Criminal Law – Investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC – Magistrate’s Power – Validity of referral for police investigation – JMFC referred private complaint alleging forgery of E-Stamp and Rent Agreement for police investigation – High Court quashed the referral on the ground of non-application of mind and irregular order – Held: JMFC’s referral was valid as prima facie material existed disclosing cognizable offences – The Magistrate had jurisdiction and exercised discretion judiciously – Use of the word “further” in JMFC’s order did not vitiate the referral – Irregularity, if any, was curable under Section 460 CrPC – Orders of the High Court quashing the investigation unsustainable [Paras 34–39, 43–47].

Forgery and Fraud – Use of fake E-Stamp Paper – Prima facie evidence of conspiracy and forgery – Rent Agreement produced before High Court in earlier civil proceedings found to be on a fake E-Stamp Paper whose serial number actually corresponded to an unrelated Sale Agreement – Held: Existence of prima facie material warranted police investigation – Suppression of material facts and misuse of forged documents before the High Court justified invocation of criminal process [Paras 35–38].

Judicial Review – High Court’s Power under Section 482 CrPC – Scope of interference – High Court erred in interfering at the nascent stage of investigation and substituting its view for that of the Magistrate – As held in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. V. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, criminal proceedings should not be stifled prematurely where prima facie allegations exist [Paras 20, 38–40].

Order under Section 156(3) CrPC – Application of Mind – Principles Reiterated – Reaffirmed that Magistrate may refer complaint to police for investigation before taking cognizance if allegations disclose cognizable offence (Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615; Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. V. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439) – The JMFC had complied with Priyanka Srivastava v. State of UP, (2015) 6 SCC 287 requirements [Paras 37–39].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned orders of the High Court quashing the investigation set aside – Criminal proceedings restored – Investigation to proceed in accordance with law.

Vehicles – Inter-State permits – Overlap with notified intra-State routes – Chapter VI overrides Section 88 – Inter-State agreement not “law” – Private operators cannot be allowed on overlapping notified routes absent express statutory carve-out – High Court directions set aside – Writ petition dismissed – States directed to confer and consider modifications if MPSRTC winding-up is established [Paras 23, 41-45, 48-50].

Inter-State Agreement vs. Notified Routes – Nature of IS-RT Agreement – An inter-State reciprocal transport agreement under Section 88 is an agreement between States and not “law”; approved schemes and notified routes framed under Chapter VI prevail by virtue of Section 98 – Consequently, private operators cannot ply on any portion of a notified route, even if part of an inter-State route overlaps, unless the scheme permits it – Mysore SRTC (I) view not good law; Constitution Bench in Adarsh Travels followed [Paras 41-45].

Overlapping Routes – Absolute Prohibition – Consistent line of authority reiterated: if a scheme imposes total prohibition on private operators on a notified route, no permit can be granted or renewed for a route that traverses/overlaps—even for a short distance; intersection is distinct from overlap [Para 41].

Question of Law – Framed and Answered – Whether a private operator can be granted a permit under an IS-RT Agreement when a portion of the inter-State route is common to a notified intra-State route? – Answer: No, in view of Chapter VI’s overriding effect and binding precedents [Para 23; Paras 41-45].

Effect of MPSRTC Winding-up – Contractual Clause – IS-RT Agreement contemplated inclusion of Schedule B routes into Schedule A upon MPSRTC’s winding-up; however, absence of clinching proof of winding-up defeats private operators’ claims; relief is “well-nigh impossible” unless winding-up is clearly shown [Paras 43-44].

Court Directions – Gwalior Bench’s directions requiring MP to issue permanent permits and UP to countersign within set timelines set aside; connected orders also set aside; Writ Petition © No. 748 of 2024 dismissed [Paras 4-9, 50(i)-(iii)].

– Cooperative Federalism & Public Interest – Principal Secretaries (Transport) of MP and UP to meet within 3 months to explore working out the IS-RT Agreement, including (i) moving Schedule B routes to Schedule A upon proof of MPSRTC’s winding-up, (ii) considering partial exclusions/modification of approved schemes to avoid public inconvenience, and (iii) prompt permits/countersignature if consensus emerges [Paras 48-49, 50(iv)].

Decision: Appeals allowed; impugned High Court orders set aside; Writ Petition © No. 748 of 2024 dismissed; directions issued to MP and UP to confer as indicated; no order as to costs [Para 50].

Arbitration – Enforcement of Award – Execution - Objections under Section 47 CPC – Dismissal – Appellant MMTC Limited objected to execution of arbitral award favouring Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Ltd., alleging fraud and collusion by its own officials during fixation of coal prices – High Court dismissed objections under Section 47 and application for stay under Order XXI Rule 29 CPC – Held: Mere allegation of fraud on MMTC’s internal decision-making without showing fraud on the arbitral tribunal or the award itself does not render award inexecutable – Award had attained finality, and objections raised did not demonstrate nullity or jurisdictional infirmity as required under Section 47 – Appeal dismissed [Paras 15, 25, 31, 94, 95, 100].

Execution Proceedings – Section 47 CPC – Scope – Narrow compass – Objection to enforcement can only lie on limited grounds such as jurisdictional infirmity or decree being a nullity – Held: Allegations of internal collusion and breach of fiduciary duty, even if true, do not constitute jurisdictional infirmity or render arbitral award a nullity – No fraud on tribunal alleged or proved – Electrosteel Steel Ltd. v. ISPAT Carrier Pvt. Ltd. followed [Paras 21, 23, 24, 25].

Contract – Long Term Coal Supply Agreement – Price fixation clause linked to SAIL/RINL pricing – 5th Delivery Period – Price fixed at US$ 300 PMT – MMTC later claimed fraud by its own officers for agreeing to that price – Held: There was consistent correspondence, board approvals, and prior performance under the LTA – No evidence that decisions were irrational or outside range of reasonableness – Price aligned with SAIL/RINL – Business Judgment Rule applied – Directors’ decisions within permissible commercial discretion [Paras 32, 39, 40, 94].

Company Law – Directors’ Duties – Breach of fiduciary duty – Allegations against MMTC officers for collusion – Held: For a finding of breach of fiduciary duty, conduct must fall outside the bounds of what a reasonably competent director would have done – No such evidence found – Retrospective scrutiny with benefit of hindsight is impermissible – Re Living Images Ltd., Sharp v. Blank, and Maple Leaf Foods v. Schneider Corp. followed [Paras 35, 38, 39, 95].

Criminal Law – FIR against MMTC officials and Anglo – Allegation of corruption and conspiracy – Held: Mere registration of FIR or pendency of criminal proceedings does not render an award inexecutable – Execution cannot be stayed on mere pendency of unproven criminal charges – No finding of fraud by any court or investigating agency till date – FIR is a one-sided version, not evidence of fraud vitiating the award [Paras 85, 90, 94(q)].

Res Judicata – Arbitration Award upheld by Supreme Court – Finality – Re-litigation through Section 47 objections barred – Attempt to revisit issues already adjudicated under Section 34 and 37 of Arbitration Act not permissible – Objections amount to abuse of process – Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi reiterated – Execution proceedings cannot become a retrial [Paras 31, 94, 97, 98].

Civil Procedure – Order XXI Rule 29 CPC – Stay of execution pending suit – Rejected – Held: Suit seeking to declare award void was itself rejected – Pending appeal against rejection of suit does not justify stay of execution – Objections must stand on independent merit – No exceptional circumstance shown to grant stay [Para 96].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Section 47 objections rightly rejected – Award held executable – No prima facie case of fraud or collusion made out – Appeal under Order XXI Rule 29 also untenable in absence of pending suit – Costs not awarded [Paras 95, 96, 100].

Criminal Law – Anticipatory Bail – Limited Role – Parity – FIR for offences under BNS, POCSO Act, and Prohibition of Child Marriage Act – Allegation against appellant limited to driving the vehicle – Other co-accused granted bail – High Court rejected anticipatory bail – Held: Appellant had no overt act vis-à-vis victim – Anticipatory bail granted on grounds of parity and limited involvement – Bail to be granted on arrest subject to conditions

Bail – Interim Protection – Grant of Interim Protection by Supreme Court on 09.05.2025 – Appeal allowed – Final order confirms interim protection by directing release on bail in the event of arrest – Cash security of Rs. 25,000/- with two sureties imposed – Conditions imposed for cooperation and non-interference with evidence

Criminal Procedure – Section 482 BNSS – Anticipatory Relief – Appellant entitled to invoke Section 482 of BNSS for protection in absence of direct allegations – Observed that presence at the scene or peripheral assistance not sufficient to deny anticipatory relief where others with greater involvement are already on bail

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s order dated 23.04.2025 set aside – Anticipatory bail granted to appellant in the event of arrest – To be released on furnishing cash security of Rs. 25,000/- and two sureties – Directed not to misuse liberty or influence witnesses.

Tender – Disqualification of Bid – Solvency Certificate – Clause 18 of NIT – Appellant’s technical bid rejected by Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad as “haisiyat praman patra” (solvency certificate) was issued by a private architect rather than District Magistrate – NIT did not specify that certificate must be issued by the District Magistrate – Held: Tendering authority cannot import unstated conditions – Rejection of bid dehors terms of NIT and arbitrary – Valuer empanelled with Income Tax Department was competent to issue such valuation certificate – High Court erred in upholding disqualification [Paras 12–15, 18].

Judicial Review – Scope in Tender Matters – Court cannot act as appellate authority in tender evaluation – Intervention permissible only when decision is patently arbitrary or contrary to NIT terms – Rejection of bid for non-DM certificate fell outside tender conditions and hence interfered with [Para 11].

Administrative Law – New Grounds in Counter Affidavit – Rejection order must stand or fall on reasons stated therein – Additional grounds raised subsequently cannot justify the impugned decision – Respondent could not later argue that valuation failed to show encumbrance details when original rejection was solely for non-DM certificate [Paras 16–17].

Interpretation – Meaning of “Haisiyat Praman Patra” – As per Oxford Hindi–English Dictionary, “haisiyat” means capacity, means, or resources – Certificate indicating bidder’s financial capacity suffices unless specific authority prescribed – Valuation certificate showing worth far above ₹10 crores meets requirement [Paras 17, 18].

Tender Reconsideration – Direction – Order of High Court set aside – Mandi Parishad directed to reconsider appellant’s technical bid and, upon verifying that valuation certificate satisfies Clause 18, negotiate with successful bidder or re-award contract accordingly [Para 19].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Rejection of technical bid quashed – Matter remanded to reconsider appellant’s bid per NIT terms [Paras 18–20].

Arbitration – Delay in Pronouncement – Validity of Award – Public Policy Conflict – Arbitral award pronounced after nearly 3 years and 8 months of reservation without explanation – Arbitrator’s delay resulted in demonstrable indecisiveness, non-application of mind, and denial of effective adjudication – Supreme Court held that while delay alone is not a ground under Section 34, where it materially impacts the quality and fairness of adjudication, it renders the award in conflict with public policy and patently illegal [Paras 1, 19–20, 46–48, 55].

Arbitration – Unworkable Award – Perversity – Incomplete Adjudication – Arbitrator invalidated sale deeds executed by the appellant but declined to determine compensation or finalize reliefs, leaving parties to litigate afresh – Findings held to be contradictory and Award declared ineffective – Held: Arbitrator failed to perform his core function of final dispute resolution, thereby defeating the purpose of arbitration – Award liable to be set aside for being unworkable and perverse [Paras 39–42, 44, 47–48, 55].

Section 14 vs. Section 34 – Independent Remedies – Not Mutually Exclusive – Supreme Court clarified that aggrieved party need not seek termination under Section 14(2) before challenging delayed award under Section 34 – Remedies under Sections 14 and 34 operate independently – Mandate of arbitrator can be challenged post facto under Section 34 based on effects of delay [Paras 15–16, 19–20].

Contractual Interpretation – Clauses 6(a)–(c) of Joint Development Agreement (JDA) – Arbitrator’s interpretation of “fit for occupation” under Clause 6(a) stretched beyond contractual text – Requirements of certificate by architect and application for completion certificate were fulfilled – Arbitrator’s finding of non-compliance held perverse and contrary to terms of JDA [Paras 53–54].

Arbitrator’s Interim Orders – Irreversible Consequences – Equity Consideration under Article 142 – Arbitrator’s interim order in 2010 shifted possession and altered parties' positions – Supreme Court held that reverting to status quo was impossible after 15 years and third-party rights had been created – Invoking Article 142, Court validated previously illegal sale deeds executed by appellant, directed forfeiture of ₹6.82 crore security deposit, and awarded ₹3.18 crore additional compensation to respondents – Ordered final settlement of rights to prevent further litigation [Paras 60–62].

Exercise of Article 142 – Final Settlement to Prevent Injustice – Held: When arbitral award fails to resolve core dispute and perpetuates litigation after extensive delay and altered circumstances, Supreme Court justified in invoking Article 142 to do complete justice – Power exercised in conformity with Gayatri Balasamy and Shilpa Sailesh to bring litigation to an end [Paras 57–60].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Arbitral award set aside – Sale deeds declared valid despite initial illegality – Security deposit of ₹6.82 crores forfeited and additional ₹3.18 crores to be paid by appellant to respondents – On full payment, appellant entitled to possession of its 50% share – Parties to bear own costs [Paras 64].

Urban Planning – Delhi – Monitoring Committee & Judicial Committee – Scope – Monitoring Committee was constituted to curb misuse of residential premises and lacked statutory sealing power vis-à-vis premises as such; sealing entails civil consequences and DMC Act provides statutory process/appeal – Judicial Committee’s 18.12.2023 common order did not examine individual units; SC reiterates case-by-case scrutiny and tests the applicant’s claim on its own facts – Held: Common order does not by itself entitle de-sealing; individual merits must govern [Paras 4–7, 10, 12].

Land Use – LSC Classification – New Rajinder Nagar is a shop-cum-residence Local Shopping Centre (designated LSC) under MPD-2021 – Ground floor sanctioned for commercial use; upper floors intended/reserved for residential use unless converted on payment of prescribed charges – FAR pattern (residential FAR applicable; sanctioned vs existing) confirms status; no proof of pre-1961 commercial first floor – Held: Only ground floor permitted commercially ab initio; upper floors require conversion and compliance [Paras 15–23].

Evidence/Documentary Proof – Third-party L&DO letter (1957) and generic lease deeds (1974/1975) not relied upon; 1987 conveyance recites single-storey; 1989 sale deed shows only ground-floor shop; 2005 sanctioned plan is for residential apartments over shop with basement for storage; 2018 DDA communication distinguishes planned vs designated LSCs – Held: Record rebuts claim of historic commercial use of upper floors [Paras 11, 16–19].

Municipal Law – De-sealing & Regularisation – Application for de-sealing rejected – MCD to conduct joint inspection, specify in a speaking order: (i) non-compoundable deviations to be removed, (ii) conversion charges for upper floors, (iii) penalty for excess FAR – Upon removal of non-compoundable works and payment of charges, applicant may carry on commercial activity in upper floors – Held: Relief moulded prospectively subject to statutory compliance; de-sealing not ordered now [Paras 22–24].

Decision: I.As seeking de-sealing and permission to use upper floors commercially rejected; directions issued to MCD for joint inspection and quantification of conversion/penalty charges; applicant permitted to regularise and thereafter use upper floors commercially upon compliance [Paras 23–25].

Criminal Law – Advocate–Client Privilege – Summoning of Advocates – Suo Motu proceedings arising from summons issued to an Advocate under Section 179 BNSS, for appearing as counsel for the accused – Advocate was summoned to disclose facts and circumstances of the case – Held: Such summoning without clear invocation of exceptions under Section 132 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023 is illegal and violates the statutory privilege conferred on Advocates and clients – Investigating agencies cannot summon an Advocate appearing in a case solely to obtain case details – Violation of this privilege also impacts Articles 19(1)(g), 20(3), 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution – Summons set aside – Directions issued to safeguard professional privilege [Paras 2, 3, 4, 32, 44, 48, 49, 50, 52, 67, 68].

Advocate–Client Confidentiality – Scope of Section 132 of BSA – Section 132 confers privilege upon clients and imposes duty of non-disclosure on Advocates – Covers all professional communications made in the course of service – Exception exists only for communications in furtherance of an illegal purpose or when crime/fraud is observed during engagement – This privilege survives even after professional relationship ceases – Advocate may invoke the privilege even in the absence of client – Disclosure by Advocate in violation may amount to professional misconduct – The statutory privilege is rooted in fundamental constitutional protections including Article 20(3) – Held: Blanket summoning violates these safeguards [Paras 5, 6, 7, 10, 18, 21, 32, 33, 42, 44].

Criminal Procedure – BNSS Powers of Investigation – Section 179 of BNSS permits summoning witnesses – However, such powers are limited when exercised against Advocates – Held: No summons can be issued to an Advocate representing a party in a case unless the exception under Section 132 applies and is explicitly stated in the summons – Written approval of a superior officer (not below SP rank) is mandatory – Advocate/client can seek judicial review under Section 528 BNSS [Paras 3, 11, 45, 49, 50, 52, 67.1.2, 67.1.3].

Judicial Oversight – Framing of Guidelines – Bar urged for framing guidelines similar to Jacob Mathew and Vishaka cases – Court declined – Held: Unlike Vishaka, there is no legislative vacuum or systemic failure requiring guideline formation – Existing statutory framework under BNSS and BSA sufficient – Issuance of new procedure would conflict with express legislative scheme and potentially impair investigations – Judicial review under Section 528 BNSS is the proper remedy for abuse [Paras 24–31, 44, 45, 67].

Production of Documents and Digital Devices – Section 94 BNSS – Held: Professional privilege under Section 132 does not extend to physical documents or digital devices – However, if document/device is in Advocate’s possession, it can only be produced before Court and not directly to I.O. – Any discovery from digital devices must occur in Court with presence of client and Advocate, and may require assistance of digital expert – Confidentiality of data concerning other clients must be safeguarded [Paras 54–58, 67.3, 67.3.1–3.3].

In-House Counsel – Applicability of Section 132 – Held: In-house counsel, being full-time salaried employees, do not fall under the definition of “Advocate” under the Advocates Act – Hence, they are not entitled to the privilege under Section 132 of BSA – May claim protection under Section 134 for personal communications made to their own legal advisers, but not employer–employee legal advice exchanges [Paras 59–66, 67.4].

Role of Advocate – Importance of Confidentiality – Reiterated that Advocate is not merely an agent but a dignified officer of Court – Upholds justice and ensures fair representation – Breach of privilege undermines adversarial system – Even occasional misconduct by lawyers does not justify systemic breach of confidentiality protections which are foundational to rule of law [Paras 17–23, 40, 43].

Comparative Jurisprudence – Common Law Systems – Privilege widely recognised in UK, US, Canada – Communication protected irrespective of ongoing litigation – In Greenough, Upjohn, Akzo Nobel and other cases, privilege preserved to ensure justice – Indian legal framework mirrors such protections, particularly in adversarial systems [Paras 34–36, 65].

Final Directions – Issued under Article 142 to clarify legal position – Held:

• Summons to Advocate cannot be issued unless falling within exceptions of Section 132 BSA [Para 67.1.1]

• Must be approved in writing by superior officer not below SP rank [Para 67.1.2]

• Must state specific facts and basis for exception [Para 67.1.2]

• Advocate/client may seek judicial review under Section 528 BNSS [Para 67.1.3]

• Privilege applies to litigation, pre-litigation and non-litigious engagements [Para 67.1.4]

• Production of documents governed by Section 94 BNSS, not protected by Section 132 [Paras 67.2–67.2.3]

• Digital devices to be produced only in Court; discovery to follow safeguards [Paras 67.3.1–67.3.3]

• In-house counsel excluded from Section 132 privilege [Paras 67.4, 67.4.1]

Decision: Summons issued to Advocate found to be illegal – Same set aside – Suo motu writ petition and connected matters disposed of – Strong caution issued to investigating agencies against transgressing legal privilege of Advocate–Client communications [Paras 48, 49, 50, 52, 67, 68].

Education Law – RTE Act, 2009 – Section 23 – Minimum Qualifications for Teachers – Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) – Appellants appointed as Assistant Teachers in 2012 without TET qualification – First TET held in November 2011 – Both appellants cleared TET subsequently (2011 and 2014) – Their services terminated in 2018 for not possessing TET at the time of appointment – Amendment of 2017 to Section 23 permitted all teachers in position as on 31.03.2015 to acquire minimum qualifications within four years, i.e., up to 31.03.2019 – Held: Appellants having qualified TET before 31.03.2019 fulfilled statutory requirement – Termination illegal – Reinstatement ordered without back wages but with continuity of service and consequential benefits [Paras 8–14].

Teacher Appointment – Retrospective Compliance – Interpretation of Proviso to Section 23(2), RTE Act – Statutory window of four years for acquiring qualification applies to those appointed before 31.03.2015 – Appellants, having passed TET within that window, could not be treated as unqualified on termination date (12.07.2018) – High Court erred in upholding termination solely for absence of TET at appointment [Paras 10–13].

Relief – Reinstatement – Orders of High Court and BSA quashed – Appellants to be reinstated as Assistant Teachers in Jwala Prasad Tiwari Junior High School, Kanpur Nagar – No back wages but continuity of service, seniority, and consequential benefits granted [Para 14].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders of High Court and BSA set aside – Appellants directed to be reinstated as Assistant Teachers with continuity of service and consequential benefits but without back wages [Para 14].