Facts:

Hitesh Verma appealed against the High Court of Uttarakhand's order dismissing his petition seeking to quash charges under Sections 452, 504, and 506 of the IPC, and Sections 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(e) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Issues:

Whether the offenses under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, are established in the present case?

Whether quashing of the charge-sheet in part is permissible under the law?

HELD:

The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was enacted to improve the social and economic conditions of vulnerable sections of society subjected to offenses like indignities, humiliations, and harassment due to their caste identity (Para 10). However, for an offense under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, it must be established that there was intentional insult or intimidation with the intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, and such insult or intimidation took place within public view (Para 13, 18). In the present case, the Act is not applicable as the insults alleged were against a person claiming title to the property, not on the grounds of the victim's caste membership (Para 18).

The Act does not prohibit quashing the charge-sheet in part (Para 23). In the present case, the Supreme Court quashes the charge-sheet to the extent of charges under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act since they are not made out, but the charges under IPC sections 452, 504, and 506 will be tried by the competent court (Para 25).

FACTS:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (the Act).

The central issue was whether Section 14, which mandates the District Magistrate to deliver possession of a secured asset within 30 days, extendable to an aggregate of 60 days upon reasons recorded in writing, is a mandatory (directory) provision.

ISSUES:

The primary issue before the Court was to determine whether Section 14 of the Act is a mandatory (directory) provision.

The Court also needed to ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully examining the scope and purpose of the statute.

HELD:

The Court held that the use of the word "shall" in a statute does not always render it mandatory. Literal construction of the statute without considering the context and scheme of the law may not serve its intended purpose (para 7).

The Act was enacted to empower banks and financial institutions to take possession of secured assets for recovery of public dues. The time limit in Section 14 was fixed to impress upon the authority to take possession but does not render the District Magistrate functus officio. The provision is not to be interpreted literally without considering the object and purpose of the Act (para 20).

DECISION: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that Section 14 of the Act is a directory provision and not mandatory. The District Magistrate's inability to deliver possession within the time limit does not render the remedy under Section 14 redundant.

REFERRED CASES:

Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar vs. State of Bombay & Ors., AIR 1952 SC 181

Dipak Babaria & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 502

Garbari Union Coop. Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. vs. Swapan Kumar Jana, (1997) 1 CHN 189

Harshad Govardhan Sondagar vs. International Assets Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors., (2014) 6 SCC 1

Hindon Forge Private Limited & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh through District Magistrate, Ghaziabad & Anr. (2019) 2 SCC 198

Manish Makhija vs. Central Bank of India & Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine MP 553

Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 311

Montreal Street Railway Company vs. Normandin, AIR 1917 PC 142

Nasiruddin & Ors. vs. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577

New India Assurance Company Limited vs. HUH Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited, (2020) 5 SCC 757

Nomita Chowdhury vs. State of W.B., (1999) 2 Cal LJ 21

P.T. Rajan vs. T.P.M. Sahir & Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 498

Remington Rand of India Ltd. vs. Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 224

Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. & Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 424

Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha vs. District Magistrate of Monghyr, AIR 1966 Pat 144 : ILR 45 Pat 436

State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751

State of U.P. vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912

T.V. Usman vs. Food Inspector, Tellicherry Municipality, Tellicherry, (1994) 1 SCC 754

Transcore vs. Union of India and Another, (2008) 1 SCC 125

Union of India & Ors. vs. A.K. Pandey, (2009) 10 SCC 552

United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors, (2010) 8 SCC 110

Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque & Ors., AIR 1955 SC 233

Facts:The petitioner filed a writ petition in public interest under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, seeking a direction to ban the spraying of disinfectants on human beings, supposedly for protecting them from Covid-19. The petitioner contended that despite the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare issuing an advisory on 18.4.2020 stating that spraying disinfectants on human beings is not recommended, the Union of India did not take any steps to stop the use, advertisement, and sale of chemical-based disinfection tunnels.

Issues:

Whether the respondent no. 1, the Union of India, is required to take necessary measures to prevent or regulate the spraying of disinfectants on human beings, considering the health risks involved and the advisory issued by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare.

HELD:

The Court observed that respondent No.1 did not take sufficient measures to prevent or regulate the spraying of disinfectants on human beings, despite the advisory against it (Para 29).

The Disaster Management Act, 2005, empowers the National Executive Committee to issue directions in response to disasters. Section 36 enumerates the responsibilities of Ministries and departments of the Government of India (Paras 30 and 31).

The Court held that respondent No.1 was duty-bound to act in the best interest of the people and issue necessary directions regarding the use of disinfectants on human beings (Para 32).

The Court emphasized that more action was required beyond the advisory to protect the health of citizens from potential harm caused by disinfectant use (Para 35).

The Court disposed of the writ petition by directing respondent No.1 to consider and issue necessary directions under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, to ban or regulate the usage of disinfection tunnels involving spraying of chemical/organic disinfectants for human beings or exposure to artificial ultraviolet rays (Para 42).

Facts:

A complaint was filed by the inspector of Food and Health based on a sample taken in 1989 regarding Dalda Vanaspati Khajoor Brand Ghee manufactured by Hindustan Unilever Limited.

The matter was previously remanded by the Supreme Court for an inquiry into the acknowledgment of nomination forms received by the Local (Health) Authority.

The trial Court absolved the directors of the Company, and the prosecution was ordered to continue against the appellant/nominated officer.

In 2015, the trial Court convicted the appellant under various provisions of the 1954 Act, but no conviction was passed against the Company.

Issues:

The proceedings should continue under the 1954 Act or the 2006 Act, considering the repeal and saving clause in the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.

The course adopted by the High Court to remand the matter to the trial court after more than 30 years is justified.

The nominated person can be convicted in the absence of the company, and vice versa, under Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

Held:

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, protects the prosecution and punishment under the 1954 Act despite its repeal by the 2006 Act.

The proceedings would continue under the 1954 Act as per Section 97 of the 2006 Act.

The High Court's order to remand the matter to the trial Court after 30 years to cure a defect was not justified, as the failure to convict the Company rendered the appellant's conviction unsustainable.

There is no material distinction between Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882, and Section 17 of the 1954 Act, making both the Company and the nominated person liable for the offenses.

Decision: The order passed by the High Court is set aside, and the appeal is allowed. The conviction of the appellant/nominated person is unsustainable in the absence of a conviction against the Company.

REFERED CASSES :

Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels & Tours Private Limited, (2012) 5 SCC 661

Nemi Chand vs. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 17 SCC 448

R. Banerjee & Ors. vs. H.D. Dubey & Ors., (1992) 2 SCC 552

State of Punjab vs. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84

T. Barai vs. Henry Ah Hoe & Anr., (1983) 1 SCC 177

Tiwari Kanhaiyalal & Ors. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 101

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against the judgment of the Family Court and the High Court, which had awarded interim maintenance to the wife and child.

The proceedings for payment of interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. had been pending for over 7 years.

Issues:

Interim maintenance to the wife and child, the overlapping jurisdictions under different enactments, and the enforcement of maintenance orders.

Held :

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower courts, directing the husband to pay interim maintenance to the wife and child. The court also ordered the husband to pay the entire arrears of maintenance and continue compliance during the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

The court framed guidelines on various aspects of maintenance laws:

The court addressed the issue of overlapping jurisdiction under different enactments, directing the adjustment or set-off of amounts awarded in previous proceedings if successive claims are made under different statutes.

The court emphasized the need for uniformity and consistency in determining maintenance and issued guidelines for filing concise applications for interim maintenance along with an Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities by both parties.

The court provided factors for determining the quantum of maintenance, including the status of parties, reasonable needs of the wife and children, and the financial capacity of the husband.

The court ruled that maintenance should be awarded from the date of application to prevent undue delays in disposal of maintenance applications.

The court provided directions for the enforcement of maintenance orders through civil decree provisions under the CPC.

Facts:

The Tamil Nadu Waqf Board was constituted on 10.10.2017 with 11 Muslim members from various categories.

The State Government issued a notification on 18.09.2019, superseding the Waqf Board, citing the reason that the number of elected members was less than the nominated members, hindering the Board's functioning as per the Waqf Act, 1995.

The High Court decided three writ petitions challenging the 18.09.2019 notification and one seeking to quash the press release dated 14.07.2020.

The High Court held that the supersession was not in accordance with the law but set aside the order only with respect to two elected members under the Mutawallis category.

The State Government initiated the process of reconstituting the Board through election and nomination for other categories, which the High Court did not interfere with.

Issues:

Whether the supersession of the Tamil Nadu Waqf Board was justified due to the number of elected members being less than the nominated members?

Whether the State Government had the power to supersede the Board without prima facie evidence of financial irregularity, misconduct, or violation of the Waqf Act, 1995?

Held:

The Waqf Act, 1995 enumerates various powers and functions of the Board. Section 22 saves proceedings of the Board from invalidity due to any vacancy or defect in the constitution.(Para 21)

The Board's initial constitution on 10.10.2017 did not fulfill the objective enshrined in Section 14. The Board was superseded due to the number of elected members becoming less than the nominated members. The Board's supersession was not due to any action or misconduct by the Board. (Para 22)

The State Government had the duty to constitute the Board in accordance with Section 14(4). Any lapse in fulfilling this duty cannot be a ground for superseding the Board. (Para 23)

The second proviso to Section 99, inserted by Act 27 of 2013, imposes restrictions on the State Government's power to supersede the Board. It requires prima facie evidence of financial irregularity, misconduct, or violation of the Act, which was not present in this case. (Para 24)

The legislative intent of the second proviso to Section 99 indicates that the State could not exercise its power of supersession without prima facie evidence of financial irregularity, misconduct, or violation of the Act. (Para 26)

The High Court correctly held the supersession as contrary to law. The High Court's partial setting aside of the notification only concerned the Mutawalli category, and the constitution of the Board through election and nomination for other categories was not interfered with. All the appeals are dismissed. (Para 27,29)

FACTS:

The complainant (PW-4) and his younger son (PW-5) claimed to be eyewitnesses to the murder. They stated that they saw the incident and took the victim to the hospital where he was declared dead. Three accused persons, including the appellants, were apprehended and convicted by the Trial Court for committing the murder. The High Court dismissed their appeals, and two of the accused persons filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

The credibility of PW-4 and PW-5 as eyewitnesses.

The reliability of ballistics evidence connecting the accused to the crime.

The significance of the refusal of the accused to undergo a Test Identification Parade (TIP).

HELD:

The presence of PW-4 and PW-5 at the scene of the occurrence is in doubt. PW-4 mentioned that he, PW-5, and one unknown person lifted the victim to take him to the hospital, while PW-5 did not mention any third person. Moreover, a ruqqa indicated that the deceased was brought to the hospital by someone else (SL) and not PW-4 or PW-5. (Para 17)

There are two FSL reports pertaining to FIR No. 311, and a third FSL report in context of FIR No. 781 (present case). The third FSL report erroneously attributes the weapon W/2 to accused 'R', and it does not mention the pistol W/1 at all. (Para 21)

The authors of the FSL reports were not examined by the prosecution, which is a crucial aspect, as the discrepancies in the reports could have been explained by them. (Para 26)

The failure to examine the ballistics examiner assumes significance in this case, as the eyewitness account of PW-4 and PW-5 is not reliable. (Para 34)

The refusal of the accused to undergo a TIP cannot be the sole basis for their guilt. In this case, the credibility of the eyewitnesses is seriously in doubt, and the ballistics evidence is contradictory and unreliable. (Para 39)

FACTS:

The Bank advertised vacancies for the post of Peon, specifying eligibility criteria that the candidate should have passed 12th class and should not be a graduate as of 01.01.2016.

The Respondent-candidate declared his qualification as 12th pass and was subsequently appointed as a Peon.

During scrutiny, it was discovered that the Respondent was, in fact, a graduate, rendering him ineligible as per the prescribed educational qualifications.

The original writ petitioner did not challenge the eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the advertisement and participated in the recruitment process based on the advertisement.

ISSUES:

Whether the candidate's participation in the recruitment process without challenging the eligibility criteria bars him from contending that higher qualifications cannot be a disqualification.

Whether the Bank's decision to provide eligibility criteria excluding graduates from the post of Peon was justified and reasonable.

HELD:

The appointments to the post of Peon were to be strictly made as per the eligibility criteria mentioned in Circular letter No. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008 and Circular letter No. 6 of 2016 dated 04.3.2016. (Para 5.1)

The Respondent-candidate never challenged the eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the advertisement and participated in the recruitment process based on it. Therefore, he cannot later contend that higher qualifications cannot be a disqualification. (Para 6)

The employer has the authority to determine the relevancy and suitability of qualifications for any post, and Courts are not suitable forums to assess such matters. In this case, the Bank's decision to exclude graduates from the post of Peon was justified and in force since 2008. (Para 7.3)

The Respondent-original writ petitioner suppressed the material fact of being a graduate and provided false information in the application/bio-data. Such conduct rendered him ineligible for the job, and the Bank rightfully canceled his candidature and denied him resumption of duty. (Para 8)

The impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court and the judgment and order of the Single Judge of the High Court are unsustainable and are quashed and set aside. (Para 10)

REFERRED CASES:

J. Rangaswamy vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1990) 1 SCC 288

Jyoti K.K. vs. Kerala Public Service Commission (2010) 15 SCC 596

Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. Ram Ratan Yadav (2003) 3 SCC 437

State of Orissa vs. Bibhisan Kanhar (2017) 8 SCC 608

State of Punjab vs. Anita (2015) 2 SCC 170

Yogesh Kumar vs. Government of NCT of Delhi (2003) 3 SCC 548

Zahoor Ahmad Rather vs. Imtiyaz Ahmad (2019) 2 SCC 404

Zahoor Ahmad Rather vs. State of J&K, 2017 SCC OnLine J&K 936

Facts:

The predecessor of the appellants filed a civil suit against the respondents (original defendants) seeking a declaration of a registered sale deed executed by one of the defendants as null and void.

The suit also sought a permanent injunction against the defendants to restrain them from transferring the disputed property to any other person.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, and the plaintiff appealed against the dismissal.

During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant no.1 filed an application for the dismissal of the appeal and for the appellant to vacate the property.

The appellant sought an amendment in the relief, requesting a permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from forcibly dispossessing them from the disputed house.

The High Court dismissed the application for delay and laches but allowed the appellants to file a separate suit.

Subsequently, the High Court dismissed the suit, but while doing so, it made observations regarding the possession of the plaintiffs of the disputed house.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to review its own judgment under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC?

Whether there were sufficient grounds to warrant a review of the observations made by the High Court regarding possession?

Held:

The scope of review under Section 114 CPC is a substantive provision. There are no specific conditions precedent for exercising the power of review, but the review can only be conducted on the prescribed grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

The High Court clearly overstepped its jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC in reviewing its own judgment. The observations on possession were made after appreciating the evidence on record and did not constitute an error apparent on the face of the proceedings.

The High Court had already taken note of the evidence and found that the plaintiff was in possession of the disputed house. Deleting para 20, which contained the observations on possession, was not justified.

Non-framing of the issue with respect to possession did not impact the proceedings, as the necessary pleadings on possession were present in the plaint and written statement. The parties also led evidence on the matter.

The High Court's review lacked sufficient and just reasons, and the powers of review cannot be exercised as an inherent power or an appellate power.