Motor Accident Claim – Compensation – Estimation of Income – Tribunal computed Rs.95,000/month as income of deceased based on EMI payments for two trucks owned – No income tax returns filed by claimants – Held: Tribunal and High Court erred in assuming income based on EMI alone – Such inference is speculative and unsupported by documentary evidence – Computation revised [Paras 2–3, 6–7].

Compensation – Income of Deceased – Ownership of Vehicles – Deceased was owner of two trucks and allegedly a reputed transporter – No independent evidence produced to establish actual income – Claim that deceased also drove other trucks for extra income was unsubstantiated – Mere ownership of trucks does not imply high personal income – Held: Trucks could have continued generating income after death – Dependency loss not absolute [Paras 6–7].

Motor Vehicle Claims – Just Compensation – Principle in Pranay Sethi applied – Compensation should not be windfall nor pittance – SC held Rs.50 lakhs (already deposited) sufficient for loss of dependency – Additional Rs.1.6 lakhs awarded for consortium, estate, and funeral expenses – Interest at 9% p.a. awarded from date of claim petition [Paras 8–9].

Filial Consortium – Entitlement of Children – Following Magma Insurance v. Nanu Ram, Court reiterated that not only wife but also children of deceased entitled to filial consortium – Additional compensation granted accordingly [Para 9].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Tribunal’s computation of income set aside – Total compensation fixed at Rs.50,00,000 plus Rs.1,60,000 towards conventional heads – Interest @9% p.a. from date of claim petition – Balance to be paid within one month.

Criminal Law – Dowry Death – Acquittal Reversed – Reinstatement of Conviction – Young bride burned to death within a year of marriage due to repeated dowry demands for TV, motorcycle, and ₹15,000 – Trial Court convicted husband (Ajmal) and mother-in-law (Jamila) under Sections 304-B, 498-A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – High Court acquitted both citing unreliability of prosecution witnesses and socio-economic improbability of the dowry demand – Supreme Court finds High Court reasoning erroneous and restores conviction – Held: Demand for dowry proved; presumption under Section 113B Evidence Act applies and remains unrebutted – Inconsistencies in witness testimonies immaterial where core allegations remain unshaken – High Court failed to assign valid reasons for reversing trial court findings [Paras 16, 17, 20–24].

Witness Testimony – Credibility – PW1 (father), PW2 (maternal uncle), and PW6 (mother) deposed consistent dowry demands and harassment – High Court erred in rejecting PW2’s evidence based on minor contradictions – PW2 did not claim to witness the act of setting deceased ablaze, only saw accused fleeing and informed PW1 – Contradiction between PW1 and PW2 regarding eyewitness claim not material – PW6’s statement that deceased lived ‘happily’ in matrimonial home held to be outlier and cannot override consistent evidence of harassment – Held: Minor contradictions do not justify wholesale rejection of testimony; core prosecution case remains intact [Paras 16.1–16.4, 18–22].

Circumstantial Evidence – Dowry Demand – Consistent evidence of dowry demand and threats by accused a day before death – Presumption of dowry death under Section 113B attracted – Deceased subjected to cruelty “soon before her death” – Trial Court correctly found guilt established – High Court erred in holding that demand could not have been made as accused were too poor to maintain the demanded items – Supreme Court rejects reasoning as fallacious and legally unsustainable – Dowry demand does not require financial capability to maintain articles [Paras 20, 23].

Dowry Prohibition Act – Scope of Dowry – Section 2 DPA covers demands before, at or after marriage – High Court wrongly disbelieved prosecution version due to alleged absence of dowry demand prior to marriage – Held: Section 2 does not restrict timing of demand – Demand made post-marriage also constitutes dowry – Items demanded (TV, motorcycle, cash) clearly fall within the definition [Paras 23].

Sentencing – Consideration of Age – While conviction of both accused restored, Court refrains from sending 94-year-old Jamila (mother-in-law) to prison considering age and frailty – Ajmal (husband) directed to surrender within four weeks to serve sentence of life imprisonment under Section 304-B IPC – Humanitarian considerations and dignity of the elderly convict weighed while refraining from incarceration [Para 24].

Directions – Dowry Prohibition – Systemic and Preventive Measures – Supreme Court issued comprehensive directions to strengthen enforcement of dowry-related laws – Directed State Governments to ensure strict implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – Mandated appointment and effective functioning of Dowry Prohibition Officers under Section 8-B of the Act – Emphasised sensitisation and regular training of police officers, prosecutors and judicial officers dealing with dowry death cases – Directed police authorities to promptly register FIRs and conduct time-bound investigations in cases under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC – Ordered High Courts to periodically monitor pendency and disposal of dowry death trials to avoid delays – Called for community-level awareness programmes to educate families about legal consequences of dowry demands – Directed circulation of judgment to Chief Secretaries and Directors General of Police of all States and Union Territories for compliance and follow-up action [Paras 25–27].

Decision – Appeals Allowed – Acquittal Set Aside – Appeals allowed – Judgment of High Court set aside – Conviction restored with modification on sentence – Matter concluded with binding directions to curb dowry-related offences [Paras 24–27].

Criminal Law – Circumstantial Evidence – POCSO/rape of minor – Last seen theory and recoveries disbelieved – FIR omissions and witness conduct found highly suspicious – Chain of circumstances not proved – Conviction set aside and accused acquitted [Paras 21-22, 31-33, 49-52, 68-77, 78-79].

Circumstantial Evidence – Governing principles – Five golden principles reiterated – Circumstances must be fully established by reliable evidence – Must be consistent only with hypothesis of guilt – Must exclude every possible hypothesis of innocence – Chain must be complete and incapable of explanation on any other theory – Suspicion however strong cannot take place of proof – Sharad Birdhichand Sharda principles reaffirmed and strictly applied [Paras 21-23].

FIR – Evidentiary value – FIR is not encyclopaedia but must disclose basic prosecution story – Non-mention of crucial facts admittedly within knowledge of informant held fatal – Omission of names of alleged last-seen witnesses and alleged act of accused “pushing out” the child found inexplicable – FIR lodged after medical examination yet silent on material developments – Such omissions treated as serious infirmities affecting prosecution credibility [Paras 29-35].

Last Seen Together – Doctrine – Weak type of circumstantial evidence – Requires proximity of time and place and corroboration – Alleged last-seen witnesses introduced belatedly – Names surfaced only on following day – Two witnesses turned hostile – Remaining witnesses contradicted each other and prosecution case – Unnatural conduct noted in not helping naked bleeding child or confronting accused – Evidence found unreliable and incapable of forming incriminating circumstance [Paras 37-52].

Witness Conduct – Natural behaviour test – Courts must examine human probabilities – Conduct of complainant, journalist witness and others found abnormal and suspicious – Failure to disclose crucial information at earliest point – Possibility of afterthought and tutoring could not be ruled out – Prosecution version rendered doubtful on cumulative assessment [Paras 44-45, 52].

Victim Testimony – Child witness – Identification – Victim unable to identify accused in court – Stated she was tutored by her mother – No corroborative evidence to link accused – Trial court erred in overlooking this significant circumstance – Benefit of doubt extended to accused [Para 67].

Investigation – Quality and fairness – Duty of Investigating Officer to act fairly and objectively – Serious lapses and casual approach noticed – Failure to promptly identify, examine and medically test alleged last-seen witnesses – No explanation for delay and omissions – Investigation found pedantic, negligent and biased – Such lapses struck at root of prosecution case [Paras 55-66].

Recoveries – Section 27 Evidence Act – Strict proof required – Alleged recoveries from accused’s house not proved beyond doubt – Contradictions regarding arrest date and recovery sequence – Panch evidence inconsistent – IO silent on crucial alleged recovery – Ownership and exclusive possession of premises not established – Chain of custody of seized articles not proved – Parents did not identify child’s clothes – Possibility of planting evidence could not be ruled out – FSL report rendered inconsequential [Paras 68-75].

Forensic Evidence – Evidentiary value – FSL report cannot be read in isolation – Must be supported by reliable seizure, custody and linkage evidence – In absence of proved recovery and chain of custody, forensic findings lose probative force – Courts below erred in relying mechanically on FSL results [Paras 71-75].

Appreciation of Evidence – Duty of courts – Courts dealing with heinous offences must remain cautious – Emotional response cannot replace legal scrutiny – Trial Court and High Court failed to critically analyse glaring inconsistencies and investigative lapses – Findings found perverse and unsustainable in law [Paras 66, 76-77].

Practice Directions – Criminal Trials – Need for structured judgments – Supreme Court issued comprehensive directions to streamline criminal trial records – Trial courts directed to append standardized tabulated charts containing (i) list of prosecution witnesses with role and examination dates, (ii) list of exhibits with description and proof, (iii) list of material objects with seizure and identification details – Objective to ensure clarity, transparency and ease of appellate scrutiny – Directions aimed at reducing miscarriage of justice due to poor record management – Registry directed to circulate judgment to all High Courts for implementation and compliance – Directions declared prospective and mandatory in nature [Paras 81-91].

Criminal Appeal – Result – Prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Benefit of doubt must go to accused – Conviction and sentence under IPC and POCSO Act set aside – Accused acquitted – Directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case [Paras 78-80].

Contract – Sale Agreement – Suppression of Encumbrance – Breach by Vendor – Respondent entered agreement to sell land for ₹4.45 crores but failed to disclose existing mortgage – Appellant paid ₹55 lakhs as advance – On discovering the mortgage, appellant withheld further payment – Held: Vendor's failure to disclose encumbrance constituted fraud and breach of contract – Appellant entitled to refund with interest [Paras 4–8, 12, 31].

Set-Off – Claim by Vendor for Alleged Loss – Respondent claimed to have sold property at lower price due to appellant’s breach and sought set-off – Trial Court rejected claim as barred by limitation and lacking merit – High Court reversed and remanded case to examine damages – Supreme Court held remand unwarranted – Plea of set-off was an afterthought and not legally sustainable [Paras 11, 16–18, 30].

Evidence – Admission in Cross-Examination – Weight and Reliability – High Court relied on one stray statement in appellant’s cross-examination claiming prior knowledge of mortgage – Supreme Court held such isolated admission unreliable and contradicted by evidence – High Court ignored material admissions by respondent accepting concealment and non-reply to legal notice [Paras 13–15, 23–24, 29].

Conduct of Parties – Vendor’s Admissions – Respondent admitted he accepted money after contract period and used none to repay bank – Also admitted receiving notice from appellant alleging concealment but gave no reply – Supreme Court held this conduct proved fraudulent intent and justified refund [Paras 23–24, 31].

Practice and Procedure – Remand – High Court remanded case to trial court to assess limited issue of damages – Supreme Court held remand unjustified as findings were perverse and contrary to record – Trial Court’s decree restoring refund claim reinstated [Paras 17–18, 32–33].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court judgment set aside – Trial Court’s decree restored – Appellant entitled to ₹65,43,750 with 13% interest per annum from date of suit till realization – No costs.

Multi-State Cooperative Society – Deemed Conversion – Section 103 – Applicability – Reorganization of Uttar Pradesh in 2000 led High Court to hold that cooperative sugar factories became multi-State cooperative societies – Supreme Court holds that Section 103 only applies where “objects” of society extend to more than one State – Mere fact that area of operation or members reside across States not sufficient – “Objects” must explicitly span more than one State – High Court erred in equating area of operation with objects – Impugned actions of State government were within legislative competence [Paras 12.10–12.20, 13.3–14].

Statutory Interpretation – Deeming Provisions – Scope of deeming fiction under Section 103 of Central Act clarified – Must be construed in light of scheme of the Act and not in isolation – Bye-laws must reveal that society’s objects extend to more than one State – Area of operation or sugarcane procurement from other States irrelevant unless part of objects [Paras 12.12–12.17].

Member’s Residence – Irrelevant for Multi-State Character – Held: Residence or domicile of members has no bearing on determining whether a society is a multi-State cooperative society – Legislative intent under Central Act focuses on objects and functional jurisdiction, not membership distribution [Paras 12.13, 13.8, 15(D)].

Judicial Review – Error by High Court – High Court misconstrued Section 103 by failing to examine society's objects as recorded in bye-laws – Judgment set aside as erroneous in law – Appeals allowed – Writ petitions dismissed [Paras 13.3–13.6, 16–17].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court judgment dated 26/09/2008 set aside – Writ petitions dismissed – Section 103 of the Central Act not attracted as the society’s objects remained confined to one State – State of U.P. retains legislative authority over the society.

Motor Accident Compensation – Death of Minor Child – Enhancement of Compensation – Notional Income – Multiplier – Appeal arose from claim filed by parents of a 14-year-old boy who died in a road accident caused by rash and negligent driving of a truck – Tribunal awarded meagre compensation of Rs.1,29,500/- – High Court enhanced compensation to Rs.4,70,000/- – Parents sought further enhancement before Supreme Court [Paras 2–4].

Notional Income – Minimum Wages – Applicability – Court held that monthly notional income of deceased minor can be determined on basis of Minimum Wages Act, 1948 – For a Class B city, minimum wages fixed at Rs.5,400/- per month – Contention regarding income of contemporaries rejected as speculative [Para 7].

Future Prospects – Minor Deceased – Addition of 40% – Court allowed addition of 40% towards future prospects even in case of deceased minor child – Consistent with settled principles governing motor accident compensation [Para 7].

Multiplier – Selection – Reshma Kumari Principle Applied – Multiplier of 15 held applicable relying on Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan – Judgment in Baby Sakshi Greola distinguished as applicable to permanent disability cases and not death of minor child [Paras 4–6, 7].

Personal Expenses – Deduction – One-half deduction towards personal and living expenses of deceased minor upheld as appropriate in claim by parents [Para 7].

Conventional Heads – Consortium – Estate – Funeral Expenses – Parents held entitled to loss of estate and funeral expenses at Rs.15,000/- each – Loss of filial consortium awarded at Rs.40,000/- each to both parents [Para 7].

Pain and Suffering – Minor Deceased – Award to Legal Heirs – Since deceased child survived for one day after accident, parents entitled to compensation for pain and suffering endured by child – Amount of Rs.25,000/- awarded under this head [Para 8].

Quantum of Compensation – Recalculation – Total compensation recalculated at Rs.8,65,400/- comprising loss of dependency, consortium, medical expenses, funeral expenses, loss of estate and pain and suffering – Earlier amounts awarded to be deducted [Paras 7–8].

Interest – Rate Enhanced – Compensation directed to be paid with interest at rate of 7.5% per annum within two months from date of judgment [Para 9].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Appeal allowed – Compensation enhanced and modified – Judgment of High Court modified accordingly – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 9–11].

Matrimonial Law – Divorce – Desertion – Reversal of Decree – Trial Court granted divorce on ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(i-b) – High Court reversed, holding no intention of permanent abandonment by wife – Supreme Court disagrees and holds that long separation with no reconciliation, coupled with refusal to accommodate each other's views, amounts to cruelty and breakdown of marriage beyond repair [Paras 1, 8–9, 23–24].

Constitutional Law – Article 142 – Irretrievable Breakdown – Supreme Court exercised power under Article 142(1) to grant divorce citing 24 years of separation, failed mediation, and incompatibility – Held: Continuation of legal bond serves no purpose – No child from marriage, no sanctity left – Reconciliation not possible [Paras 20–22, 28–35].

Cruelty – Mutual Incompatibility – Spouses had irreconcilable differences regarding roles and career, especially wife's employment responsibilities – Each accused the other of coercion or neglect – Held: Strongly held opposing views without accommodation constitutes cruelty to one another [Paras 24–26].

Marriage – Long-standing Separation – Where parties have lived separately for over two decades, marriage is a legal fiction and source of mental cruelty – Precedents in Naveen Kohli, Samar Ghosh, Rakesh Raman applied – Law must reflect ground reality and sever ties that have become burdensome [Paras 23, 25–27].

Complete Justice – Fault Theory Not a Bar – Constitution Bench ruling in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan applied – Supreme Court not fettered by blame theory in granting divorce under Article 142 – Public interest supports dissolution of dead marriages [Paras 29–32].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Marriage dissolved under Article 142 due to irretrievable breakdown – High Court judgment set aside – Divorce decree by Trial Court restored.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 47, Order XXI Rules 89, 90, 92, 99-104 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Articles 127, 128 – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Bar to Separate Suit – Remedies in Execution – Pendente Lite Transferees – Maintainability of Suit – Substantial Justice – Supreme Court allowed an appeal, holding that a suit by pendente lite transferees challenging an auction sale was barred by Section 47 CPC and the doctrine of lis pendens, as they were representatives of the judgment-debtor and had alternative remedies under Order XXI CPC, which they failed to avail; however, in the interest of substantial justice, directed monetary compensation to the transferees.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Applicability to Mortgage Suits – Appeal Allowed – The doctrine of lis pendens applies to suits where any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in issue – The plaint in the original suit by the bank sought recovery of money and sale of the mortgaged property in default – This directly put the mortgaged property in question – The transferees pendente lite (respondent nos. 1 and 2) purchased the property during the pendency of this suit – Their lack of knowledge or bona fide purchaser status is immaterial as lis pendens is a public policy principle – The transfer of the suit property to respondent nos. 1 and 2 is hit by Section 52 of the 1882 Act – The pendency of a suit continues until the final decree is satisfied or discharged – The Trial Court erred in holding that the property was purchased before the original decree, as one tranche of sale occurred after the decree and another after the execution petition – The High Court's finding that the suit was maintainable, despite the transferees being representatives of the judgment-debtor, was erroneous – The transaction is covered by Section 52 – [Paras 46-70, 167-168, 256(i), 258, 262].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order 21 Rule 89 – Application to Set Aside Sale on Deposit – Pendente Lite Transferees – Not Availed – Rule 89 allows any person claiming an interest in the property sold to apply to set aside the sale by depositing the purchase money and a 5% compensation to the auction purchaser – This remedy is available to pendente lite transferees of the judgment-debtor – However, the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were put to knowledge of the auction sale after the confirmation of sale, and the 60-day limitation period under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963, had lapsed – Thus, they could not have maintained an application under Rule 89 – [Paras 71, 75-87, 256(ii)].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 90 – Application to Set Aside Sale on Ground of Irregularity or Fraud – Scope and Limitations – Not Availed – Rule 90 allows setting aside a sale due to material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it, provided substantial injury is proved and the ground could not have been raised before the proclamation of sale – Allegations of in-camera auction, undervaluation, and non-disclosure of prior transfer by judgment-debtor's relatives (appellants) are irregularities – However, the primary grievance of respondent nos. 1 and 2 was the attachment and sale of property to which the judgment-debtor allegedly had no saleable interest, not merely the manner of sale – Questions of saleable interest fall under Rule 58, not Rule 90 – No specific pleading of substantial injury directly linked to publishing/conducting irregularities was made – The 60-day limitation period under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for Rule 90 application had also lapsed – Therefore, respondent nos. 1 and 2 could not have maintained an application under Rule 90 – [Paras 72, 88-117, 256(iii), 256(iv), 256(v)].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 47 & Order XXI Rule 92(3) – Bar to Separate Suit – Representatives of Judgment-Debtor – Maintainability – Suit Barred – Rule 92(3) prohibits a separate suit to set aside an order made under Rule 92 (confirming or setting aside sale) by any person against whom such order is made – Section 47 CPC bars separate suits for questions between parties to the suit or their representatives relating to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree – The High Court correctly identified respondent nos. 1 and 2 as "representatives" of the judgment-debtor, having acquired derivative title from him – Therefore, their suit challenging the auction sale is barred by Section 47 CPC – The High Court erred in holding the suit maintainable despite this bar, based on fraud allegations – [Paras 124-134, 137-147, 150-151, 255, 256(vi), 256(vii), 262].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 92(4) – "Third Party" – Interpretation – Not Applicable – The term "third party" under Rule 92(4) refers to a party extraneous to the original suit and execution proceedings, who has not had their right, title, or interest adjudicated under Rules 58, 97, or 99, or has not availed such remedy within the required time – It does not include persons falling within the scope of Section 47 CPC – Since respondent nos. 1 and 2 were representatives of the judgment-debtor, they are not "third parties" under Rule 92(4) – Rule 92(4) is a procedural provision, not one that confers a right to institute a suit – [Paras 152-159, 174-178, 180, 256(viii), 256(ix)].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 99, 100, 101, 102, 104 – Dispossession of Third Party – Pendente Lite Transferees – Remedy Barred – Suit Not Maintainable – Rule 99 provides a remedy for any person other than the judgment-debtor, dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder or purchaser, to apply to the executing court for restoration of possession – Rule 101 mandates the executing court to adjudicate all questions of right, title, or interest in such applications – Rule 102 explicitly bars transferees pendente lite of the judgment-debtor from availing remedies under Rules 97, 98, and 100 – The respondent nos. 1 and 2 were dispossessed and could have filed an application under Rule 99 within 30 days of dispossession (Article 128, Limitation Act, 1963) – However, as transferees pendente lite, Rule 102 would have prevented them from obtaining relief under Rule 100 – Allowing a separate suit in such a scenario would circumvent the statutory bar and the legislative intent to consolidate adjudication within execution proceedings – The fate of a pendente lite transferee in a separate suit would be the same as under Rule 99/101 due to Section 52 TPA – Therefore, their separate suit is not maintainable – [Paras 181-236, 240-244, 246-247, 255, 256(x), 256(xi), 256(xii)].

Substantial Justice – Monetary Compensation – Direction Issued – Considering the peculiar facts, including the 40-year lapse since the sale deeds, the relationship between auction-purchasers (nephews of vendor/judgment-debtor) and respondents, and the concession by appellants' counsel, the Supreme Court, in exercise of its power to do substantial justice, directed the appellants to pay Rs. 75,00,000/- to respondent nos. 1 and 2 within six months – Failure to pay would attract 12% interest per annum – This direction aims to put all disputes to rest and avoid further arduous litigation for recovery of money – [Paras 260-264].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court's judgment set aside – Appellants directed to pay Rs. 75,00,000/- to respondent nos. 1 and 2 within six months – [Paras 259, 264].

PIL - Maternity Benefits – Adoptive Mothers – Constitutionality of Section 5(4), Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 – Provision granted 12 weeks’ maternity benefit only if adopted child is below three months of age – Petitioner challenged this as discriminatory and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 – Court noted that the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 was repealed on 21.11.2025 by notification under the Code on Social Security, 2020 – Section 60(4) of the 2020 Code is pari materia to the repealed provision – Held: Petition need not be withdrawn – Petitioner permitted to amend the petition within six weeks to challenge Section 60(4) of the 2020 Code – Union of India raised no objection – Judgment to be pronounced after amended petition is filed [Paras 2–11].

Decision: Petitioner permitted to amend the writ petition to challenge Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 within six weeks – Judgment to follow upon submission of amended petition.