Facts:

The impugned regulation, Telecom Consumers Protection (Ninth Amendment) Regulations, 2015, mandated cellular mobile telephone service providers to credit consumers for call drops.

The Cellular Operators Association of India challenged the validity of the amendment, asserting it violated the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997.

Issues:

Whether the amendment is consistent with the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997.

Whether the amendment infringes fundamental rights under Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Whether the amendment is manifestly arbitrary and violates the regulatory process.

Held:

The power to make the Impugned Regulation is traced to Section 36(1) of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997. The Regulation-making power is non-delegable and must be consistent with the Act. The Impugned Regulation is not referable to Section 11(1)(b)(i) and (v) as it does not ensure compliance with license terms or lay down quality of service standards.

The Impugned Regulation does not carry out the purposes of the Act and is ultra vires. The Authority's functions, as laid down in Section 11, are not aligned with the source of power mentioned in the Impugned Regulation.

The Impugned Regulation does not carry out the purpose of the Act and is ultra vires. It violates the balance sought by the Act for orderly growth in the telecom sector.

Subordinate legislation must not be manifestly arbitrary, and it can be challenged on grounds applicable to plenary legislation.

The State, under Article 19(6), must conform to the tests of reasonable restriction and public interest. The Impugned Regulation, though brought in the interest of the public, is manifestly arbitrary and violates Article 14 and 19(1)(g).

The Impugned Regulation, besides the general public interest, must pass the separate test of not being manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable. It must be a result of intelligent care and deliberation.

The basis for the Impugned Regulation, assuming service providers are 100% at fault for call drops, is contradicted by technical data, making it manifestly arbitrary.

The doctrine of reading down cannot apply to the definite and unambiguous language of the Impugned Regulation.

The plea that the Regulation may be administered reasonably does not save an otherwise invalid statute.

The Regulation does not accord with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the TRAI Act, 1997. Motive aside, means must be as pure as ends for regulations to pass constitutional muster.

Profits or losses of service providers are irrelevant to determining the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of the Regulation.

The appellants did not approach the Court in haste, and the Regulation would have affected their rights from January 1, 2016.

The claim that the Regulation is an experimental measure is incorrect, as the Explanatory Memorandum only suggests a review after six months if found necessary.

The Quality of Service Regulations and Consumer Regulations must be read together to test their reasonableness.

Penalizing a service provider complying with another Regulation from the same source of power is manifestly arbitrary and violates Articles 14 and 19(1)(g).

Strict penal liability without establishing fault is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable.

The notion of notional compensation is without basis, and the Regulation lacks intelligent care and deliberation.

The Authority's recognition of fault distribution in a technical paper after the Regulation shows manifest arbitrariness.

The Regulation is manifestly arbitrary, violating Article 14 and being an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g).

The Regulation avoids adjudicatory processes, legislates penalties without proof, and is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable.

Interference with license conditions without legal authority renders the Regulation invalid.

Facts:

Commissioner of Income Tax-1, Mumbai, passed an order under Section 263.

The order was challenged by the Revenue in the High Court.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

The case involved issues related to the assessment order for the year 2001-2002.

Issues:

Whether the Commissioner's revisional power was rightly exercised under Section 263.

Whether the withdrawal of the claim for additional expenses justified further inquiry.

Whether the High Court's decision to dismiss the appeal was justified.

Held:

The court held that the Commissioner was justified in his conclusions, and the Tribunal and High Court should not have interfered.

Withdrawal of the claim did not preclude further inquiry, and the Assessing Officer should have examined the matter regarding the actual incurring of additional expenses and their sources.

The court allowed the Revenue's appeal, setting aside the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court, and restored the Commissioner's order. The appeals are disposed of.

Facts:

In 2002, Chandigarh Administration notified the rules for the Allotment of Small Campus Site in Chandigarh Information Services Park. Rule 9 of these rules prohibited the transfer of the campus site by the allottee for a period of 10 years from the date of allotment. The respondent, M/S. ESYS Information Technologies Pvt. Ltd., was allotted a 6-acre land in 2006 with similar conditions. The estate officer canceled the allotment in 2008, alleging a violation of Rule 9 and Clause 15 of the allotment letter, as the respondent had transferred a significant portion of shares to another company in Dubai without permission.

Issues:

The violation of Rule 9 and Clause 15, the subsequent cancellation of the allotment, and the legality of the resumption of the allotted land.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision setting aside the orders of resumption was not sustainable. The respondent was found guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi for violating the court's order regarding disclosure. The Court concluded that there was a clear violation of Rule 9 and Clause 15, justifying the resumption of the allotted land by the appellant (Estate Officer). The appeal was allowed, and each party was directed to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The case involves 16 accused individuals charged under multiple sections of the law for their alleged involvement in a serial bomb blast in different trains. Confessional statements of the accused were recorded, and the charges include offenses under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, Explosive Substance Act, 1908, Explosives Act, 1884, Railways Act, 1989, and Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.

Issues:

The admissibility and reliability of confessional statements, the proper invocation of provisions under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, and the validity of prior approval from the District Superintendent of Police.

Held:

Prior Approval under TADA (Para 42): According to Section 20-A(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police is mandatory before recording information about offenses under TADA. The absence of such approval renders further proceedings under TADA invalid.

Validity of TADA Provisions Invocation (Para 46): The Designated Court found improper invocation of TADA provisions in certain cases, leading to the invalidity of confessions recorded in those cases. Proper invocation is crucial for the legal sanction of confessions under TADA.

Valid Invocation in Present Cases (Para 53, 54, 55): The registration of the crime under TADA in Hyderabad was deemed valid, and the invocation of TADA provisions was correct. Contemporaneous documentation supported the proper invocation of TADA provisions.

Confessions and Their Admissibility (Para 60): Section 15(1) of TADA makes confessions recorded by a Police Officer admissible. Confessions meeting statutory requirements and conditions are admissible against the maker, co-accused, abettor, or conspirator. However, caution is advised regarding reliability, especially against co-accused.

Individual Assessment of Accused (Para 71): The confessional statements of certain accused (A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-7, A-14, A-15, and A-16) were deemed admissible and established the prosecution's case against them. Their convictions were affirmed. However, for other accused (A-5, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, and A-13), their confessions were unreliable, leading to the setting aside of their convictions.

Role of Accused Individuals (Para 71.2 to 71.6): The court individually assessed the roles of accused individuals (A-5, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-13) and found insufficient evidence to support their convictions. The convictions and sentences of A-8, A-9, A-10, and A-13 were set aside.

Decision: The appeals of Accused Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 13 were allowed, and their convictions and sentences were set aside. The convictions and sentences of Accused Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 14, 15, and 16 were maintained. The case against A-5, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, and A-13 was not proven, leading to the setting aside of their convictions.

Facts:

The case originated from a government order dated July 11, 1986, providing exemption from building tax for hotels in Kerala. In response, Section 3A was added to the Kerala Buildings Tax Act, 1975. The appellant, M/S Manuelsons Hotels Private Limited, constructed a hotel based on this assurance. However, the government, on February 6, 1997, denied the promised concession, citing the omission of Section 3A.

Issues:

The validity of the government's denial of the concession promised in the government order, the legislative history of Section 3A, and the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

Held:

The court held that Section 3A was enacted by the Kerala legislature, conferring the power to grant exemption from building tax from November 6, 1990, to March 1, 1993. The non-issuance of a notification under Section 3A during this period was deemed arbitrary. The doctrine of promissory estoppel applied, and the government's failure to fulfill its promise was considered unconscionable. Relief was granted for the period when Section 3A was in force, but no relief was allowed post-March 1, 1993, due to the absence of a statutory provision.

Decision: The court partially allowed the appeal, ruling that no building tax was payable by the appellants for the period when Section 3A was in force (November 6, 1990, to March 1, 1993). However, no relief was granted for the period post-March 1, 1993, when Section 3A was deleted and no statutory provision for exemption existed.

Facts:

The Court noted a lack of will on the part of the mentioned states in acknowledging and addressing the potential drought situation. Despite information available since October 2015 regarding several districts facing varying degrees of drought, no preparatory steps were taken by the states.

Issues:

The Court was the failure of the states to disclose full facts about the prevailing conditions and their apparent lack of readiness to tackle a possible disaster.

Held:

The Court held that the ostrich-like attitude of the state governments compelled it to make comments about their concern. In response, the Court directed the Union of India to constitute a National Disaster Response Force within six months from the date of the decision, with an appropriate and regular cadre strength.

Decision: The Court ordered the Union of India to take immediate action in establishing the National Disaster Response Force, emphasizing the importance of preparedness in the face of potential disasters. This decision aimed to address the negligence of the states in responding to the known drought-like conditions.

Facts:

A. Sivaprakash (Appellant) was implicated in a case under Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The charges were related to the alleged misuse of official position in issuing a letter (Ex.P/16(a)) in connection with a JRY Scheme Work, leading to pecuniary advantage.

Issues:

Whether the appellant misused his official position to obtain pecuniary advantage.

Whether the prosecution established a causal connection between the release of payment and the letter issued by the appellant.

Held:

The court set aside the conviction of the appellant, emphasizing the lack of evidence establishing a causal connection between the release of payment and the letter issued by the appellant.

It was noted that there was no proof of what kind of pecuniary advantage the appellant obtained in issuing the letter.

The circular related to the JRY Scheme Work was interpreted, arguing that the appellant had no role in the Panchayat's payment to A-3.

The court highlighted that the prosecution failed to prove essential ingredients for conviction under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Reference to relevant circulars and regulations supported the argument that 50% payment release was not contingent upon the stage of execution but on the start of the work.

The nature of Ex.P/16(a) was considered, with the court pointing out that there was no causal connection between payment release and the letter.

The court relied on precedent cases, including C. Chenga Reddy vs. State of A.P. and Abdulla Mohd. Pagarkar vs. State, to emphasize that codal violations and irregularities are not sufficient to prove criminal cases.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a complaint against Balveer Singh and another, where the police report did not include the appellants as accused persons. The complainant filed an application before the Magistrate, seeking cognizance against the appellants, which was rejected. The Magistrate limited cognizance to the son of the appellants.

Issues:

The interpretation of Sections 190 and 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically concerning the power of the Court of Session to take cognizance after a case has been committed to it by the Magistrate.

Held:

Section 190 Empowers Magistrate to Take Cognizance Section 190 empowers Magistrates to take cognizance of any offense, including those triable by the Court of Session. However, when the case is committed to the Court of Session by the Magistrate under Section 193, the Court of Session takes cognizance "as a Court of original jurisdiction." The order passed by the Magistrate while committing the case does not amount to taking cognizance by the Court of Session.( Para 8 to 11)

Magistrate's Active Role in Cognizance In this case, the Magistrate rejected the complainant's application after due consideration, limiting cognizance to the son of the appellants. This indicates an active role played by the Magistrate, who did not simply forward the application to the Sessions Court.( Para 21)

Judicial Review Considering the proper opportunity given to the appellants to present their case and the Sessions Court's hearing of their arguments, there is no reason mentioned to interfere with the impugned order.( Para 22)

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Sessions Court's order in this case.

Facts:

The appellant filed Title Suit No.195 of 1998 seeking specific performance of an agreement dated 25.8.1992 with the respondent.

The dispute arose over the interpretation of the term "built-up area" mentioned in the agreement.

The appellant claimed half of the built-up area on the ground floor, mezzanine floor, and the complete built-up area on the first floor of a proposed complex.

Issues:

Whether the parties had entered into an agreement knowing that 'built-up area' included common areas.

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance as claimed.

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a money decree.

Held:

The High Court, relying on a letter from the appellant, concluded that the built-up area includes common areas.

The Supreme Court found that subsequent letters from the respondent accepted the appellant's definition of "built-up area," excluding common areas.

It is not a case where the appellant resiled from the agreement; the respondent changed its stand and agreed to the appellant's position.

The Court, referring to Section 5 of the Indian Contract Act, held that the respondent cannot resile from the mutually agreed position.

The High Court's finding on the built-up area was set aside, and the trial court's decision was restored.

The trial court was directed to calculate the built-up area in line with the judgment and dispose of the suit expeditiously.