Facts:

The case involved a power purchase agreement (PPA) between CLP India Pvt. Ltd. and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. (GUJ) entered on 03.02.1994. A notification dated 30.03.1992 was issued by the Central Government, with an amendment notification on 06.11.1995, regarding the incentive payable to units using naphtha as fuel. GUJ sought to enforce the amended notification, but CLP continued to bill GUJ for power supplied. A supplementary agreement was executed in 2003, involving a deemed equity component and the payment of interest. GUJ filed an application for recovery of amounts paid between 1997-1998 to 2005-06.

Issues:

The applicability and binding nature of the notifications dated 30.03.1992 and 06.11.1995 on the PPA terms.

Liability for interest on deemed equity and the scope of payment for the same.

The period for which refund claims were valid and the applicability of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.

Held:

The court held that the notifications dated 30.03.1992 and 06.11.1995, issued under Section 43(A) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, were statutory and binding on the parties. Any PPA must comply with these statutory provisions, and contractual terms cannot override such statutory notifications concerning tariff matters. The court upheld the amended notification's applicability, which eliminated the deemed Generation Incentive.

The court determined that the parties agreed on the payment of interest on the deemed equity amount as specified in the supplementary agreement. The specified period for interest payment was from 01.07.2003 to 31.12.2009. The court rejected CLP's claim for interest on any prior period, emphasizing that the agreement's terms must be followed.

The court found the concurrent findings of the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (GERC) and the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) reasonable regarding the restricted refund for the three-year period prior to GUJ's application. The court noted that repeated letters or communications do not extend the limitation period. The earliest cause of action arose in May 1996, and the court agreed with APTEL that Section 18 of the Limitation Act was inapplicable.

Facts:

The appellants are legal representatives of the original landowner and challenged the possession of surplus land taken over by the state through a Possession Panchanama dated March 20, 1986. They pursued various legal remedies, including seeking exemption under different sections of the Urban Land Act and filing writ petitions.

Issues:

Whether the appellants' delayed challenges to the possession actions were barred by laches.

Whether the appellants' writ petition filed after a lapse of 14 years was maintainable.

Held:

The appellants had pursued multiple legal avenues, but their actions were marked by delays and laches. They initially withdrew exemption applications and later filed for exemptions under other sections. The appellants also failed to challenge the possession actions in a timely manner. Despite the state's clear assertion of having taken possession, the appellants did not challenge the possession actions until much later. Additionally, the appellants filed a writ petition in the name of a deceased individual's Power of Attorney holder, not realizing the authority had ended upon the individual's demise. The court held that the appellants' challenges lacked merit due to their own delayed actions and dismissed the appeal.

Decision: The court upheld the impugned order, concluding that the appellants' writ petition filed after a significant delay was barred by laches. The court agreed with the High Court's decision and ruled against the appellants.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 alleged taking a term loan from Punjab National Bank (PNB) and disputed various financial transactions. PNB denied these allegations, asserting the documents provided were forged.

Issues:

The authenticity of the loan and transactions, whether the case was suitable for a writ petition, and whether the High Court erred in its decisions.

Held:

The judgment of the single Judge of the High Court lacked proper analysis and was disposed of casually. The Division Bench repeated this error. The Division Bench failed to analyze the bank's denial of the agreement's existence and the documents provided.

The District Magistrate's affidavit denied the existence of certain proceedings. The High Court disregarded these complex factual aspects.

In cases involving complex factual questions, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions but refer parties to alternative remedies, like a civil suit.

Decision: The impugned decisions of the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Facts:

The suit was filed by the Plaintiff, Ratnagiri Nagar Parishad, seeking a permanent injunction against State authorities to restrain them from commencing a solid waste disposal project. The Plaintiff challenged the Project at its nascent stage.

Issues:

Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit concerning environmental issues, given the establishment of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.

Whether an injunction could be granted under Sections 41(f) and 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, considering the circumstances of the case.

Whether the Plaintiffs had fulfilled the burden of proof required to establish actionable nuisance.

Held:

The suit was filed prior to the establishment of the NGT and even after the establishment of the NGT, the civil court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit involving environmental issues. The suit should have been transferred to the NGT for adjudication under Section 29 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 and the precedent set by the Bhopal Gas Case. (Para 13)

The Plaintiffs' suit suffered from a fundamental deficiency as it did not challenge the decisions of the competent authority regarding the Project. Relief of permanent injunction simpliciter was not sufficient. The suit should have been dismissed at the threshold. (Paras 14 and 15)

The possibility of harm due to the proposed Project was insufficient to grant an injunction. The Plaintiffs failed to meet their initial burden of proof to establish actionable nuisance. Equally efficacious relief could be obtained through other modes of proceedings as provided under Sections 41(f) and 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. (Paras 17 and 18)

The trial court had rightly found that the Plaintiffs failed to substantiate their case of actionable nuisance. The appellate court's findings were based on assumptions and conjectures, shifting the burden of proof improperly. (Para 16)

The civil suit should have been dismissed, allowing affected parties to make representations to appropriate authorities and seek remedies as permissible by law. (Para 19)

Facts:

The complainant party used an old path through the fields of the accused parties, leading to a dispute over passage rights. A confrontation ensued on the day of the incident, where the accused, armed with weapons, attacked the complainant party. Accused No. 5 struck the victim on the head with a weapon, leading to the victim's death. Accused parties were convicted under various IPC sections, including Section 302 IPC (murder) by the Trial Court.

Issues:

Whether the accused were the aggressors or acting in self-defense.

Whether the conviction of accused No. 5 should be converted from Section 302 IPC to Section 326 IPC.

Held:

The Court carefully reviewed the evidence and judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court, concluding that the accused party was the aggressor in the incident. The accused, who were armed with weapons, were hiding and waiting for the complainant party to arrive. Accused No. 5's blow to the victim's head was intended to cause death. The Court found no evidence to support the claim of self-defense and disagreed with the High Court's reasoning.

The Court held that the incident was not provoked by the complainant party's unauthorized entry onto the fields but was rather instigated by the accused party's aggression. The victim's death resulted from a single fatal blow to the head, which was intended to cause death or serious bodily injury. Therefore, the Court modified the High Court and Trial Court judgments, convicting accused No. 5 under Section 304-I and Section 148 IPC.

FACTS:

The appellant filed a suit seeking to declare a compromise decree as illegal and obtained through fraud, also requesting an injunction. The compromise decree had been passed by the High Court, and the appellant was not a party to it. The appellant claimed rights based on a sale deed executed before the compromise decree.

ISSUES:

Whether the suit challenging the compromise decree's validity is maintainable.

Applicability of Order 23 Rule 3A CPC.

Whether the appellant has a right to question the compromise decree.

Validity of the appellant's claim based on a sale deed.

HELD:

The Court discussed the relevant legal provisions and established the legislative intent behind the amendments to Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3A CPC. The Court concluded that:

A suit to set aside a compromise decree on the ground of unlawfulness is barred under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC.

The purpose of compromise decrees is to avoid further litigation and promote finality of decisions.

The appellant, being a stranger to the compromise decree, cannot challenge its validity in a separate suit. Only the court that passed the decree can examine its validity.

The appellant's suit before the civil court was not maintainable due to the specific bar under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC.

The Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the appellant's remedy was to approach the court that passed the compromise decree. The appellant's claim based on the sale deed should be considered in light of the findings of the lower courts.

REFERRED CASES:

Pushpa Devi Bhagat(Dead) Through LR Sadhna Rai(Smt) vs. Rajinder Singh and Others, 2005(5) SCC 566

R. Rajanna vs. S.R. Venkataswamy and Others, 2014(15) SCC 471

Facts:

The appellant's father, an employee of the first respondent, passed away while in service on June 16, 2004. Despite having applied for retirement on medical grounds prior to his death, the approval of the retirement application was granted only on June 17, 2004, with retroactive effect from April 8, 2003. The appellant sought compassionate appointment following his father's demise.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the appellant's application for compassionate appointment based on the age limit clause of the policy, under the circumstances mentioned, was valid?

Held:

The Court found merit in the appellant's contention that the age limit clause of the policy should not be applicable in this case. It was held that the application for retirement on medical grounds was approved after the employee's death, rendering the age limit clause irrelevant. The Court referred to clause 2(a) of the policy, which pertains to government servants who pass away while in service, leaving their family in immediate need of assistance.

The Court directed that the appellant's application for compassionate appointment should be reconsidered based on its observations. The authorities were mandated to communicate their final decision to the appellant within three months from the date of the order. In the event that compassionate appointment is granted, no arrears of salary would be payable, and the appellant would be entitled to salary from the date of joining service.

It was further ordered that a copy of the decision be forwarded by the State Government of Himachal Pradesh to the Standing Counsel, who would include the copy in the record of the proceedings.

The appeal was allowed in accordance with the terms described in the previous paragraphs.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of the applicability of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 to co-operative banks. The central question revolves around whether co-operative banks, registered under state legislation and multi-state co-operative societies, fall under the purview of the Act and the constitutional provisions related to banking.

Issues:

Whether co-operative banks registered under state legislation and multi-state co-operative societies are governed by legislation related to Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.

Whether co-operative banks involved in banking activities can be considered within the definition of a "Banking Company" under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

Whether the recovery procedure prescribed under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act is applicable to co-operative banks.

Whether the Constitutional provisions inserted by the Constitution (Ninety Seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, support the interpretation that co-operative banks fall under Entry 45 of List I.

Held:

The Court held that co-operative banks registered under state legislation and multi-state co-operative societies with respect to banking activities are governed by legislation related to Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. Co-operative banks engaged in aspects of incorporation, regulation, and winding up that fall outside Entry 45 are governed by the legislation related to Entry 32 of List II.

Co-operative banks engaged in banking activities fall within the definition of a "Banking Company" under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. They are covered under Entry 45 of List I and must comply with the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and other applicable legislation.

The Court ruled that recovery is an essential part of banking, and therefore, the recovery procedure under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, a legislation related to Entry 45 of List I, is applicable to co-operative banks.

The Constitutional provisions introduced by the Constitution (Ninety Seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, make a clear distinction between co-operative banks and other co-operative societies. Co-operative banks are governed by Entry 45 of List I, and the BR Act, 1949, and RBI Act under Entry 38 of List I are applicable to them.

Facts:

The case revolved around the classification of car mats by M/S. Uni Products India Ltd. The question was whether these car mats should be classified as parts and accessories (Chapter 87) or as textile floor coverings (Chapter 57) under the Central Excise Tariff Act.

Issues:

The appropriate classification of car mats: Chapter 57 (textile floor coverings) or Chapter 87 (parts and accessories). The dispute arose from the difference in excise duty rates between the two classifications.

Held :

The Commissioner argued that car mats should be classified under Chapter 87 due to their use as parts and accessories for cars. However, the Tribunal and the Court upheld the respondent's contention that car mats should be classified under Chapter 57. The Court referred to the HSN Explanatory Notes, recognizing their strong persuasive value, to analyze the proper classification.

The Court emphasized that the common parlance test and other similar tools for interpretation are applicable when an item could be classified under more than one heading. In this case, the Explanatory Notes provided guidance for classification. The Court noted Chapter Note 1 of Chapter 57, which stipulated that textile materials serving as the exposed surface of the article when in use should be considered as carpets and floor coverings.

The Court further highlighted the exclusion of "textile carpets" from parts and accessories under Section XVII of the Explanatory Notes, confirming that car mats should be classified under Chapter 57. The argument that car mats were designed exclusively for cars was not sufficient to transplant them to the residual entry under Chapter 87.

Therefore, the Court sustained the Tribunal's decision, classifying car mats under Chapter 57 (textile floor coverings) rather than Chapter 87 (parts and accessories) of the Central Excise Tariff Act.