Facts:

The case involves appeals against the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, regarding the extension of benefits to technicians appointed prior to 1-1-1986. The government issued orders on 22-10-1990 and 31-3-1992, granting benefits for training periods, but the controversy arose regarding the cut-off date.

Issues:

The primary issue is whether the benefit of Government Order dated 31-3-92 should be extended to technicians appointed before 1-1-1986, and if the cut-off date of 1-1-1986 is valid.

Held:

The Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras, had previously overruled the Bangalore Bench's decision, stating that the cut-off date was valid. The Court emphasizes the different nature of technical and non-technical posts, justifying the government's decision for a cut-off date based on the financial burden.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, setting aside the judgment of the Bangalore Tribunal. The Court upholds the validity of the cut-off date as per the Full Bench decision of the Madras Tribunal.

Facts:

Respondent appointed as a Conductor in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation in 1965.

Accused of issuing incorrect tickets in 1981, leading to a departmental enquiry and eventual termination.

Respondent challenged termination through appeals, including a Writ Petition in the Allahabad High Court.

Issues:

Main contention: The severity of the punishment (dismissal) in relation to the charges.

Discrepancy in ticket issuance location: High Court questioned the adequacy of evidence, emphasizing the lack of passenger statements or examination during the trial.

Held:

The High Court exercised discretion under Article 226, questioning the proportionality of the punishment.

Emphasized the importance of evidence collection, noting the failure to examine passengers during the trial.

Referred to B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, highlighting that the court can interfere if the punishment shocks the conscience.

Upheld the High Court's decision to intervene in the quantum of punishment.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.

Facts:

Respondent, a driver, was charge-sheeted for habitual absence, unauthorized use of a bus, and misconduct involving a drunken demand for money.

Enquiry conducted by a retired District Judge found the habitual absence charge unproven, but established unauthorized use of the bus and the misconduct charge.

Respondent was removed from service after a show cause notice, leading to an industrial dispute.

Issues:

Whether the Labour Court had the authority to interfere with the quantum of punishment.

The propriety of the punishment imposed on the respondent.

Held:

The Labour Court has the power to consider the proportionality of punishment under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act and Article 226 of the Constitution.

The discretion to interfere is limited to cases where the punishment is "shockingly disproportionate."

The Labour Court, in this instance, was not justified in modifying the order of removal as the serious charge of misconduct stood proved.

The High Court failed to correct the erroneous order of the Labour Court, leading to a potential miscarriage of justice.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the Labour Court's award. No costs are awarded.

Facts:

The respondent, engaged in the purchase and crushing of stone boulders for further sale, contested the imposition of sales tax on the resultant products. The argument posited that since sales tax was already paid during the boulder purchase, the subsequent goods should not be subject to taxation.

Issues:

Whether the processed goods (gitti, stone chips, and dust) were distinct enough to warrant separate taxation, considering the initial payment of sales tax during boulder acquisition.

Held:

The Tribunal, in a majority decision upheld by the High Court, concluded that the processed goods retained their identity as stone and should not be considered commercially different for the purpose of sales tax. The court analyzed the definition of 'manufacture' under Section 2(e-1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, emphasizing that every activity altering or processing goods falls under this definition. However, it was clarified that for sales tax purposes, the focus should be on the emergence of distinct commercial commodities.

In examining the goods listed in Entry 40 of the September 7, 1981 notification, the court affirmed that once separate commercial commodities emerge from a process, they become individually taxable. Despite potential differences in size, the goods, such as gitti, kankar, and stone ballast, maintained their identity as stone. The court rejected the notion that Entry 40 intended to categorize these goods as something other than stone.

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1 filed a civil suit against the appellant regarding a plot, claiming that it was open land and not covered by the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. The appellant contested, arguing that it was a residential house. A decree was initially passed, but the appellant appealed.

ISSUES:

Applicability of Clause 13-A introduced by amendments during the pendency of the appeal.

Retrospective or prospective effect of the amendments.

Whether the expression "premises" includes open plots.

HELD:

The court established that an appeal is a continuation of the hearing of the suit, and amendments to statutes apply to pending appeals. Citing Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, the court emphasized that an appeal is in the nature of a re-hearing. (Para 6)

The court clarified that the amendments were not retrospective; they had retroactive force. It reasoned that the amendments only imposed a limitation for the future, not affecting actions done in the past. The expression "premises" in the Act applied when the suit or proceeding was pending for eviction. (Para 8)

DECISION: The appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's order. The matter was remitted to the High Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with the law. No order as to costs. (Para 11)

REFERRED CASES:

Lakshmi Narayan Guin and Others Vs. Niranjan Modak, AIR 1985 SC 111 : (1984) 2 SCALE 924 : (1985) 1 SCC 270 : (1985) 1 SCC 200 : (1985) 2 SCR 202 : (1985) 17 UJ 294

Garikapatti Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540 : (1957) 1 SCR 488

Amarjit Kaur Vs. Pritam Singh and Others, AIR 1974 SC 2068 : (1975) 77 PLR 19 : (1974) 2 SCC 363 : (1975) 1 SCR 605

The Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs and Central Excise Cochin and Others, AIR 1970 SC 1950 : (1978) 2 ELT 375 : (1969) 3 SCC 112 : (1970) 2 SCR 830

Motiram Ghelabhai (Dead) through Lr Maniram Motiram Vs. Jagan Nagar (Dead) through Lrs and Others, AIR 1985 SC 709 : (1985) 1 SCALE 360 : (1985) 2 SCC 279 : (1985) 2 SCR 1051 : (1985) 17 UJ 691

Bakul Cashew Co. and Others Vs. Sales Tax Officer Quilon and Another, AIR 1987 SC 2239 : (1986) 159 ITR 565 : (1986) 1 SCALE 380 : (1986) 2 SCC 365 : (1986) 1 SCR 610 : (1986) 62 STC 122 : (1986) 2 UJ 121

Income Tax Officer, Alleppey Vs. M.C. Ponnoose and Others, AIR 1970 SC 385 : (1970) 75 ITR 174 : (1969) 2 SCC 352 : (1969) 2 SCC 351 : (1970) 1 SCR 678

H. Shiva Rao and Another Vs. Cecilia Pereira and Others, AIR 1987 SC 248 : (1986) 2 SCALE 909 : (1987) 1 SCC 258 : (1987) 1 UJ 15

Facts:

The appellant was challenging a detention order issued under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981.

The appellant was accused of extorting money from a businessman, making threats in public places, and engaging in activities affecting public order.

Issues:

Legibility of documents supplied to the appellant.

Whether the alleged activities amounted to a breach of public order.

The nature of the criminal proceeding against the appellant and its relevance to the detention.

Held:

The grounds of detention referred to a criminal proceeding against the appellant, involving an assault on Harishchandra Gupta and his brother. When seeking help, none came forward due to fear of the appellant, indicating disturbance to the life of the people in the area.( Para 5)

Referring to precedent cases, the court clarified that the disturbance caused by the appellant's activities must go beyond ordinary law, affecting the community at large or a significant section of society to qualify as a breach of public order.( Para 7)

The court determined that the appellant's actions, including extortion and threats, undoubtedly disturbed the even tempo of life in society, qualifying as a disturbance of public order.( Para 9)

The appellant argued that the criminal proceeding was for bailable offenses. However, the court noted that none dared to help the victims due to fear of the appellant, indicating a disturbance in public order.( Para 10)

Addressing the issue of delay, the court found that there was no undue delay in passing the detention order, and the actions were taken in a routine manner.( Para 12)

The High Court's dismissal of the petition was upheld, and there was no reason to interfere with the order.( Para 13)

The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The Bihar Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1951, framed under the proviso to Article 309, did not provide for reservation for recruitment to the cadre of district judges. The Bihar Judicial Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1955, framed by the Governor of Bihar, provided for reservation in the lower judiciary. Despite the High Court's disagreement with the State authorities on reservation in district and subordinate judges' posts, the State issued an advertisement in 1994, reserving 50% of the vacancies.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of the reservation provisions in the Bihar Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1991, as applied to the subordinate judiciary.

The conflict between legislative powers, consultation requirements with the High Court, and the authority to make appointments were key points of contention.

Held:

S.4 of the Bihar Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1991, is ultra vires and in direct conflict with Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution.

Articles 233 and 234 cover the entire field regarding recruitment and appointment of district judges and judges of the subordinate judiciary. Legislative power of the State in this field is excluded by the constitutional scheme.

No recruitment to the post of a district judge can be made without a recommendation from the High Court. Appointments to subordinate judiciary at the grass-root level also cannot be made without consultation with the High Court and adherence to rules framed by the Governor.

Reservations were not a stage anterior to recruitment and appointment. The Act does not apply to the cadre of district judges or the cadre of judiciary subordinate to the district judges.

Consultation with the High Court is essential for direct recruitment of judicial officers at the grass-root level. The second part of Article 235 permits State legislation only to govern the conditions of service of already recruited judicial officers.

Facts:

The assessee, a plantation company, entered into agreements for the sale of old rubber trees in 1975. The purchasers paid earnest money and advances, but the sales did not materialize, leading to the termination of agreements and forfeiture of amounts. The Assessing Officer deemed the forfeited amounts non-taxable, but the Commissioner of Income Tax revised the assessment, holding them as revenue income. The Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the assessee, but the High Court remanded the matter back, emphasizing the difference between earnest money and advances.

Issues:

Whether the forfeited amounts are to be considered capital or revenue receipts in the context of an abortive sale transaction of rubber trees.

Held:

The Tribunal, on reconsideration, determined that the receipt by way of the forfeiture of the advance was not assessable as revenue, but the earnest money was assessable as income under other sources. The High Court, in the first instance, focused on the forfeiture ending the agreement's character and declared the forfeited amounts as income receipts. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the cancellation of a sale of capital assets does not change the nature of the receipt of forfeited amounts. It emphasized Section 51 of the Income Tax Act, which deals with the computation of the cost of acquisition for determining capital gains. The Court clarified that the monies forfeited were related to the capital asset and preserved the rule that the character of a receipt is fixed when received. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Two claimants filed separate petitions for injuries in a motorcycle-car accident.

Awards were passed against the insurance company.

Insurance company alleged fraud, presenting evidence contradicting the claimants' accident description.

The Tribunal rejected the application for review, citing lack of power.

High Court expressed helplessness in considering fraud allegations.

Issues:

Whether the Tribunal has the power to review its order based on fraud allegations.

The legality of recalling an award on the grounds of newly discovered facts.

Held:

The court emphasized the maxim "Fraud and justice never dwell together" and the power of the court to recall its order if fraud is established.

The court asserted that the Tribunal and the High Court erred in not considering the fraud allegations, leading to a potential miscarriage of justice.

Fraud allegations should not be foreclosed, and the Insurance Company has the right to resist the claim on the grounds of fraud.

The judgment allows the appeals, sets aside the orders, and quashes the awards, directing the Tribunal to reconsider the claims, providing an opportunity for both parties to present their case.