Facts:

Writ petitions filed by private tour operators (PTOs) under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

Apprehension that applications for Hajj Yatra for 2016 may be rejected.

PTOs seek relief, including mandamus to accept applications and issue Registration Certificates.

Issues:

Whether the applications of PTOs for Hajj Yatra 2016 are likely to be rejected.

Relief sought under Article 32, including mandamus to accept applications.

Held:

The court dismisses the writ petitions.

No opinion expressed on the issues raised in previous orders.

The Additional Solicitor General states that no decision has been taken on the PTOs' applications.

Each PTO directed to make a fresh application by a specified date.

The concerned authority to examine, consider, and decide each application on its merit in accordance with the law.

Writ petitions disposed of with liberty granted to each petitioner to make a fresh application.

The concerned authority to decide each application with a reasoned order communicated to the applicant by a specified date.

Facts:

The employee (respondent No.1) worked as a Branch Manager at Ghat Branch of the Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Ltd.

Charge sheet dated 03.07.1992 was issued, alleging 19 charges, including unauthorized payments and issuance of overdrafts.

Employee responded, and an Inquiry Officer submitted a report on 21.09.1992.

Without further action, a fresh charge sheet with additional charges was issued on 16.01.1993.

Employee replied on 04.02.1993, but no inquiry proceedings were conducted.

Disciplinary Authority passed a resolution on 11.07.2000, stating charges were proved, and dismissal order was issued on 01.02.2002.

Issues:

Whether a proper disciplinary inquiry, as mandated by U.P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations Act, 1975, was conducted before dismissing the employee.

Whether the dismissal order was in violation of the principles of natural justice.

Held:

The Division Bench quashed the dismissal order, finding that no proper inquiry was held. The Court held that the second charge sheet (issued on 18.01.1993) rendered the earlier proceedings obsolete, and no inquiry was conducted thereafter. The Court emphasized the importance of conducting a fair and bona fide inquiry, observing that the principles of natural justice were not followed.

The Court directed the Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Ltd. to hold a de-novo inquiry within six months if they desired to proceed with disciplinary action. The employee was deemed to be under suspension, and the High Court's directions on suspension allowance were upheld. The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

Firoz Khan was accused of murdering an 11-year-old named Liley Khan.

The trial took place in Sessions Trial Case No. 48 of 2002 in the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Jaisalmer.

The Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent on 13.08.2004, giving the benefit of doubt.

The State of Rajasthan, dissatisfied with the acquittal, filed an application for leave to appeal before the High Court under Section 378(3) of the CrPC.

The High Court dismissed the application without assigning any reasons.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's dismissal of the application for leave to appeal without providing reasons was justified.

Whether there were discrepancies and errors in the judgment of the Sessions Judge.

Held:

The Supreme Court, while partially agreeing with the State's submission, criticized the High Court's order for a clear case of non-application of mind. The Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the High Court for deciding the application for leave to appeal afresh on merits within three months. The Court emphasized the need for the High Court to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or arguable points have been raised. The Supreme Court clarified that it had not applied its mind to the merits of the case and urged the High Court to decide the matter uninfluenced by any of the observations made in the order.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a Contract of Affreightment dated 18.1.2008 between Eitzen Bulk A/S (Appellant) and Ashapura Minechem Limited (Respondent).

The Contract included an Arbitration Clause (Clause No. 28) stating that any dispute under the Contract would be settled through Arbitration in London, governed by English Law.

The Arbitration was held in London, and Ashapura was held liable to pay a specified amount along with compound interest.

Ashapura filed a suit in Gujarat challenging the legality of the Contract and the Arbitration Clause but failed to obtain an injunction.

Eitzen initiated proceedings to enforce the Foreign Award in various jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, the USA, Belgium, and the UK.

Ashapura, having failed in the Arbitration proceedings, filed objections in India under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to challenge the Award.

Issues:

Whether Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act applies when the juridical seat of Arbitration is outside India, and the Arbitration is governed by a foreign law.

Whether objections under Section 34 can be raised before a Court in India in such cases.

Held:

The Court held that by choosing London as the seat of Arbitration and specifying English Law as the governing law in the Arbitration Clause, the parties intended to exclude the application of Part I of the Arbitration Act to the proceedings. Therefore, objections under Section 34 were not tenable before a Court in India. The jurisdiction to decide such objections lies with the courts of the juridical seat. The Gujarat High Court's decision allowing objections under Section 34 was deemed incorrect. The Bombay High Court's decision enforcing the Foreign Award under Part II of the Arbitration Act was upheld.

Facts:

Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (HSIIDC) invited bids for the Kundli-Manesar-Palwal Expressway.

Consortium of banks, including IDBI Bank and State Bank of India, financed the project, with outstanding dues of approximately Rs. 1419.15 crores.

Due to delays and non-completion of work, the concessionaire was replaced by a new one as directed by the Supreme Court in its order dated 30.01.2015.

Disputes arose regarding the termination payment of RS. 1300.00 crores to the outgoing concessionaire and the obligation to take over the debts due to the lenders by the new concessionaire.

Issues:

Whether HSIIDC failed to adhere to the contractual obligations under the substitution agreement?

Whether the unilateral revocation of termination payment by HSIIDC caused prejudice to the rights of the lender banks?

Held:

All disputes between the lender banks, HSIIDC, and the outgoing concessionaire stand referred to the arbitral tribunal.

Eighty percent of the toll collected for the Manesar-Palwal Expressway is to be deposited in an escrow account, with the remaining 20 percent available for HSIIDC for maintenance.

The amount in the escrow account is to be disbursed by the arbitral tribunal based on its interim arrangements or as deemed appropriate after hearing the parties.

The pendency of arbitration shall not impede the new concessionaire from commencing its work, subject to a committee's measurement of the work done by the outgoing concessionaire.

Decision: The disputes are referred to arbitration. The escrow account mechanism is established for the toll collections. The new concessionaire can commence its work, and the measurement of work is to be determined by a committee.

Facts:

The charge sheet was filed against the respondent and others before the Magistrate under the Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. Five individuals were taken as approvers after recording their confessional statements. The prosecutor filed an application under Section 306 for the grant of pardon. The Magistrate granted pardon, and the case was committed to a Special Judge. The Special Judge upheld the order of granting pardon. However, the High Court held that the Special Judge was empowered to grant tender of pardon, and the Magistrate's order was not lawful.

Issues:

The interpretation of the Magistrate's power under Section 306 in cases where the charge sheet is filed before the Magistrate, and whether this power extends to offenses triable by the Court of Session or a Special Judge.

Held:

Sub-section (1) of Section 306 explicitly mentions the Metropolitan Magistrate as a Judicial Officer with the power to grant tender of pardon. The Metropolitan Magistrate is specifically given this power under Section 306. Sub-section (2) clarifies that this section applies even to offenses triable exclusively by the Court of Session or a Special Judge. Sub-section (5) reinforces that even when an offense is triable by a Session Judge, the Magistrate has the power to grant tender of pardon. Section 307 restricts the power to grant tender of pardon to the Court to which the commitment is made, only after the commitment of a case. This supports the position that before commitment, the Magistrate is duly empowered.

A plain reading of Section 306 in conjunction with Section 307 shows that the Magistrate is empowered to grant tender of pardon even in cases triable by the Session Court or a Special Judge.

Section 5(1) of PC Act empowers a Special Judge to take cognizance of an offense without the accused being committed to him for trial, waiving the requirement of Section 193 of the Code. This does not imply that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance at all. The Magistrate has the option to commit the case to the Special Judge, and in such cases, the provisions of Section 306 of the Code would be applicable.

Section 460 of the Code considers tendering a pardon under Section 306 as an 'irregularity,' even if it is presumed that the Magistrate was not empowered. The order passed by the Magistrate is saved by Section 460(g).

The High Court formulated the wrong question by focusing on the competence of the Special Judge to tender pardon. The correct question was whether the Magistrate rightly passed the order of tender of pardon. The High Court's judgment does not stand legal scrutiny and is set aside.

Facts:

The case involves a writ petition (Crl.) No. 184 of 2014, where the constitutional validity of criminal defamation under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) is challenged. The petitioner, Subramanian Swamy, raises concerns regarding the compatibility of criminal defamation with the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether criminal defamation, as outlined in Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC, is constitutionally valid.

The interpretation of the term 'defamation' in Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

The balancing of the right to freedom of speech and expression against the right to reputation.

Held:

The court rejects the argument that criminal defamation is obnoxious to freedom of speech and expression. It asserts that the existence of criminal defamation is constitutionally valid. The Preamble of the Constitution balances different rights, and the legislature has intentionally retained Sections 499 and 500 as a criminal offense.

The term 'defamation' in Article 19(2) is to be construed independently and not narrowly. The court emphasizes the protection of individual reputation as a fundamental and human right. The concept of crime is linked to social order, and defamation laws serve the societal interest.

The court discusses the concept of crime in relation to social order, emphasizing that the protection of individual rights is essential for social stability. Harm caused to an individual affects the society as a whole, justifying the existence of defamation laws.

The right to freedom of expression is distinct in the case of fictional characters compared to defamation concerning real individuals. Freedom of speech is a cherished value but subject to reasonable restrictions. The court underscores that defamation laws are not an absolute restriction on free speech.

The court examines the reasonableness of restrictions imposed by defamation laws. It discusses the "impact doctrine" and the principle of proportionality, emphasizing that limitations should not be arbitrary or excessive.

The right to reputation is recognized as a constituent of Article 21 of the Constitution. Balancing fundamental rights is imperative, and reputation should not be sacrificed for the sake of another's freedom of speech.

The permissibility of criminal defamation is tested based on the touchstone of constitutional fraternity and fundamental duty. The court highlights the duty of every citizen to promote harmony and common brotherhood, emphasizing that the concept of fraternity does not eliminate dissent or criticism.

Fraternity expects citizens to respect the dignity of others. The court clarifies that dissent and different voices are acceptable, but they should not jeopardize constitutional values. Fundamental duties under Article 51-A gain significance in promoting harmony and common brotherhood.

Individual interests serve collective interests, and constitutional values help structure both. The court reaffirms the constitutional duty to promote fraternity and highlights the interconnectedness of individual and community interests.

The court examines the role of public servants in filing complaints of defamation through public prosecutors. Public servants are considered a different class when it comes to defamation related to their discharge of duties.

The engagement of public prosecutors for public servants is justified, given the protection granted for their official acts. The court dismisses criticism that this provision allows authorities to misuse public prosecutors for personal vendettas.

Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) envisages the filing of a complaint in court for criminal defamation. The magistrate plays a crucial role in scrutinizing complaints before issuing processes.

The court emphasizes the need for the magistrate to carefully examine complaints, especially in cases of criminal defamation. The burden is on the complainant to prove exceptions like good faith.

Facts:

The petitioner, Swaraj Abhiyan, challenges the low relief or subsidy provided by the government for crop loss, particularly during droughts. The petition also addresses issues related to the establishment of Fodder Banks and the restructuring of crop loans.

Issues:

Adequacy of the 'Crop Input Advance' or 'Agricultural Input Subsidy.'

Extension of Fodder Banks to all drought-affected areas.

Restructuring of crop loans for drought-affected farmers.

Held:

The court summarizes the position in law, stating that executive policies are subject to judicial review if unconstitutional, de'hors the provisions of the Act, beyond the power of delegation, or contrary to statutory or larger policy.( Paragraph 22)

The court suggests the establishment of watch-dog committees or ombudsmen by the Union of India and the States for effective implementation and monitoring of policies.( Paragraph 26)

The court affirms the principle of continuing mandamus as an integral part of constitutional jurisprudence. It keeps the possibility of continuing mandamus open to ensure compliance with directions.( Paragraph 32)

Facts:

The case pertains to Swaraj Abhiyan, the appellant, challenging issues related to the implementation of a government Scheme aimed at providing guaranteed wage employment in rural areas. The Scheme faces challenges concerning funding and, more prominently, the delayed release of payments for wages and materials.

Issues:

Lack of informal capping of funds for the Scheme.

Government's reluctance to release funds promptly.

Delayed release of payments, both for wages and materials, under the Scheme.

Dispute regarding the effectiveness of the National Electronic Fund Transfer System (Ne-FMS system) for wage payments.

Held:

The court acknowledged the absence of informal capping of funds for the Scheme but noted the government's reluctance to release funds promptly.

Highlighting the primary issue of delayed payments, the court discussed the introduction of the Ne-FMS system in various states for prompt wage payments. However, the petitioner contested the system's efficiency, citing significant delays in Kerala.

Addressing concerns raised by the petitioner, the court examined the working of the Ne-FMS system and evaluated its effectiveness in ensuring timely payments.

The court weighed the arguments presented by both parties, considering the delays in wage payments and the potential impact on the beneficiaries of the Scheme.

After careful consideration, the court arrived at a decision regarding the efficacy of the Ne-FMS system and its impact on addressing the issue of delayed payments.