Facts:

The case involves the respondent, M/S. Bombay Machinery Store, and the issue revolves around the movement of goods, delivery, and taxation under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Goods were delivered to a carrier for transmission, and circulars by the Tax Administration of the State imposed a timeframe for delivery to determine the applicability of exemptions.

Issues:

• Whether a timeframe imposed by circulars for delivery of goods to a carrier is permissible under the first explanation to Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956?
• Whether the concept of constructive delivery applies under Section 3 of the Act?
• Whether the interpretation given in a previous case, Arjan Dass Gupta and Brothers v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi Administration, is applicable to the present case?

Held:

The first explanation to Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, creates a legal fiction where the movement of goods terminates when delivery is taken from a carrier. The provision does not specify a timeframe for delivery. Therefore, fixing a timeframe through circulars is impermissible.

The concept of constructive delivery does not apply under Section 3 of the Act. The movement of goods terminates only when actual delivery is taken from the carrier.

The interpretation in Arjan Dass Gupta and Brothers v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi Administration, does not align with the correct interpretation of Section 3 of the 1956 Act.

Decision: The High Court's judgments in favor of the respondent in various appeals are not interfered with, and the appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The case revolves around the disconnection of electricity supply to M/S Iceberg Industries Ltd. by the Bihar State Electricity Board due to non-payment or partial payment of bills, specifically Annual Minimum Guarantee (AMG) charges. The company's supply was disconnected despite an order of stay from the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, which resulted in legal proceedings.

Issues:

• Whether the company, M/S Iceberg Industries Ltd., qualifies as a "consumer" under the Electricity Act, 2003.
• The legality of disconnecting the electricity supply in defiance of the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum's order.
• Whether the company was liable to pay AMG charges during the period of disconnection.
• Interpretation and applicability of Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003, in the context of disconnection.

Held:

The term 'consumer' is defined under Section 2(15) of the Electricity Act, 2003. The respondent company, M/S Iceberg Industries Ltd., satisfies this definition as the consumption of electricity was for its own factory. Thus, the company retains the right to approach the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum. (Paragraphs 10-11)

The disconnection of the company's electricity supply, despite the stay order from the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, was found to be impermissible. The Board should not have disregarded the forum's directive and proceeded with the disconnection. (Paragraph 12)

The question of whether the company was required to pay AMG charges during the disconnection period was addressed. The Forum referred to Circular No. 477 dated 29.10.2002 (General Terms and Conditions of Supply) and partly favored the company's stance that the Board could not charge AMG during the disconnection period. The Court upheld this finding regarding the interpretation of the circular. (Paragraphs 13, 15-16)

Under Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003, disconnection of supply is a special power granted to the supplier. While the company's request for installment payment was initially seen as a plea for mercy, the fact that the company eventually agreed to make installment payments and entered into an agreement to clear the dues demonstrated its willingness to pay the dues. The act of disconnection on September 8, 2006, was considered arbitrary. The Board's appeals have been dismissed. The decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court remains valid. All related applications have been resolved. No costs shall be imposed. (Paragraphs 19-21)

Facts:

Aishwarya Atul Pusalkar, the appellant, sought to enforce her right to reside in her matrimonial home, which was comprised of two flats in a redeveloped building. The building's reconstruction was undertaken under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, with provisions for rehabilitation of displaced occupants.

Issues:

• Whether the appellant's claim for the right to reside in her matrimonial home falls within the purview of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976.
• Whether the appellant's claim to reside in her matrimonial home is valid under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Held:

The court observed that the appellant's right to reside in her matrimonial home is grounded in her status as a wife, as recognized under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. However, the court emphasized that her claim to residence does not directly arise from the provisions of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976.

The court ruled that the appellant's claim must be adjudicated by the appropriate legal forum, such as the Civil Court or the Family Court, as her right to reside in her matrimonial home is distinct from the statutory rehabilitation provisions. The court also directed the appellant and the respondent to take certain actions, including verifying the availability of a specific flat for the appellant's residence.

The court held that the appellant's claim cannot be enforced through a writ jurisdiction and that she should pursue her claim through the appropriate legal channels.

All connected applications are disposed of.

FACTS:

Yum! Restaurants (Marketing) Private Limited (YRMPL), a fully-owned subsidiary of Yum! Restaurants (India) Private Limited (YRIPL), was incorporated to undertake Advertising, Marketing, and Promotion (AMP) activities for YRIPL and its franchisees. YRMPL received contributions from both members (franchisees) and non-members (Pepsi Foods Ltd.). YRMPL claimed tax exemption based on the doctrine of mutuality.

ISSUES:

• Whether YRMPL qualifies as a mutual concern, thereby exempting its transactions from tax liability under the doctrine of mutuality.

HELD:

The doctrine of mutuality has three conditions/tests: common identity, completeness of identity, and impossibility of profits. YRMPL failed to meet these conditions:

Common Identity – YRMPL accepted contributions from both members (franchisees) and non-members (Pepsi Foods Ltd.), violating the principle of common identity. The transaction lost its mutual character when non-members contributed to the fund.

Completeness of Identity – YRMPL's receipt of money from non-members (Pepsi Foods Ltd.) without allowing them to participate as beneficiaries in the surplus violated the completeness of identity requirement.

Test of Non-profiteering and Obedience to Mandate – YRMPL's acceptance of contributions from Pepsi Foods Ltd. and its inability to demonstrate obedience to the mandate of mutuality and non-profiteering contravened this test.

Impossibility of Profits – YRMPL's arrangement allowed one member (YRIPL) to control the operations to the detriment of others (franchisees), making it impossible for other members to derive profits.

Due to these failures, YRMPL did not qualify as a mutual concern and was not eligible for tax exemption under the doctrine of mutuality.

CONCLUSION: Yum! Restaurants (Marketing) Private Limited (YRMPL) did not qualify as a mutual concern under the doctrine of mutuality due to its acceptance of contributions from both members and non-members, its failure to adhere to the mandate of mutuality and non-profiteering, and the ability of one member (YRIPL) to control operations to the detriment of others (franchisees). Consequently, YRMPL's claim for tax exemption under the doctrine of mutuality was denied.

Facts:

Applications were invited for the appointment of Sub Inspector of Police (Trainee) by the Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC). The KPSC published the first Ranked List (RL-I) on 11.09.2013, and subsequent selections were made based on this list. A challenge was made to the unified/consolidated ranked list, leading to legal proceedings.

Issues:

• The validity and applicability of RL-I, the interpretation of Rule 13 of the Kerala Public Service Commission Rules of Procedure, and the subsequent advice and appointments made by KPSC.

Held:

The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had the competence to finally decide the case under Section 7 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. The Full Bench analyzed the factual matrix and found that the first Ranked List (RL-I) published on 11.09.2013, ceased to operate on 01.06.2016, in accordance with Rule 13. The interim order passed by the Tribunal on 05.12.2013, did not interdict the operation of RL-I. The final advice from RL-I was made on 11.11.2015, and the last batch of candidates joined training on 01.05.2016, triggering the application of the first proviso to Rule 13.

Therefore, the appellants' claim based on RL-I was not valid for vacancies reported after 01.06.2016. Such vacancies should be filled from candidates in the fresh Ranked List (RL-II published on 26.05.2015 or RL-III published on 14.03.2019).

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between Seth Group and Mittal Group, both parties of a Joint Venture (JV) Company. The JV Company had acquired land including Sector 89, Faridabad, with the intent to develop it. Disputes arose over liabilities and development rights, leading to litigation, including Writ Petitions. A MoS was executed on May 4, 2015, outlining obligations. The Seth Group alleged that the Mittal Group did not fulfill their obligations as per the MoS and court orders, deliberately and intentionally.

Issues:

• Whether the Mittal Group willfully failed to fulfill their obligations under the MoS and court orders, leading to contempt of court proceedings.

Held:

 The court analyzed the clauses of the MoS and the respective obligations of the parties. The Seth Group was found to have complied with their obligations, except for depositing a specific amount (Rs. 25.27 crores) toward liabilities. The Mittal Group failed to fulfill their obligations under clauses 1.2, 5.3, and 8 of the MoS. Specifically, they did not deposit the balance amount for the EDC liability of Rs. 59.05 crores.

The court noted that the Seth Group's liability was limited to their share of the land (Rs. 25.27 crores), and the balance was to be paid by the Mittal Group/JV Company. The Mittal Group's non-compliance affected license renewals and rendered the MoS unworkable. The court provided a two-month extension for the Mittal Group to fulfill their obligations, failing which contempt proceedings would be initiated.

The respondent purchased a "Transit Marine Insurance Policy" to cover the transportation of a helicopter from Langley, Canada to Bhopal, India. The policy specified the transit route, and the helicopter was transported in a knocked-down state to New Delhi. Subsequent damage was reported during inspection and assembly at New Delhi. The respondent claimed coverage under the policy for the reported damages.

Issues:

• Whether the damage occurred during the ordinary course of transit as defined by the policy.
• Whether the unpacking, assembly, and storage of the helicopter at New Delhi fell within the scope of coverage.
• Impact of altering the nature of the cargo on insurance coverage.
• Burden of proof on the respondent to establish loss during transit.

Held:

The insurance cover is tied to the voyage itself and extends from the time the cargo leaves the warehouse until the end of the ordinary course of transit. The expression "in the ordinary course of transit" depends on context and includes interruptions incidental to or in furtherance of transportation.

Unpacking, assembly, and storage of the helicopter at New Delhi terminated the ordinary course of transit. The policy covered only risks associated with transportation, not flight or operation.

Changing the nature of the cargo from knocked-down to ready-to-fly state exposed insurer to unanticipated risks, ending policy coverage.

Burden of proof lies with the insured to show loss during transit within policy terms. A mere assertion is insufficient; proximate cause must be demonstrated.

Decision: The appeals were allowed. The court held that the insurance coverage ended when the cargo was unpacked, assembled, and stored at New Delhi. The nature of the cargo was altered, exposing the insurer to risks beyond the policy's scope. The respondent failed to establish that the reported damages occurred during transit and within policy terms.

Facts:

Appellant's land was acquired in 1973 for the benefit of the respondent company.

Parties reached an agreement to retain a portion of the land and sell the rest, subject to arbitration for price determination.

An arbitrator's award determined the price of the land in 1985.

Respondent sought execution of the award, including directing the appellant to execute a sale deed.

Issues:

• Could the award be independently executed?
• Could the respondent claim execution of the sale deed based on the award?

Held:

The award was only for the determination of the price of the land and not for enforcing the agreement. (Para 30)

The award was merely declaratory of the price of the land, subject to the agreement. The relief for execution of the sale deed based on the award was outside the realm of law.The respondent abandoned its direct claim for execution of the sale deed under the agreement by withdrawing the suit.

Execution of an award can only be for what has been awarded or decreed and not beyond it. The award in this case only declared the price of the land. Going beyond the decree to change the nature of the case was not permissible. The award did not constitute a conclusive contract for execution. (Para 32)

The High Court's judgment was quashed. The appellant was directed to pay specified amounts to the respondent for litigation costs and expenses. (Para 38, 44-46, 48)

Accordingly, this appeal stands allowed in terms of the directions given hereinabove.

Plaintiffs filed a civil suit seeking a declaration and injunction based on a will dated 20.05.1991, asserting ownership rights in certain properties. Defendants challenged the genuineness of the will. The Trial Court decided in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue of the will's authenticity, but the High Court reversed that decision, questioning the unusual features of the will.

Issues:

• The authenticity of the will. The High Court found unnatural and unusual features in the document, leading to doubts about its genuineness. The question arose whether these features were sufficient to conclude that the will was not genuine.

Held:

The High Court observed several unnatural circumstances and abnormalities in the document. These included using different sheets of paper, inconsistent signature placement, different pens for signatures, missing signatures on certain pages, blank spaces, incorrect property descriptions, and an unusual recital of a past event as a future happening. The High Court's findings were supported by the evidence on record. The observations and findings of the High Court were upheld by the Supreme Court.

The document exhibited four unusual features: typewritten on different sheets, irregular placement of signatures, different pens for signatures, and missing signatures on some pages. While some individual abnormal features might occur in document preparation, the cumulative presence of these features casts doubt on the document's genuineness.

Beyond abnormalities, the document contained errors, inconsistencies, and even mystical elements, such as mentioning a past event as future and referring to accidents that eventually occurred after the will's date. These factors magnified the doubts about the document.

While the appellants stressed adherence to legal requirements for execution, including testimony of witnesses, the mere compliance with these formalities does not overcome doubts arising from suspicious circumstances. In cases of suspicious documents, compliance with legal formalities might not prove genuineness.

The document failed the basic question from H. Venkatachala Iyengar: whether the testator signed the will. Additionally, the document did not meet the requirements of Section 63(b) of the Indian Succession Act. Given these observations, it wasn't necessary to delve into other shortcomings in the plaintiffs' case.

The court discussed the power of remand by the Appellate Court. It highlighted that remand should not be a routine measure and should be considered only when a re-trial is necessary after reversing a decree on appeal. Remand elongates litigation and should be used judiciously.