NGT – Appeal under Section 22 NGT Act – Environmental Compensation of ₹18 Crore Imposed on Sugar Mill – Orders Set Aside – Appellant challenged NGT orders dated 15.02.2022 and 16.09.2022 which imposed 2% of annual turnover as environmental compensation based on a joint committee report alleging effluent discharge violations – Held: NGT acted in violation of Sections 21–22 of the Water Act and principles of natural justice under Section 19 NGT Act by not impleading or hearing the appellant and by relying solely on a committee report – Orders declared illegal and quashed; UPPCB given liberty to act in accordance with law – Appeals Allowed [Paras 19, 30-34].

Evidence – Sampling of Trade Effluent – Sections 21–22, Water Act – Admissibility – The statutory protocol (notice to occupier/agent, splitting, sealing, dual-lab analysis, delivery of reports) is mandatory; results are inadmissible unless the procedure is followed – NGT’s reliance on committee findings absent compliance vitiates the basis for compensation [Paras 10.5–10.9, 30-33].

Role of Expert/Joint Committees – Adjudicatory Function vs. Fact-Finding – Committees appointed by tribunals assist in fact-finding but cannot substitute adjudication; their reports must be subject to party participation and judicial determination – NGT erred in basing liability solely on committee recommendations without hearing the affected party [Paras 27, 31-33].

Audi Alteram Partem – Opportunity to be Heard – Section 19 NGT Act – Even in suo motu or preventive environmental jurisdiction, affected parties must be heard before adverse directions – Failure to implead and hear the appellant rendered the proceedings non-est [Paras 19(i)-(ix), 31-33].

Relief and Liberty – Appeals Allowed – Consequential Directions – Setting aside of NGT orders does not preclude lawful regulatory action; UPPCB is at liberty to inspect and take remedial steps in accordance with the Water Act and principles of natural justice [Paras 33-34].

Probate—Escheat—Locus of State—Sections 8–13, 29, 30 HSA; Sections 63, 263 IS Act—State has no standing to assail probate where Will stands proved and probated—Grant of probate renders escheat inapplicable; Government is a stranger to probate/succession proceedings unless there is failure of heirs upon intestacy—SLPs by State dismissed on locus—Explained with reference to “State of Rajasthan v. Lord Northbrook” and Delhi HC’s judgment granting probate [Paras 1–6.5, 7–8].

Succession—Testamentary vs. Intestate—Sections 8–13, 29, 30 HSA—Where a competent court finds the Will valid and grants probate, succession is testamentary and devolves as per the Will; escheat under Section 29 arises only on failure of heirs upon intestacy—Held, doctrine of bona vacantia has no play when probate subsists [Paras 4–6, 6.5].

Probate Practice—Revocation—Section 263 IS Act—Who may challenge—Only those who would succeed if the Will failed (i.e., heirs under HSA) may appeal/revoke probate; State cannot do so merely by invoking a State Escheats statute—Clarified [Paras 6.2, 6.4].

Evidence—Proof of Will—Section 63 IS Act & Section 68 Evidence Act—Delhi High Court’s finding of due execution and proof affirmed as context; probate upheld—Will executed on 30.10.1985 at Tis Hazari in presence of two attesting witnesses—Compliance recorded [Para 1.2].

Agnates’ SLP—Suppression of material facts—Article 136—CPC O.XXIII R.1—Litigants who withdrew a civil suit challenging the same Will (without liberty) and withdrew objections in probate cannot later maintain SLP; suppression of withdrawal disentitles discretionary relief—Costs of ₹1,00,000 each imposed; SLP dismissed on suppression and locus [Paras 9–13].

Estoppel—Probate Objections Withdrawn—No “blowing hot and cold”—Where objections to probate and independent suit are withdrawn, petitioners estopped from re-agitating validity—High Court’s grant of probate stands; consequential steps to follow [Paras 10–14].

Decision—SLP (C) Nos. 14721–14723/2024 dismissed on ground of locus of State; SLP (Civil) Diary No. 30645/2023 dismissed for suppression and lack of locus—Costs imposed ₹1,00,000 each on agnate-petitioners; probate to proceed per law [Final Paras].

Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Section 18 SC/ST Act – Bar on Applicability – Offences under Sections 3(1)(o), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w)(i) SC/ST Act alleged against respondent, including casteist abuses and assault for voting against accused in assembly election – High Court granted pre-arrest bail holding prosecution exaggerated – Held: Section 18 creates absolute bar to anticipatory bail when prima facie offence disclosed – High Court erred by conducting mini trial and ignoring statutory bar – Anticipatory bail cancelled [Paras 3.4–3.5, 4, 5.2, 6–9].

SC/ST Act – Offence by Casteist Abuse – Intention and Public View – Utterances “Mangtyano, you have become arrogant” directed at complainant and his mother, accompanied by beating and threats to burn house – Abuses in public view outside complainant’s house – Prima facie caste nexus established – Offence under Section 3(1)(r)(s) SC/ST Act made out [Paras 3.3, 7–7.2, 8].

Scope of Judicial Scrutiny – Bail Stage – No Mini Trial – At anticipatory bail stage, court must only examine prima facie case from FIR – Detailed appreciation of evidence not permissible – High Court exceeded jurisdiction by doubting witness accounts and speculating on political overtone [Paras 4.1, 5.5.1, 6.2, 9].

Constitutional Validity – Bar on Anticipatory Bail – Section 18 & 18A SC/ST Act – Upheld by precedents (Ram Krishna Balothia, Vilas Pandurang Pawar, Prathvi Raj Chauhan) – Denial of anticipatory bail not violative of Articles 14 or 21 – Bar furthers constitutional mandate of equality and social justice under Articles 14 and 17 [Paras 5.3–5.7].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court order dated 29.04.2025 set aside – Anticipatory bail granted to respondent No.1 cancelled – Observations confined to bail question, trial to proceed uninfluenced [Paras 9–10.1].

Maintainability of Second SLP – Dismissal of Earlier SLP Without Leave – Abuse of Process – A second SLP was filed challenging the same High Court judgment after the earlier SLP had been dismissed without granting leave – The petitioner argued that the non-speaking dismissal did not bar a second SLP relying on S. Narahari v. S.R. Kumar – Held: The earlier dismissal constituted finality under Article 136 and re-litigating the same issue through a second SLP was impermissible – The attempt was viewed as an abuse of process and contrary to the principle of finality in litigation – Reference to larger bench in Narahari held not applicable as facts not pari materia – Present SLP dismissed [Paras 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10].

Review Jurisdiction – Order XLVII Rule 7 CPC – No Appeal from Order in Review – Petitioner challenged the High Court’s dismissal of the review petition, but Supreme Court held that under Order XLVII Rule 7 CPC, no appeal lies from such order – Any attempt to challenge the main judgment through this route is an indirect method to re-agitate concluded issues – No relief can be granted where the main order has attained finality – SLP dismissed [Paras 5, 8].

Constitutional Law – Article 141 and Judicial Discipline – Reference to Larger Bench Does Not Stay Binding Precedent – Just because a legal issue has been referred to a larger bench does not permit departure from binding law under Article 141 – Courts must continue to apply prevailing precedents unless overturned – SLP rightly dismissed in line with established precedents [Para 10].

Decision – Second SLP dismissed as not maintainable – Held to be an abuse of process – Dismissal of review petition by High Court upheld – No tagging or reference to larger bench warranted [Paras 6, 9, 10].

Property Law – Transfer of Immovable Property – Title Dispute – Appeal against concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court decreeing plaintiff’s suit for possession, mesne profits, declaration, and injunction – Plaintiff relied upon Agreement to Sell, GPA, Affidavit, Receipt, and Registered Will to claim title – Supreme Court held that such documents do not confer valid title under Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act – Sale of immovable property can only be by registered sale deed – Held: Plaintiff not entitled to relief as no valid conveyance executed – Appeal allowed – Suit dismissed [Paras 11-19, 27-28, 35]

General Power of Attorney – Scope and Legal Effect – GPA relied upon by Plaintiff only authorised management of property, not transfer of ownership – GPA, even if valid, does not transfer title – Held: GPA is an instrument of agency, not a conveyance – No title conferred on Plaintiff through GPA – Power of Attorney is revocable and cannot be used to create proprietary rights [Paras 18-22]

Will – Validity and Proof – Registered Will dated 16.05.1996 propounded by Plaintiff found unproven – Plaintiff failed to examine attesting witnesses as mandated under Section 68 of Evidence Act and Section 63 of Indian Succession Act – Will surrounded by suspicious circumstances, including complete exclusion of three other children without justification – Held: Will not proved in accordance with law – No valid title derived by Plaintiff [Paras 23-27]

Doctrine of Part Performance – Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act – Plaintiff sought protection under doctrine of part performance – Supreme Court held that actual possession is precondition to invoke Section 53A – Plaintiff not in possession at the time of filing suit – Relief under Section 53A not available [Paras 29-31]

Succession – Absence of Valid Transfer or Will – On demise of original owner (father), property devolves upon all Class-I legal heirs – Plaintiff’s claim based on unproven Will and invalid sale documents rejected – Held: Property to be treated as intestate succession among legal heirs [Para 32]

Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser – Defendant No.2 purchased 50% share from Defendant No.1 – Supreme Court protected such share to the extent of Defendant No.1’s right – Held: Rights of Defendant No.2 preserved to the extent of seller’s share – Parties free to assert claims through appropriate legal proceedings [Paras 33-34]

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgment and decree of High Court and Trial Court set aside – Plaintiff’s suit dismissed – No costs – Rights of Defendant No.2 protected to extent of seller’s share [Para 35]

Criminal Law - Rape of Minor – Conviction under Section 376(2) IPC & Sections 4, 6 POCSO – Trial Court’s Conviction Restored – High Court erred in acquitting accused on grounds of procedural irregularities and alleged inconsistencies – Held: Evidence of victim consistent and corroborated by medical records (pregnancy, abortion); procedural lapses (Section 223/defective charge) did not cause prejudice or failure of justice – High Court judgment unsustainable – Conviction and life sentence restored [Paras 13-23, 25-36, 38].

Age of Victim – Proof – Minor Status Established – Transfer Certificate, testimony of parents, statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and medical report showed victim aged 12-15 years – Defence did not rebut or challenge minority – High Court erred in doubting age determination – Victim entitled to protection under POCSO [Paras 16-18].

Evidence – Testimony of Victim – Sole Basis for Conviction – Consistency of statements before Magistrate, police, and court; corroborated by medical reports of pregnancy and abortion – Absence of DNA test not fatal where identity and acts proved – Victim’s testimony reliable and trustworthy [Paras 14-15, 19-24].

Procedural Irregularity – Section 223 Cr.P.C. – Joint Trial of Two Accused – Even if joinder was technically improper, no prejudice or failure of justice shown – High Court wrongly treated misjoinder as fatal without proof of prejudice – Mere irregularity does not vitiate trial [Paras 29-35].

Defective Charge – Section 215 & 464 Cr.P.C. – Error in mentioning date of offence (02.07.2016 instead of March 2016) – Did not mislead accused or affect fair trial – Accused aware of allegations and time frame – Conviction not invalidated [Paras 25-27].

Standard of Proof – Beyond Reasonable Doubt – Misapplication – High Court erred in elevating minor inconsistencies to reasonable doubt – Principle must not be misused to acquit actual culprits – Doubts must be serious and rational; not trivial inconsistencies [Paras 22-23, 36].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s acquittal set aside – Trial Court’s judgment of conviction and concurrent life sentences restored – Respondents directed to surrender within two weeks, failing which Trial Court to secure custody [Paras 38-39].

Promissory Note – Proof of Debt – Presumption under Negotiable Instruments Act – Decretal Amount Restored – The Trial Court decreed the suit for ₹35,29,680 based on a promissory note acknowledging receipt of ₹30,80,000 – The High Court reduced the recoverable amount to ₹22,00,000 on the ground that only this portion was evidenced by bank transactions – Held: Once the execution and contents of the promissory note are not disputed, and the document is upheld, the entire amount therein must be presumed valid under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – The presumption includes both bank and cash payments – Rejection of the cash component solely due to lack of documentary evidence, in absence of rebuttal by the respondent, was erroneous – Onus to disprove the debt lay on the respondent, who neither appeared nor contested – Trial Court’s decree restored [Paras 3-7].

Motor Vehicles – Motor Vehicle Tax – Scope of ‘Public Place’ – Section 3 of A.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963 – Rule 12A of A.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1963 – Interpretation – Liability to pay tax arises only when motor vehicle is used or kept for use in a public place – Appellant’s vehicles used exclusively within the restricted premises of RINL – Area not accessible to public – Held: Not a ‘public place’ – No tax liability incurred – Appeal allowed.

Motor Vehicle Tax – Use in Restricted Industrial Premises – Section 3 of A.P. Act, 1963 – Exemption Allowed – The appellant operated heavy vehicles solely within the enclosed and access-controlled premises of Visakhapatnam Steel Plant (RINL), which is not a public place under the Motor Vehicles Act – Held: Section 3 imposes tax only on vehicles used or kept for use in a public place – Since the site was not accessible to the general public, tax under the Act was not leviable [Paras 8–10, 28, 45–46, 50].

Interpretation of Rule 12A – Presumption of Use Must Align with Section 3 – No Automatic Liability – Rule 12A creates a deeming fiction of vehicle use unless prior intimation is given – Held: As subordinate legislation, Rule 12A cannot override Section 3 – Where actual use was exclusively in a non-public place, absence of intimation under Rule 12A is irrelevant – The vehicles were not ‘kept for use in a public place’, hence no tax liability arose [Paras 29, 43, 47–48, 50].

Public Place – Meaning under Section 2(34) of Motor Vehicles Act – Premises of RINL Not a Public Place – Appellant’s vehicles operated within a compound guarded by CISF with no public access – Held: ‘Public place’ requires a right of public access – Presence of a government company does not convert private industrial premises into a public place – Reliance on Bolani Ores Ltd. upheld – Decision in Akhil Gujarat Pravasi distinguished as not dealing with ‘public place’ requirement [Paras 28, 31–34, 44–46].

Constitutional Principle – Article 265 – Tax Only by Authority of Law – Literal Interpretation – Held: Taxing statutes must be strictly construed – There can be no presumption or inference of tax liability – Since Section 3 clearly restricts tax to vehicles used or kept for use in a public place, the levy in this case was without authority of law [Paras 36–38, 50].

Decision – Civil Appeal Allowed – Division Bench Set Aside – Judgment of learned Single Judge restored – Appellant not liable to pay motor vehicle tax for the period when its vehicles were confined to non-public premises – Refund of Rs. 22,71,700 ordered – No order as to costs [Para 51].

Service Law – Dismissal from Police Force – Rule 16.2(1) of Punjab Police Rules – Repeated Absence Amounts to Gravest Misconduct – Dismissal Justified - Respondent constable remained repeatedly absent from duty during a short service period of less than seven years – Departmental inquiry initiated for fourth absence and due process followed – Held: Disciplinary authority acted under the first part of Rule 16.2(1), and length of service was not relevant in cases of gravest misconduct – High Court erred in applying second part of Rule 16.2(1) [Paras 25, 27-30, 32-33].

Disciplinary Proceedings – Past Misconduct – No Mandatory Requirement to Include in Show Cause When Not Basis of Punishment – Held: Disciplinary authority referred to past misconduct only to add weight to decision, not as the basis of dismissal – Hence, no violation of principles laid down in K. Manche Gowda’s case – High Court wrongly interfered with punishment [Paras 19, 31-33].

Judicial Review – Limited Scope – Interference with Dismissal in Disciplinary Matters – High Court's Interference Unwarranted – Held: When penalty is imposed for proven gravest misconduct following due process and natural justice, courts should refrain from interference under judicial review unless penalty is shockingly disproportionate – High Court failed to follow this principle [Paras 21-24, 33].

Final Decision – Appeal Allowed – Dismissal Order Restored – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the dismissal of the respondent from service – Held: Departmental action complied with rules and principles of natural justice – No reinstatement or relief due [Para 33].