Service Law - Voluntary Retirement from Service - All India Service Death-cum-Retirement Benefits Rules 1958 - Rule 16(2A) - Rejection of VRS request - Appellant an IPS officer belonging to 1997 Batch Maharashtra cadre applied for VRS under Rule 16(2A) - State Government recommended acceptance stating that three pending complaints were unlikely to result in major penalty - Central Government rejected notice on the ground that the officer was not clear from vigilance angle as disciplinary proceedings were pending or contemplated - CAT and High Court dismissed challenges holding Central Government as the final authority - Supreme Court found that on the date of rejection no chargesheet was served meaning proceedings were not pending - Court observed two complaints were either inconclusive or withdrawn while third was delayed - Held - Central Government is the ultimate authority for VRS acceptance but must exercise discretion with independent application of mind and engagement with State Government views - rejection order set aside due to non-application of mind and remanded for fresh decision considering subsequent developments and unexplained delays - [Paras 1-34].

Service Law - Scope of Acceptance - All India Service Death-cum-Retirement Benefits Rules 1958 - Rule 16(2A) - Authority of Central Government - The word acceptance in Rule 16(2A) cannot be construed as a ministerial act or automatic exercise - Central Government must apply its mind to all relevant materials to arrive at an informed decision - While not bound by State Government recommendations the Central Government must accord them weight as the State has direct supervisory knowledge - Held - The Central Government has the last word on career-terminating decisions but must balance discipline with fairness in action - [Paras 15-22].

Service Law - Pendency and Contemplation - All India Services Discipline and Appeal Rules 1969 - Rule 8 - Initiation of proceedings - Disciplinary proceeding is considered pending only upon the issuance of a formal chargesheet - Contemplation requires a deliberate intention to act on a complaint rather than mere existence of a complaint - Unexplained and abnormal delay in concluding proceedings causes prejudice and mental agony to the employee - Held - Method and manner of conducting proceedings with long unjustified delays is unacceptable and must be considered when evaluating VRS requests - [Paras 23-31].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order dated 25.10.2019 set aside – Central Government directed to revisit the decision and examine the notice for voluntary retirement afresh within three months.

Criminal Law – Murder – Kidnapping – Circumstantial Evidence – Chain Incomplete – Acquittal Upheld – Accused persons convicted by Trial Court under Sections 364/120B, 302/120B, 396 and 201 IPC for kidnapping and murdering a taxi driver and sentenced to life imprisonment – High Court on re-appreciation of evidence found that prosecution failed to complete the chain of circumstances; set aside conviction and acquitted all four accused – State and complainant challenged acquittal before Supreme Court – Held: High Court committed no error; view taken is plausible; no interference warranted under Article 136 – Appeals dismissed [Paras 1–11, 43].

Scope of Interference – Appeal Against Acquittal – Article 136, Constitution of India – Held: Supreme Court would be slow to interfere with a finding of acquittal unless there is perverse appreciation of evidence resulting in serious miscarriage of justice – Where two views are possible and the High Court has chosen a just and reasonable view, interference is not warranted – Relied upon: State of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah, (2005) 3 SCC 169; State of Punjab v. Kewal Krishan, (2023) 13 SCC 695 [Paras 25–27].

Recovery of Dead Body – Disclosure Statement – Credibility – Recovery of dead body from a dry well allegedly pursuant to disclosure statement of accused Balraj @ Tiloo doubted on three grounds: (i) arrest memo recorded Section 302 IPC before any body was found, suggesting pre-knowledge; (ii) PW5 testified that police had already visited the well on 28.04.2007 and none of the accused were present when body was actually recovered on 29.04.2007; (iii) independent witness Ramawtar, present at the recovery, not produced by prosecution – Held: High Court rightly held recovery not proved pursuant to disclosure statement; failure to produce material witness creates doubt – Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute legal evidence [Paras 29–31].

Recovery from Open/Public Place – No Evidentiary Value – Recovery of bolero jeep at instance of accused Balraj @ Tiloo made from a public road and not from accused's possession – Held: Recovery from a place accessible to all cannot be relied upon – Relied upon: Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P., (2021) 13 SCC 716 [Para 32].

Test Identification Parade – Recovered Articles – Mandatory Requirement – Tape recorder and wrist watch allegedly recovered from accused Manjeet Kumar @ Billu were not subjected to Test Identification Parade as required under Rajasthan Police Rules, 1965 – Held: Without TIP, identification of recovered articles is meaningless in law; conviction on such flimsy basis would amount to conviction on conjectures and surmises – Relied upon: Thammaraya & Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2025) 3 SCC 590 [Paras 38, 17].

Last Seen Together – Weak Evidence – Burden Under Section 106, Evidence Act – Accused Vijay Singh @ Sunder identified by PW1 and PW8 as last seen with deceased – Held: Last seen together is a weak piece of evidence; it does not shift the primary burden of proof which always remains on the prosecution; adverse inference under Section 106 can be drawn only after the prosecution establishes the case beyond reasonable doubt; mere strong suspicion cannot found conviction – Relied upon: Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 INSC 1466; Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 715 [Paras 33–37].

Recovery of Common Household Article – Towel – No Incriminating Material – Towel recovered from house of accused Vijay Singh alleged to be murder weapon – Held: Towel being a common household object found in every residence, its recovery without bloodstains or other connecting material cannot link the accused to the crime [Para 39].

Circumstantial Evidence – Settled Principles – Held: To convict on circumstantial evidence, prosecution must prove each incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt; circumstances must be of definite tendency unerringly pointing to guilt; chain must be so complete as to exclude every hypothesis consistent with innocence – Relied upon: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343 [Paras 41–42].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Acquittal of all four respondents/accused persons by High Court upheld.

Quashing of FIR — Matrimonial Disputes — Omnibus Allegations Against In-Laws — Section 482 CrPC — Where allegations in the FIR and complaint under the DV Act against the relatives of the husband are broad, generalised, and devoid of specific overt acts or particular incidents attributable to each accused individually, continuation of criminal proceedings amounts to abuse of process of law — Specific allegations disclosing active participation in cruelty, harassment or unlawful dowry demand are sine qua non for fastening criminal liability — Mere familial association with the husband or failure to intervene in a matrimonial dispute does not constitute a criminal offence [Paras 21, 28, 29, 30, 44, 45, 46].

Domestic Violence Act — Proceedings Under Section 12 — Female Relatives as Respondents — Omnibus Allegations — Allegations in DV complaint that appellants "supported" the husband, "used to harass" the complainant, or advised her to adjust or return to her parental home, without specification of any particular date, incident or act, do not disclose "domestic violence" within the meaning of the DV Act — Further, where marriage stands dissolved by decree of divorce during pendency of proceedings, continuation of DV proceedings against relatives of the husband in absence of specific allegations serves no useful purpose [Paras 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40].

Section 482 CrPC — Jurisdiction — Filing of Chargesheet — No Bar to Quashing — Even after filing of chargesheet, the High Court retains jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to examine whether continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process — The power to prevent abuse of the process of court is not restricted to the stage of FIR [Paras 15, 16] — Relied upon: Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706.

Quashing — Power of Trial Court Under Section 319 CrPC — Double Jeopardy — Quashing of FIR/chargesheet under Section 482 CrPC does not operate as a bar to the trial court exercising its power under Section 319 CrPC to summon the appellants should evidence emerge during trial establishing their specific involvement — An order of quashing at the threshold, without trial on merits, does not constitute "prosecution and punishment" within the meaning of Article 20(2) of the Constitution nor "tried and convicted or acquitted" within Section 300(1) CrPC — Constitutional and statutory bar of double jeopardy is not attracted [Paras 47, 48, 52, 53, 56, 57, 60].

Decision: Both appeals allowed — Impugned orders of the High Court dated 21.11.2024 set aside — FIR/Crime No. 0041/2023 under Sections 498A/34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, along with all consequential proceedings including chargesheet, quashed qua appellants Arti Mehta, Shrivati Bai Dhakad, Manisha Dhakad and Vikram Dhakad — D.V. Complaint No. 1752 of 2023 under Section 12 of the DV Act likewise quashed qua the said appellants — Trial against the husband to proceed unimpeded — Trial court at liberty to invoke Section 319 CrPC against the appellants if cogent evidence emerges during trial [Para 58].

Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 163A - Standard of Proof - Preponderance of Probability - Nature of proceedings under the Act are summary intended for expeditious justice - Held - Claim petitions are to be decided on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt - Strict proof of accident by a particular vehicle in a particular manner need not be established - Discrepancies not going to root of occurrence cannot defeat a claim  [Paras 8-10]

Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 163A - Medical History Discrepancies - Entry of fall from lorry in MRI report vs consistent testimony of being hit by lorry - Medical history recorded during emergency treatment is to facilitate diagnosis and is not a precise reconstruction of accident mechanics - Held - Isolated wording in history column cannot displace cumulative evidentiary record including FIR and chargesheet  [Paras 11-12]

Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 163A - Delay in FIR - Grievous Injuries - Priority given to medical treatment over legal formalities - Claimant remained under continuous treatment and hospitalisation - Held - Delay in approaching police cannot lead to inference that accident did not occur - Investigation culminating in chargesheet attributing negligence to lorry driver outweighs the delay  [Para 13]

Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 163A - Independent Witnesses - Absence of third-party evidence - Claimant himself deposed to the occurrence and was not shaken in cross-examination - Held - Claim cannot be rejected solely for want of independent witnesses - Approach should be to analyse existing record on touchstone of probability [Para 16]

Constitution of India - Article 142 - Just Compensation - Deviation from Structured Formula - Claim filed under Section 163A (no-fault liability) - Second Schedule structured formula found inadequate and defective for 100% permanent disability cases - Held - Strict confinement to Section 163A would not serve interests of justice - In exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 the Court determined compensation drawing guidance from principles evolved under Section 166  [Paras 21-25]

Decision: Appeal allowed - Judgments of MACT and High Court set aside - Respondent-insurer directed to deposit Rs 14,90,000/- with 6% interest from date of filing within three months.

Industrial Policy — Concessional Electricity Charges — Scope of Clause 16(a) — Existing vs. New Enterprises — Clause 16(a) of the Industrial Policy of 2019 provided that "eligible enterprises" would be charged energy charges 15% lower than approved rates for 3 years, while Clause 16(b) provided a 15% rebate on additional power consumption for existing industrial consumers — Respondent, an existing enterprise established in 2006 and having undertaken substantial expansion in 2020, claimed the benefit of Clause 16(a) in addition to Clause 16(b) already availed — Held: On a conjoint reading of Clause 16 with contemporaneous tariff orders, Clause 16(a) was always intended for new industrial enterprises alone, and Clause 16(b) for existing enterprises undergoing substantial expansion — Accepting the respondent's interpretation would result in an impermissible double benefit contrary to the scheme of the Policy [Paras 40–48].

Amendment Notification — Clarificatory vs. Substantive Amendment — Retrospective Operation — Vide amendment notification dated 29.04.2022, the word "eligible" in Clause 16(a) and Rule 16(i)(a) was substituted with "new", and "substantial expansion" was inserted in Clause 16(b) and Rule 16(i)(b) — Appellants contended the amendment was clarificatory; respondent argued it was prospective as Clause 4 stated "immediate effect" — Held: The amendments to Clause 16 and Rule 16 were clarificatory and retrospective, as they did not introduce new beneficiaries or alter substantive rights but merely removed an inadvertent drafting error — However, the amendment prescribing a three-year duration for the benefit under Clause 16(b) was substantive and prospective [Paras 49–51].

Promissory Estoppel — Industrial Incentive Schemes — Doctrine Inapplicable Where Benefit Never Intended for the Class — Respondent contended that having acted upon the representations in the Policy and obtained the COP Certificate dated 12.02.2021, the doctrine of promissory estoppel precluded the appellants from denying the Clause 16(a) benefit — Held: COP Certificate merely recognised substantial expansion and did not amount to a sanction of the Clause 16(a) incentive, which required formal approval by the Director of Industries under Rule 27 — Once Clause 16(a) is correctly construed as confined to new enterprises, the doctrine cannot be invoked to create an entitlement beyond the true scope of the Policy — Respondent, having already received the benefit under Clause 16(b), no enforceable equity survived [Paras 52–63].

Principles — Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel — Restatement — Court comprehensively restated twelve governing principles of the doctrine: (i) it operates on equity and good conscience; (ii) a clear, unequivocal promise acted upon becomes binding; (iii) actual detriment need not be proved — alteration of position suffices; (iv) it applies against the State and instrumentalities under Article 12; (v) where entrepreneurs act upon incentive scheme representations and satisfy eligibility, an enforceable equity arises; (vi) fiscal benefits are ordinarily defeasible and may be withdrawn in public interest, but the Government may be precluded by promissory estoppel unless overriding public interest justifies departure; (vii) where a specific sanction has been granted and investment made, the promisor is more firmly bound — Court followed IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 28 and earlier authorities [Paras 57–59].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Impugned judgment and order of the High Court set aside — Respondent held entitled only to the rebate under Clause 16(b), already extended — Doctrine of promissory estoppel held inapplicable — Pending applications disposed of [Paras 64–66].

Constitution of India - Article 215 - High Court Powers - Inherent Jurisdiction - High Court directed criminal investigation into siphoning of estate funds during testamentary suit - Held - High Court while exercising testamentary jurisdiction does not cease to be a Constitutional Court of record - It retains undiminished inherent and plenary powers to prevent abuse of process and safeguard the estate from depletion - Court is not a silent spectator to glaring irregularities or mischief played by an executor - [Paras 15-18 27-29 33 43]

Indian Succession Act 1925 - Section 247 - Administrator Pendente Lite - Status and Duties - Administrator appointed under Section 247 due to intermeddling by rival Will propounder - Held - Administrator is an officer of the court and is the hand of the court - Status of the estate is in custodia legis - Administrator is duty bound to take all reasonable steps for preservation and maintenance of the estate including drawing attention of the court to facts necessitating criminal action - [Paras 7-8 30-31]

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Sections 340 and 341 - Procedure - Investigation - Appellants contended High Court bypassed Section 340 CrPC mandate - Held - Direction for criminal investigation was not passed strictly under Section 340 CrPC for offences affecting administration of justice alone - Court exercised broader inherent powers to investigate a larger conspiracy of siphoning estate funds through shell entities - Procedural bars under Section 341 CrPC are inapplicable - [Paras 40-41]

Indian Succession Act 1925 - Sections 211 and 307 - Executor Authority - Limitations - Propounder of rival Will transferred estate funds to dormant trusts before probate - Held - While an executor derives authority from the Will such authority is not a license to plunder - Where rival Wills are contested and estate is in medio an executor cannot unilaterally dispose of assets - Appointment of Administrator pendente lite suspends the powers of the executor - [Paras 30 39]

Indian Succession Act 1925 - Section 269 - Protection of Property - Parsi Testator - Bar under Section 269-2 - Held - Testator being a Parsi the bar in Section 269-2 is not applicable - High Court as a court of record has inherent power to ensure the Administrator is not impeded and the estate is not misappropriated - [Paras 34-35]

Decision: Appeals dismissed - High Court order upheld - Investigating authority directed to proceed expeditiously and submit progress reports as per High Court

Customs Law — Classification of Goods — n-Hexane — Chapter 27 vs. Chapter 29 — Burden of Proof on Revenue — Revenue sought classification of imported n-Hexane under CTH 2710.00/CETH 2710.12 (Chapter 27) as a petroleum oil/motor spirit on the ground that its flash point was below 25°C and distillation range was 63–70°C — Respondent-Assessee claimed classification under CTH 2901.10/CETH 2901.90 (Chapter 29) as a saturated acyclic hydrocarbon existing as a separate chemically defined compound — Held: Burden of proof in classification disputes rests on the Revenue — Revenue failed to discharge this burden as mere flash point below 25°C was insufficient without proof that n-Hexane was suitable for use as fuel in spark ignition engines, which is an essential condition for classification as Motor Spirit under Chapter 27 [Paras 41–43, 58].

HSN Explanatory Notes — Interpretative Value — Specific over General — Classification disputes under the Customs Tariff and Central Excise Tariff are to be resolved with the aid of HSN Explanatory Notes, which form the internationally accepted basis of tariff classification — Rule 3(a) of the General Rules of Interpretation mandates that the heading providing the most specific description shall prevail over a general heading — Chapter 29, Sub-Heading 2901.10 specifically names Hexane as a saturated acyclic hydrocarbon with six carbon atoms, whereas Chapter 27 provides only a general coverage of petroleum oils — Held: The specific entry in Chapter 29 prevails [Paras 44–55].

Separate Chemically Defined Compound — Impurities — Classification under Chapter 29 — n-Hexane, bearing the molecular formula C6H14 with a linear definitive structural diagram, qualifies as a separately chemically defined compound under Chapter Note 1 to Chapter 29 — Impurities present (other hexane isomers, sulfur, chlorine etc.) were unconverted starting materials arising from the fractional distillation process and were not deliberately added — Purity of 63.93% n-Hexane in the SGS Report matched Table 10 of the Kirk-Othmer Encyclopedia — Held: Presence of process-borne impurities does not displace classification under Chapter 29; imported product is not a mixture of acyclic hydrocarbon isomers excluded from that chapter [Paras 59–63].

Motor Spirit — Three Conditions — All Must Be Satisfied — For classification as Motor Spirit under Chapter 27/CETH 2710.12, all three conditions must be conjunctively fulfilled: (i) the product must be a hydrocarbon oil excluding crude mineral oil; (ii) flash point must be below 25°C; and (iii) the product must be suitable for use as fuel in spark ignition engines either by itself or in admixture — Revenue proved only the flash point condition — No evidence was placed on record that n-Hexane was used or suitable as fuel in spark ignition engines — Court followed CCE v. GAIL (India), 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2130 [Paras 56–58].

DGFT Policy Circular — Binding Classification — Policy Circular No. 40(RE-2003)/2002-2007 dated 14.07.2004 issued by the DGFT categorically clarified that import of Hexane falls under Chapter 29 of the ITC (HS) — Under Para 2.3 of the Foreign Trade Policy, the DGFT's decision on classification is final and binding on all authorities — Held: The Revenue's classification under Chapter 27 was contrary to the binding DGFT circular; the appeal was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone [Paras 64–66].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Order of CESTAT dated 15.07.2011 affirmed — n-Hexane correctly classifiable under CTH 2901.10 and CETH 2901.90 (Chapter 29) — Pending applications disposed of [Paras 72–73].

Criminal Law - Regular Bail - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 147 148 149 120-B and 302 - Petitioner in judicial custody for over nine years as an under-trial prisoner - Allahabad High Court denied bail in CRMBA No. 43979/2024 by relying on Para 8 of X v. State of Rajasthan 2024 INSC 909 - High Court interpreted the precedent to mean bail should not be granted after charge framing if trial is in progress - Co-accused Vaibhav Singh granted bail by Supreme Court on 29-04-2026 - Supreme Court clarified that the dictum in X v. State of Rajasthan must be understood in the facts of each case - Held - Incarceration for nine years without trial conclusion is a gross violation of the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution - Gravity of crime cannot justify indefinite detention - Petitioner released on bail - [Paras 1-6].

Constitutional Law - Fundamental Rights - Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Accused languishing in jail for nine years for no fault of his own - Supreme Court observed that the High Court failed to understand the true purport and ratio of previous decisions - Howsoever grave the crime may be if the accused is denied his right of speedy trial and languishes in jail for years he cannot be kept in jail for an indefinite period - Held - Infringement of Article 21 rights necessitates the grant of bail - [Paras 10-12].

Decision: Special Leave Petition disposed of - Delay condoned - Petitioner ordered to be released on bail forthwith - Subject to terms and conditions imposed by the trial court.

Medical Negligence — Section 304-A IPC — Criminal Standard — Off-Duty Anaesthetist — Where an anaesthetist's duty hours had concluded and she telephonically advised a standard post-operative analgesic (sensorcaine) in response to an SOS call, leaving physical administration to available on-duty hospital staff, such conduct does not constitute a "rash and negligent act" within the meaning of Section 304-A IPC — Criminal medical negligence requires a degree of gross culpability far exceeding civil negligence, and the act must be one which no medical professional in ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to do — Improper injection technique by the nurse constitutes, at worst, a deficiency in service attracting civil liability, not criminal rashness on the part of the off-duty doctor [Paras 19, 20, 24, 25] — Relied upon: Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1.

Exoneration in Civil Proceedings — Effect on Criminal Prosecution — Where the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum categorically exonerated the appellant on merits, finding that she had not given any instructions to the nurse to administer the injection, and the deceased's family did not challenge this finding before the appellate commission (challenging only the quantum of compensation), continuation of criminal prosecution for identical allegations on the same set of facts amounts to gross abuse of the process of law [Paras 21, 22, 23] — Relied upon: Radheyshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581; Videocon Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2016) 12 SCC 315; Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon, (2024) 6 SCC 143.

Proximate Cause — Criminal Liability — Where post-mortem established that the deceased had an asymptomatic 80% coronary artery blockage and the immediate cause of death was acute coronary insufficiency, criminal liability cannot be fastened upon the off-duty anaesthetist by extending the doctrine of proximate cause beyond permissible limits through a remote chain of events involving the nurse's improper injection technique [Para 28].

Expert Medical Panel — Jacob Mathew Guidelines — Absence of Specialist Anaesthetist — A four-member expert medical panel constituted without including an anaesthetist is inherently incompetent to evaluate technical nuances of epidural anaesthesia and catheter management — Prosecution's reliance on such a flawed expert report violates the protective safeguards laid down in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab for preventing harassment of medical professionals [Paras 26, 27].

Inconsistent Witness Statements — Evidentiary Value — Nurse Rosamma's three statements were wholly inconsistent and contrary to each other — In her first two statements she attributed the instruction to administer the injection to the surgeon, while in her third statement she attributed it to the appellant — Surgeon's own statement before the expert panel stated the nurse had consulted the appellant over phone — Such contradictory statements are devoid of evidentiary value and cannot sustain criminal allegations [Paras 9, 18].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Order of the High Court of Kerala dated 16.10.2024 in Crl. M.C. No. 6415 of 2018 quashed and set aside — Criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 501/2008 pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class-I, Kannur quashed — Appellant discharged from all offences alleged against her [Para 29].