Facts:

The appellants were working as Professors in various disciplines at Kumaun University. They challenged an office order dated 21.12.2019 that specified their respective dates of retirement, which were the last dates of the months they attained the age of superannuation. The appellants argued that Statute No. 16.24 of the University entitled them to continue their service beyond the last date of the month in which they attained superannuation until the "30th of June following" their retirement.

Issues:

Whether Statute No. 16.24 grants the appellants the right to continue their service beyond the last date of the month they attain superannuation.

Whether the proviso to Statute No. 16.24 (2) permits the appellants to be treated as on re-employment until the end of the following June, despite reaching the age of superannuation.

Held:

On a plain interpretation of Statute No. 16.24, including the proviso, the Court observed the following:

Each teacher attains the age of superannuation on completing 65 years, as per Statute No. 16.24 (1).

No teacher who attains the age of superannuation has a right or entitlement to re-employment, as per Statute No. 16.24 (2). The opening expression "No teacher" seems to rule out re-employment of superannuated teachers.

The proviso to Statute No. 16.24 (2) carves out an exception to the main provision. It provides that a teacher whose "date of superannuation does not fall on June 30 shall continue in service till the end of the academic session, i.e., June 30 following, and will be treated as on re-employment from the date immediately following his superannuation till June 30 following."

The Court opined that the very object and intent of the proviso to Statute No. 16.24 is to avoid the disruption caused by discontinuity of service of a teaching staff employee or official mid-session. Therefore, the appellants are entitled to continue until the end of the following June on re-employment basis.

Decision: The Court ruled in favor of the appellants, holding that they are entitled to continue their employment till the end of the following June on re-employment basis. If any of them has been superannuated, they shall be reinstated with full salary for the period they were out of employment and allowed to continue until the following June on a re-employment basis.

REFERRED CASES:

Brownsea Haven Properties vs. Poole Corpn.(1958 [Ch] 574)

Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community vs. State of Maharastra (2005) 2 673

Dr. Indu Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2017 SCC Online 1527

Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. vs. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (2009) 8 SCC 646

Raj Narain Pandey vs. Sant Prasad Tewari & Ors., 1973 (2) SCR 835

S. Kasi v State through Inspector of Police 2020 SCC Online 529

S.K. Rathi vs. Prem Hari Sharma, (2001) 9 SCC 377

State of U.P. vs. Ramesh Chandra Tiwari, (2015 (6) ADJ 579)

Facts:

The U.P. State Warehousing Corporation issued an e-tender for handling and transport of foodgrains and fertilizers. The tender was canceled multiple times due to complaints of financial irregularities.

Respondent No.1, Sudhir Kumar Singh, was declared the successful bidder for one of the centers, and an agreement was entered into between him and the Corporation.

Sudhir Kumar Singh filed a writ petition challenging the tender's cancellation, and the High Court allowed his petition, setting aside the cancellation and certain disciplinary actions recommended against the Corporation's officers.

The State of U.P. appealed against this judgment.

Issues:

Whether the principles of natural justice, particularly audi alteram partem, were violated during the cancellation of the tender.

Whether the breach of natural justice can lead to a conclusion of arbitrary state action under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The prayer in the writ petition was confined to the cancellation of the tender, but the High Court went beyond that and set aside the Managing Director's report and the Special Secretary's order, which recommended disciplinary action and recovery of financial loss from the responsible parties. The impugned judgment is set aside to that extent. (Para 18)

Whenever a plea of breach of natural justice is made against the State, the said plea, if found sustainable, sounds in constitutional law as arbitrary State action, which attracts the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (Para 23)

Non-observance of natural justice was earlier considered to be prejudice in itself, but the Court clarified that the existence of prejudice must be determined by the Court or Tribunal and not the authority that denies natural justice. (Para 28)

Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to remedy injustice. Breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot lead to a conclusion of prejudice by itself. Prejudice must be a matter of fact or a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice. (Para 39)

In the present case, respondent No.1 was completely in the dark regarding the cancellation of the tender, and prejudice was caused to him. The impugned judgment is upheld on this ground. (Para 40)

The appeals arising out of SLP (C) 5136 of 2020 and SLP (C) 7351 of 2020 are partially allowed. The earnest money deposit and security deposit made by respondent No.1 are ordered to be returned within eight weeks. (Para 42)

The State Corporation may also pay any amount that remained unpaid for work actually done by respondent No.1, subject to a hearing and reasons to be stated. (Para 43)

Facts:

The respondent, Gayatri Prasad Prajapati, was a former minister accused of offenses under Sections 376D, 376, 511, 504, 506 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act. He sought interim bail on medical grounds and had received treatment at King George's Medical University (K.G.M.U.) and Sanjay Gandhi Postgraduate Institute of Medical Sciences (S.G.P.G.I.M.S.).

Issues:

The adequacy of medical treatment received by the respondent in K.G.M.U. and S.G.P.G.I.M.S.

Whether the High Court properly considered all relevant medical reports before granting interim bail.

The justification for the respondent's release on bail despite receiving treatment in a specialized medical facility.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that the respondent was admitted to K.G.M.U. and discharged after more than seven months, with the medical board concluding that there was no significant difference in the treatment provided by both hospitals. The court further noted that the report of the medical board had not been adequately considered by the High Court while granting interim bail on medical grounds. Moreover, the respondent had been receiving treatment at S.G.P.G.I.M.S., as recommended by K.G.M.U., with no indication of inadequate medical attention.

The High Court's order granting interim bail lacked sufficient evidence to support the claim that the treatment offered to the respondent was insufficient and necessitated his release on medical grounds. The court emphasized that no satisfaction had been recorded by the High Court to warrant such an order.

The Supreme Court found that the High Court's contemplation that the respondent would reside far from the prosecutrix's residence was not substantiated by evidence or the entire material on record. Consequently, the order passed by the High Court granting interim bail on medical grounds was unsustainable.

Facts:

The appellant, Saravanan, had applied for default bail or statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) as he had been in jail for more than the required 60 or 90 days (depending on the offense), and the investigation was not completed, and no chargesheet was filed. The High Court granted the default bail but imposed a condition that the appellant must deposit a sum of Rs. 8,00,000/- before the Magistrate, taking into consideration an earlier undertaking given by the appellant's wife during the hearing of a regular bail application under Section 437 Cr.P.C.

Issues:

Whether the High Court could have imposed a condition of depositing Rs. 8,00,000/- while granting default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C.?

Whether the condition directing the appellant to report to the police station daily at 10:00 a.m., until further orders, for interrogation was valid?

Held:

The Supreme Court considered the short question before it - whether the High Court could have imposed the condition of depositing Rs. 8,00,000/- while granting default bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C.( Para 8)

The Court emphasized that the only requirement for obtaining default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. is that the accused should have been in jail for more than 60 or 90 days (depending on the offense), and within that period, the investigation must not have been completed, and no chargesheet should have been filed. The Court held that no other condition, such as depositing a sum of money, could be imposed while granting default bail, as doing so would frustrate the purpose of the provision.( Para 9)

The Court found that the condition of depositing Rs. 8,00,000/- imposed by the High Court was unsustainable and quashed it. (Para 9.2)

Regarding the condition of reporting to the police station daily for interrogation, the Court deemed it too harsh. Instead, it directed the appellant to cooperate with the investigating officer in completing the investigation and to be present at the concerned police station for investigation/interrogation as and when required. The investigating officer could approach the court for the cancellation of bail in case of any breach of this condition. (Para 10)

REFERRED CASES:

Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67

Facts:

The appellant was tried for offenses punishable under Section 7 read with Section 8 of the POCSO Act. Based on the deposition of PW-3, the 13-year-old victim, the accused was convicted under Section 7 and sentenced to 3 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 8. The trial court also ordered the accused to pay one lakh rupees as compensation to the victim, in accordance with Rule 7(2) of the POCSO Rules.

Issues:

The reliability and credibility of the sole testimony of PW-3, the victim.

The legality and enforceability of the compensation order under Rule 7(2) of the POCSO Rules.

Held:

The court found that there was no evidence to suggest that the legal aid counsel did not have access to the necessary papers to defend the accused. The deposition of PW-3 was thoroughly cross-examined, and the court deemed it reliable and trustworthy. The trial court had not erred in convicting the accused based on PW-3's testimony.

The High Court modified the compensation order, directing that the amount be paid by the State to the victim girl. If the State finds the accused to have sufficient means, the amount can be recovered from the accused under the Revenue Recovery Act.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The trial court's conviction of the accused under Section 7 of the POCSO Act and the sentence imposed under Section 8 were upheld. The High Court's modification of the compensation order, making the State liable for payment, was also upheld.

Facts:

The Wildlife Trust of India identified several elephant corridors in the Sigur Plateau region, which were challenged by resort owners and private landowners. The High Court upheld the notification of the elephant corridor. The case was then appealed before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the State Government has the authority to protect forests and wildlife within its territory, including the power to notify an elephant corridor.

Whether the Precautionary Principle is applicable in environmental conservation.

Whether the Expert Committee's findings regarding the elephant corridor were acceptable.

Held:

The Court acknowledged elephants as a "keystone species" and recognized the significance of elephant corridors in maintaining ecological balance and biodiversity. (Para 34)

The State Government possesses the power to protect forests and wildlife under Entries 17A and 17B of the Concurrent List and the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. It is empowered to notify an elephant corridor on private lands classified as private forests. (Para 39)

The Precautionary Principle is essential in anticipating, preventing, and addressing environmental degradation, and the State Government has a duty to safeguard the environment under relevant constitutional provisions. (Para 40)

The Court accepted the findings of the Expert Committee and upheld the State Government's notification of the elephant corridor in line with the recommendations made by the Committee. (Para 41)

To address the appellants' objections, an Inquiry Committee was appointed to investigate the veracity of the claims related to the corridor's dimensions and location, as well as any allegations of arbitrary actions taken by the District Collector. (Para 42-43)

Facts:

The case revolves around a suit for pre-emption filed on January 10, 1974, by the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 1. The suit sought a decree of pre-emption against the appellant and respondent Nos. 4 to 6, concerning a property situated in Ajmer. The plaintiff claimed the right of pre-emption based on a common portion within the property. Prior to the transaction in question, the property had been involved in three earlier sale transactions in 1945, 1946, and 1966. The plaintiff's contention was that the suit property was sold to respondent No. 4 on January 10, 1974, for a consideration of Rs. 4000, and subsequently, the same property was sold to the appellant on January 21, 1974, for the same amount. It was alleged that no notice as required under Section 8 of the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966 had been served. The main issue in the case was the bar of limitation as the plaintiff did not challenge the sale deed of 1966.

Issues:

Whether the right of pre-emption can be exercised repeatedly on subsequent transactions involving the same immovable property.

Whether the suit is barred by limitation due to the plaintiff's failure to challenge the sale deed executed in 1966.

Held:

The Court held that the right of pre-emption is a weak right and can only be exercised for the first time when the cause of such a right arises. Once the plaintiff chooses to waive the right after the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966 became operational, he cannot exercise the right of pre-emption on a subsequent transaction concerning the same immovable property. The loss of the right of pre-emption under Section 9 of the said Act is absolute and does not re-arise for a plaintiff who has waived the right in an earlier transaction (Paras 17, 23).

The Court rejected the interpretation that the right of pre-emption is a recurring right for every sale, even after the plaintiff has waived his right in an earlier transaction. Such an interpretation would create uncertainty and adversely affect subsequent purchasers, potentially impacting the price offered for the property due to the fear of a pre-emption claim arising at any time (Para 19).

Facts:

Anil Bhardwaj applied for the position of District Judge (Entry Level) and disclosed the existence of a pending FIR against him. The FIR was filed under Sections 498A, 406, and 34 IPC and was registered based on a complaint filed by his wife.

On September 14, 2018, the Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee declared Anil Bhardwaj ineligible and removed his name from the select list for the said post.

In response, Anil Bhardwaj filed a writ petition challenging the committee's decision. However, he subsequently withdrew the petition after being acquitted in the criminal case on September 18, 2019.

Anil Bhardwaj then filed a fresh writ petition, incorporating the subsequent events and the acquittal order in his plea.

Issues:

Determine the validity of the Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee's decision to declare Anil Bhardwaj unsuitable for the post.

Whether Anil Bhardwaj's subsequent acquittal in the criminal case should have led to a reconsideration of his appointment.

The court also considered the applicability of the guidelines issued by the Government of Madhya Pradesh regarding character verification (Clause 6(viii)) to Anil Bhardwaj's case.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee's decision to declare Anil Bhardwaj unsuitable for the post was well within its jurisdiction and power. The decision was considered valid and sustainable, given the pending criminal case against him at the time of the committee's decision (Para 23).

The subsequent acquittal of Anil Bhardwaj, which occurred after more than a year from the rejection of his candidature, did not provide sufficient grounds for reconsideration of his appointment (Para 24).

The court clarified that the guidelines issued by the Government of Madhya Pradesh regarding character verification (Clause 6(viii)) could not be applied to Anil Bhardwaj's case since he had not been acquitted at the time of character verification or during the committee's consideration of his case (Para 26, 27).

Facts:

The prosecution's case was based on the eyewitness account of PW-1, who witnessed the incident where the victim was attacked by three accused persons with hockey sticks and a knife. The victim's brothers, PW-1 and PW-11, attempted to rescue him but were threatened by the assailants not to intervene. The victim was later taken to the hospital and declared dead. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 302 of the IPC read with Section 34 and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

Issues:

whether the sole testimony of PW-1, the only remaining eyewitness, was sufficient to rely upon for the conviction of the accused.

Held:

The Court observed that PW-11 and PW-5 turned hostile, not supporting the prosecution's case. The conviction of the accused was based solely on the testimony of PW-1, the eyewitness. However, the Court found certain discrepancies and unnatural conduct in the case, casting doubt on the presence of PW-1 at the time of the incident. The Court noted that the assailants were armed only with hockey sticks and a knife, and it seemed unnatural that PW-1 and PW-11, being present on the spot, did not attempt to save their brother when threatened. Such conduct raised doubts about PW-1's presence as an eyewitness.

The Court also noted discrepancies between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence, as there were 15 injuries inflicted on the victim according to the medical report, and PW-1 stated that the entire incident lasted only 5 minutes. The Court deemed it practically impossible to inflict 15 injuries within such a short span, and the behavior of PW-1 and PW-11 further suggested that PW-1 was not an eyewitness to the incident.

Considering these factors, the Court held that the reasons given by the lower courts for convicting the accused were not convincing, and the appellants deserved the benefit of doubt. Therefore, the impugned orders of the lower courts were set aside, and the appeals were allowed.