Facts:

The case involved the recruitment process for the post of Assistant Teacher of Junior Basic Schools in U.P. In a previous case, "Anand Kumar Yadav," Shiksha Mitras were given the opportunity to be considered for the next two recruitment cycles for the post. Subsequently, the U.P. government amended the U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981, to make Shiksha Mitras eligible for the Assistant Teacher position. The amendments required candidates to pass the Teachers Eligibility Test (TET) and Assistant Teacher Recruitment Examination (ATRE) to be eligible.

ISSUES:

The primary issue was the validity of fixing the minimum qualifying marks at 65% for General category and 60% for reserved categories in ATRE-2019 after the examination was conducted.

The question was whether such fixation was exclusionary and illegal.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the fixation of minimum qualifying marks at 65% for General category and 60% for reserved categories in the ATRE-2019 examination was valid (Para 65). The Court affirmed the authority of the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) to lay down norms for teacher appointments for classes I to V, which were binding on the State of U.P. (Para 41).

The Court also clarified that Shiksha Mitras could not be equated with candidates of ATRE-2018, as they were part of different selection processes (Para 51). The Government had the power to fix minimum marks after the examination, provided it was not actuated by malice or ill-will and aimed at securing the best talent (Para 63).

Consequently, the appeals of Shiksha Mitras, ex-servicemen, persons with disabilities, and B.Ed./B.T.C. candidates were dismissed (Para 68). The Court upheld the State's right to fix the minimum qualifying marks and fill the vacancies in accordance with the law. The State can proceed with recruitment based on the results declared on May 12, 2020 (Para 69).

Cases Referred

Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra vs. State of Orissa, (2014) 4 SCC 583 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 54

Anand Kumar Yadav vs. Union of India, 2015 SCC Online All 3997 : ILR 2015 All 1108

Basic Education Board, U.P. vs. Upendra Rai and others, (2008) 3 SCC 432

C. Channabasavaih vs. State of Mysore, AIR 1965 SC 1293

Dr. Preeti Srivastava and another etc. vs. State of M.P. and others etc., (1999) 7 SCC 120

Durgacharan Misra vs. State of Orissa, (1987) 4 SCC 646

Hemani Malhotra etc. vs. High Court of Delhi, (2008) 7 SCC 11

Jharkhand Public Service Commission vs. Manoj Kumar Gupta, (2020) 1 SCALE 504

K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, (2008)3 SCC 512

Madan Mohan Sharma and another vs. State of Rajasthan and others, (2008) 3 SCC 724

Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and others vs. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve and others, (2001) 10 SCC 51

Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Surender Singh and others, (2019) 8 SCC 67

P. Mahendran and others etc. vs. State of Karnataka and others, (1990) 1 SCC 411

P.K. Ramachandra Iyer vs. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141

Salam Samarjeet Singh vs. High Court of Manipur at Imphal and another, (2016) 10 SCC 484

Sandhya Singh vs. State of U.P., (2013) 7 ADJ 1

Shiv Kumar Sharma vs. State of U.P., 2013 SCC Online All 4097 : (2013) 6 ALJ 366 : 6 ADJ 310

Sivanandam C.T. and others vs. High Court of Kerala and others, (2018) 1 SCC 239

State of Haryana vs. Subash Chander Marwaha and others, (1974) 3 SCC 220

State of Karnataka vs. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 826

State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753

State of M.P. and others vs. Gopal D. Tirthani and others, (2003) 7 SCC 83

State of Maharashtra vs. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya and others, (2006) 9 SCC 1

State of U.P. and another vs. Anand Kumar Yadav and others, (2018) 13 SCC 560

State of U.P. etc. vs. Rafiquddin and others etc., 1987 (Supp) SCC 401

Tej Prakash Pathak and others vs. Rajasthan High Court and others, (2013) 4 SCC 540

Umesh Chandra Shukla vs. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 721

Yogesh Yadav vs. Union of India and others, (2013) 14 SCC 623

Facts:The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) conducted an investigation into the respondent's alleged insider trading activities related to the sale of 51,000 company shares based on confidential financial information. The investigation was initiated in 2017, and the respondent was requested for information on November 28, 2019. The Whole Time Member passed an ex-parte order on June 15, 2020.

Issues:whether the SEBI's ex-parte interim order, passed by the Whole Time Member without considering the balance of convenience or irreparable injury, was justified under the given circumstances.

Held:The Tribunal was correct in its conclusion that there was no extreme urgency to pass an ex-parte interim order in this case, considering the investigation had been pending since 2017 and the required information was supplied on November 28, 2019. While the power of SEBI to pass such orders in urgent matters was affirmed, it should be exercised "only in extreme urgent matters." However, the interpretation of SEBI's powers by the Tribunal in this specific case should not be cited as a precedent in other cases.

Decision: The appeals were disposed of in accordance with the above observations.

Facts:

An FIR was registered by the CBI against the Director of a coal-purchasing company and unknown public servants, alleging offenses under Section 120B and 420 IPC and Section 13(2) r/w. Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. Later, during the investigation, two public servants of the State Government were found to be involved in the conspiracy. The charge-sheet was filed against the Director and the public servants after obtaining sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act. Subsequently, the accused individuals filed petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking to quash the criminal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether prior consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act was necessary for registering an FIR against private individuals?

Whether post-facto consent after completion of investigation was valid under Section 6 of the DSPE Act for public servants?

Whether any prejudice or miscarriage of justice was caused to the public servants due to the absence of prior consent under Section 6?

Held:

The Court held that for private individuals, no specific consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act is required, and there is no embargo in registering an FIR against them under the relevant provisions.

Regarding public servants, the Court found that the post-facto consent given by the State Government under Section 6 of the DSPE Act for their investigation was valid. The public servants failed to demonstrate any prejudice caused to them or any miscarriage of justice due to the absence of prior consent under Section 6.

The Court remitted the matter to the High Court to decide other issues raised before it, as the Single Judge did not consider question Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of the case after the matter was returned by the Division Bench.

Facts:

The Corporation issued a Bid Document inviting bids for a recruitment agency to conduct the recruitment process for hiring watchmen.

UMC Technologies Private Limited (appellant) was awarded the contract and conducted the written exam for the watchmen post.

On the same day of the exam, the police arrested 50 individuals found in possession of handwritten documents related to the exam.

The Corporation issued a show cause notice to the appellant, alleging breaches of the Bid Document.

Eventually, the Corporation terminated its contract with the appellant and blacklisted them from participating in future tenders for a period of 5 years.

Issues:

whether the show cause notice given to the appellant prior to blacklisting was valid and provided a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

Held:

The Court emphasized that a valid, clear, and unambiguous show cause notice is essential in cases of blacklisting due to the severe consequences and reputational damage it entails for the affected entity (para 14).

The Court cited previous decisions stating that a prior show cause notice granting a reasonable opportunity to be heard is vital in blacklisting cases (para 19).

The Court highlighted the importance of the show cause notice containing a clear mention or inference of the intention to blacklist the noticee, ensuring a meaningful opportunity to defend against blacklisting (para 21).

The Court observed that the show cause notice issued by the Corporation lacked clarity on the intention to blacklist the appellant, rendering it invalid for the purpose of blacklisting (para 24).

As a result, the Court quashed the Corporation's blacklisting order, as it exceeded the scope of the inadequate show cause notice (para 25).

Facts:

The case involved NTPC Ltd. (Simhadri Project) as the appellant and Rajiv Chakraborty as the respondent. The dispute pertained to the preparation of the Information Memorandum by the Resolution Professional.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's name was appropriately classified in the Information Memorandum?

What is the role and authority of the Resolution Professional in accepting or disallowing claims during the CIRP?

Held:

The court held that the appellant's claim was listed as "other creditors claim" in the memorandum because it was still pending adjudication before an Arbitrator. The purpose of the Information Memorandum was to provide relevant financial information about the company and did not decide the validity of claims. The Resolution Professional lacked the authority to accept or disallow claims. The court emphasized that the appellant's claim would not be extinguished unless adjudicated upon by a competent forum or by operation of law.

Decision: The court disposed of the matter, affirming that the appellant's claim could be appropriately addressed if it is aggrieved with the final resolution plan by taking recourse to an appropriate remedy.

FACTS:

The plaintiffs filed suits to declare sale-deeds executed by the Power of Attorney-holder and by the plaintiff herself as illegal and void, alleging fraud in the execution of the GPA and sale deeds. The trial court dismissed both suits, and the first appellate court partly allowed one appeal and dismissed the other. However, the High Court reversed the findings of the lower courts.

ISSUES:

Whether the disputed documents were genuine since they were registered.

Whether the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that the subject documents were forged or a product of fraud.

Whether the plaintiff could prove the misuse of trust by the defendants.

Whether the sale deed required the signature of the vendee to be valid.

Whether the standard of proof in civil disputes is preponderance of probabilities.

Whether the expert evidence produced by the plaintiff regarding disputed signatures was conclusive.

Whether the suits were barred by limitation due to the existence of fraud.

Whether subsequent purchasers' titles were valid.

HELD :

The Supreme Court held that the disputed documents were registered and, therefore, presumed to be genuine. (Para 32)

The Court concluded that the initial burden of proving that the subject documents were forged or a product of fraud rested on the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to prove the misuse of trust by the defendants. (Para 40 and 41)

The plaintiff could not establish the existence of fraud, and the Court found no credible and tangible evidence to support the plea of impersonation by the defendants. (Para 46)

The Court clarified that the signature of the vendee was not mandatory for the validity of a sale deed. (Para 48)

The standard of proof in civil disputes was determined to be preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized the need for tangible evidence to support claims of fraud. (Para 80)

The expert evidence produced by the plaintiff regarding disputed signatures was not conclusive, and the Court deemed it unreliable since it lacked corroborating evidence. (Para 65)

The suits were held to be barred by limitation as the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of fraud, thus negating any grounds for invoking Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (Para 78)

The titles of subsequent purchasers were found to be valid since the 1990 GPA had been proved. The trial court and first appellate court's findings on this matter were upheld. (Para 82 and 83)

REFERRED CASES:

Aloka Bose v. Parmatma Devi and Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 582

Anil Rishi vs. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558

Damodar vs. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 12 SCC 336

Jagdish Chand Sharma vs. Narain Singh Saini (dead) through legal representatives & Ors., (2015) 8 SCC 615

Prem Singh and Ors. vs. Birbal and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 353

Satya Gupta (Smt.) alias Madhu Gupta vs. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423

FACTS:

The respondents filed a suit for permanent injunction claiming ownership and possession of a property situated in the revenue estate of Village Basai Darapur, Delhi. The appellant contested the jurisdiction of the civil court, arguing that it is a boundary dispute between Village Basai Darapur and Village Shakarpur, and should be decided under Section 28 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954.

ISSUES:

Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to decide boundary disputes between revenue estates.

Whether additional documents can be produced under Order XLI Rule 27 if they are not relevant to the plea raised by the applicant.

HELD:

The boundary disputes between two revenue estates are not covered under Section 83 of the Land Revenue Act, which bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in certain matters. The suit in question was a simpliciter for an injunction based on possession, and there was no mechanism prescribed under the Land Revenue Act to grant injunctions in possession disputes. Therefore, the civil court has plenary jurisdiction to entertain all disputes, except where barred explicitly or implicitly by Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (Para 18, 19, 20)

The application under Order XLI Rule 27 sought to produce additional documents related to Village Basai Darapur. However, the appellants' claim was limited to Khasra No. 79 of Village Shakarpur, and the correctness of Khasra No. 238 of Village Basai Darapur was not directly relevant to their plea. As the parties had already understood the controversy and adduced evidence, the appellants cannot introduce additional evidence in the first appeal. Therefore, the High Court did not commit any illegality in not framing any substantial question of law while dismissing the appeal. (Para 17, 21, 23)

DECISION: The appeal was dismissed.

REFERRED CASES:

Ashok Rangnath Magar vs. Shrikant Govindrao Sangvikar, (2015) 16 SCC 763

Chandragouda & Anr. vs. Shekharagouda S. Pittanagoudar (dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 617

Hubli Dharwar Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs. H.S. Mohd. Khan (dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 109

Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors., (1997) 5 SCC 438

Madhavan Nair vs. Ramankutty & Anr., (2000) 2 SCC 356

Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by LRs vs. Jagadish Kalita & Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 271

N. Venkatareddy & Ors. vs. Gopal & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 309

Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (Dead) By LRs vs. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 681

Shiv Kumar Chadha vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1993) 3 SCC 161

South Delhi Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs. Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. etc., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1052

Facts:

The drug in question was manufactured by Vetindia Pharmaceuticals Limited, a valid license-holder, and was supplied to the State of Uttar Pradesh through a supplier as per a Tender. The State issued a show cause notice to the manufacturing company, mentioning further action in terms of the Tender for supplying misbranded medicine to the respondent. The State, however, did not explicitly state that action by blacklisting was to be taken or was under contemplation. The appellant company contended that they had not supplied the drug to the respondents, rendering the order of blacklisting invoking Tender clauses as a fundamental flaw. Despite bringing this fact to the attention of the respondents, they disregarded it, leading to the blacklisting order dated 08.09.2009.

Issues:

The order of blacklisting, which was based on Tender clauses, is valid when the manufacturing company did not supply the drug to the respondents.

An order of permanent debarment is justified, and if not, what would be a reasonable duration for blacklisting.

The writ petition challenging the blacklisting order is barred by unexplained delay.

HELD:

The Court held that the order of blacklisting the drug based on Tender clauses was a fundamental flaw as the appellant company did not supply the drug to the respondents. An order of permanent debarment was considered unjustified, and blacklisting beyond 3 years or maximum 5 years was deemed disproportionate, considering the severe consequences on the appellant's business and reputation (Para 9 and Para 13).

The Court clarified that the High Court's discretionary writ jurisdiction can decline to entertain a writ petition due to delay, but it is not mandatory. The Limitation Act does not strictly apply to writ jurisdiction, and discretion must be judiciously exercised. The respondents' claim of acting in accordance with the Drugs Act was rejected as they did not follow the prescribed procedure under the Act (Para 14 and Para 15).

The writ petition was not barred by unexplained delay as the appellant had been actively pursuing the matter with the authorities. The High Court's dismissal based on delay was deemed erroneous, and the blacklisting order was set aside and the appeal is allowed. (Para 16).

Cases Referred

Basanti Prasad vs. Bihar School Examination Board and others, (2009) 6 SCC 791

Gorkha Security Services vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 105

Joseph Vilangandan vs. The Executive Engineer, (PWD), Ernakulam and others, (1978) 3 SCC 36

Kulja Industries Limited vs. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and others, (2014) 14 SCC 731

M/s Daffodills Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Anr., 2019 (17) SCALE 758

M/s. Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal and another, (1975) 1 SCC 70

Maharashtra SRTC vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329

Moon Mills Ltd. vs. Industrial Court, AIR 1967 SC 1450

State of M.P. and Others vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and others, (1986) 4 SCC 566

Facts:The petitioner filed a writ petition in public interest under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, seeking a direction to ban the spraying of disinfectants on human beings, supposedly for protecting them from Covid-19. The petitioner contended that despite the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare issuing an advisory on 18.4.2020 stating that spraying disinfectants on human beings is not recommended, the Union of India did not take any steps to stop the use, advertisement, and sale of chemical-based disinfection tunnels.

Issues:

Whether the respondent no. 1, the Union of India, is required to take necessary measures to prevent or regulate the spraying of disinfectants on human beings, considering the health risks involved and the advisory issued by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare.

HELD:

The Court observed that respondent No.1 did not take sufficient measures to prevent or regulate the spraying of disinfectants on human beings, despite the advisory against it (Para 29).

The Disaster Management Act, 2005, empowers the National Executive Committee to issue directions in response to disasters. Section 36 enumerates the responsibilities of Ministries and departments of the Government of India (Paras 30 and 31).

The Court held that respondent No.1 was duty-bound to act in the best interest of the people and issue necessary directions regarding the use of disinfectants on human beings (Para 32).

The Court emphasized that more action was required beyond the advisory to protect the health of citizens from potential harm caused by disinfectant use (Para 35).

The Court disposed of the writ petition by directing respondent No.1 to consider and issue necessary directions under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, to ban or regulate the usage of disinfection tunnels involving spraying of chemical/organic disinfectants for human beings or exposure to artificial ultraviolet rays (Para 42).