Civil Law - Insolvency - Presidency Towns Insolvency Act 1909 - Section 9(2) - Insolvency Notice - Basis of Recovery Certificate - Appellant-Bank issued insolvency notice against the respondent-director based on a DRT recovery certificate for over Rs. 14.74 crores - Respondent challenged the notice before the Bombay High Court - High Court quashed the notice holding that a recovery certificate is not a decree or order within the meaning of the Insolvency Act - Supreme Court examined whether the term decree or order in Section 9(2) includes a DRT recovery certificate - Court noted that insolvency statutes must be strictly construed due to the grave civil death consequences involved - Relied on Paramjeet Singh Patheja ratio which held that an arbitral award is not a decree - Terms decree and order must be understood as defined under CPC Sections 2(2) and 2(14) - Only a regularly constituted court can pass a decree in a suit commenced by a plaint - DRT recovery certificate is not a decree of a civil court - Legislative intent in 2016 amendment adding Section 19(22A) to the RDB Act specifically deeming recovery certificates as decrees for insolvency purposes confirms that such equivalence did not exist previously - Held - Prior to the 2016 amendment a recovery certificate could not form the basis of an insolvency notice - Appeal dismissed - [Paras 1-14].

Civil Law - Retrospective Application - Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act 1993 - Section 19(22A) - Non-retrospectivity - Bank contended that the 2016 amendment which deems a recovery certificate as a decree for initiation of insolvency proceedings should support the notice - Court held that rights of parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation - Right to relief must be judged based on facts and law existing when the suitor institutes the proceeding - Litigation commenced in 2006-2007 long before the 2016 amendment - Amendment has not been given retrospective effect by Parliament - A claim untenable on the date of entry into court cannot become tenable due to a subsequent event during pendency unless the statute expressly requires - Held - Section 19(22A) does not aid the Appellant-Bank - [Paras 15-22].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Bombay High Court order quashing the insolvency notice affirmed – Proceedings against the deceased original respondent stand closed.

Civil Law - Motor Accident Claims - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 166 - Negligence - Collision between Maruti car and tanker resulted in three deaths and one survivor - MACT and High Court dismissed claim petitions holding car driver solely negligent based on photographs showing car on wrong side - Supreme Court found photographs inherently suspect as they were taken 10-12 hours post-accident by tanker owner and failed to show full road width - Testimony of injured eyewitness PW-2 was reliable and consistent - Tanker driver failed to produce material witness conductor leading to adverse inference - Heavy vehicle parked on public road at night without warning signals constitutes negligence - Held - Findings of lower courts were perverse and unsustainable - Tanker driver held rash and negligent - Appeals allowed - [Paras 1-31].

Evidence Law - Standard of Proof - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Preponderance of Probabilities - Settled legal position that standard of proof in motor accident claim proceedings is one of preponderance of probabilities and not the strict criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt - Tribunal is not a criminal court and must appreciate evidence pragmatically to fulfill the beneficial object of the Act - Held - Strict rules of evidence do not apply - Claims must be decided on the touchstone of probability - [Paras 14-16].

Evidence Law - Res Ipsa Loquitur - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 166 - Presumption of Negligence - Accident occurred at 10:00 p.m. in January - Heavy vehicle left standing on roadway without parking lights or hazard indicators - Principle of res ipsa loquitur shifts burden to respondents to prove all reasonable precautions were taken - Respondents failed to discharge burden or explain non-production of conductor - Held - Parking a heavy vehicle at night without adequate warning signals constitutes negligence per se - [Paras 24-25].

Criminal Law - Corroborative Evidence - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 279, 338 and 304A - Evidentiary Value of Charge-sheet - Police investigation resulted in filing of a charge-sheet against the tanker driver for rash driving and causing death by negligence - While a charge-sheet is not conclusive proof of negligence in civil proceedings it remains a relevant circumstance supporting the claimants' version - Held - Charge-sheet lends support to the testimony of the eyewitness - [Para 26].

Civil Law - Quantum of Compensation - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 166 - Calculation Principles - Tribunal and High Court failed to determine compensation due to dismissal on negligence grounds - Supreme Court calculated compensation applying principles from Sarla Verma and Pranay Sethi - Included components for monthly income - future prospects - multiplier - loss of consortium - loss of estate and funeral expenses - Held - Total compensation of Rs 65,58,449.30 for SLP 10565/2025 - Rs 35,36,132.78 for SLP 33538/2025 - and Rs 41,66,829.68 for SLP 33539/2025 awarded with 6% interest - [Paras 31-36].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgment of Allahabad High Court and Awards of MACT Jalaun at Orai set aside – Respondent-Insurance Company directed to deposit awarded amounts within eight weeks – Claimants entitled to 6% interest per annum from date of filing petitions until realization.

Civil Law - Land Acquisition - Land Acquisition Act 1894 - Section 5A - Mandatory requirement of personal hearing - Right of audi alteram partem - Appellants challenged acquisition of 27 hectares of land for a metro car depot alleging they were denied a personal hearing after being absent on one specific date - Single Judge of High Court quashed the acquisition finding non-compliance - Division Bench reversed the order holding that landowners failed to pursue their objections - Supreme Court reviewed the timeline of proceedings where appellants appeared on multiple dates but failed to file a rejoinder or appear on 09/04/2012 - Held - Section 5A engrafts a valuable right for landowners as a safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of property - However the right to hearing is not unqualified and is subject to the overarching principle of eminent domain - Where the Land Acquisition Officer provides reasonable opportunity and the party fails to avail it the authority is not obligated to repeatedly fix new dates - The right of hearing was abandoned by the appellants through their own lack of diligence and subsequent silence - Principles of natural justice are meant for substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual - Acquisition upheld - [Paras 1-54].

Civil Law - Land Acquisition - Land Acquisition Act 1894 - Section 5A(2) - Nature of the Land Acquisition Officer's report - Administrative vs Quasi-judicial capacity - Recommendation to Government - Appellants contended that the report was mechanical and lacked application of mind as it stated objections are not being considered - Held - The Land Acquisition Officer acts as an administrative authority whose role is limited to making recommendations - There is no requirement to pass a detailed speaking order or a judicial decree - Brevity of reasons is not synonymous with absence of reasons - The phrase objections are not being considered in the report meant they were looked into but did not merit acceptance in light of the public purpose - The purpose of Section 5A is to aid the State Government in reaching a final decision which was fulfilled here - [Paras 10-12, 19, 38, 43, 61-64].

Civil Law - Public Purpose - Land Acquisition Act 1894 - Section 4 and 6 - Selection of land - Judicial restraint in technical projects - Appellants suggested alternative government lands for the project to avoid acquisition of their private property - Held - The determination of which particular parcel of land is required for a project falls squarely within the domain of expert planning authorities - A metro car depot is an indispensable operational component and its location involves technical and operational considerations - Writ courts will not substitute their judgment for the government's decision on land suitability unless there is manifest arbitrariness or mala fides - Eminent domain power allows the State to reassert dominion for public exigency - [Paras 72-82].

Evidence Law - Statutory Presumption - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 114 - Regularity of official acts - Service of notice - Landowners claimed they were not served with a notice for a further hearing date - Held - Once the authorities demonstrate that notices were duly issued for initial proceedings and the parties appeared the burden shifts to the landowners to prove that subsequent stages were inefficacious - Parties participating in proceedings are presumed to have knowledge of dates recorded in the order sheets - Non-exercise of discretion to grant an adjournment in an administrative setting does not constitute malice in law or a breach of statutory duty - [Paras 30-36, 47-52].

Environmental Law - Forest Status - Land Acquisition Act 1894 - Section 5A - Ecological impact - Appellants objected that the land had significant tree cover and was ecologically sensitive - Supreme Court referred to Naveen Solanki v. RLDA - Held - Determination of forest or deemed forest status must be informed by the original character of the land and the Master Plan - Subsequent proliferation of vegetation cannot subvert an expert planning framework - Mere existence of trees does not ipso facto elevate land to forest status - Any loss of tree cover is to be mitigated by compensatory plantation at designated sites as directed by the authorities - [Paras 83-86].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Judgment of the High Court Division Bench affirmed – Interim orders vacated – Appellants permitted to seek enhancement of compensation as per law.

Civil Law - Refund of Premium - Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act 1966 - Section 154 - Unutilized additional Floor Space Index - Appellants paid premium of 3046290 rupees for extra FSI to develop group housing on agricultural land in Pune - Project was abandoned in favor of plotting which did not require extra FSI - Refund application was rejected by authorities on grounds that no statutory provision existed for such refund for residential projects though it was permitted for educational and medical institutions - High Court dismissed the writ petition citing lack of provision and delay - Supreme Court observed that the State had modified regulations to permit refunds for other categories while omitting residential projects through oversight or lack of policy rationale - Held - Refusal to refund premium for unutilized privilege is arbitrary and discriminatory - State cannot justify retention of premium when no tangible benefit accrued to the citizen - Distinction between residential and institutional categories for refund lacks a rational nexus - Appeal allowed - [Paras 1-18].

Constitutional Law - Arbitrariness - Constitution of India - Article 14 - Equality and non-arbitrariness - State authorities argued that refund regulations applied only to specific categories or regions like Mumbai and not to residential projects in Pune - Supreme Court reiterated that equality is antithetical to arbitrariness and State action must be informed by reason - Held - The mandate of Article 14 requires fairness in every State action - Placing unutilized FSI for residential projects on a lower pedestal than institutional projects is bereft of rationale and whimsical - Principle of fairness is intrinsic to Article 14 - [Paras 13-17].

Writ Law - Laches and Delay - Claim for Refund - High Court held against appellants on grounds of delay as first writ petition was filed in 2018 for a 2012 payment - Supreme Court found that appellants sought refund in 2015 within three years of payment - Held - Inaction of authorities upon a timely request cannot be attributed to the claimant as delay - Claim was within time and authorities failed to act on recommendations - [Paras 6-7, 10].

Civil Law - Interest on Refund - Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act 1966 - Section 124I - Interest rate - Statute provides 18 percent interest for refunds arising from assessment appeals - Appellants claimed interest on withheld premium - Held - While refund is justified the 18 percent rate under Section 124I is for a different statutory context - Simple interest at 7 percent per annum awarded from date of deposit till actual payment - [Paras 19-20].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Rejection order dated 15/02/2020 and High Court judgment dated 17/11/2022 set aside – Appellants entitled to refund of premium of 3046290 rupees after 10 percent deduction for administrative charges – Authorities directed to refund 2741661 rupees with simple interest at 7 percent per annum from date of deposit till payment within two months.

Criminal Law - Murder and Conspiracy - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 302 - 120B - 201 and 34 - Alleged conspiracy between wife and neighbor to eliminate husband - Deceased killed by smashing head with grinding stone - Trial Court convicted Accused 1 to 3 for murder and conspiracy - High Court acquitted Accused 1 of all charges and Accused 2 and 3 of murder citing broken chain of circumstantial evidence - Prosecution failed to prove motive of reciprocal affair - Last seen theory was weak as witness conduct was unnatural - Telephonic records contradicted prosecution narrative - Recovery of grinding stone and syringe from public area without sealing lacked evidentiary value - Supreme Court upheld High Court judgment noting vital lacunae in motive - last seen evidence - and procedural lapses in seizure - Held - Conviction under Section 302 and 120B cannot be sustained where chain of circumstances is broken and fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence - appeals dismissed - [Paras 1-41].

Criminal Law - Disappearance of Evidence - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 201 and 34 - Accused 2 and 3 intercepted by police at 5:00 a.m. on a motorcycle carrying a bundle containing the deceased body - Human foot seen protruding from the bundle - Blood of deceased matching group A found on motorcycle silencer - High Court sustained conviction for screening offenders - Held - Physical reality of transporting the tied body at early morning hours establishes that they knowingly caused evidence to disappear - conviction and sentence for one year affirmed - [Paras 34-37].

Evidence Law - Circumstantial Evidence - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 3 - Standard of Proof - Case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence - Law requires complete and unbroken chain of circumstances pointing unerringly to guilt - Prosecution must prove motive - last seen - and forensic link - High Court identified massive lapses in handling seized physical evidence - Total absence of blood in bedroom where brutal murder supposedly occurred - Held - Suspicion should not allow to take place of legal proof - chain of circumstances was broken - [Paras 19-33].

Evidence Law - Recovery and Seizure - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 27 - Recovery of blood-stained grinding stone and syringe at instance of accused - Articles not sealed at spot of seizure - No link evidence to prove they remained in sealed condition until reaching Chemical Analyzer - Recovery made from public dumping place accessible to anyone - Held - Recoveries made without affixing lac seals or from public areas hold no evidentiary value and raise doubt about factum of recovery - [Paras 26-29].

Criminal Law - Criminal Conspiracy - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 120B - Foundational prerequisite - Agreement to commit illegal act must be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence - Prosecution failed to adduce convincing legal evidence of meeting of minds - Held - When lack of evidence is apparent it is not safe to hold a person guilty of conspiracy - [Paras 30-33].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Acquittal of Accused Nos. 1, 2, and 3 for murder and conspiracy upheld – Conviction of Accused Nos. 2 and 3 under Section 201 IPC confirmed.

Constitutional Law - Foreigner Status - Foreigners Act 1946 - Section 9 - Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964 - Paragraph 3 - Batch of appeals involving declarations of foreigner status rendered in ex-parte or effectively ex-parte proceedings - High Court affirmed these opinions despite procedural defaults or lack of substantive contest - Appellants grouped into categories based on non-appearance - first-time factual appreciation by High Court in writ jurisdiction - and defaults occurring midway through proceedings - Court noted the grave consequences of foreigner declarations including detention - deportation - and potential statelessness - Held - Section 9 places the burden of proof on the proceedee but does not permit mechanical declaration or relieve the Tribunal of its obligation to conduct lawful adjudication - Tribunals must satisfy themselves that minimum requirements of fair adjudication are met including proof of service and application of mind to state evidence even in ex-parte cases - Impugned judgments set aside and matters remitted for fresh adjudication with a direction to decide within six months - [Paras 1-56].

Constitutional Law - Fundamental Rights - Constitution of India - Articles 14 and 21 - Protection to non-citizens - Right to life and personal liberty available to every person within Indian territory - State power to regulate entry and removal of foreigners does not place the person concerned outside the protection of fair procedure - Adjudicatory process must satisfy requirements of fairness - reasonableness - and non-arbitrariness - Held - Even a person whose citizenship is disputed is entitled to the protection of Article 21 - the mere prescription of a procedure does not satisfy constitutional mandates unless it is fair - just - and reasonable - [Paras 19-24].

Evidence Law - Burden of Proof - Foreigners Act 1946 - Section 9 - Scope of statutory burden - Onus lies on the proceedee to prove they are not foreigners - Burden operates within a legal process and does not replace the process itself - Proceedee must be served with "main grounds" of the allegation to meaningfully answer the reference - Held - Statutory burden under Section 9 does not convert the absence of the proceedee into proof of the allegation - Tribunal must independently assess the material provided by the State to ensure the conclusion follows from the record - [Paras 11-18].

Writ Law - Factual Inquiry - Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964 - Paragraph 3 - High Court jurisdiction - High Court appreciated documents and material for the first time while declining interference with ex-parte opinions - Factual inquiry regarding ancestry - residence - and identity belongs to the statutory Tribunal - Held - Statutory adjudication cannot be substituted by first-time factual appreciation in writ proceedings - high courts should not ordinarily become the first forum for appreciation of such material when documents were not tested before the statutory forum - [Paras 34-38].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgments and tribunal opinions set aside – Matters remitted to concerned Foreigners Tribunals for fresh adjudication – Appellants directed to appear within four weeks – No coercive steps to be taken based on set-aside opinions pending fresh determination.

Criminal Law - Suspension of Sentence - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 389 - Fixed-term sentence - Petitioner aged 67 years was tried and convicted for offences under Sections 147 148 149 323 341 324 326 and 307 IPC in FIR No 76 of 2014 - Sentenced to undergo 7 years rigorous imprisonment - Criminal Appeal No 2966 of 2025 was admitted by the High Court but an application for suspension of sentence was declined - The only ground assigned by the High Court for declining suspension was that the petitioner had undergone only eight months of the sentence - Supreme Court noted that the appeal was filed in 2025 and would take significant time for final hearing - Court reiterated that pleas for suspension of fixed-term sentences should be considered liberally unless exceptional circumstances exist - Held - Undergoing only eight months of a seven-year sentence does not constitute an exceptional circumstance to deny relief - Substantive order of sentence suspended - [Paras 1-13].

Criminal Law - Suspension of Sentence - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 389 - Liberal Approach - Ratio Decidendi - Supreme Court emphasized that High Courts have been repeatedly reminded to consider the plea for suspension of a fixed-term sentence liberally - Decline of suspension is warranted only when exceptional circumstances are present on record - Held - High Court erred in declining suspension solely based on the short period of sentence undergone - [Paras 9-11].

Decision: Petition disposed of – Substantive order of sentence suspended – Petitioner directed to be released on bail subject to terms and conditions imposed by the trial court.

Criminal Law - Juvenile Justice - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 - Sections 15 - 18(3) and 19(1) - Mandatory duty of Children Court - Appellant aged sixteen and half years at the time of offence was accused of murder and other offences - Following preliminary assessment under Section 15 the Juvenile Justice Board committed the matter to the Children Court under Section 18(3) for trial as an adult - Children Court proceeded with the trial without passing an independent order under Section 19(1) and convicted the appellant to fourteen years rigorous imprisonment - High Court affirmed the conviction - Supreme Court observed that Section 19(1) requires the Children Court to independently decide whether there is a need for trial as an adult or as a child upon receipt of the preliminary assessment from the Board - The court held that the word may in Section 19(1) must be construed as shall as the decision determines the jurisdiction and procedure of the court - Non-compliance with this mandatory requirement is a substantive illegality that strikes at the root of the protective framework for children - Held - Failure to pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) vitiates the entire trial - Conviction set aside - [Paras 1-16].

Criminal Law - Statutory Interpretation - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 - Section 19(1) - Interpretation of word may as shall - Court analyzed the statutory design and observed that the trial of a child as an adult and an inquiry as a juvenile have vastly different consequences regarding procedure and punishment - Although Section 19(1) uses the term may it imposes a mandatory obligation to record satisfaction on specific parameters before assuming jurisdiction as a Sessions Court - Unless such a decision is arrived at the Court cannot proceed further with the matter - Held - Use of the word may in Section 19(1) is mandatory in nature - [Paras 10.1-10.8].

Criminal Law - Vitiation of Trial - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 - Section 19 - Effect of non-compliance - Trial concluded and appellant served over six years of incarceration - Appellant currently twenty-four years of age - Court determined that remitting the matter for fresh assessment after many years would be an exercise in futility - Relying on precedents in Thirumoorthy v State and Ajeet Gurjar v State of MP the Court held that gross violation of mandatory requirements renders the trial illegal to the core - Held - The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence cannot be sustained - Appellant acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith - [Paras 11-14].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence passed by the Children’s Court and affirmed by the High Court set aside – Appellant acquitted and ordered to be released – Children’s Courts nationwide directed to pass reasoned orders under Section 19(1) of the JJ Act immediately after taking cognizance following committal.

Civil Law - Contractual Terms - Punjab Minor Minerals Concession Rules 1964 - Clause 19 of Form-L - Interest on Security Deposit - Respondent-contractor was high bidder for sand extraction contract and executed agreement in statutory Form-L - Clause 19 expressly stipulated that security deposit shall carry no interest and be refunded within three months of expiry or determination - Contractor defaulted in payments leading to contract termination on 09.03.2000 - High Court held Clause 19 unsustainable in law and against public policy because State charged 24 percent interest on delayed installments while denying interest on security - Supreme Court held that courts cannot rewrite or create a new contract however reasonable it may appear - Clause 19 was an unambiguous term accepted in an open commercial tender - Stipulation is neither immoral nor unlawful and does not violate public policy - Held - High Court erred in declaring Clause 19 unsustainable - Judgment of High Court set aside to that extent - [Paras 1-28].

Civil Law - Commercial Contracts - Judicial Interpretation - Limits of Writ Jurisdiction - Function of a Court is to interpret and enforce terms as agreed between parties - In commercial contracts where parties stand on equal footing the language of the contract must be strictly followed - Parties having accepted terms with eyes open cannot later assail them as unconscionable or oppressive after the contract period has mostly expired - Explicit terms of a contract are the final word regarding the intention of the parties - Held - A Writ Court is not entitled to add new terms to a contract or rewrite the agreement - [Paras 23-25].

Civil Law - Interpretation of Clauses - Interdependent Limbs - Rule of Construction - Clause 19 of Form-L comprises two interdependent limbs - First limb states security carries no interest - Second limb requires refund within three months of determination - Correct interpretation means deposit earns no interest during contract and for the three-month grace period post-termination - State cannot retain interest-free money in perpetuity - If State retains deposit beyond three months the contractor becomes entitled to interest from the date of expiry of the three-month period - Held - Since contract was determined on 09.03.2000 the three-month period expired on 09.06.2000 - Respondent entitled to 9 percent simple interest from 09.06.2000 until date of adjustment or refund - [Paras 29-32].

Decision: Appeals partly allowed – Clause 19 of Form-L declared valid and binding – Direction to pay interest from the date of deposit set aside – Respondent held entitled to simple interest at 9 percent per annum only for the period commencing from 09.06.2000 until the date of appropriation or refund – No order as to costs.