Judicial Independence – Financial Independence of Judges – Non-discrimination based on Source of Appointment – Held: High Court judges, irrespective of their recruitment source (Bar or judicial service), are entitled to uniform financial benefits to maintain judicial independence – Differentiation between judges based on their pre-appointment service violates Articles 14 and 217 – Directed all judges to have access to the General Provident Fund – The communication dated 13 December 2022 was quashed as unconstitutional [Paras 10-20].

Provident Fund – Section 20 of the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 – Scope of Proviso – Mandate to extend GPF benefits to all judges of the High Court – Proviso interpreted as preserving benefits accrued before High Court appointment without creating a discriminatory regime – Directed refund of New Pension Scheme contributions and opening of GPF accounts for petitioners [Paras 22-28].

Constitutional Interpretation – Uniform Service Conditions – Financial Security as Integral to Judicial Independence – Emphasized: Salaries, allowances, and pensions of High Court judges determined by parliamentary enactments to ensure uniformity – Article 221 prohibits discriminatory service terms – Equality in post-retirement benefits like GPF underlines judiciary’s homogeneity [Paras 30-33].

Decision: The petitions were allowed, directing that:

A General Provident Fund account be opened for the petitioners, effective from their date of appointment as High Court judges.

Contributions under the New Pension Scheme be refunded to petitioners within four weeks.

The impugned communication dated 13 December 2022 be quashed.

Secularism and Minority Rights – Constitutional Validity of Madarsa Act – The Court analyzed whether the Madarsa Act violates secularism, a core principle of the Constitution, by establishing a board that regulates Islamic educational institutions – Held: The Act, being regulatory and aiming at educational standardization, does not per se contravene secularism if balanced with minority rights under Article 30. However, provisions granting legislative discretion in the membership structure were adjusted to reinforce neutrality and inclusivity. The Act remains largely valid under Entry 25, List III [Paras 29-45, 51].

Legislative Competence – Entry 25, List III vis-à-vis Entry 66, List I – The Act’s provisions were scrutinized for potential overlap with the UGC’s powers under Entry 66, List I, particularly concerning higher education standards – Held: State law is constitutionally valid under Entry 25, List III for primary and secondary education; higher education must comply with UGC standards without contravening Entry 66, List I. Only provisions that exceed state competence or conflict with UGC norms require revision [Paras 54-59].

Right to Education – Exemption of Madarsas from the RTE Act – Section 1(5) of the RTE Act exempts religious institutions, including madarsas, from compliance – Held: While exclusion of madarsas from the RTE Act is constitutional, States should ensure curriculum standards and educational quality to facilitate secular and skill-based learning for greater integration of minority students into the broader socio-economic framework [Paras 25-28].

Equality and Non-Discrimination – Article 14 and Discrimination based on Religion – The composition of the Madarsa Board, largely drawn from members of a specific religious community, was challenged for violating Article 14’s equality mandate – Held: The selection process is permitted under Article 30 but requires adjustments to include educational experts regardless of religious affiliation to maintain neutrality in regulatory oversight [Paras 36-39].

Right to Establish and Administer Educational Institutions – Article 30 and Minority Rights – The Court examined whether the Act infringes upon the minority community's rights to administer educational institutions – Held: Regulation by the State is constitutionally sound as it aims to enhance educational quality while respecting minority rights under Article 30 [Paras 41-45].

Judgment – Legislation Upheld with Modifications – The Court upheld the Madarsa Act with stipulations to ensure adherence to secular principles in governance while allowing state oversight for standardizing educational standards in minority institutions [Paras 69-70].
 

Eligibility for Public Employment – Requirement of CCC Certificate at Interview Stage – Termination of Candidates' Services Deemed Arbitrary – Candidates selected under the 2014 recruitment for the post of Technician Grade-II in Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited challenged their termination on the ground that they fulfilled the CCC (Computer Concepts Course) certification requirement at the time of interview, as stipulated in the Corporation’s regulations – Held: Candidates possessing CCC certificates by the interview stage were eligible, and their termination by the Corporation based on the lack of the certificate by the application deadline was erroneous – Court directed reinstatement of candidates meeting the CCC certification requirements at interview stage [Paras 15-16, 26].

Role of Recognized Certification in Public Appointments – Compliance with Article 16 and Requirement of DOEACC/NIELIT Certification – The requirement of a CCC certificate by DOEACC/NIELIT was deemed necessary for entry into public service under Article 16 – Court upheld that self-certification of equivalency was inadequate and that recognized certifications from DOEACC/NIELIT or equivalent qualifications should govern eligibility – Equivalence of certificates must follow formal inquiry and standards; informal certifications were disallowed [Paras 14-15, 19-20].

Interpretation of Advertisement and Service Regulations – Validity of CCC Certification Obtained Before Interview Date – Division Bench’s Order Overturned – Despite conflicting stances by the Corporation, the Court found that the 2014 advertisement and the 1995 Regulations mandated CCC certification only by the interview date – The Court dismissed the contention that the last date for application controlled eligibility, ruling that eligibility compliance at interview suffices under the amended service regulations [Paras 24-25, 27].

Doctrine of Legal Consistency – Contradictory Positions of Respondent Corporation – Respondent Corporation’s shifting stances on eligibility, first accepting DOEACC/NIELIT and later rejecting equivalent self-certified qualifications, constituted a breach of consistent legal approach in hiring practices – Court exercised Article 142 powers to rectify Corporation’s misinterpretation, ruling that candidates were entitled to continued service if CCC certified by interview date [Paras 23, 28].

Equitable Relief Under Article 142 of the Constitution – Reinstatement Without Back Wages but With Service Continuity – Recognizing the misinterpretation of eligibility standards by the Corporation, the Court exercised Article 142 to reinstate the applicants without back wages, but with continuity of service and placement in the seniority list as per the original select list – Relief limited to non-back wage compensation but includes seniority and consequential benefits [Para 29].

Decision:

Appeal allowed, with the Supreme Court ordering the reinstatement of candidates who had obtained the CCC certificate by the interview date, rejecting the Corporation’s termination based on application date eligibility. Candidates were denied back wages but granted continuity in service and benefits, including seniority adjustments, as per the 2015 select list [Para 30].

Service Law - Recruitment Qualification – Prescribed vs. Equivalent Qualifications – Rule Interpretation – The qualification specified for the post of LDC was a Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from an approved institution. The Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC) initially took a strict stance against recognizing higher qualifications, such as a Diploma in Computer Applications (DCA), as equivalent. The Court held that the Rules of 2011 did not provide for an equivalent qualification to the prescribed certificate, thus precluding DCA and similar qualifications – Held: The prescribed qualification requirement is limited to specific certificate holders, and the equivalence pertains only to the institution, not the qualification [Paras 15-17].

Doctrine of Estoppel – Consistent Stance Required from Public Bodies – The Court observed that the KPSC's inconsistent stance—initially opposing and later supporting the inclusion of DCA holders—led to protracted litigation. The KPSC, a statutory authority, was expected to maintain consistency and transparency in its actions, as inconsistent positions undermine the predictability required under the rule of law – Held: The KPSC is estopped from changing its stance on the eligibility of DCA holders after previously asserting that DCA was not a valid qualification [Paras 20, 24-27].

Equivalence of Higher Qualifications – Requirement of Foundational Inquiry – The Court held that the KPSC failed to conduct a foundational inquiry into whether higher qualifications like DCA presuppose the skills imparted by the prescribed Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation. The KPSC’s assumption that higher computer-related degrees or diplomas automatically included data entry and office automation skills was arbitrary and unsupported by evidence – Held: KPSC’s decision to treat DCA as equivalent to the prescribed certificate without inquiry was arbitrary and lacked rational basis [Paras 21-23].

Rule of Law – Importance of Predictability and Consistency – The Court emphasized that public authorities must act with consistency to uphold citizens' expectations of fairness and stability in decision-making. Citing the principles of regularity and predictability, the Court criticized the KPSC's arbitrary shift in position, as it resulted in needless litigation and uncertainty for affected candidates – Held: The KPSC’s deviation from its initial stance without public interest justification violates the principles of fairness under Article 14 of the Constitution [Para 26].

Procedural Fairness – Representation of Interested Parties – The Court rejected the appellants' contention that all affected candidates had not been impleaded, noting that over 100 candidates with DCA or higher qualifications were already parties, which was sufficient representation of their collective interest. The Court held that the purpose of Rule 148 of the Kerala High Court Rules is to ensure representation of affected persons, not to delay proceedings by requiring individual impleadment of each candidate – Held: No merit in the argument of non-impleadment due to sufficient representation of the affected group [Para 11].

Decision – The Supreme Court upheld the Kerala High Court’s decision to exclude candidates with DCA or higher qualifications from the LDC selection process, affirming that only those with the prescribed qualification were eligible. The appeals were dismissed, with each party bearing its own costs [Paras 28].
 

Compassionate Appointment – Rejection on Grounds of Delay – Appeal Dismissed – Opportunity Granted for Ex-Gratia Compensation [Paras 1–26].
Compassionate Appointment – Claim by Minor Dependent – Delay Beyond Policy Period – Appellant’s father, a Haryana Police constable, died on duty in 1997 – Minor dependent’s claim recorded in Minor’s Register in 1998 – Appellant attained majority in 2008 and applied for compassionate appointment – Claim rejected in 2009 on the grounds of delay beyond the three-year period prescribed in Government instructions dated 22.03.1999 – 2006 Rules under which the claim was considered did not provide for compassionate appointments – Held: Compassionate appointment is not a vested right; rejection of claim upheld [Paras 1–6, 13–16].

Promissory Estoppel – Not Applicable in the Absence of Statutory Backing – Appellant contended that communications from authorities promising consideration for appointment created legitimate expectation – Supreme Court held: Entries in Minor’s Register or administrative communications do not create enforceable rights absent statutory support – Principle of promissory estoppel inapplicable as the 1999 instructions prescribed a three-year limit for such claims [Paras 3–5, 9–12].

Compassionate Appointment – Objective and Limitation – Purpose of compassionate appointment is to provide immediate relief to families facing destitution due to the loss of the sole breadwinner – Policies prescribing time limits for claiming such benefits are reasonable – Held: Appellant’s claim after 11 years from the father’s death fell outside the scope of such policies [Paras 13–15].

Ex-Gratia Compensation – Opportunity Granted for Consideration – Claim for compassionate appointment remained pending until rejection in 2009 – Government of Haryana’s 2011 decision provided a one-time relaxation for old cases to apply for ex-gratia compensation – Widow of deceased employee not informed of this option – Held: Widow permitted to submit a representation for lump sum ex-gratia compensation – Authorities to decide within six weeks of receipt, failing which interest at 6% per annum shall be payable [Paras 17–23].

Decision: 
Appeal dismissed as regards compassionate appointment.
Opportunity granted to widow of the deceased to apply for ex-gratia compensation.
Authorities directed to decide representation within six weeks – No interest on timely disbursal, but interest at 6% applicable for delays.
No order as to costs [Paras 23–26].
 

Criminal Law – Murder – Acquittal – Appeal Against Acquittal – The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court for the murder of the deceased, Naseem Khan, under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, based on testimonies of the deceased’s family members as eyewitnesses and corroborative medical evidence – Upon appeal, the High Court reversed the conviction, granting benefit of doubt to the accused due to inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses – The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s acquittal, emphasizing that appellate interference in acquittal judgments is warranted only when there is clear perversity in evidence appreciation by the lower courts [Paras 1, 5, 8, 24, 30].

Witness Testimony – Reliability and Contradictions – Family Members as Eyewitnesses – Key witnesses (PWs 5 and 9, minor brothers of the deceased, and PW 8, the mother) claimed to have seen the attack – The Trial Court relied on their testimonies, finding corroboration with medical evidence – The High Court, however, deemed their testimonies unreliable due to contradictions and omissions, noting significant discrepancies between their court statements and earlier police statements – Testimonies were found to be inconsistent, as witnesses failed to mention crucial details in initial statements, such as the specifics of the alleged attack and an oral dying declaration, undermining credibility [Paras 5, 20, 23, 28, 29].

Oral Dying Declaration – Veracity and Evidentiary Value – The mother (PW-8) claimed that the deceased made a dying declaration implicating the accused – The High Court questioned its reliability, highlighting that neither this statement nor corroborative evidence of the deceased’s ability to speak was present in initial police records or statements of other witnesses – The Court cited legal principles on caution in accepting verbal dying declarations, especially when first introduced in court testimony – Absence of corroboration and significant omissions justified rejection of the dying declaration as evidence [Paras 10, 17, 20, 22].

First Information Report (FIR) – Evidentiary Role and Limitations – The Court clarified that while an FIR is not an exhaustive account, it serves as an important document for setting the criminal law in motion – Omissions of vital facts in the FIR, like the alleged dying declaration, raised concerns about witness reliability and the prosecution’s case – These omissions affected the credibility of PW-8, weakening the prosecution’s stance, as such information was expected to be present in initial reports if genuine [Paras 11, 13, 15, 16].

Eyewitness Testimonies – Inconsistencies Among Witnesses – Other eyewitnesses, including PWs 2 and 17, either turned hostile or provided contradictory accounts – PW-17’s testimony that the accused threw the deceased on a stone boulder was inconsistent with the medical evidence, which did not support this mode of injury – Such contradictions, coupled with the absence of corroborative detail from PW-8 and other witnesses, led the High Court to reject these testimonies as unreliable [Paras 27, 28].

Necroscopical Evidence – Cause of Death – The medical evidence, presented through the testimony of PW-1 and the postmortem report, confirmed that the injuries sustained by Naseem Khan were sufficient to cause death – Both the Trial Court and High Court agreed on the homicidal nature of the death but diverged on the identification of the perpetrators due to the inconsistencies in eyewitness accounts [Paras 24, 25].

Judgment on Acquittal – Scope of Appellate Review in Acquittal Cases – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s acquittal, reiterating that appellate courts should interfere in acquittals only if there is a clear perversity or error in evidence appraisal – Referring to precedents, the Court emphasized that if the view taken by the High Court is reasonable, even if not the sole possible view, it should be upheld to avoid unwarranted appellate interference in acquittal judgments [Paras 7, 8, 26, 29].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, acquitting the accused based on inconsistencies and gaps in witness testimonies – The accused were acquitted due to lack of conclusive evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt [Para 30].

Criminal Law – Bail - Jurisdiction of Court in Bail Conditions – Extent of Conditions under Sections 437(3) and 439 CrPC – Conditions for Bail Set Aside - The High Court, while granting bail to the appellants, imposed conditions mandating the removal of a wall and transferring possession of disputed property to the complainant, thus encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the civil courts in pending civil suits – Held: The Court in granting bail should impose conditions solely related to ensuring the presence of the accused in trial; any condition overreaching into civil rights or property possession is improper and beyond the scope of bail proceedings [Paras 14-16].

Reasonable Conditions in Bail – Discretion of Courts – Case Law Emphasis on Restraint - Citing precedent, the Supreme Court emphasized that the "any condition" discretion under Section 437(3) CrPC must be reasonably exercised and must not interfere with civil rights or encumber the rights of parties in a civil dispute – Extreme conditions such as those imposed in this case may amount to an unlawful exercise of judicial discretion [Paras 14-15].

Decision – Appeal Allowed; Bail Conditions Modified - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's conditions involving property possession and removal of structural obstructions, directing that none of its findings be prejudicial to the rights of either party in ongoing civil litigation. Appellants are granted bail upon furnishing a bond with all other conditions of the High Court order remaining in force [Paras 16-18].

Consumer Law - Medical Negligence – Allegation of Negligent Surgery – Complainant claimed that surgery for congenital ptosis (drooping eyelid) in minor patient, performed by Dr. Neeraj Sud at PGI, Chandigarh, was conducted negligently, worsening the patient’s condition instead of improving it – State Commission initially dismissed complaint, finding no evidence of negligence, but NCDRC reversed this decision, awarding compensation of Rs. 3,00,000 and costs to complainants for alleged negligent treatment by the doctor – Supreme Court held that mere deterioration of condition post-surgery does not imply actionable negligence without evidence showing lack of due skill or care by the medical professional – Appeal allowed and judgment of the NCDRC set aside – Held: Negligence cannot be presumed without proof of failure to exercise requisite skill and due care by a qualified doctor [Paras 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16].

Standards for Medical Negligence – Duty of Care – Supreme Court reiterates the three key components of actionable negligence in medical cases: duty of care, breach of duty, and consequential harm – Reference made to Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee and Jacob Mathews v. State of Punjab, emphasizing that a doctor is not liable for negligence if he acted in accordance with acceptable medical practice – Bolam’s Test applied, wherein a doctor is deemed not negligent if treatment follows accepted norms within the medical community, absent evidence from an expert body to show a deviation from standard practice – Held: No actionable negligence was established as the doctor possessed requisite skill and performed surgery as per acceptable medical norms [Paras 14, 16, 17].

Evidence – Lack of Proof of Negligence – Complainants relied on medical records indicating deterioration post-surgery but did not provide expert testimony to substantiate negligence or deviation from standard medical practices by the doctor – The Court observed that worsening condition alone does not suffice to prove negligence in the absence of evidence showing inadequate care or lack of skill – Held: Without clear evidence showing that Dr. Neeraj Sud lacked the requisite skill or failed to exercise due diligence, allegations of negligence are unsubstantiated [Paras 8, 13, 15, 18].

Decision – Judgment Reversal – Supreme Court reverses NCDRC’s judgment which had partly allowed the complainants’ appeal by awarding compensation for alleged negligence – Court restores the State Commission’s original order, which found no evidence of negligence on part of the doctor or the PGI – Civil Appeal No. 272 of 2012 by Dr. Neeraj Sud allowed, while Civil Appeal No. 5526 of 2012 by complainants dismissed – Held: No compensation awarded as complainants failed to establish negligence, no enhancement possible [Paras 19, 20, 21].

Civil Law - Horizontal Reservation – Right of Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PWBDs) – The petitioner, with a locomotor disability of 60%, sought quashing of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examinations, 2024 results for not applying separate cut-offs for PWBDs – The petitioner argued that the denial of such benefit violated Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution – Held: The principle of horizontal reservation for PWBDs must be respected as it cuts across vertical reservations, ensuring fair representation within each category [Paras 3-5, 8].

Eligibility Criteria – Distinction Between Vertical and Horizontal Reservations – Clarified that horizontal reservations are applied across vertical categories, and candidates are adjusted within their respective vertical reservation categories – Cited Indira Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) and its clarification on horizontal reservation, ensuring PWBDs are considered in each category [Paras 7-8].

Equal Opportunity and Non-Discrimination – Upholding Constitutional Mandates – The refusal to apply a distinct cut-off for PWBDs in the main examination violated constitutional provisions ensuring equality and non-discrimination – The petitioner, who met the lower cut-off threshold prescribed for PWBDs, was entitled to an interview – The Court directed the respondent to include the petitioner in the interview process [Para 9].

Provisional Inclusion in Interview Process – Interim Relief Granted – Similar to the relief granted in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 710 of 2024 involving a blind candidate – Directed that the petitioner be included in the ongoing interview process, pending the final hearing [Paras 5, 7].

Decision: The petition was allowed in part as an interim measure. The respondents were directed to call the petitioner for an interview as part of the ongoing process. The case was listed for further hearing along with Writ Petition (Civil) No. 710 of 2024 [Paras 7-9].