Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 (Lis Pendens) – Applicability to Transferees Pendente Lite – Upheld – The doctrine of lis pendens, enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, applies with full force to transfers made during the pendency of a suit – Such transfers are not void ab initio but remain subservient to the decree that may be passed by the court – The Explanation to Section 52 clarifies that pendency commences from the date of plaint presentation and continues until final decree or satisfaction – The Maharashtra amendment requiring registration of lis pendens notice is for the benefit of third parties to prevent undue hardship, but its absence does not render the doctrine inapplicable or grant absolute title to subsequent purchasers who bought during pendency – Appellants, as transferees pendente lite, were bound by the decree for specific performance, and their rights were subservient to the decree holder – The High Court's finding that Section 52 TPA was applicable to the pendente lite transfers was affirmed [Paras 39-45, 65-66].

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 19(b) (Relief against subsequent transferees) – Interaction with Section 52 TPA – Distinguished – Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which provides for specific performance against subsequent transferees for value without notice, operates at a stage prior to the institution of a suit or proceeding – Once a suit is instituted and the property is transferred during its pendency, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, takes precedence – A transferee pendente lite cannot claim protection as a bona fide purchaser without notice under Section 19(b) because the doctrine of lis pendens binds them to the outcome of the litigation irrespective of their knowledge – The interpretation of Section 19(b) must align with Section 52 TPA to avoid incongruous situations [Paras 46-50].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 97, 98, 101 (Execution, Resistance, Adjudication) – Powers of Executing Court – Affirmed – The Executing Court has wide powers under Order XXI Rules 97 to 103 CPC to adjudicate all questions, including those relating to right, title, and interest, arising between the parties to the proceeding or their representatives, when a decree holder seeks possession and is resisted or obstructed – Transferees pendente lite have no independent right or locus standi to obstruct the execution of a decree for possession as they step into the shoes of the judgment debtor and their title is extinguished under Section 52 TPA – The Bombay Amendment to Rule 98(2) CPC further empowers the Executing Court to order civil imprisonment and compensation for obstruction – The Executing Court's decision to allow the decree holder's application for removal of obstruction and reject the obstructionists' objections was upheld [Paras 51-60, 64.5, 65].

Limitation Act, 1963 – Articles 129, 134 (Execution of Decree) – Rejection of Limitation Plea – Upheld – A plea of limitation raised by the appellants at a belated stage, not having been pleaded before the High Court or framed as a substantial question of law, was rejected – The decree holder had sought execution within one year of the trial court's judgment and decree – The application for removal of obstruction was filed within 30 days of the resistance, as prescribed by Article 129 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 134 was held not to be attracted to the facts of the present case – The High Court's view on this aspect was affirmed [Paras 69-71].

Constitution of India – Article 142 (Extraordinary Powers) – Directions to Prevent Frivolous Litigation – Issued – Considering the peculiar facts of the case, where the decree holder had to suffer multiple rounds of litigation for over three decades despite the decree attaining finality, the Supreme Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Directions were issued to ensure that no further application(s) or petition(s) by the appellants, the judgment debtor, or any other person claiming rights qua the suit property through them, shall be entertained by any court, to prevent further harassment and ensure the ends of justice [Paras 74].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Appellants directed to hand over actual physical possession of the suit property to respondent No. 1 (decree holder) on or before 15.02.2026 – No cost – No further application(s) or petition(s) by appellants, judgment debtor, or any person claiming through them regarding the suit property shall be entertained by any court [Paras 72, 73, 75].

Consumer Law – Execution Proceedings – Liability of Directors and Promoters – Consumer complaints admitted only against company – Directors/promoters not proceeded against at adjudicatory stage – No notice issued, no pleadings, no findings recorded against them – Held: Execution must strictly conform to the decree – Persons against whom no adjudication of liability exists cannot be proceeded against in execution merely because they are directors/promoters of judgment-debtor company [Paras 9–13, 17, 23].

Execution of Decree – Scope and Limitations – Executing forum cannot go behind or enlarge decree – Liability cannot be shifted or expanded at execution stage – Decree binding exclusively on company cannot be enforced against non-judgment debtors – Settled principle reiterated – Executing court may construe decree but cannot travel beyond it [Paras 12–13].

Consumer Protection Act – Adjudicatory Safeguards – Necessity of pleadings, notice and findings – Personal liability cannot be fastened without foundational adjudication – Execution proceedings cannot operate as substitute for trial or adjudication – Absence of pleadings and findings fatal to execution against individuals [Paras 11, 17].

Insolvency Law – Moratorium under Section 14 IBC – Effect on execution proceedings – Moratorium shields only corporate debtor – Does not automatically extend to directors/promoters – However, execution against directors permissible only if independent liability is established – Moratorium cannot be indirectly bypassed by proceeding against non-liable directors [Paras 7, 15, 20–22].

Company Law – Separate Legal Entity – Company distinct from shareholders and directors – Liability of directors limited unless personal guarantees, undertakings or statutory exceptions shown – Doctrine of corporate personality reaffirmed – No material to show guarantees or statutory basis for fastening personal liability [Paras 13–16].

Corporate Veil – Piercing of – Exceptional doctrine – Requires specific pleadings and findings of fraud or misuse of corporate form – Invocation impermissible at execution stage without prior adjudication – Directors/promoters cannot be exposed to personal liability in absence of established grounds [Paras 18–19].

Effect of Prior Supreme Court Order – Scope clarified – Earlier order permitting continuation of execution against directors removed only moratorium-related bar – Did not adjudicate or declare personal liability – National Commission rightly examined executability on merits and declined execution against directors – No inconsistency with prior order [Paras 19–22].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Order of NCDRC declining execution against directors/promoters upheld – Decree executable only against corporate debtor – Liberty reserved to appellants to pursue other remedies available in law against directors/promoters in appropriate proceedings – No order as to costs [Paras 24–27].

Service Law – Government Employment – Suppression of Criminal Antecedents – Cancellation of Appointment – Respondent selected as Sahayak Samiksha Adhikari – Required to disclose pendency of criminal cases in attestation and verification forms – Respondent answered in the negative despite two criminal cases pending against him – Held: Proper and complete disclosure of criminal antecedents is a fundamental requirement rooted in fairness, integrity and public trust – Repeated non-disclosure amounts to deliberate concealment and is a serious lapse justifying cancellation of appointment [Paras 3–6, 8–9].

Service Law – Attestation / Verification Forms – Effect of Disclaimer – Forms contained clear stipulation that furnishing false information or suppressing material facts would render candidate unfit and ineligible for government service – Respondent submitted incorrect information twice in clear violation of disclaimer – Held: What is decisive is the status of criminal cases at the time of filling the forms – Subsequent acquittal or later disclosure does not efface the misconduct of suppression [Paras 7–9].

Service Law – Criminal Cases – Pending Investigation – Relevance at Time of Disclosure – At the time of filling forms, investigations in criminal cases were pending – Acquittal or dropping of proceedings occurred later – Held: Subsequent developments cannot accrue to benefit of candidate who furnished false information at the relevant time [Paras 8–9].

Service Law – Equity and Sympathy – Limits – High Court interfered on grounds of triviality of offences, absence of charge-sheet, subsequent disclosure and opinion of District Magistrate – Supreme Court held that sympathy cannot supplant law – Maxim “juda lex sed lex” applied – Loss of employment cannot justify overlooking deliberate concealment of material facts [Paras 9–10].

Precedents – Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P. – Applicability – Principles relating to consideration of surrounding circumstances in cases of non-disclosure reiterated – Held: Facts of present case show demonstrated mal-intent due to repeated false declarations – Hence benefit of said precedents not available to respondent [Para 9].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgments of Single Judge and Division Bench of Allahabad High Court set aside – Cancellation of respondent’s appointment upheld – Pending applications disposed of [Para 10].

Criminal Law – Culpable Homicide – Distinction between Murder and Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder – Sections 299, 300 and 304 Part II IPC – Appellant convicted for causing death of deceased by a single lathi blow on head during a sudden group clash – No premeditation or common object established – Incident arose out of a sudden quarrel and free fight between rival parties – Both sides sustained injuries – Held: Act attributable to appellant showed knowledge that injury was likely to cause death but no intention to cause death – Conviction rightly altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC [Paras 5–5.6].

Unlawful Assembly – Common Object – Sections 147, 148 and 149 IPC – Prosecution failed to establish existence of unlawful assembly with common object to cause death – Evidence disclosed a sudden free fight with no prior meeting of minds – Accused persons could not be held vicariously liable – Charges under Sections 147, 148 and 149 IPC not made out [Paras 5.2–5.2.1].

Evidence Appreciation – Ocular Evidence and Medical Corroboration – Eyewitnesses consistently stated that appellant struck deceased with lathi on head – Medical evidence confirmed single blunt force injury on head resulting in fracture and death – Ocular and medical evidence found consistent and reliable to fix individual liability of appellant [Paras 3.6–3.9, 5.3].

Single Blow Case – Knowledge vs. Intention – Use of lathi and injury on vital part (head) sufficient to infer knowledge of likelihood of death – Absence of intention to cause death and lack of premeditation excluded offence from Section 302 IPC – Offence squarely falls under Section 304 Part II IPC [Paras 5.4–5.5].

Sentence – Reduction on Grounds of Advanced Age and Period Undergone – Appellant more than 80 years of age – Had already undergone about six years and three months of imprisonment – Sending appellant back to prison at advanced age held harsh and unwarranted – Sentence reduced to period already undergone while maintaining conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC [Paras 6–6.1].

Decision: Appeal dismissed on merits – Conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC affirmed – Sentence modified to imprisonment already undergone considering advanced age of appellant – Bail bonds discharged – Interlocutory applications disposed of.

Prevention of Corruption Act – Registration of FIR – Preliminary Inquiry – Not Mandatory in Every Case – FIRs registered by Karnataka Lokayukta Police on directions of Superintendent of Police without conducting preliminary inquiry – High Court quashed FIRs holding action to be without jurisdiction – Held: Issue no longer res integra in view of judgment in State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy – Preliminary inquiry not mandatory where source information is detailed and prima facie discloses commission of cognizable offence – High Court erred in quashing FIRs on this ground [Paras 3–6, 12].

Section 17, PC Act – Power of Superintendent of Police – Authorization of Investigation – Challenge raised that Superintendent of Police could not authorize Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate offences under PC Act – Held: Superintendent of Police is competent to direct registration of FIR and simultaneously authorize investigation, subject to restrictions under Section 17 PC Act – Registration of FIR governed by CrPC and not fettered by Section 17 – Law settled by T.N. Sudhakar Reddy and followed in State of Karnataka v. Channakeshava H.D. [Paras 4–6, 12].

Writ Jurisdiction – FIR under PC Act – Adjudication on Merits – High Court allowed writ petitions solely on preliminary jurisdictional issues without examining other grounds touching upon merits including lack of foundational material for disproportionate assets cases – Held: Respondent deprived of adjudication on remaining grounds – Matter remitted to High Court for fresh consideration limited to grounds not earlier adjudicated [Paras 7–14].

Remand – Scope – Filing of Chargesheet During Pendency of Appeal – During pendency of appeal, chargesheets filed against respondent – Held: Respondent permitted to assail chargesheets in revived writ petitions post-remand – Liberty limited to challenge chargesheets filed during pendency of appeal – Remedies under CrPC/BNSS remain unaffected [Paras 15–16].

Interim Protection – Continuance on Remand – Respondent had interim protection during pendency of writ petitions – Held: No coercive steps to be taken against respondent till disposal of writ petitions by High Court post-remand [Para 17].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order of the High Court set aside – Writ petitions restored to file of High Court of Karnataka for fresh adjudication on merits confined to grounds not earlier decided – Interim protection to continue till disposal – Pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law – Bail Jurisdiction – Section 439 CrPC – Scope and Limits – High Court while deciding bail application under Section 439 CrPC issued sweeping directions mandating medical age determination of victims in all POCSO cases and laid down procedural norms for investigation – Held: Jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC is confined to consideration of grant or refusal of bail – High Court cannot issue general or policy directions unrelated to adjudication of bail – Exercise of statutory jurisdiction cannot be enlarged by invoking constitutional status of High Court – Directions issued beyond jurisdiction and liable to be set aside [Paras 10–11.5].

POCSO Act – Determination of Age of Victim – Statutory Scheme – High Court held medical age determination under Section 164-A CrPC read with Section 27 POCSO Act to be mandatory at commencement of investigation – Supreme Court held that statutory framework does not mandate compulsory medical age determination in every case – Section 94 JJ Act provides a clear hierarchy for age determination, giving primacy to documentary evidence – Medical tests are permissible only in absence of primary documents and by competent authority at appropriate stage – High Court erred in holding otherwise [Paras 12–14.5].

Bail Proceedings – Mini Trial Impermissible – High Court undertook detailed evaluation of victim’s age, documentary records and medical opinion at bail stage – Held: Bail court is required to form only a prima facie view – Detailed examination of evidence, determination of disputed facts and issuance of binding findings amounts to conducting a mini trial – Such exercise is impermissible while deciding bail [Paras 11.1.2, 14].

Juvenile Justice Act vs. POCSO Act – Distinct Fields of Operation – JJ Act primarily deals with children in conflict with law or children in need of care and protection – Victims under POCSO Act do not automatically fall within jurisdiction of JJ Board or Committee – Age determination mechanism under Section 94 JJ Act cannot be mechanically imported into bail proceedings under POCSO Act – Conflation of statutory regimes by High Court held erroneous [Paras 14.5.1–14.5.4].

Constitutional Law – Statutory Power vs. Constitutional Power – High Court justified directions on ground of being a constitutional court – Supreme Court clarified distinction between constitutional powers and statutory powers – When exercising statutory jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, High Court must act within limits of statute – Constitutional status cannot be used to expand statutory jurisdiction [Paras 11.3–11.4].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment of High Court set aside to extent it issued general and mandatory directions regarding age determination in POCSO cases – Bail order interfered with accordingly – Law clarified that such directions cannot be issued in exercise of bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC.

Civil Law – Dismissal for Default – Conditional Restoration – Appeal dismissed for non-prosecution – High Court restored appeal subject to deposit of costs within stipulated time – Failure to deposit costs within time resulted in refusal to process restoration – Subsequent deposit made belatedly without leave of Court – Recall application rejected – Held: In peculiar facts, rigid adherence to procedural condition defeated substantial justice – Appeal deserved to be restored [Paras 3–5, 9].

Civil Procedure Code – Section 151 CPC – Inherent Powers – Recall of Orders – High Court declined to exercise inherent powers to recall order refusing restoration on ground of non-compliance with conditional cost order – Supreme Court held that inherent powers exist to prevent miscarriage of justice where default is technical and not deliberate [Paras 5–9].

Procedural Law – Handmaid of Justice – Technical Lapses – Supreme Court reiterated that procedure should not override merits – Dispute pending since long and dismissal on technical ground led to unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings – Matter should be decided on merits rather than non-suiting parties for procedural lapses [Paras 9–11].

Discretionary Jurisdiction – Supreme Court – Balancing Equity – While restoring appeal, Supreme Court deprecated laxity on part of appellants – Respondents unnecessarily dragged to Supreme Court – To balance equities, costs imposed payable to Supreme Court Middle Income Legal Aid Society [Paras 11–12].

Costs – Deterrent and Compensatory – Appellants directed to deposit Rs.50,000/- with Supreme Court Middle Income Legal Aid Society within two weeks – Restoration made subject to such deposit – Ensuring accountability of litigants while advancing justice [Para 12].

Direction to High Court – Expeditious Disposal – Restored appeal directed to be heard and decided by High Court within four weeks – Respondents granted liberty to file counter affidavit – Emphasis on early resolution of long-pending litigation [Paras 9–10, 12].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order dated 15.09.2025 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur set aside – Civil First Appeal restored to its original file – Appellants directed to deposit Rs.50,000/- with Supreme Court Middle Income Legal Aid Society – High Court directed to decide the appeal on merits within four weeks – Pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law - Companies Act, 2013 – Fraud – Cognizance on Private Complaint – Bar under Section 212(6) – Special Court took cognizance of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act on a private complaint alleging falsification of company records and fraudulent filings – Section 448 provides no independent punishment and makes the accused “liable under Section 447” – Held: Offence under Section 448 is an offence “covered under Section 447” and therefore attracts the statutory bar under the second proviso to Section 212(6) – Cognizance cannot be taken except on a complaint by the Director, SFIO or authorised Central Government officer – Cognizance under Sections 448 and 451 on a private complaint is without jurisdiction [Paras 21–35, 41–45].

Statutory Interpretation – Companies (Amendment) Act, 2015 – Meaning of ‘offence covered under Section 447’ – Post-2015 amendment, Section 212(6) substituted earlier enumeration of sections by expression “offence covered under Section 447” – Legislative intent was to confine stringent bail conditions to fraud, not to dilute safeguard against frivolous prosecutions – Expression includes offences which, upon proof, entail punishment under Section 447 – Section 448 being inextricably linked to Section 447 cannot be read in isolation [Paras 27–34].

Quashing of Proceedings – Section 451, Companies Act – Section 451 applies only in case of repeated default of a substantive offence – Once cognizance under Section 448 itself is barred and quashed, offence of repeated default under Section 451 cannot survive – Proceedings under Sections 448 and 451 liable to be quashed in entirety [Paras 46–47].

Judicial Discipline – Coordinate Bench Decisions – Earlier judgment of the same High Court holding that private complaint for offences attracting Section 447 is barred was not noticed in impugned order – Failure to follow judicial comity and stare decisis deprecated – High Court ought to have followed earlier view or referred matter to larger Bench [Paras 36–38].

Companies Act and IPC – Jurisdiction of Special Court – Section 436(2) – Special Court may try IPC offences only when it is trying an offence under the Companies Act – Once Companies Act offences are quashed, Special Court ceases to have jurisdiction to try IPC offences – Complaint to be transferred to court of competent territorial jurisdiction – Distinction from cases under Companies Act, 1956 noted [Paras 48–54].

Criminal Proceedings vis-à-vis Civil/Corporate Disputes – Pendency of civil suits and proceedings before NCLT relating to management and control of company does not ipso facto bar criminal prosecution – Allegations disclose prima facie criminality under IPC – No ground to quash IPC offences at threshold – Criminal proceedings for IPC offences to continue independently [Paras 55–57].

Decision – Appeals partly allowed – Impugned judgment of High Court set aside – Cognizance and proceedings under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act quashed – Proceedings under IPC to continue before court of competent jurisdiction after transfer – No opinion expressed on merits of IPC offences – No order as to costs [Paras 59–61].

Income Tax – Amalgamation – Shares held as Stock-in-Trade vs Capital Asset – Taxability under Section 28 – Assessees, promoter investment companies, received shares of amalgamated company in lieu of shares of amalgamating company under a court-sanctioned scheme – Assessing Officer treated shares as stock-in-trade and taxed notional gains as business income – Tribunal held no income accrued in absence of sale or transfer – High Court remanded matter holding that if shares were stock-in-trade, gains would be taxable under Section 28 – Supreme Court examined whether substitution of shares itself constitutes taxable business income – Held: Mere substitution of shares on amalgamation does not automatically give rise to taxable business income – What is relevant is real commercial realisation and not notional appreciation – Taxability depends on whether shares received are immediately realisable, freely tradable, and of ascertainable market value – Matter remitted for factual determination by Tribunal [Paras 8–11, 15–18, 39–40].

Income Tax – Section 28 – Scope and Interpretation – Real Income Doctrine – Section 28 is a wide charging provision taxing real profits and gains of business whether received in cash or kind – However, income must be real, accrued or received, and commercially realisable – Hypothetical or notional gains cannot be taxed unless expressly deemed by statute – In amalgamation, unless assessee receives a real, immediately disposable commercial benefit, no income accrues at the stage of substitution – Principle of real income reiterated [Paras 13–15, 18–19].

Amalgamation – Legal Nature – Not a Sale or Exchange per se – Amalgamation results in statutory substitution of one corporate holding by another – Amalgamating company ceases to exist and shareholders receive shares by operation of law – Not a bilateral exchange in strict legal sense – However, amalgamation constitutes “transfer” for purposes of capital gains as held in Grace Collis – Distinction maintained between capital gains taxation and business income taxation [Paras 16–18].

Capital Gains – Section 47(vii) – Limited to Capital Assets – Exemption under Section 47(vii) applies only where shares are held as capital assets – If shares are stock-in-trade, exemption under Section 47(vii) is unavailable – Determination of nature of holding is foundational to deciding taxability – Tribunal directed to decide nature of holding afresh [Paras 12–13, 26].

Section 260A – High Court Jurisdiction – Incidental Questions of Law – Contention that High Court exceeded jurisdiction by addressing Section 28 rejected – Issue of business income taxability was incidental and arose directly from Tribunal’s findings – Parties were fully heard and no prejudice caused – High Court empowered to consider such incidental questions even if not formally framed – Distinguished Shiv Raj Gupta [Paras 9–9.6].

Preliminary Inquiry vs Final Tax Liability – Role of Tribunal – Tribunal erred in declining to decide whether shares were capital assets or stock-in-trade – Such determination is mandatory before applying charging provisions – High Court justified in remanding matter for fresh adjudication – Tribunal to examine commercial realisability, marketability, and nature of shares received [Paras 8.3, 11, 18.4–18.6].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – High Court judgment upheld – Matters remanded to Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to determine whether shares were held as stock-in-trade or capital assets and whether substitution on amalgamation resulted in real, taxable business income under Section 28 – No automatic taxability on mere substitution of shares.