Land Acquisition Act 1894 – Section 4 – Acquisition of land – Compensation – Appellant challenging the imposition of liabilities for unpaid duty, penalty, and interest accrued before the acquisition of the Amroha sugar mill – Slump Sale Agreement clauses interpreted to distinguish between liabilities accruing before and after the signing date – High Court's reliance on generic conditions of contingent liabilities set aside – Specific clauses in the Sale Deed governing the parties upheld – Liability for transactions before the signing date held to be the seller's responsibility [Paras 1-20].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Impugned High Court judgment set aside – Liability for transactions before the signing date of the Slump Sale Agreement to be borne by the seller, not the purchaser [Para 20].

Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 – Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) – Proof of demand and acceptance – In the absence of direct evidence from the complainant, it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution – Demand and acceptance must be proved either by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence – Legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be made only when foundational facts are proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence [Paras A-D].

Decision – Appeals addressed – Legal principles affirmed concerning the proof required for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Land Acquisition Act 1894 – Section 4 – Acquisition of land – Compensation – Claimants not entitled to the same compensation as awarded for lands acquired after 5 years from the date of acquisition – High Court awarding compensation at Rs.297/- per sq. yard unsustainable – Compensation rate revised to Rs.120/- per sq. yard [Paras 1-6].

Decision – Appeal allowed in part – Compensation revised to Rs.120/- per sq. yard – Statutory benefits and interest to be provided excluding the delayed period in preferring the appeal [Para 6].

Insurance contract – Deficiency in service – Home loan sanctioned on pre-condition of life insurance policy – Bank acting as an agent for insurance company – Premium accepted and retained after normal medical test results – Malafide actions by insurance company after death of insured – Ante-dated letter issued post death intimation – Refund of premium followed by repudiation – Clear case of deficiency of service and non-bonafide conduct by respondent – Insurance claim to be processed and payable sum remitted [Paras 1-27].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment set aside – Insurance claim to be processed and payable sum remitted [Para 27].

Criminal Law – Framing of Charge – Failure to Frame Proper Charge – In the case of Kalicharan and others, the accused were charged under Sections 148, 302, and 307 read with Section 149 of IPC – The specific charge framed alleged that Harpal Singh died due to bullet injuries from shots fired by accused no.2 – However, evidence showed Harpal Singh died from injuries caused by sharp weapons used by accused nos.1, 2, and 4 – This discrepancy led to serious prejudice against the accused as they were not informed of the true nature of the accusations [Paras 10-17].

Criminal Procedure – Examination of Accused – Section 313 CrPC – The accused must be explained the circumstances appearing in the evidence against them – In this case, the accused were only questioned about bullet injuries, not the actual cause of death from sharp weapons – This failure to explain material circumstances deprived the accused of a fair opportunity to defend themselves, resulting in a failure of justice [Paras 21-23].

Conviction and Sentence – Set Aside – Due to the failure to frame proper charges and omission to put relevant circumstances to the accused, the Supreme Court set aside the convictions and sentences – The charge of murder against accused nos.1, 2, and 4 could not be substantiated, and they were acquitted [Paras 24-27].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Convictions and sentences set aside – Accused to be released forthwith unless required for any other case [Para 27-28].

Seniority – Inter-Se-Seniority between Promotees and Direct Recruits – Principle of Rotation of Quota – The dispute concerned the fixation of inter-se-seniority between promotees and direct recruits for the post of Income Tax Inspectors in Gujarat – The principle of rotation of quota as provided in the Office Memoranda (OM) dated 7th February 1986 and 3rd July 1986 was applied for determining seniority – Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to restore the seniority list dated 7th September 2016, which interspaced direct recruits of CGLE-2010 with promotees of the year 2009-10 [Paras 3-6, 26].

Judicial Precedent – Prospective Overruling – The decision in N.R. Parmar v. Union of India (2012) was prospectively overruled by the larger bench in K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam Siro (2020) – Supreme Court clarified that the overruling decision will not affect inter-se-seniority already fixed based on N.R. Parmar's decision – The seniority list of 7th September 2016 was protected and could not be altered retrospectively [Paras 27, 33(ii)].

Administrative Procedure – Recruitment Year – The concept of recruitment year was confirmed to be the financial year as opposed to the calendar year – Supreme Court confirmed that the process for recruitment of direct recruits for the year 2009-10 commenced within the same financial year, thus validating the interspaced seniority list [Paras 20-23].

Reference to Larger Bench – Potential Conflict with Precedent – Supreme Court noted potential conflicts between the decisions in K. Meghachandra and earlier precedents set by Constitution Bench in Mervyn Coutindo and coordinate bench in M. Subba Reddy – Matter referred to larger bench to resolve these conflicts [Paras 30-33].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment upheld – Seniority list dated 7th September 2016 restored – Interim relief vacated – Matter referred to larger bench to address potential conflicts in judicial precedents [Paras 33-35].

Specific Relief – Suit for Specific Performance – Plaintiff’s Entitlement to Alternative Reliefs – The plaintiff, in a suit for specific performance, can seek alternative reliefs, including the refund of earnest money, provided such relief is specifically claimed in the plaint. The Court has discretion to permit amendment of the plaint at any stage to include such relief. Failure to specifically claim refund at the time of filing or through amendment precludes the grant of such relief [Paras 31].

Contract Law – Breach and Compensation – Section 74 of Contract Act – The forfeiture of earnest money stipulated in a contract is valid if it is a genuine pre-estimate of loss. The burden to prove that the pre-estimated amount is 'penal' lies on the party seeking refund. In absence of proof, the forfeiture stands as reasonable compensation for breach [Paras 35-36].

Evidence and Procedural Aspects – Onus of Proof – The court emphasizes the responsibility of parties to provide evidence supporting their claims. The respondent failed to provide evidence showing steps taken to obtain the necessary NOC under the HUDA Act, thus not substantiating the claim of non-cooperation by the appellants [Paras 26-28].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Suit dismissed – Forfeiture of earnest money by the appellants justified as per Section 74 of the Contract Act. The respondent did not claim the refund of earnest money in the original or amended plaint, hence not entitled to such relief. No order as to costs [Paras 37-39].

Industrial Law – Back Wages – Section 33-C(2) of ID Act – The Supreme Court held that the appellant is entitled to full wages from the date of the reinstatement order by the CGIT (18.07.2007) to the date of actual reinstatement (23.09.2013) – The period during which the reinstatement order was stayed cannot be used to deny back wages – The interim order merges with the final order, and the appellant's reinstatement was ultimately confirmed [Paras 7-7.4].

Judicial Procedure – Interim Orders – The interim stay on reinstatement during the pendency of proceedings does not affect the employee's entitlement to back wages once the reinstatement order is confirmed – The principle of merger implies that the final decision retroactively validates the interim period [Para 7.2].

Wages During Stay – Section 17B of ID Act – Wages paid under Section 17B during the stay of the reinstatement order should be deducted from the back wages due to the appellant – The appellant is entitled to back wages less any amount already received under Section 17B [Para 7.3].

Decision: High Court judgment quashed and set aside – CGIT order reinstated – Appellant entitled to full wages from 18.07.2007 to 23.09.2013 after adjusting amounts paid under Section 17B – Appeal allowed with no costs [Paras 8].

Service Law – Selection and Waiting List – Rule 15 of 1978 Rules – No vested right of the unsuccessful candidate to insist upon consideration in the absence of a rule requiring the preparation of a waiting list – The Supreme Court held that Rule 15 of the 1978 Rules, which provides for an extended list of candidates, does not confer any vested right to a waiting list – The 2015 Rules, applicable at the time of recruitment, do not provide for a waiting list – The 2016 amendment to the 1978 Rules was clarificatory and does not imply the continuation of a waiting list [Paras 20-27].

Judicial Interpretation – Conflicting Rules – The later general rules (2015 Rules) prevail over the earlier special rules (1978 Rules) when the two are inconsistent – The 2015 Rules governed the recruitment process under the authority of the 2014 Act, superseding the 1978 Rules in terms of selection procedure and authority [Para 26].

Judicial Review – Principle of Estoppel – Candidates who participated in the selection process under the 2015 Rules cannot later challenge the process after being unsuccessful – The principle of estoppel prevents candidates from contesting the rules of a process they accepted and participated in [Paras 21-22].

Decision: High Court judgments set aside – Order of learned Single Judge restored – Appeals allowed – No costs [Para 34].