Facts:                                                   

The appellant and respondent companies entered into various agreements for renting construction equipment for infrastructure development projects. The agreements contained arbitration clauses referring to the Construction Industry Arbitration Association (CIAA) Rules and Regulations. The agreements also specified different venues for arbitration, including New Delhi and Kolkata.

Issues:

• Whether the respondent's objections regarding the venue of arbitration were waived due to its non-participation in the arbitration proceedings.
• Whether the venue specified in the agreements was crucial to the validity of the arbitration awards.

Held:

The respondent's failure to participate in the arbitration proceedings and its failure to raise objections regarding the venue amounted to a waiver of its right to object to the venue.

The Court held that the specification of the place of arbitration did not have a critical bearing on the validity of the arbitration awards in the present case. The respondent's objections on this ground were rejected.

Decision: The Court upheld the dismissal of the respondent's application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging the arbitration awards. The Court held that the venue of arbitration did not invalidate the awards, and the respondent's objections were waived due to its non-participation in the arbitration proceedings.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of Sections 143(1) and 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appellant, Vodafone Idea Ltd., filed a return of income for Assessment Year (AY) 2017-18. Subsequently, a notice was issued under Section 143(2) of the Act, initiating proceedings for scrutiny assessment.

Issues:

• The distinction between the exercise of power under Section 143(1) and Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
• Whether an intimation is required to be given to the assessee regarding the deferral of processing the return under Section 143(1) once proceedings are initiated under Section 143(2).
• Applicability of Section 241-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in withholding refunds.

Held:

The power under Section 143(1) is summary in nature and is designed to make adjustments that are apparent from the return. On the other hand, the power under Section 143(2) involves deeper scrutiny to ensure no understatement of income, overstatement of loss, or underpayment of tax. The processing under Section 143(1) should await the outcome of scrutiny assessment under Section 143(2).

For AYs ending on or before March 31, 2017, if a notice is issued under Section 143(2), it is not necessary to process the return under Section 143(1). The requirement to process the return stands overridden in such cases.

In AYs commencing on or after April 1, 2017, Section 241-A requires a separate recording of satisfaction by the Assessing Officer to withhold refunds when a notice is issued under Section 143(2) and it is likely to adversely affect revenue.

The intimation under Section 143(1) does not require a separate notice of deferral due to initiation of proceedings under Section 143(2). The issuance of notice under Section 143(2) is sufficient indication, and no separate intimation is contemplated by the statute.

This judgment clarifies the distinction between Sections 143(1) and 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and establishes that processing under Section 143(1) must be deferred if proceedings under Section 143(2) are initiated. It also addresses the requirement for intimation and the withholding of refunds under Section 241-A for AYs commencing on or after April 1, 2017.

The Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Facts:

Pradeep Mehra, the respondent, resigned from his position as Chief Operating Officer after 12 years of service.

He claimed gratuity of Rs.1.83 crores based on his last drawn monthly wage.

The appellant-employer argued that the respondent was entitled to a maximum of Rs.10 lacs as gratuity, in line with Section 4(3) of the Act.

Issues:

• Whether the respondent is entitled to receive gratuity of Rs.1.83 crores based on his last drawn wage, or if the ceiling under Section 4(3) of the Act applies.

Held:

The court analyzed Section 4(3) and Section 4(5) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Section 4(3) places a cap on the amount of gratuity payable to an employee, while Section 4(5) preserves an employee's right to receive better terms of gratuity under any award, agreement, or contract.

For Section 4(5) to be invoked, better terms of gratuity must be available under an arrangement with the employer compared to what the Act provides.

The Trust Deed and Scheme of the appellant-Company clearly stipulate that gratuity calculations for employees covered by the Act should be in accordance with the Act itself. No alternative is offered under the Scheme for such employees.

Rule 6(b) of the Scheme explicitly states that if an employee is covered by the Act, the gratuity amount must be calculated as per the Act's provisions.

The court emphasized that the intent of the Scheme was to provide a similar benefit to employees not covered by the Act and not to offer a better package to employees covered by the Act.

The court concluded that Section 4(5) does not apply in this case, and the appellant-employer was correct in applying the provisions of the Act and the prescribed ceiling under Section 4(3).

Any errors in making extra payments to some other employees would not create a right in favor of the respondent in light of the stipulations in the Trust Deed and the Scheme.

We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and order and dismiss the Claim Petition preferred by the respondent.

Facts:
The case involves Judicial Officers who were promoted on an ad-hoc basis to serve as Additional District and Sessions Judges in Fast Track Courts. The question arose regarding their seniority in relation to officers promoted on a substantive basis to the Cadre of District Judge and those selected through Direct Recruitment and Limited Competitive Examination (LCE).

Issues:

• Whether officers promoted on ad-hoc basis as Additional District and Sessions Judges for Fast Track Courts are entitled to seniority from the date of their initial ad-hoc promotion.
• Whether the selection process initiated under a certain notification can be considered a continuation of an earlier process.
• Whether the promotion of 47 Judicial Officers to the Cadre of District Judge can be treated as part of the same selection process as the candidates selected through LCE.
• How the inter se seniority of candidates selected through LCE should be determined.
• Whether the Report dated 15.03.2019 requires any modification or correction.

Held:

Judicial officers promoted on ad-hoc basis to Fast Track Courts are entitled to seniority from the date of their substantive appointment, not from the date of initial ad-hoc appointment.

The selection process initiated under a specific notification is not in continuation of an earlier selection process.

The promotion of 47 Judicial Officers to the Cadre of District Judge is not part of the same selection process as candidates selected through LCE. Cyclic Order rules do not apply, and the 47 Officers were rightly placed senior to the candidates from the later selection process.

The inter se placement of candidates selected through LCE should be based on merit, not their seniority in the erstwhile cadre.

The Report dated 15.03.2019 does not require significant modification, except regarding the placement of LCE candidates based on merit.

The seniority list issued in line with the Report stands modified only to the extent mentioned above.

This case primarily deals with issues related to the seniority and promotion of Judicial Officers in the Cadre of District Judges in Rajasthan and provides clarifications on various aspects of the selection process and the application of relevant rules and regulations.

Facts:

PILCOM, a committee formed by Cricket Control Boards/Associations of Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka for conducting the World Cup tournament in 1996, made payments to ICC and various Cricket Control Boards/Associations of member countries from its London Bank Accounts. The Income Tax Officer issued a show cause notice under Section 194E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, questioning whether income accrued to Non-Resident Sports Associations in India and whether PILCOM was liable to deduct Tax at Source.

Issues:

• Whether income accrued to Non-Resident Sports Associations in India?
• Whether PILCOM was liable to deduct Tax at Source under Section 194E?

Held:

The payments made by PILCOM were intricately connected with the World Cup event, where cricket teams of Non-Resident Sports Associations played matches in India. The source of income was the playing of matches in India. Therefore, income accrued to the Non-Resident Sports Associations in India.

Section 115BBA(1)(b) mandates that if the total income of a Non-Resident Sports Association includes guaranteed payments for games played in India, income tax becomes payable. The connection between the game played in India and the Guarantee Money establishes liability. Thus, PILCOM was liable to deduct Tax at Source under Section 194E.

Conclusion: The appeal and special leave petitions were dismissed, confirming PILCOM's liability to deduct Tax at Source for payments made to Non-Resident Sports Associations participating in the World Cup event held in India.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the notifications issued by the Medical Council of India (MCI) and Dental Council of India (DCI) introducing NEET for admissions to MBBS, BDS, and other medical courses. The initial quashing of the notifications was later recalled. During the pendency of the case, Section 10D of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, providing for a uniform entrance examination, was introduced.

Issues:

• Whether the notifications and amendments violate the rights of unaided/aided minority institutions under Articles 19(1)(g), 25, 26, 29(1), and 30. The case also examines whether the introduction of NEET for admissions in medical and dental courses is constitutionally valid.

Held:

The notifications, amendments to Section 10D, and the regulations introduced by MCI and DCI do not violate the rights of unaided/aided minority institutions. The court emphasizes the need for regulatory mechanisms at the national level, even in prestigious institutions like All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS). The decision aligns with T.M.A. Pai Foundation, allowing regulatory mechanisms and maintaining academic standards.

The notifications and amendments do not infringe upon minority institutions' rights. Regulatory measures apply uniformly to all institutions, and conditions of recognition must be followed. The court emphasizes that regulations do not impede minority institutions' rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 25, and 30.

The court justifies the introduction of NEET in the larger public interest and the improvement of medical education. NEET is a reasonable condition of recognition/affiliation and aims to prevent malpractices and commercialization of education. The court cites constitutional articles, including Article 47, Article 51A(j), and Article 30, to support the constitutionality of NEET.

NEET is seen as a means to standardize qualifications and combat malpractices in admissions. The court emphasizes that minority institutions must comply with reasonable regulatory measures for the overall welfare of students and the nation's interest.

The court concludes that NEET and regulatory measures do not violate Articles 19(1)(g) and 30, as they are intended to maintain educational standards, prevent malpractices, and ensure transparency. The court underscores the importance of balancing rights in the interest of the nation.

Accordingly, the transferred cases, appeal, and writ petitions are disposed of.

Facts:

The case revolves around the disconnection of electricity supply to M/S Iceberg Industries Ltd. by the Bihar State Electricity Board due to non-payment or partial payment of bills, specifically Annual Minimum Guarantee (AMG) charges. The company's supply was disconnected despite an order of stay from the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, which resulted in legal proceedings.

Issues:

• Whether the company, M/S Iceberg Industries Ltd., qualifies as a "consumer" under the Electricity Act, 2003.
• The legality of disconnecting the electricity supply in defiance of the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum's order.
• Whether the company was liable to pay AMG charges during the period of disconnection.
• Interpretation and applicability of Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003, in the context of disconnection.

Held:

The term 'consumer' is defined under Section 2(15) of the Electricity Act, 2003. The respondent company, M/S Iceberg Industries Ltd., satisfies this definition as the consumption of electricity was for its own factory. Thus, the company retains the right to approach the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum. (Paragraphs 10-11)

The disconnection of the company's electricity supply, despite the stay order from the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, was found to be impermissible. The Board should not have disregarded the forum's directive and proceeded with the disconnection. (Paragraph 12)

The question of whether the company was required to pay AMG charges during the disconnection period was addressed. The Forum referred to Circular No. 477 dated 29.10.2002 (General Terms and Conditions of Supply) and partly favored the company's stance that the Board could not charge AMG during the disconnection period. The Court upheld this finding regarding the interpretation of the circular. (Paragraphs 13, 15-16)

Under Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003, disconnection of supply is a special power granted to the supplier. While the company's request for installment payment was initially seen as a plea for mercy, the fact that the company eventually agreed to make installment payments and entered into an agreement to clear the dues demonstrated its willingness to pay the dues. The act of disconnection on September 8, 2006, was considered arbitrary. The Board's appeals have been dismissed. The decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court remains valid. All related applications have been resolved. No costs shall be imposed. (Paragraphs 19-21)

Facts:

Aishwarya Atul Pusalkar, the appellant, sought to enforce her right to reside in her matrimonial home, which was comprised of two flats in a redeveloped building. The building's reconstruction was undertaken under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, with provisions for rehabilitation of displaced occupants.

Issues:

• Whether the appellant's claim for the right to reside in her matrimonial home falls within the purview of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976.
• Whether the appellant's claim to reside in her matrimonial home is valid under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Held:

The court observed that the appellant's right to reside in her matrimonial home is grounded in her status as a wife, as recognized under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. However, the court emphasized that her claim to residence does not directly arise from the provisions of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976.

The court ruled that the appellant's claim must be adjudicated by the appropriate legal forum, such as the Civil Court or the Family Court, as her right to reside in her matrimonial home is distinct from the statutory rehabilitation provisions. The court also directed the appellant and the respondent to take certain actions, including verifying the availability of a specific flat for the appellant's residence.

The court held that the appellant's claim cannot be enforced through a writ jurisdiction and that she should pursue her claim through the appropriate legal channels.

All connected applications are disposed of.

Facts:

The case involves the respondent, M/S. Bombay Machinery Store, and the issue revolves around the movement of goods, delivery, and taxation under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Goods were delivered to a carrier for transmission, and circulars by the Tax Administration of the State imposed a timeframe for delivery to determine the applicability of exemptions.

Issues:

• Whether a timeframe imposed by circulars for delivery of goods to a carrier is permissible under the first explanation to Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956?
• Whether the concept of constructive delivery applies under Section 3 of the Act?
• Whether the interpretation given in a previous case, Arjan Dass Gupta and Brothers v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi Administration, is applicable to the present case?

Held:

The first explanation to Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, creates a legal fiction where the movement of goods terminates when delivery is taken from a carrier. The provision does not specify a timeframe for delivery. Therefore, fixing a timeframe through circulars is impermissible.

The concept of constructive delivery does not apply under Section 3 of the Act. The movement of goods terminates only when actual delivery is taken from the carrier.

The interpretation in Arjan Dass Gupta and Brothers v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi Administration, does not align with the correct interpretation of Section 3 of the 1956 Act.

Decision: The High Court's judgments in favor of the respondent in various appeals are not interfered with, and the appeals are dismissed.