Selection Process and Bias – Relationship of candidates with selection committee members – Appointment of appellants as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III set aside due to close familial relationships with committee members, indicating reasonable likelihood of bias – Found not in compliance with Sections 40 and 100 of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 [Paras 2, 36, 37].

Collector's Order and Appeal – Collector's order quashing selection was challenged before Commissioner and later in Writ Petition – Arguments centered on violation of principles of natural justice due to non-joinder of appellants in initial appeal before Collector – Revisional authority and High Court, after detailed examination, found no prejudice caused to appellants [Paras 5-11].

Principles of Natural Justice – Doctrine not applied rigidly – Focus on prejudice caused – Test of reasonable likelihood of bias – Court upheld findings of lower authorities and observed non-joinder at initial stage before Collector did not vitiate principles of natural justice in this case [Paras 13-15, 34, 35, 44-49].

Decision – Affirming lower courts' findings – Selections vitiated by bias – Non-joinder before Collector, while procedural, did not result in prejudice – Dismissal of appeals as no interference warranted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India [Paras 38-49].

Resolution for Recusal during Interview - Committee members with close relatives as candidates recused from the selection process - Chief Executive Officer assigned to allot their marks during interviews - [Paras 11-12]

Appointment of Appellants and Subsequent Challenges - Appellants' appointments as Shiksha Karmis-Grade III were contested by R-4 (Archana Mishra), who was not selected - R-4's appeal led to the setting aside of appellants' appointments by the Collector, followed by the Commissioner's dismissal of the revision - Appellants' plea of violation of natural justice in these proceedings - [Paras 13-21, 32-34]

Judicial Scrutiny of Violation of Natural Justice - High Court's dismissal of writ petitions - Division Bench upheld Single Judge's order - Issue of whether appellants received an adequate opportunity of hearing at appellate/revisional stages examined - [Paras 22-34, 47-51, 61]

Remand for Fresh Enquiry at Original Stage Not Feasible - Given the significant lapse of time (over 25 years) and continuous service by appellants, remanding the case deemed inappropriate - [Paras 75-76]

Decision - Appeals allowed, High Court's judgment set aside - Appellants to continue in service with all benefits - [Para 77]

Order:

In view of divergent views, the matter is to be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench. Interim order to remain in operation.

Caste Certificate Validation and Challenge – Scrutiny Committee validated appellant’s ‘Mochi – Scheduled Caste’ certificate based on documents from pre-independence era – High Court overturned this, citing forged documents and unauthorized intervention in the Presidential Order [Paras 1-3, 13, 17, 24].

High Court’s Scope in Writ of Certiorari – Assessment of whether High Court overstepped its bounds in re-assessing the Scrutiny Committee’s findings – High Court intervened on grounds of alleged document forgery and inappropriate scrutiny of the Presidential Order – Supreme Court found High Court’s intervention to be excessive [Paras 14, 17, 22-23].

Scrutiny Committee’s Procedure and Authority – Discussed procedural adherence by Scrutiny Committee in validating caste claims – Committee’s conclusions based on subjective satisfaction and due consideration of evidence were upheld [Paras 11-12, 20].

Presidential Order’s Ambit – Discussion on whether the Scrutiny Committee’s decision alters the Presidential Order – Supreme Court concluded that the validation of appellant’s caste claim as ‘Mochi’ does not amend or misinterpret the Presidential Order [Para 24].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court judgment set aside – Scrutiny Committee’s validation order restored – No order as to costs [Para 25].

Lease Property Dispute – Respondent’s lease to Appellants – Breach of lease terms – Suit for recovery of possession and arrears – Decree in favor of respondent [Paras 4-5]

Judicial Process and Appeals – Appellant’s appeal dismissed by District Judge – Further challenge in High Court under Article 227 – Writ petition dismissed for non-prosecution in 2006 – Execution petition by respondent in 2013 [Paras 6-10]

Condonation of Delay – Appellant’s application for restoration and condonation of 12-year delay – High Court’s refusal to condone delay – Appellant’s appeal in Supreme Court [Paras 11-13]

High Court’s Suggestion and Appellant’s Refusal – Offer to restore writ petition if appellants surrendered property possession – Appellant’s refusal led to dismissal of restoration application [Paras 21-22]

Supreme Court Assessment – No justification for condoning 12-year delay – Lack of diligence and bona fides from appellants – Principles of limitation and equity against appellants [Paras 23-27, 34-35]

Court Observations on Condonation of Delay – Emphasis on bona fides and diligence – No special treatment for government bodies – Reference to relevant case laws on limitation and delay condonation [Paras 28-33]

Decision – Appeal dismissed due to failure in proving diligence and bona fides in delay condonation – No error in High Court’s judgment under its supervisory jurisdiction – No order as to costs [Paras 34-37]

Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Cheque Bounce – Criminal Appeal against High Court and lower courts' conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Supreme Court quashes conviction, holding that civil court's decree on the same cheque being only a security renders the criminal proceedings unsustainable. [Paras 1-13]

Interaction Between Civil and Criminal Proceedings – Analysis – Held – Decisions of civil courts binding on criminal courts; Criminal courts not bound by civil decrees for sentencing and damages. Constitution Bench ruling in Iqbal Singh Marwah vs. Meenakshi Marwah clarified that conflict of findings between civil and criminal courts is permissible given differing standards of proof. However, in this case, the criminal court bound by civil court's declaration of cheque as security. [Paras 9-11]

Decision – Quashing of Criminal Conviction and Damages – Based on the civil court's decree declaring the disputed cheque as merely a security, Supreme Court finds criminal proceedings under Section 138 N.I. Act against appellant unsustainable. Orders quashing of conviction and return of damages imposed by lower courts. [Para 12]

Decree Execution and Limitation Issue – Appellants’ challenge to the High Court's decision affirming Munsiff Court's dismissal of execution application as time-barred - Pertaining to a property possession decree dated 10.12.1986, with finality attained on 09.11.2000 - Execution application filed on 18.12.2000, initially rejected by Tehsildar for jurisdictional reasons, later filed in Munsiff Court and dismissed as barred by limitation – High Court affirmed dismissal [Paras 2-5, 8, 10, 14].

Civil Procedure – Limitation – Execution of Decree – Application for Execution and Exclusion of Time – Civil Appeal allowed by Supreme Court – Overturning High Court and Munsiff Court decisions that had deemed execution application as time-barred – Case hinged on whether time spent pursuing execution before the Tehsildar is to be excluded for limitation computation – Held, time from 18.12.2000 to 29.01.2005 to be excluded as per Section 14 of the Limitation Act, thus rendering execution application within prescribed limitation period – Impugned orders set aside, execution application restored for fresh consideration. [Paras 24-40]

Exclusion of Time – Section 14 of the Limitation Act – Applicability and Interpretation – Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 14 – Focus on advancing justice by allowing exclusion of time where proceedings pursued in good faith in a court lacking jurisdiction – Key conditions of Section 14 discussed, including due diligence, good faith, and civil nature of proceedings – Application to the current case resulted in exclusion of time period where Plaintiff pursued remedy before Tehsildar under bona fide belief of its jurisdiction. [Paras 30-37]

Jurisdiction – Execution Proceedings – Wrongful Forum Selection – Assessment of Plaintiff’s approach to Tehsildar for execution of decree – Court finds no malafide intent or lack of due diligence – Wrong forum selection under genuine belief does not negate bona fides or due diligence for Section 14 applicability – Advances cause of justice by acknowledging honest mistakes in jurisdiction selection. [Paras 17-20, 37-38]

Decision – Supreme Court allows appeal – Sets aside High Court and Munsiff Court orders – Execution application restored for fresh consideration by Munsiff Court, Hiranagar, with exclusion of time spent before Tehsildar in limitation period calculation – Execution application held within the 3-year limitation of Article 182 of the J&K Limitation Act [Paras 38-41].

Land Reforms Act and Surplus Land Computation – Interpretation and Application – The Supreme Court affirms the High Court's interpretation of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. The judgment upheld the High Court's decision that the state cannot reopen the holdings of the purchasers/petitioners under the pretext of computing the holding of Syed Mohammed Ali Khan, thereby compelling the petitioners to surrender the land. The court asserts the impermissibility of reopening the computation of holdings of the purchasers/petitioners under the Act, which had attained finality in 1975. [Paras 6-7]

Sale and Possession of Land – Effect on Title and Ownership –Supreme Court recognizes that the entire subject land was sold to the private respondents in 1960-1961. Despite one of the three legal heirs not executing the sale deed, the court finds that the private respondents have been in uninterrupted physical possession of the land since the sale, substantially fulfilling the agreement's conditions. The court notes the lack of assertion of title by the non-executing heir post-enactment of the 1973 Act or during the required declaration in 1975, concluding that the subsequent attempt to reopen the issue was barred by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. [Para 9]

Judicial Finality and Non-Reviewability – Supreme Court underscores the principle of finality in legal proceedings, observing that neither the state nor Syed Mohammed Ali Khan challenged the computation of the holdings of the purchasers/petitioners when declared in 1975. It emphasizes the prohibition of collateral attack under the guise of computing holdings at a later stage, thereby reaffirming the finality of the High Court's judgment. [Para 7]

Conclusion – Dismissal of Appeals – The appeals are dismissed, upholding the High Court's judgment. The court finds no merit in the appeals, affirming that the private respondents' possession and the title of the land remain unaffected by the impugned judgment. It is stated that the judgment does not affect the land already declared surplus in the hands of the purchasers in compliance with the 1973 Act. [Para 11]

Quashing of Conviction and Sentences – Criminal Appeal against High Court's reversal of acquittal – Appellants convicted under Sections 302, 201 and 34 IPC for murder of Mahesh Sahu – Supreme Court finds High Court erred in reversing well-reasoned acquittal based on conjectures and surmises – Held, the trial judge's findings were on correct appreciation of evidence, and High Court’s interference was unwarranted – Convictions and sentences against appellants set aside, appellants acquitted. [Paras 1-23]

Principles of Circumstantial Evidence – Examination – Supreme Court reiterates the established principles for convicting based on circumstantial evidence – Emphasizes the necessity of establishing a conclusive chain of circumstances, leaving no reasonable ground for innocence – Finds prosecution failed to establish such a chain in the present case. [Paras 6-7, 12-13]

Appellate Interference in Acquittal – Scope and Limitations – Highlights limited scope for appellate interference in cases of acquittal – Interference justified only when trial court’s findings are perverse or impossible – In the present case, trial court's acquittal based on sound appreciation of evidence, High Court's reversal deemed unwarranted. [Paras 9, 20-21]

Decision – Restoration of Trial Court’s Acquittal – Supreme Court allows appeal, sets aside High Court's judgment, restores trial court's order of acquittal – Appellants acquitted of all charges, bail bonds discharged. [Para 23]

Definition of ‘Workman’ – Interpretation – Held –Court clarifies that mere absence of power to appoint, dismiss, or hold disciplinary inquiries does not alone determine whether a person is a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The decision in Ved Prakash Gupta relied on by the High Court is distinguished. The Court notes the need for a holistic assessment of the employee’s role, including nature of duties and managerial responsibilities. [Paras 18-25]

Scope of Judicial Review – High Court’s Power under Article 226/227 – Held –Court reiterates the limited scope of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, emphasizing that the High Court should not re-appreciate facts or act as an appellate authority unless there is a significant infirmity in the Tribunal’s order. [Para 26]

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(s) – Applicability –Court finds that the respondent, employed as a Senior Manager with substantial salary and perks, performing supervisory roles over managers, and lacking in power to appoint or dismiss employees, does not fall under the definition of ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. [Paras 19-23, 29]

Employment Resignation – Voluntariness – Assessment – In considering the voluntariness of the respondent’s resignation, the Court observes that dissatisfaction with appraisal ratings and a sense of not being properly appreciated, without direct evidence of coercion by the employer, does not equate to a forced resignation. [Paras 27-28]

Decision – Appeal Allowed –Court allows the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the Single Judge, and restoring the judgment of the Labour Court. It is held that the respondent is not a ‘workman’ under the ID Act, making the reference to the Labour Court against the appellant company not maintainable. [Para 29]

Employee Date of Birth Discrepancy – Respondent no.3, employed at Barsua Iron Ore Mines, declared different dates of birth during his employment – Initially declared 27.12.1948, later changed to 12.03.1955 – Discrepancy affected retirement date and subsequent claims. [Paras 4-7, 16-17]

Submission by Appellant – Appellant argued against the change in date of birth, contending that initial declaration (27.12.1948) made the employee eligible for employment – Any alteration, especially without proof, was considered as taking undue advantage and misleading. [Paras 11, 16]

Response by Respondent No.3 – Respondent no.3 claimed unawareness of initial date of birth recorded – Submitted a School Transfer Certificate as proof of correct date of birth (12.03.1955) – Argued for correction in records and eligibility for back wages. [Paras 12-15]

Court Analysis and Conclusion – Supreme Court found respondent no.3’s conduct dubious – Initial declaration considered deliberate for employment eligibility – Change in date after a decade, and without documentary proof initially, raised questions about authenticity – Court deemed the appellant’s decision to consider the first recorded date as final was justified. [Paras 16-17, 21-22]

Principles of Estoppel and Precedents – Court applied principles of estoppel – Respondent no.3 barred from contradicting initial declaration – Referred to previous judgments emphasizing consistency in date of birth declarations. [Paras 18-20]

Decision – Appeal allowed – Award by CGIT and High Court's judgment set aside – Respondent no.3’s retirement date to be considered as per initially declared date of birth (27.12.1948) – Direction for 50% back wages from retirement till notional superannuation in 2015 also set aside. [Para 22]