Facts:

Workers employed as contract laborers sought regularization at the respondent-Corporation's depots. An understanding was recorded in a meeting on April 12, 1996. An Industrial Tribunal directed the workers' regularization, which was affirmed by higher courts, culminating in a Supreme Court decision.

Issues:

Whether the direction for regularization applied to the Departmental Labor System (DLS) or the Direct Payment System (DPS).

Held:

To establish civil contempt, willful and deliberate disobedience of the order with knowledge of consequences is required. The issue referred for adjudication was regularization, not a specific labor system. The Tribunal's award did not specify a labor system. The Corporation operates multiple labor systems, including DLS and DPS. The relevant policy at that time was to regularize under DPS. The Departmental Labor System was declining, and the policy was to regularize under DPS. The contempt petitions were dismissed as no case was made for contempt action against the Corporation.

Decision: The contempt petitions were dismissed as no willful disobedience was shown, and the direction did not specify a particular labor system.

Facts:

The case revolves around the development of an Integrated Infrastructure Corridor and Finance Project (IICFP) between Bangalore and Mysore in Karnataka. The project involved residential, industrial, and commercial facilities. The dispute arose when the Project Proponents submitted a modified development plan for permission to set up a group housing scheme at a location different from those specified for Townships in the Framework Agreement (FWA) and Infrastructure Corridor Project Technical Report (PTR). The Planning Authority rejected the modified plan, and the High Court directed the Planning Authority to issue a Commencement Certificate to the Project Proponents. The High Court's decision was appealed.

Issues:

Whether the Project Proponents had the authority to deviate from the stipulations and specifications of the FWA by proposing a standalone group housing scheme at a location other than the designated Townships' demarcated areas.

Whether the Planning Authority's rejection of the modified proposal was justified.

Held:

The court examined the Framework Agreement (FWA) and the Infrastructure Corridor Project Technical Report (PTR). The FWA specified the construction of five self-sustaining Townships at designated locations. The PTR demarcated these locations and set forth the specifications for the Townships. The court noted that the FWA obliges the Project Proponents to construct Townships within the stipulated locations and areas. The FWA defines "Townships" as an integral component of the Infrastructure Corridor Project. The court determined that the Project Proponents cannot deviate from the FWA stipulations without prior written approval from the State. (Para: 41-44, 47, 52)

The court examined whether the Planning Authority was justified in rejecting the modified proposal for a standalone group housing scheme. The court emphasized that the Project Proponents were required to obtain prior approval from the State for any deviations from the FWA. The court observed that the Project Proponents did not submit their proposal for approval to the State and instead directly approached the Planning Authority. The court held that the Planning Authority's rejection was valid since the proposal deviated from the FWA stipulations without prior State approval. (Para: 45-47, 51, 52)

The court rejected the argument of acquiescence or waiver based on the Planning Authority's earlier assurance and the State's involvement in previous litigation. The court held that these factors do not negate the State's authority to enforce FWA stipulations. (Para: 54-55)

Decision: The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Project Proponents were directed to approach the State for prior permission to deviate from the FWA stipulations. The court emphasized that any development must be in accordance with the FWA, PTR, and relevant regulations. The Planning Authority's decision was upheld as valid. (Para: 60, 62, 66-68)

Facts:

The petitioner, Arnab Ranjan Goswami, filed a writ petition seeking the quashing of several FIRs and complaints lodged against him across various states. These cases arose from his broadcast of a program on R Bharat. The allegations in these FIRs and complaints were similar and based on identical incidents.

Issues:

Whether subjecting a journalist to multiple proceedings in different jurisdictions for the same incident violates the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Whether the transfer of investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) should be ordered in this case.

Whether FIRs can be filed for defamation or whether only complaints can be filed under Section 199 of the CrPC.

Held:

The court recognized the significance of journalistic freedom and upheld the petitioner's exercise of his right to speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). However, this right is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). The court held that subjecting an individual to multiple proceedings in different jurisdictions for the same cause of action is not the least restrictive way to achieve the legitimate aim of prosecuting crimes. Therefore, except for one FIR, all other FIRs related to the same incident were quashed as an abuse of process. (Para 28, 31, 32, 33, 34)

The transfer of investigation to the CBI is an extraordinary power and must be used sparingly and in exceptional circumstances. Allegations against the police alone are insufficient to warrant a transfer. The court emphasized that the investigation agency has the discretion to decide the mode, manner, and line of interrogation. The petitioner's request to transfer the investigation to the CBI based on a perceived conflict of interest was not valid. (Para 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44)

The court clarified that in cases of criminal defamation, only a complaint can be filed by the aggrieved person under Section 199 of the CrPC. Therefore, FIRs for defamation are not maintainable. (Para 45, 46, 47)

The petitioner's subsequent writ petition regarding a specific FIR was deemed inappropriate since it lacked the jurisdictional basis present in the original petition. The court emphasized that remedies under the CrPC and High Court jurisdiction should be pursued for specific cases. (Para 52)

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

FACTS:

In 1976, Food Corporation of India (FCI) invited offers for construction of godowns, followed by possession on lease. The appellants' offer was accepted, leading to an agreement on 16.12.1976. Disputes arose regarding possession, completion, and rent payment for the godowns. The trial court decreed in favor of appellants, which was challenged by FCI in the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the agreement dated 16.12.1976 qualifies as a lease under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act or an agreement for lease; and the entitlement of appellants to damages.

HELD:

The distinction between a lease and an agreement to lease under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was highlighted. For an agreement to be considered a lease, there must be an actual demise of property at the time of the agreement.( Para 17)

Citing precedents, including Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi vs. Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd. (AIR 1919 PC 79), the Court reiterated that an agreement to lease must effect an actual demise and create a present and immediate interest in the property.( Para 20-21)

Analyzing the terms of the agreement dated 16.12.1976, the Court held that it was not a lease but an agreement to enter into a lease. The execution of the lease was contingent upon completion of construction and approval by FCI.( Para 25)

The Court discussed Clause 6 of the agreement, emphasizing the requirement of obtaining a completion certificate from FCI before execution of the lease agreement. The possession of godowns was subject to the final inspection and approval of FCI officials.( Para 26-27)

The Court dismissed appellants' reliance on a letter dated 15.05.1979 as evidence of possession, noting its questionable authenticity and the misconduct of FCI officials involved.( Para 28)

Appellants' claim for rent prior to 08.02.1978 was rejected, as rent was payable only after actual possession as per Clause 8 of the agreement.( Para 29)

The Court addressed the claim for enhanced rent and held that the agreement did not stipulate any provision for enhanced rent after possession was taken over.( Para 30)

Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing appellants' claims for damages based on the terms and conditions of the agreement.( Para 31)

REFERRED CASES:

Hemanta Kumari Debi vs. Midnapur Zamindari Co. Ltd., AIR 1919 PC 79

Panchanan Bose vs. Chandra Charan Misra (ILR (1910) 37 Cal 808 :14 CWN 874

Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi vs. Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd, AIR 1919 PC 79

State of Maharashtra & Ors. vs. Atur India Pvt. Ltd. (1994) 2 SCC 497

Tiruvenibai vs. Lilabai, 1959 Supp 2 SCR 107: AIR 1959 SC 620

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit seeking declaration of ownership of land and alleging that certain mutations were based on a forged will. They sought permission to prove a copy of the will through secondary evidence, as the original will was handed over for mutation but could not be retrieved. The Trial Court allowed the application, but the High Court set aside the order.

Issues:

Whether secondary evidence of a will can be admitted without proving the existence of the original will.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that for secondary evidence to be admissible, foundational evidence must establish reasons for the non-production of the original document. Section 65 of the Evidence Act permits secondary evidence when the original is not in possession of the party against whom it is sought to be proved. The Court emphasized that while admission of secondary evidence does not automatically establish authenticity, truthfulness, or genuineness, those aspects must be established during trial.

The High Court erred in not allowing the appellants to lead secondary evidence and in denying the opportunity to prove the existence of the will. The Court allowed the appeal and granted the appellants the opportunity to provide secondary evidence, while clarifying that authenticity must be established during trial.

Facts:

The appellant (South East Asia Marine Engineering and Constructions Ltd.) filed an appeal against the respondent (Oil India Limited) challenging an arbitral award related to a contract for well drilling and auxiliary operations. The central issue revolved around the interpretation of Clause 23 of the contract, which addressed subsequent changes in law and their impact on the contract.

Issues:

The interpretation of Clause 23 and whether the increase in the price of High-Speed Diesel (HSD) triggered the "change in law" provision under the contract.

Whether the Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of Clause 23 was reasonable and whether the award was valid under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Held:

The Court highlighted that the document forming a written contract should be read as a whole and interpreted in a manner that is mutually explanatory. The Arbitral Tribunal failed to apply this basic rule while interpreting Clause 23.( Para 25)

The Court clarified that the contract was based on a fixed rate, and the parties had entered the contract after mitigating the risk of price increases. The interpretation provided by the Arbitral Tribunal, expanding the scope of Clause 23 to include changes in the rate of HSD, would defeat the explicit wording and purpose of the contract.( Para 26)

The Court emphasized that the interpretation provided by the Arbitral Tribunal was not a plausible interpretation of the contract and that the appellant did not introduce any evidence to support such an interpretation.( Para 27)

The Court further noted that the existence of other contractual terms, such as Item 1 of List II (Consumables) of Exhibit C, indicated that the interpretation suggested by the Arbitral Tribunal was not reasonable.( Para 28)

The Court affirmed that the interpretation of a contract must consider all its clauses and be based on a reasonable and fair understanding. The Court concluded that the interpretation provided by the Arbitral Tribunal was not a possible interpretation of the contract.( Para 29)

Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside the arbitral award, concluding that the Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation was not reasonable. The appeal was dismissed.( Para 33)

Facts:

The case pertains to the Sisodia Rani ka Bagh (Monument) situated in Jhalana, Jaipur, Rajasthan. The Monument was declared a protected one by the Department of Art, Literature, Culture, and Archaeology, and its supervision was transferred to the Department of Archaeological and Museums. The Monument was used for holding ceremonies and events, generating revenue for the state. Respondent Ashish Gautam filed a Public Interest Litigation, seeking directions to ensure the safety of wildlife and to restrain the use of laser lights, loud music, and fireworks in the Monument.

Issues:

Whether the Monument can be used for various multi-purpose activities?

Whether there should be restrictions on the use of laser lights, loud music, and fireworks?

Whether the maintenance of fountains is necessary?

Whether the blanket ban imposed by the Tribunal on holding functions and events is justified?

Held:

The court noted that the Monument has historical significance and is enclosed by a structure. While the Monument was being used for functions and events, the Tribunal's blanket ban was not justified. The court ordered that the Monument could be used for appropriate activities between 8:00 AM to 8:00 PM, with no activities permitted after 8:00 PM. Restrictions on laser lights, loud music, and fireworks were ordered. Maintenance of fountains was deemed necessary. The court directed the appointment of a Consultant for further beautification and horticultural development. The Tribunal's order was modified, and the appeal was allowed in part.

FACTS:

The appellant filed a suit seeking to declare a compromise decree as illegal and obtained through fraud, also requesting an injunction. The compromise decree had been passed by the High Court, and the appellant was not a party to it. The appellant claimed rights based on a sale deed executed before the compromise decree.

ISSUES:

Whether the suit challenging the compromise decree's validity is maintainable.

Applicability of Order 23 Rule 3A CPC.

Whether the appellant has a right to question the compromise decree.

Validity of the appellant's claim based on a sale deed.

HELD:

The Court discussed the relevant legal provisions and established the legislative intent behind the amendments to Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3A CPC. The Court concluded that:

A suit to set aside a compromise decree on the ground of unlawfulness is barred under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC.

The purpose of compromise decrees is to avoid further litigation and promote finality of decisions.

The appellant, being a stranger to the compromise decree, cannot challenge its validity in a separate suit. Only the court that passed the decree can examine its validity.

The appellant's suit before the civil court was not maintainable due to the specific bar under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC.

The Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the appellant's remedy was to approach the court that passed the compromise decree. The appellant's claim based on the sale deed should be considered in light of the findings of the lower courts.

REFERRED CASES:

Pushpa Devi Bhagat(Dead) Through LR Sadhna Rai(Smt) vs. Rajinder Singh and Others, 2005(5) SCC 566

R. Rajanna vs. S.R. Venkataswamy and Others, 2014(15) SCC 471

Facts:

The complainant party used an old path through the fields of the accused parties, leading to a dispute over passage rights. A confrontation ensued on the day of the incident, where the accused, armed with weapons, attacked the complainant party. Accused No. 5 struck the victim on the head with a weapon, leading to the victim's death. Accused parties were convicted under various IPC sections, including Section 302 IPC (murder) by the Trial Court.

Issues:

Whether the accused were the aggressors or acting in self-defense.

Whether the conviction of accused No. 5 should be converted from Section 302 IPC to Section 326 IPC.

Held:

The Court carefully reviewed the evidence and judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court, concluding that the accused party was the aggressor in the incident. The accused, who were armed with weapons, were hiding and waiting for the complainant party to arrive. Accused No. 5's blow to the victim's head was intended to cause death. The Court found no evidence to support the claim of self-defense and disagreed with the High Court's reasoning.

The Court held that the incident was not provoked by the complainant party's unauthorized entry onto the fields but was rather instigated by the accused party's aggression. The victim's death resulted from a single fatal blow to the head, which was intended to cause death or serious bodily injury. Therefore, the Court modified the High Court and Trial Court judgments, convicting accused No. 5 under Section 304-I and Section 148 IPC.