Execution of Decree – Abatement of Appeal – Decree Passed in Favour of Deceased Appellants – Nullity – Trial Court’s Decree Revived – Decree passed by First Appellate Court in favour of defendant Nos. 4 and 5 who had died prior to hearing and without substitution of legal heirs – Held: Decree a nullity as Order XXII Rule 6 CPC not attracted – Decree of Trial Court alone executable – Execution petition wrongly dismissed [Paras 5–14]

Civil Procedure – Abatement – Death of Appellants – Effect – Defendant Nos. 4 and 5 died before appeal hearing – No legal heirs brought on record – First appellate court’s judgment held to be void ab initio – Citing Rajendra Prasad v. Khirodhar Mahto and Amba Bai v. Gopal – High Court erred in treating appellate decree as operative – Restoration of execution proceedings ordered [Paras 8–13]

Execution Law – Null Decree – Executability – Principle – Where decree is a nullity, its invalidity can be raised even at execution stage – Citing Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan – Appellant entitled to enforce trial court decree dated 14.08.2006 – Rejection of execution by courts below unsustainable [Paras 14–16]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders of executing court and High Court set aside – Execution proceedings restored – Decree of trial court dated 14.08.2006 held valid and executable – No order as to costs [Para 16]

Criminal Procedure – Arrest – Communication of Grounds – Mode, Timing, and Language – Arrest without written communication of grounds violative of Articles 21 and 22(1) – Arrest and remand thereby rendered illegal – Minimum requirement: Written grounds of arrest to be furnished at least two hours before production for remand – Applies to all offences including under BNS 2023 [Paras 46–58].

Constitutional Law – Grounds of Arrest – Article 22(1) Violation – Arrest declared illegal if grounds not furnished in writing – mandatory communication of grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 47 BNSS 2023 (formerly Section 50 CrPC 1973) – Supreme Court holds that the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest is a fundamental right and must be meaningfully communicated in writing in the language understood by the arrestee – Oral communication deemed insufficient, except in limited exigent circumstances, where delay in furnishing written grounds must be justified and completed at least two hours before production for remand – Held: Arrest and remand without such compliance are illegal [Paras 2, 7, 33–36, 39–41, 46, 49–55].

Procedure for Arrest – Mode and Timing of Communication – Arrest in Exceptional Situations – Supreme Court clarifies that written grounds of arrest must be furnished to arrestee in all cases, including offences under BNS 2023 (formerly IPC 1860), UAPA, PMLA, or other statutes – Exception carved out for flagrant arrests during commission of crime or in exigent circumstances – In such cases, oral communication at the time of arrest permitted, but written grounds must be furnished within a reasonable time, and in no case later than two hours before production before magistrate for remand – Remand papers must include such grounds and note cause for any delay – Held: This framework balances fundamental rights and law enforcement needs [Paras 7, 41, 48–54].

Fundamental Rights – Article 21 and 22 – Personal Liberty and Legal Aid – Right to legal representation and to oppose remand must be made effective by timely communication of grounds of arrest – Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of early access to legal assistance and meaningful opportunity to contest arrest – Cites Suhas Chakma and Ashok v. State of U.P. for reinforcing right to legal aid at pre-remand stage – Communication in a language not understood by arrestee held to defeat the constitutional safeguard under Article 22(1) – Arrest without such safeguards is unconstitutional [Paras 17–20, 35–38, 42–45].

Interpretation of Precedents – Harmonizing Case Law – Court harmonizes earlier judgments – Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha, and Vihaan Kumar – Holds that while earlier decisions dealt with special statutes (UAPA, PMLA), the principle of furnishing grounds of arrest in writing applies universally, including to BNS 2023 – Clarifies that Article 22(1) is not offence-specific – Held: Earlier inconsistent High Court views not good law [Paras 9–13, 22–27, 56–58].

Police Powers and Duties – Arrest Procedure – Statutory Compliance under BNSS 2023 – Sections 47 and 48 BNSS mandate informing arrestee and their relatives about the arrest and grounds thereof – Court directs that these duties be recorded in station diary – Magistrates must satisfy themselves that these safeguards have been followed – Emphasizes purpose behind these provisions is to protect liberty, avoid arbitrariness, and reduce custodial abuse – Held: Violation of these procedural duties renders arrest and remand void [Paras 19–21, 47].

Impact of Arrest – Social and Psychological Consequences – Supreme Court acknowledges the deep psychological and societal stigma of arrest – Arrest causes irreversible reputational damage and mental health deterioration – Cites Arnesh Kumar and Joginder Kumar to reinforce that arrest is not to be made mechanically – Held: Arrest powers must be exercised cautiously, keeping in view the consequences and the requirement to inform the arrested person meaningfully [Paras 28–31].

Decision:

– Criminal Appeal No. 2195 of 2025 disposed of, as issue of law has been settled – Appeal not entertained on merits [Para 59]

– Ad interim bail granted in Criminal Appeals No. 2189 & 2190 of 2025 to continue – Liberty to prosecution to seek remand after supply of written grounds [Para 60]

– Ad interim bail in SLP (Crl.) No. 8704 of 2025 to continue – Matter to be listed before appropriate bench [Para 63]

– Registry directed to circulate this judgment to Registrar Generals of all High Courts and Chief Secretaries of States/UTs [Para 65]

Election Law – Disqualification – Non-disclosure of Conviction – Section 138 NI Act – Election Set Aside – Petitioner elected as Councillor but failed to disclose conviction and sentence of one year under Section 138 of the NI Act in affidavit under Rule 24-A – High Court and Trial Court held that non-disclosure breached Rule 24-A and attracted Section 22(1)(d)(i) & (iii) of MP Municipalities Act – Held: Disclosure mandatory irrespective of nature of offence – Omission affected the validity of nomination and the election was rightly declared void [Paras 1–5, 12–17, 19–24]

Election Affidavits – False Declaration – Rule 24-A of MP Nirvachan Rules – Right to Know – Petitioner furnished false affidavit omitting criminal conviction – Such omission held to interfere with the free exercise of electoral rights of voters under Article 19(1)(a) – Citing Association for Democratic Reforms and Krishnamoorthy – Held: False affidavit violates voter’s right to informed choice and mandates invalidation of the election [Paras 13–15, 20–24]

Subsequent Acquittal – Effect on Nomination Validity – Acquittal After Election – Petitioner claimed disqualification was cured as conviction was later set aside – Court held eligibility is to be assessed as on date of nomination – Subsequent developments irrelevant for compliance with Rule 24-A – Held: Subsequent acquittal does not invalidate prior disqualification or omission [Paras 5, 12, 19]

Article 136 – Discretion Not Invoked – Concurrent Findings – Supreme Court declined to interfere under Article 136 – Held: No exceptional circumstances or miscarriage of justice shown – Petitioner’s non-disclosure was deliberate and unexplained – She did not enter witness box – Bye-election held and she lost – No reason to invoke discretionary jurisdiction [Paras 25–26]

Decision: Special Leave Petition dismissed – Election rightly declared void due to improper acceptance of nomination and suppression of material facts – No interference warranted under Article 136 [Paras 25–26]

Partition Suit – Validity of Release Deeds – Family Settlement – Fresh Preliminary Decree Passed – Challenge to concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court upholding partition claim of plaintiffs – Appellants (LRs of Defendant No. 5) contended that plaintiffs’ brothers (Plaintiff No. 2 and Defendant No. 3) had relinquished their shares via registered release deeds – Also claimed partition had taken place under an unregistered “Palupatti” dated 11.02.1972 – Trial Court and High Court held the release deeds were not “acted upon” and the Palupatti inadmissible due to non-registration – Held: Both courts below erred in law and in appreciation of documentary and conduct-based evidence – Release deeds were valid and binding – Palupatti admissible for collateral purposes – Partitionable estate and shares revised accordingly [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].

Release Deeds – Legal Effect – Registered Release Deeds dated 09.11.1956 (Ex.D-15) and 14.09.1967 (Ex.D-16) – Plaintiff No. 2 and Defendant No. 3 respectively relinquished their shares – Supreme Court held: Deeds were duly registered, proved on record, and not rebutted – Execution admitted or not effectively challenged – Absence of cross-examination and conduct over decades corroborated their validity – Presumptions under Section 90 of Evidence Act/Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam apply – Estoppel created against releasors from claiming share in joint family estate – Deeds effective to exclude Plaintiff No. 2 and Defendant No. 3 from coparcenary from respective dates [Paras 7.1 to 7.9].

Unregistered Partition Deed – Collateral Purpose – Admissibility of Palupatti (Ex.D-17) – Held: Though unregistered, document can be used to prove severance of joint status and nature of subsequent possession – Cumulative conduct including separate cultivation, residence, revenue entries, independent dealings with land support disruption – Partition was real, effective, and acted upon – High Court and Trial Court erred in rejecting document purely on registration ground – Long-standing course of conduct consistent with separation [Paras 8.1 to 8.9].

Hindu Succession – Partitionable Estate – Scope and Computation – Coparcenary restricted to Plaintiff No. 1 and Defendant No. 5 as of 1969 (due to valid releases by Plaintiff No. 2 and Defendant No. 3) – Notional partition posited under unamended Section 6 of HSA – Schedule A and items 1–16 of Schedule C form the family pool – Schedule B and item 17 of Schedule C excluded as co-owned equally by Defendant No. 5 and Defendant No. 6 – Shares determined accordingly [Paras 9.1 to 9.3].

Fresh Preliminary Decree – Revised Shares – Supreme Court set aside High Court and Trial Court decisions – Substituted new preliminary decree – Declared Ex.D-15 and Ex.D-16 valid and binding – Held severance effective from 11.02.1972 – Revised shares: Plaintiff No. 1 = 8/21, Defendant No. 5 = 8/21, Each daughter’s branch = 1/21, Predeceased daughter’s share to Defendant No. 2 – Plaintiff No. 2 and Defendant No. 3 excluded – Schedule B and item 17 of Schedule C to be held equally by Defendant Nos. 5 and 6 – Final decree to be drawn accordingly [Paras 10, 11, 12].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgments of High Court and Trial Court set aside – Fresh preliminary decree passed declaring valid releases and severance – Shares recomputed – Final decree to be drawn by Trial Court in conformity with this judgment – No order as to costs – All IAs disposed of [Paras 10 to 14].

Vehicles – Inter-State permits – Overlap with notified intra-State routes – Chapter VI overrides Section 88 – Inter-State agreement not “law” – Private operators cannot be allowed on overlapping notified routes absent express statutory carve-out – High Court directions set aside – Writ petition dismissed – States directed to confer and consider modifications if MPSRTC winding-up is established [Paras 23, 41-45, 48-50].

Inter-State Agreement vs. Notified Routes – Nature of IS-RT Agreement – An inter-State reciprocal transport agreement under Section 88 is an agreement between States and not “law”; approved schemes and notified routes framed under Chapter VI prevail by virtue of Section 98 – Consequently, private operators cannot ply on any portion of a notified route, even if part of an inter-State route overlaps, unless the scheme permits it – Mysore SRTC (I) view not good law; Constitution Bench in Adarsh Travels followed [Paras 41-45].

Overlapping Routes – Absolute Prohibition – Consistent line of authority reiterated: if a scheme imposes total prohibition on private operators on a notified route, no permit can be granted or renewed for a route that traverses/overlaps—even for a short distance; intersection is distinct from overlap [Para 41].

Question of Law – Framed and Answered – Whether a private operator can be granted a permit under an IS-RT Agreement when a portion of the inter-State route is common to a notified intra-State route? – Answer: No, in view of Chapter VI’s overriding effect and binding precedents [Para 23; Paras 41-45].

Effect of MPSRTC Winding-up – Contractual Clause – IS-RT Agreement contemplated inclusion of Schedule B routes into Schedule A upon MPSRTC’s winding-up; however, absence of clinching proof of winding-up defeats private operators’ claims; relief is “well-nigh impossible” unless winding-up is clearly shown [Paras 43-44].

Court Directions – Gwalior Bench’s directions requiring MP to issue permanent permits and UP to countersign within set timelines set aside; connected orders also set aside; Writ Petition © No. 748 of 2024 dismissed [Paras 4-9, 50(i)-(iii)].

– Cooperative Federalism & Public Interest – Principal Secretaries (Transport) of MP and UP to meet within 3 months to explore working out the IS-RT Agreement, including (i) moving Schedule B routes to Schedule A upon proof of MPSRTC’s winding-up, (ii) considering partial exclusions/modification of approved schemes to avoid public inconvenience, and (iii) prompt permits/countersignature if consensus emerges [Paras 48-49, 50(iv)].

Decision: Appeals allowed; impugned High Court orders set aside; Writ Petition © No. 748 of 2024 dismissed; directions issued to MP and UP to confer as indicated; no order as to costs [Para 50].

Criminal Law – Investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC – Magistrate’s Power – Validity of referral for police investigation – JMFC referred private complaint alleging forgery of E-Stamp and Rent Agreement for police investigation – High Court quashed the referral on the ground of non-application of mind and irregular order – Held: JMFC’s referral was valid as prima facie material existed disclosing cognizable offences – The Magistrate had jurisdiction and exercised discretion judiciously – Use of the word “further” in JMFC’s order did not vitiate the referral – Irregularity, if any, was curable under Section 460 CrPC – Orders of the High Court quashing the investigation unsustainable [Paras 34–39, 43–47].

Forgery and Fraud – Use of fake E-Stamp Paper – Prima facie evidence of conspiracy and forgery – Rent Agreement produced before High Court in earlier civil proceedings found to be on a fake E-Stamp Paper whose serial number actually corresponded to an unrelated Sale Agreement – Held: Existence of prima facie material warranted police investigation – Suppression of material facts and misuse of forged documents before the High Court justified invocation of criminal process [Paras 35–38].

Judicial Review – High Court’s Power under Section 482 CrPC – Scope of interference – High Court erred in interfering at the nascent stage of investigation and substituting its view for that of the Magistrate – As held in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. V. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, criminal proceedings should not be stifled prematurely where prima facie allegations exist [Paras 20, 38–40].

Order under Section 156(3) CrPC – Application of Mind – Principles Reiterated – Reaffirmed that Magistrate may refer complaint to police for investigation before taking cognizance if allegations disclose cognizable offence (Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615; Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. V. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439) – The JMFC had complied with Priyanka Srivastava v. State of UP, (2015) 6 SCC 287 requirements [Paras 37–39].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned orders of the High Court quashing the investigation set aside – Criminal proceedings restored – Investigation to proceed in accordance with law.

Criminal Law – Anticipatory Bail – Limited Role – Parity – FIR for offences under BNS, POCSO Act, and Prohibition of Child Marriage Act – Allegation against appellant limited to driving the vehicle – Other co-accused granted bail – High Court rejected anticipatory bail – Held: Appellant had no overt act vis-à-vis victim – Anticipatory bail granted on grounds of parity and limited involvement – Bail to be granted on arrest subject to conditions

Bail – Interim Protection – Grant of Interim Protection by Supreme Court on 09.05.2025 – Appeal allowed – Final order confirms interim protection by directing release on bail in the event of arrest – Cash security of Rs. 25,000/- with two sureties imposed – Conditions imposed for cooperation and non-interference with evidence

Criminal Procedure – Section 482 BNSS – Anticipatory Relief – Appellant entitled to invoke Section 482 of BNSS for protection in absence of direct allegations – Observed that presence at the scene or peripheral assistance not sufficient to deny anticipatory relief where others with greater involvement are already on bail

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s order dated 23.04.2025 set aside – Anticipatory bail granted to appellant in the event of arrest – To be released on furnishing cash security of Rs. 25,000/- and two sureties – Directed not to misuse liberty or influence witnesses.

Arbitration – Enforcement of Award – Execution - Objections under Section 47 CPC – Dismissal – Appellant MMTC Limited objected to execution of arbitral award favouring Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Ltd., alleging fraud and collusion by its own officials during fixation of coal prices – High Court dismissed objections under Section 47 and application for stay under Order XXI Rule 29 CPC – Held: Mere allegation of fraud on MMTC’s internal decision-making without showing fraud on the arbitral tribunal or the award itself does not render award inexecutable – Award had attained finality, and objections raised did not demonstrate nullity or jurisdictional infirmity as required under Section 47 – Appeal dismissed [Paras 15, 25, 31, 94, 95, 100].

Execution Proceedings – Section 47 CPC – Scope – Narrow compass – Objection to enforcement can only lie on limited grounds such as jurisdictional infirmity or decree being a nullity – Held: Allegations of internal collusion and breach of fiduciary duty, even if true, do not constitute jurisdictional infirmity or render arbitral award a nullity – No fraud on tribunal alleged or proved – Electrosteel Steel Ltd. v. ISPAT Carrier Pvt. Ltd. followed [Paras 21, 23, 24, 25].

Contract – Long Term Coal Supply Agreement – Price fixation clause linked to SAIL/RINL pricing – 5th Delivery Period – Price fixed at US$ 300 PMT – MMTC later claimed fraud by its own officers for agreeing to that price – Held: There was consistent correspondence, board approvals, and prior performance under the LTA – No evidence that decisions were irrational or outside range of reasonableness – Price aligned with SAIL/RINL – Business Judgment Rule applied – Directors’ decisions within permissible commercial discretion [Paras 32, 39, 40, 94].

Company Law – Directors’ Duties – Breach of fiduciary duty – Allegations against MMTC officers for collusion – Held: For a finding of breach of fiduciary duty, conduct must fall outside the bounds of what a reasonably competent director would have done – No such evidence found – Retrospective scrutiny with benefit of hindsight is impermissible – Re Living Images Ltd., Sharp v. Blank, and Maple Leaf Foods v. Schneider Corp. followed [Paras 35, 38, 39, 95].

Criminal Law – FIR against MMTC officials and Anglo – Allegation of corruption and conspiracy – Held: Mere registration of FIR or pendency of criminal proceedings does not render an award inexecutable – Execution cannot be stayed on mere pendency of unproven criminal charges – No finding of fraud by any court or investigating agency till date – FIR is a one-sided version, not evidence of fraud vitiating the award [Paras 85, 90, 94(q)].

Res Judicata – Arbitration Award upheld by Supreme Court – Finality – Re-litigation through Section 47 objections barred – Attempt to revisit issues already adjudicated under Section 34 and 37 of Arbitration Act not permissible – Objections amount to abuse of process – Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi reiterated – Execution proceedings cannot become a retrial [Paras 31, 94, 97, 98].

Civil Procedure – Order XXI Rule 29 CPC – Stay of execution pending suit – Rejected – Held: Suit seeking to declare award void was itself rejected – Pending appeal against rejection of suit does not justify stay of execution – Objections must stand on independent merit – No exceptional circumstance shown to grant stay [Para 96].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Section 47 objections rightly rejected – Award held executable – No prima facie case of fraud or collusion made out – Appeal under Order XXI Rule 29 also untenable in absence of pending suit – Costs not awarded [Paras 95, 96, 100].

Arbitration – Delay in Pronouncement – Validity of Award – Public Policy Conflict – Arbitral award pronounced after nearly 3 years and 8 months of reservation without explanation – Arbitrator’s delay resulted in demonstrable indecisiveness, non-application of mind, and denial of effective adjudication – Supreme Court held that while delay alone is not a ground under Section 34, where it materially impacts the quality and fairness of adjudication, it renders the award in conflict with public policy and patently illegal [Paras 1, 19–20, 46–48, 55].

Arbitration – Unworkable Award – Perversity – Incomplete Adjudication – Arbitrator invalidated sale deeds executed by the appellant but declined to determine compensation or finalize reliefs, leaving parties to litigate afresh – Findings held to be contradictory and Award declared ineffective – Held: Arbitrator failed to perform his core function of final dispute resolution, thereby defeating the purpose of arbitration – Award liable to be set aside for being unworkable and perverse [Paras 39–42, 44, 47–48, 55].

Section 14 vs. Section 34 – Independent Remedies – Not Mutually Exclusive – Supreme Court clarified that aggrieved party need not seek termination under Section 14(2) before challenging delayed award under Section 34 – Remedies under Sections 14 and 34 operate independently – Mandate of arbitrator can be challenged post facto under Section 34 based on effects of delay [Paras 15–16, 19–20].

Contractual Interpretation – Clauses 6(a)–(c) of Joint Development Agreement (JDA) – Arbitrator’s interpretation of “fit for occupation” under Clause 6(a) stretched beyond contractual text – Requirements of certificate by architect and application for completion certificate were fulfilled – Arbitrator’s finding of non-compliance held perverse and contrary to terms of JDA [Paras 53–54].

Arbitrator’s Interim Orders – Irreversible Consequences – Equity Consideration under Article 142 – Arbitrator’s interim order in 2010 shifted possession and altered parties' positions – Supreme Court held that reverting to status quo was impossible after 15 years and third-party rights had been created – Invoking Article 142, Court validated previously illegal sale deeds executed by appellant, directed forfeiture of ₹6.82 crore security deposit, and awarded ₹3.18 crore additional compensation to respondents – Ordered final settlement of rights to prevent further litigation [Paras 60–62].

Exercise of Article 142 – Final Settlement to Prevent Injustice – Held: When arbitral award fails to resolve core dispute and perpetuates litigation after extensive delay and altered circumstances, Supreme Court justified in invoking Article 142 to do complete justice – Power exercised in conformity with Gayatri Balasamy and Shilpa Sailesh to bring litigation to an end [Paras 57–60].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Arbitral award set aside – Sale deeds declared valid despite initial illegality – Security deposit of ₹6.82 crores forfeited and additional ₹3.18 crores to be paid by appellant to respondents – On full payment, appellant entitled to possession of its 50% share – Parties to bear own costs [Paras 64].