Revision of Pay Scale – Pension Entitlement: The appellants, retired Assistant Professors and a College Librarian, were entitled to revised pension benefits as per the Manipur Services (Revised Pay) Rules 2010. The Office Memorandum dated December 24, 2011, which purported to clarify a subsisting anomaly, was deemed to encroach upon the acquired or vested rights of the retirees. Such clarificatory orders cannot override orders having statutory strength [Paras 1-18]​​.

Office Memorandum and Vested Rights: The Court held that the Office Memorandum of December 24, 2011, could not alter the benefits under the Order of August 12, 2011. The appellants were entitled to revised pension benefits from April 1, 2010, as recognized by Clause 7 of the Order of August 12, 2011. The State Government’s contention that the benefit of revised pension should be from November 1, 2010, was rejected [Paras 1-18]​​.

Constitutional Provisions – Article 309: The revisions and orders made under Article 309 of the Constitution hold statutory strength. The Office Memorandum of May 5, 2010, and subsequent orders under Article 309 were binding and provided vested rights that could not be overridden by administrative orders [Paras 1-18]​​.

Decision: The appeal was allowed. The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court was set aside, and the Single Judge’s order, which granted the benefit of revised pension from April 1, 2010, was restored​​.

Suspension and Departmental Proceedings – Authority of Commissioner: The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner of the KDM Corporation had the power to suspend or initiate departmental proceedings against an AMC, an officer superior in rank to the Assistant Commissioner. This authority is derived from a harmonious construction of subsection (9) of Section 2, Sections 39A, and 56 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (MMC) Act. The requirement is to report the suspension to the Corporation with reasons, and if not confirmed within six months, the suspension ends [Paras 1-18] .

High Court’s Error – Legislative Intent: The High Court erred in setting aside the suspension and departmental proceedings initiated against the AMC. The legislative intent indicated that the Commissioner and Corporation had the authority to act against officers, including AMCs, to avoid absurd and anomalous situations where misconduct goes unaddressed due to jurisdictional issues [Paras 1-18] .

Principles of Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious Construction: The Court emphasized that statutory provisions must be interpreted to avoid conflicts and redundancies, ensuring all provisions work cohesively. The broader interpretation preserving the legislation’s workability and efficacy was preferred over a narrower one leading to futility [Paras 1-18] .

Decision: The appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The writ petition by the respondent was dismissed, and the departmental proceedings were directed to be completed within four months. The respondent would remain suspended until the proceedings' conclusion .

Genuineness of Execution of Will: Under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the genuineness of a Will's execution must be established without considering whether the distribution by the testator was fair and equitable among all children. The Court should not apply Article 14 to dispositions under a Will​​.

Suspicious Circumstances – High Court's Findings: The High Court identified several suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Wills, including discrepancies in the evidence about the timing and registration of the father’s Will, the exclusion of the daughter from the bequests, and minor contradictions in witness testimonies. However, the Supreme Court found these reasons insufficient to invalidate the Wills​​.

Court’s Approach – Previous Judgments: The Supreme Court referenced its previous decisions in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Kavita Kanwar v. Mrs. Pamela Mehta and Ors. to emphasize that the mental capacity of the testator and the absence of sound and disposing state of mind are critical factors in evaluating suspicious circumstances, not merely the exclusion of some heirs or the presence of minor discrepancies​​.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the probate granted by the Principal District Court. It ruled that the High Court had overlooked crucial aspects and unjustifiably created suspicion where none existed. The Wills executed by the parents were held valid, and the probate was confirmed​​.

Revisional Jurisdiction under Waqf Act – Section 83(9): Subsection (9) of Section 83 of the Waqf Act confers a narrower revisional jurisdiction on the High Court compared to the jurisdiction of an appellate court. The High Court, in exercising this revisional jurisdiction, must not re-appreciate evidence or decide issues beyond the scope of revision​​.

High Court’s Findings – Rejection of Relief: The High Court found that the Mahal Committee, being an unregistered entity, was not entitled to file a suit. The High Court also noted procedural lapses, such as the suit not being filed in a representative capacity and the absence of a schedule of property. The High Court decreed the respondents' suit in entirety and dismissed the appellants' suit, emphasizing that the evidence on record supported the Salafi Trust’s management and administration of the mosque​​.

Tribunal’s Error – Legal Entity Status: The Waqf Tribunal erroneously treated the Mahal Committee as a legal entity entitled to sue, based on its affiliation with a registered society. The High Court corrected this error under its revisional jurisdiction, stating that a local unit of a registered society without proper authorization to sue cannot maintain a suit​​.

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The Court agreed that the High Court acted within its powers in setting aside the Tribunal's judgment and rightly found procedural and substantive issues in the appellants' claims. There was no ground to interfere with the High Court's decision​​.

Administrative Law – Fairness in Administrative Actions: The Supreme Court emphasized that even if the High Court found the actions of the authorities to be irregular, illegal, or perverse, such findings alone do not imply deliberate action or bad faith on the part of the Assessing Authority. It is necessary to have concrete evidence to impute motives or bad faith​​ .

Service of Notice – Procedural Compliance: The Court observed that while the Assessing Authority must ensure proper service of notice, mere procedural errors do not automatically indicate malafide intentions. In this case, attempts were made to serve notice at both the registered and changed addresses, but the High Court did not accept these as proper service under the rules​​ .

Revisional Jurisdiction – Scope and Limitations: The High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act is narrower than that of an appellate court. The High Court's role is to ensure compliance with the law without re-appreciating evidence or acting beyond its limited revisional powers​​ .

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the adverse observations and directions against the appellant made by the High Court. It held that the strictures and costs imposed were unwarranted as there was no sufficient basis to conclude deliberate or bad faith actions by the appellant. The matter was directed to be closed with annulment of the adverse remarks​​ .

Contract Law – Neglect by Promisee: Section 67 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, stipulates that if the promisee neglects or refuses to provide reasonable facilities for the promisor to perform the promise, the promisor is excused from non-performance. In this case, the High Court’s conclusion that the appellant abandoned the contract was erroneous. The evidence showed the respondents failed to provide essential materials and modified the contract terms without resolving the appellant’s demands for a modified rate​​.

Remand of Case – Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction: The High Court’s decision to remand the case based on perceived abandonment was found unjustified. The Supreme Court reiterated that procedural lapses on the respondent's part excused the appellant from performance, and there was no abandonment​​.

Effect of Non-Performance by Respondent: The refusal of the appellant to continue the work without reciprocal performance from the respondent did not constitute abandonment. The appellant's refusal to perform was deemed a reaction to the respondent’s failure to meet contractual obligations​​.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court’s judgment and restoring the Trial Court’s decree. The bank guarantee provided by the appellant was discharged, affirming the appellant’s claims for the value of work done, idle labor, and other heads​​.

Land Acquisition – Lapse of Proceedings – Section 24 of the 2013 Act: Under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings if the award is not made as of the date of commencement of the 2013 Act (01-01-2014). Compensation must be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act. Section 24(2) provides for deemed lapse if the authorities fail to take possession or pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act's commencement. The period during which interim orders were subsisting must be excluded in this computation​​.

Compensation Tender – Legal Requirements: The obligation to pay compensation under the 1894 Act is complete upon tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The original landowners who refuse compensation or seek higher compensation cannot claim lapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act due to non-payment or non-deposit in court​​.

High Court’s Error – Interim Orders and Exclusion Period: The High Court erred in its decision by not considering the period of the subsistence of interim orders. As clarified in the case of Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Ors., the period during which interim orders were operative must be excluded in computing the five years​​.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court’s judgment. The impugned judgment declaring the land acquisition proceedings as lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act was quashed and set aside. The Court emphasized that proper consideration of interim orders and the correct application of legal principles under the 2013 Act and the 1894 Act were essential​​.

Restitution – Principle and Application: Section 144 of the CPC embodies the principle of restitution, which mandates that no party should benefit from a wrong order of the court once it is set aside by a higher court. This principle ensures that parties are restored to their original position as if the erroneous order had never been passed. The High Court's judgment permitting the State to recover excess amounts paid to the original writ petitioners was upheld based on this principle. The excess amounts were paid pursuant to an order later set aside, and thus, the State's right to recover was affirmed​​.

Study Leave vs. Deputation: The Court clarified that the period of the three-year Nursing Course for in-service candidates cannot be treated as deputation but must be considered leave as per the applicable rules. The original writ petitioners, who were working as ANM, Lab Technicians, Multi-Purpose Workers, Accounts Clerks, or similar posts, sought this benefit, which was initially granted by the Single Judge but later reversed by the Division Bench​​.

Recovery of Excess Payment: The Supreme Court agreed with the Division Bench's decision allowing the recovery of excess amounts paid under the erroneous Single Judge's order. It emphasized that employees cannot retain benefits accrued from a judgment that was subsequently overturned. The recovery should be made in easy equal installments, ensuring that the employees are not unduly burdened​​.

Decision: Appeals dismissed. The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, which set aside the Single Judge's order and allowed the State to recover the excess amount paid to the original writ petitioners, was upheld. The recovery is to be made in thirty-six equal monthly installments starting from April 2022​​.

Mandatory Injunction – Maintainability: A suit for mandatory injunction to execute a sale deed based on participation in a public auction is not maintainable if there is no vested right with the plaintiff. Participation in an auction does not confer any equitable or legal right unless the auction is confirmed by the competent authority​​.

Restitution – Principle and Application: Section 144 of the CPC embodies the principle of restitution, ensuring no party benefits from a wrongful order once set aside. The courts emphasized that restitution requires placing parties in their original position as if the erroneous order had never been passed​​.

Auction Confirmation – Legal Requirements: The approval of an auction by the competent authority, such as the Deputy Commissioner, is necessary for any rights to be vested. An inter-departmental communication without formal approval does not confer any enforceable rights to the highest bidder​​.

Delay and Limitation: The suit for mandatory injunction filed in 2011 for an auction held in 1999 was barred by limitation, as suits for specific performance must be filed within three years of the auction. The courts failed to properly consider the aspect of limitation​​.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts. The Municipal Committee was directed to take possession of the land and the amount paid by the plaintiff was ordered to be forfeited as damages for illegal occupation. The High Court's decision to dismiss the second appeal was deemed a perverse reading of the law and facts​​.