – Court issued directions: taxpayers must comply with summons and inform about existing proceedings; authorities must coordinate to avoid overlap; if overlap exists, one authority should proceed and the other must transfer materials; if dispute remains, the first initiating authority proceeds – Taxpayers may approach High Courts if duplication persists [Para 97].

Decision – Special Leave Petition Dismissed – Summons issued under Section 70 held valid – High Court’s view upheld – Petition dismissed with guidelines to ensure coordination between authorities and prevent multiplicity of proceedings [Paras 96-100].

Trademark Infringement – Composite Marks – Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act – Interim Injunction Refused – The appellants alleged that the respondent’s use of ‘LONDON PRIDE’ infringed their registered trademarks ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and ‘SEAGRAM’S’ – The Commercial Court and High Court denied interim injunction – Supreme Court held that deceptive similarity must be assessed holistically including visual, phonetic and structural aspects – Found no error in the denial of interim relief – Held: No ground for appellate interference.

Trademark Law – Infringement and Passing Off – Denial of Interim Injunction – Appeal against denial of interim injunction in suit for trademark infringement and passing off – Appellants alleged deceptive similarity between their registered trademarks ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and ‘SEAGRAM’S’ and respondent’s mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’ – Commercial Court and High Court dismissed application on ground that ‘PRIDE’ is a laudatory, commonly used term and no prima facie case was made out – Held: Marks must be compared holistically – Mere use of a common element like ‘PRIDE’ insufficient to establish deceptive similarity – No actionable confusion likely in the mind of an average consumer [Paras 20-24, 29.1, 30, 31.9, 32.4, 33.4, 34.6, 35.7, 44-45, 47, 49, 52-54, 56-57]

Trademark Law – Anti-Dissection Rule – Appellants sought to isolate the word ‘PRIDE’ from composite marks to allege infringement – Court reiterated that marks must be compared as a whole, not by dissecting generic components – Held: ‘PRIDE’ being a publici juris term, cannot independently ground a claim for exclusivity or infringement – No exclusivity over bottle shape or common colour schemes – Composite nature of marks must govern the infringement inquiry [Paras 25, 31.5, 32-32.4, 34, 34.2, 34.6, 51, 55]

Trademark Law – Dominant Feature Test – Word ‘PRIDE’ not dominant or distinctive enough to influence consumer perception – Dominant features in competing marks (‘BLENDERS’, ‘IMPERIAL’, and ‘LONDON’) are dissimilar and produce distinct commercial impressions – Held: No likelihood of confusion or false association arises from respondent’s mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’ – Shared use of ‘PRIDE’ insufficient to ground claim of infringement or passing off [Paras 33-33.4, 45, 50, 54]

Trademark Law – Passing Off and Infringement – Distinction – Court reiterated that infringement requires use of an identical or deceptively similar mark for same goods; passing off requires proof of goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage – Held: Appellants failed to show goodwill in isolated term ‘PRIDE’, and no misrepresentation shown in respondent’s packaging or trade dress – Composite marks not deceptively similar – Suit to be tried on merits independently [Paras 29, 29.1, 29.5, 35.5, 41-43, 46]

Trademark Law – Average Consumer Test – Courts emphasized evaluation from perspective of average consumer with imperfect recollection – Held: In case of premium whiskey products, consumers presumed to be discerning and attentive – Overall impression of marks not likely to cause confusion – Similarities in colour or font insufficient to mislead such consumers [Paras 24, 25.1, 31.3, 35-35.7, 49, 53]

Interim Injunction – Equitable Principles – Denial of Interim Relief – No prima facie case or likelihood of confusion made out – No irreparable harm shown – Balance of convenience not in favour of appellants – Appellants’ conduct and past admissions undermined their claim – Held: Injunctive relief rightly denied by Commercial Court and upheld by High Court – Appellants’ reliance on generic word ‘PRIDE’ rejected as contrary to settled principles [Paras 22, 36-36.4, 37, 39, 57-58]

Previous Litigation – Estoppel – Appellants earlier failed in similar claim against United Spirits for use of ‘ROYAL CHALLENGE AMERICAN PRIDE’ – High Court held they had no registration over word ‘PRIDE’ – Supreme Court declined to interfere – Held: Appellants estopped from reasserting similar claims – Doctrine of estoppel applies where appellants earlier disclaimed rights over ‘PRIDE’ [Paras 37, 37.1, 56]

Foreign Jurisprudence – Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine – UK Supreme Court decision in Iconix Luxembourg Holdings SARL v. Dream Pairs Europe Inc discussed – Post-sale confusion not applicable to products like whiskey not meant for public display – Held: Though concept evolving in foreign law, not relevant to present facts – Confusion must be established at point of sale in Indian context [Paras 40-40.6]

Conclusion: Appeal dismissed – No case for interim injunction made out – Commercial Court to proceed with trial on merits uninfluenced by observations in interlocutory stage – No order as to costs [Paras 58-59]

Taxation Law – GST – Provisional Attachment – Reissuance of Provisional Attachment Orders Post-Lapse – Validity – Respondent issued fresh provisional attachment orders on 13th November 2024 and 18th December 2024 claiming them to be a ‘renewal’ of earlier orders dated 17th and 26th October 2023 – Appellant challenged the orders before Gujarat High Court claiming lack of jurisdiction and expiry of earlier orders under Section 83(2) of CGST Act, 2017 – High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding no embargo in law against reissuance of fresh attachment orders – Held: The CGST Act does not permit issuance of a second provisional attachment order under Section 83(1) after lapse of the first by virtue of Section 83(2) – Renewal or reissuance would render sub-section (2) otiose and enable perpetual attachment, contrary to legislative intent – Absence of statutory or executive authority to permit such ‘renewals’ – Attachment orders set aside [Paras 1, 2, 3, 5, 14, 19, 20, 29-31, 41, 42]

Statutory Interpretation – Literal Rule – Section 83(2) of CGST Act – Provides that every provisional attachment ceases to have effect after one year – Plain and literal interpretation must prevail – No scope for reading into the statute a power to reissue or renew attachment orders – Interpretation advanced by Revenue would reduce the limitation period to a nullity – Held: Any act of renewal not specifically empowered under the statute amounts to overreach and misuse of draconian power [Paras 19, 20, 30, 31]

Executive Power – Limitations – Statutory Supremacy – Principle that statutory authorities cannot exercise powers not conferred by statute or executive instruction – Constitution Bench decisions affirm executive power can supplement but not supplant legislation – No executive instruction authorizing renewal of attachment orders found – Held: Exercise of power in absence of statutory or executive source is ultra vires [Paras 26-28, 29]

Comparative Statutory Framework – Excise and Customs Acts – These enactments explicitly provide for extension of provisional attachment beyond initial periods – CGST Act does not – Held: Legislative intent clearly different – Absence of extension clause implies no implied power to renew or reissue attachment – Executive cannot import mechanisms from other statutes [Paras 6, 32, 39]

Judicial Precedent – Approval of Kerala High Court’s View – Kerala HC in Ali K. held that reissuance of provisional attachment post-lapse is ultra vires – View accepted and affirmed – Contrasted with Gujarat HC’s divergent view in present case – Held: Permitting fresh attachment on same grounds after lapse would lead to abuse and denial of due process [Paras 10, 34]

Administrative Inaction – Delay in Releasing Attachment – Statutory lapse after one year not implemented by authorities unless direction given to banks – GST Council itself proposed amendment to Rule 159 to resolve misalignment – Held: Failure to effectuate statutory lapse undermines rule of law and forces unnecessary litigation – Legislature’s intent and protection must be honoured by authorities [Paras 35-38]

Relief – Appellant's bank accounts directed to be de-freezed – Appeal allowed – Fresh attachment orders dated 13th November 2024 and 18th December 2024 set aside – Respondent not precluded from taking action under law if investigation leads to assessment or final demand [Paras 41, 42, 43]

Anticipatory Bail – Cancellation by High Court – Section 376 IPC – Anticipatory Bail Restored - The appellant, a practicing advocate, was granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Court in an FIR alleging offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 452, 354 IPC – Later, Section 376 was added only through a statement under Section 164 CrPC – High Court cancelled the anticipatory bail, but Supreme Court found cancellation unwarranted – Held: Order of High Court set aside, anticipatory bail restored [Paras 3-4, 9-11, 16-17].

Delay and Addition of Serious Charge – Victim’s Statement under Section 164 CrPC – Section 376 Allegation Introduced Later - The FIR originally contained no allegation of rape – Allegation under Section 376 was introduced for the first time in the Magistrate’s statement nearly three weeks later – Held: In absence of initial mention in FIR, subsequent addition of serious charges requires careful scrutiny at anticipatory bail stage [Para 9].

Cross-FIR and Counter-Allegations – Mutual Allegations by Parties – Relevance for Bail - The appellant had lodged a counter FIR alleging criminal assault and attempt to murder against the complainant and her husband – The existence of cross-FIRs raised doubts regarding the bona fides of the complaint – Held: Sessions Court rightly considered all circumstances in granting anticipatory bail [Paras 6-8, 14].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Anticipatory Bail Restored – Compliance Directed - Supreme Court permitted the appellant to appear before the territorial Sessions Court and furnish bail bonds – Restored the original anticipatory bail granted by the Sessions Court and nullified High Court’s cancellation order [Paras 16-19].

Appeal challenging post-disposal directions issued by the Court permitting non-signatories to arbitration agreement to participate in arbitral proceedings, despite their exclusion by earlier judicial orders.

Criminal Bail Law - Bail Granted to Accused in Brutal Murder Case Set Aside – Serious Offences, Abscondence, and Witness Intimidation Ignored – Judicial Discretion Misapplied – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the complainant against the Delhi High Court's order granting regular bail to accused Sushil Kumar, a renowned wrestler, in a case involving abduction, assault, and murder – The Court found that the High Court failed to consider key factors such as the accused’s abscondence, seriousness of allegations under Sections 302, 307 IPC and Arms Act, and a recurring pattern of prosecution witnesses turning hostile during temporary bail – Held: The order granting bail was perverse and devoid of legal justification and thus liable to be set aside [Paras 1-3, 20-27].

Bail Jurisprudence – Distinction Between Grant and Cancellation – Misapplied Judicial Discretion – The Supreme Court clarified that the appeal concerned the correctness of the bail grant order, not a cancellation post-conduct – Bail granted to the accused was set aside as the High Court failed to consider crucial parameters like abscondence, seriousness of allegations, and the possibility of witness tampering [Paras 14-21].

Prima Facie Material – High Court Erred in Overlooking Evidentiary Details – Charge sheet revealed strong prima facie evidence including video footage, blood-stained weapons, firearms, and MLC/post-mortem confirming brutal assault – Despite these facts, the High Court did not consider the gravity and nature of the offence, rendering its bail order unsustainable [Paras 5-10, 20-23].

Witness Intimidation – Pattern of Hostile Witnesses Linked to Bail Periods – Accused allegedly influenced witnesses while on temporary bail – Out of 35 examined, 28 turned hostile – Although Court refrained from affirming motive, it noted the serious possibility of trial interference justifying denial of bail [Paras 24-25].

Public Influence – Olympian’s Societal Impact Considered – Court acknowledged the accused’s status as a celebrated wrestler and held that his societal influence could not be disregarded in assessing risks of witness coercion and trial delay [Para 24].

Legal Principles – Bail Order Must Reflect Relevant Considerations – A bail order must show application of mind, including factors such as gravity of offence, past conduct, and risk to trial integrity – A perverse or unreasoned order is open to appellate interference – High Court’s order was devoid of such assessment and was thus quashed [Paras 15-19].

Final Decision – Bail Set Aside – Supreme Court directed the accused to surrender within one week – Liberty granted to apply for bail afresh upon change in circumstances – Appeal allowed [Paras 26-27].

Company Law - IBC Appeal – Limitation and Filing Requirements – Section 61(2) IBC and Rule 22(2) NCLAT Rules – Appeal Barred – Respondent No. 1 e-filed appeal before NCLAT on 25.07.2023 without certified copy of impugned order or application for condonation of delay – Certified copy applied for only on 23.08.2023 and delay condonation sought on 22.09.2023 – Limitation commenced from date of pronouncement (23.06.2023) and not date of uploading (26.06.2023) – Held: Appeal defective and barred by limitation, NCLAT erred in ignoring mandatory procedural requirements; its judgment on merits set aside [Paras 5-13].