Facts:

Appellant constructed a bakery in a purely residential locality.

Plaintiffs sought an injunction against operating the bakery, citing potential nuisance.

Municipal Corporation granted a license during the suit.

Trial Court decreed against the appellant, but the appellate court set it aside.

High Court reinstated the trial court's decision based on health concerns and emitted substances.

Issues:

Whether the action initiated by the plaintiffs was a quia timet action, premature on the date of initiation.

Whether the operation of the bakery posed an imminent or likely nuisance to warrant a preventive injunction.

Held:

The action was a quia timet action, preventive in nature, and premature on the date of initiation.

A future nuisance must be imminent or likely to cause irreparable damage for preventive injunction.

Nuisance actually in existence differs from a future nuisance; a clear cause of action must be established.

The High Court's findings were oscillating and lacked specificity; no clear case for quia timet action.

Dismissal of the suit against the Municipal Corporation was justified, and plaintiffs were advised to seek relief through appropriate legal avenues.

Facts:

The appellant-landlady filed an application under the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, seeking permission to file an eviction suit against the tenant based on bonafide requirements. Subsequently, a suit was instituted on the basis of the granted permission but was later withdrawn without liberty to file a fresh suit. A subsequent application under the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, was filed for eviction. Both the Prescribed Authority and District Judge rejected the application.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 43(2)(rr) and Section 43(2)(r), the relationship between permissions granted under the old Act and grounds specified in the new Act, and the interpretation of the proviso in the context of Section 21.

Held:

When a suit is filed for the eviction of a tenant based on permission granted by the District Magistrate and if such a suit is pending on the date of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the said suit is to be continued and concluded as per Section 43(2)(r) of the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.

The landlord may apply to the prescribed authority for tenant eviction even if a suit based on permission was filed or not filed. The prescribed authority shall order eviction if conditions under Section 43(2)(rr) are satisfied. If the permission granted under the old Act aligns with grounds specified in Section 21(1) & (2) of the new Act, the prescribed authority need not be satisfied afresh.

Section 43(2)(r) applies when the ground for permission granted is not covered by Section 21(1) and Section 21(2) of the new Act. In such cases, the suit, if filed on that permission, continues under the old Act, which is fictionally kept alive despite its repeal.

If an application for eviction is based on the ground that the tenant's residential building is required for business purposes or commercial activity, it is not a ground for eviction under the third proviso to Section 21(2) of the new Act. Therefore, an application under Section 43(2)(rr) will not be entertained.

The proviso to Section 21 serves to except something out of the enactment or qualify something enacted therein. It is crucial to give the enacting part a construction that makes the exceptions carved out by the proviso necessary, avoiding redundancy.

Decision: The application for eviction under the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, is not maintainable in this case.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits, claiming the defendant was a trespasser, never legally inducted as a tenant. The plaintiff alleged the defendant unlawfully occupied the property, intended for use by the National Cadet Corps (NCC).

Issues:

Validity of the defendant's tenancy.

Existence of a power of attorney permitting letting out of the premises.

Plaintiff's entitlement to possession and mesne profits.

Held:

The court considered the defendant's claim of tenancy based on a receipt and the power of attorney held by D.K. Chadha. The court observed that the letter from the defendant to the plaintiff, dated 28.10.1977, negated the existence of a power of attorney for letting out the premises. The court held that the defendant trespassed without a proper lease agreement and noted the plaintiff's denial of granting any such power to D.K. Chadha. The court rejected the argument that the plaintiff withheld the power of attorney, stating it was not proven to be in her possession. The court reinstated the decision of the Single Judge, ordering the defendant to vacate the premises. (Para 7-12)

Facts:

The appellant, whose marriage was dissolved, sought enhanced maintenance for two minor children. Both parents were employed, and the appellant claimed maintenance from the date of application under Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The salaries of both parents increased over time.

Issues:

Whether both parents are obligated to contribute to the maintenance of minor children?

How should the maintenance amount be determined, considering the financial status of both parents?

Held:

The court examined the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, particularly Sections 18, 20, and 3(b). It emphasized that maintenance includes provisions for food, clothing, residence, education, and medical attendance for minor children. Section 20 establishes the obligation of both parents to maintain a minor child. The court determined that, regardless of the mother's financial status, both parents are responsible for the maintenance of their children.

The court, considering the salaries of both parents, established a proportional contribution for maintenance. If the husband's salary is approximately twice that of the wife, they are obligated to contribute to the children's maintenance in that proportion. The court directed the respondent to pay a specified amount for each child from different dates.

Facts:

The respondent had booked consignments with the appellant for transportation. The goods were destroyed in a fire at the appellant's godown, leading to a complaint before the National Consumer Forum.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies in cases of loss or damage to goods entrusted for transportation.

Liability of the common carrier for the loss of goods, with a focus on the applicability of Section 9 of the Carriers Act.

The burden of proving negligence and its relevance in consumer complaints.

Held:

The Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies have jurisdiction over complaints related to loss or damage to goods entrusted for transportation.

The liability of a common carrier is that of an insurer, and negligence need not be established by the complainant. The absolute liability is subject to exceptions like acts of God, but accidental fire is not considered an act of God.

Section 9 of the Carriers Act is applicable to proceedings before consumer dispute redressal agencies. The term 'suit' in the Carriers Act includes proceedings before these forums.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the deficiency in the performance of service by the common carrier, making them liable for the loss of goods.

Facts:

During the pendency of the appeal, all parties entered into an arbitration agreement.

Issues:

Whether the court has the authority to refer parties to arbitration under the new Act.

The conditions under Section 8 that need to be satisfied before referring parties to arbitration.

The interpretation of the phrase "which is the subject of an arbitration agreement."

Held:

The court can refer parties to arbitration under the new Act.

Conditions under Section 8 include the existence of an arbitration agreement, the subject matter of the action being the same as the arbitration agreement, and the timing of the application.

The phrase "which is the subject of an arbitration agreement" does not necessarily require the agreement to be in existence before the court action is brought.

Decision: The application is allowed, and the parties are referred to arbitration. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

Controversy over the admission of 19 and 14 candidates to Post Graduate Degree and Diploma courses in Medicine during the academic year 1997 for HCMS candidates.

Petitioners claimed admission should be based solely on marks obtained in the entrance examination, while respondents argued for the Selection Committee's role in final selection based on various criteria.

High Court favored the petitioners, citing the force of law in the Prospectus and challenging the government's right to issue conflicting instructions.

Issues:

Dispute over the criteria for admission of HCMS candidates to Post Graduate courses.

Validity of government orders modifying admission criteria.

Interpretation of the Prospectus as the sole governing document for admissions.

Held:

High Court erred in asserting the Prospectus as the exclusive criterion and disregarding the modifying government orders.

Government orders, including those dated 20.3.96 and 21.2.97, continued to hold significance and were not overridden by the later orders dated 21.5.97.

The merit of HCMS candidates must be assessed based on both the Prospectus and government orders, ensuring a fair evaluation of their service credentials.

Decision: The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The merit of HCMS candidates is to be adjudged in terms of the criteria contained in the government orders and the selections made for admission against reserved seats are to be determined by the Selection Committee constituted for the purpose.

Facts:

Roop Singh (Appellant) claimed ownership of agricultural land, accusing Ram Singh (Respondent, now deceased) of illegal possession. Appellant sought possession through a civil suit, while the Respondent defended claiming ownership through an alleged sale agreement and adverse possession.

Issues:

Whether the defendant's possession was permissive or adverse.

Existence and proof of the alleged agreement to sale.

Adverse possession claim by the defendant.

Held:

High Court jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is limited to substantial questions of law, not pure questions of fact. No substantial question of law found, and High Court should not have interfered with the factual findings of lower courts.( Para 7)

Defendant failed to prove the alleged agreement to sale, lacking documentation and witnesses. High Court erred in considering evidence that contradicted findings of lower courts.( Para 8)

High Court's reliance on defendant's possession for 15-16 years as adverse is contradicted by lower courts' findings that it was permissive, established by revenue records. Plea of adverse possession inconsistent with Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act.( Para 9)

Judgment and decree of High Court set aside, restoring the decision of the Appellate Court in favor of the plaintiff. Costs to be borne by respective parties.( Para 10)

FACTS:

Appellant No. 4 was notionally promoted to the post of Additional Director General (Works) on 22nd February 1995.

The respondent claimed eligibility for consideration for the post of Director General, asserting that he could have been appointed as Additional Director General in 1995-96.

The Departmental Promotion Committee considered only the appellant for the post of Director General.

ISSUES:

Whether notional promotion qualifies as 'regular service' for eligibility criteria.

Whether the respondent has the locus standi to challenge the promotion process.

HELD:

The notional promotion of the appellant No. 4 was granted in accordance with relevant rules and orders.

The respondent challenged the promotion process but clarified that he did not dispute the eligibility of the appellant for consideration.

The High Court erred in not dismissing the writ petition due to the lack of locus standi in the respondent.

The term 'regular service' does not necessarily mean 'actual service,' and the High Court misconstrued this aspect.

Reference to K. Madhavan case clarifies that 'on a regular basis' means an appointment on a regular basis, not ad hoc or temporary.

The appellant was entitled to count the period from his supersession as qualifying service for the purpose of further promotion.

The term 'service' in the eligibility criteria means 'qualifying service,' as clarified by relevant notes.

Denying consideration for promotion based on notional promotion perpetuates the wrong done to the appellant.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's order regarding the appellant.

REFERRED CASES:

Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. M. Bhaskar and Others, (1996) 73 FLR 1676 : (1996) 5 JT 500 : (1996) 4 SCALE 670 : (1996) 4 SCC 416 : (1996) 2 SCR 358 Supp : (1996) 2 SLJ 25

K. Madhavan and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1987 SC 2291 : (1987) 4 JT 43 : (1987) 2 SCALE 727 : (1987) 4 SCC 566 : (1988) 1 SCR 421