Bail Cancellation – Long Pre-Trial Detention – FIR and Role of Accused – Bail Upheld – Accused not named in FIR – Implicated based on oral dying declaration and co-accused’s disclosure – High Court granted bail after six and a half years of incarceration – Co-accused already granted bail – Supreme Court held that there was no misuse of liberty post bail – Reiterated strict parameters for bail cancellation and found no exceptional circumstances to warrant interference – Held: Discretion exercised by High Court justified – Appeal dismissed [Paras 5-6, 10, 12].

Criminal Law – Scope of Appellate Interference in Bail Orders – Discretionary Jurisdiction – Citing Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (2020) 2 SCC 118 and Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349 – Court emphasised distinction between grant and cancellation of bail – Noted that bail once granted should not be cancelled unless there are supervening circumstances or abuse of liberty – Court found none in present case [Paras 6, 11-12].

Dying Declaration – Evidentiary Value at Bail Stage – Accused implicated on basis of deceased’s alleged oral dying declaration to witnesses – Court refrained from evaluating evidentiary value at bail cancellation stage – Bail not interfered with solely on such implicating statements [Paras 7, 10, 12].

Public Interest Litigation – Maintainability – Stem Cell Therapy for ASD – Maintainable – The Supreme Court held the writ petition to be maintainable as it raised an issue of public importance concerning the regulatory framework for stem cell therapies for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), despite contentions regarding commercial interests – The petitioners were found to be bona fide, and no personal grievance was sought to be addressed [Paras 50-52].

Medical Negligence – Standard of Care – Stem Cell Therapy for ASD – Not Permissible as Routine Treatment – Medical practitioners owe a duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and knowledge—Administering interventions lacking credible scientific evidence of safety and efficacy, or expressly advised against by authoritative medical bodies, fails to meet this standard—Stem cell therapy for ASD is not recognized as a "sound and relevant medical practice" based on current scientific knowledge and should not be offered as a standard or routine clinical service outside approved research/clinical trials [Paras 58, 63, 64, 70, 73, 75, 90, 151(ii), 151(vi)].

Medical Ethics – Professional Misconduct – Stem Cell Therapy for ASD – Constitutes Misconduct – The Ethics & Medical Registration Board (EMRB) of the National Medical Commission (NMC) recommendations (06.12.2022), approved by the NMC (28.03.2024), unequivocally state that the use, promotion, and advertisement of stem cell therapy for ASD constitute 'professional misconduct' due to the lack of adequate evidence—Medical practitioners indulging in such practices are liable for disciplinary action under the Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 / National Medical Commission Registered Medical Practitioner (Professional Conduct) Regulations, 2023 [Paras 26, 28, 67, 68, 70, 74, 140, 145, 151(iii), 151(vi), 151(xiii)].

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Definition of "Drug" – Stem Cells – Included – Autologous stem cells, even if not classified as "stem-cell derived products" under the New Drugs and Clinical Trial Rules, 2019 due to minimal manipulation, fall within the broader definition of "drugs" as 'substances' intended for treatment under Section 3(b)(i) of the Drugs Act, 1940—This ensures that protections under the Act are available for such therapies [Paras 103, 109, 151(i), 151(ix)].

Patient Rights – Informed Consent – Unproven Treatments – Invalid Consent – Patient autonomy allows choosing or refusing offered treatments but does not confer a right to demand unproven treatments—Valid consent requires "adequate information" about the treatment's nature, purpose, benefits, risks, and alternatives—For stem cell therapy in ASD, where scientific evidence is absent or inconclusive, adequate information cannot be provided, rendering consent invalid and leading to "therapeutic misconception," which is a gross violation of medical ethics [Paras 91, 94, 95, 96, 128, 130, 151(vii)].

Regulatory Framework – Stem Cell Research/Clinical Trials – Mandatory Clinical Trial Setting – Therapeutic use of stem cells for ASD is permissible only within an approved and monitored research/clinical trial setting—"Stem-cell derived products" (substantial manipulation) are regulated as "new drugs" under NDCT Rules, 2019—Stem cells with minimal manipulation are governed by "biomedical and health research" framework under Chapter IV of NDCT Rules, 2019, with Rules 15 and 16(4) making National Ethical Guidelines binding, which mandate that all stem cell research (except for hematopoietic stem cell transplantation for haematological disorders) must be undertaken as a clinical trial [Paras 113-119, 151(x)].

Statutory Interpretation – Executive Orders vs. Statutory Rules – DHR's Regulatory Role – Executive Order Non Est – Clause 2(vi) of the Order dated 03.03.2024, dissolving the National Apex Committee for Stem Cell Research and Therapy (NAC-SCRT) and stating "no regulatory role is anticipated to be carried out by DHR related to stem cell research," is in conflict with Rules 17 and 18 of the NDCT Rules, 2019, which mandate DHR oversight on Ethics Committees (ECs) for biomedical and health research—Executive instructions cannot supplant statutory rules; therefore, Clause 2(vi) of the Order dated 03.03.2024 is non est—The Department of Health Research (DHR) or its appointed authority must continue to monitor ECs reviewing clinical trials for stem cells [Paras 133-138, 151(xi), 151(xii)].

Commercial Practices – Stem Cell Banking and Processing – Regulation – Commercial banking of only Umbilical Cord Blood stem cells is permitted with Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO) licenses—Commercial banking of all other biological materials is prohibited until further notification—Any entity processing stem cells, even partially, must obtain necessary prior approvals for biomedical and health research or clinical trials [Para 147].

Legislative Reform – Regulatory Vacuum – Consolidation of Framework – The current fragmented legal framework for stem cell research leads to ambiguity and exploitation of patients—The Union, specifically the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), is urged to consolidate rules, regulations, and guidelines, clearly define stem cells, establish specific clinical trial procedures, ensure patient safety and compensation, provide timelines for approvals, and create a dedicated monitoring authority (suggesting reconstitution of NAC-SCRT) [Paras 148-150, 152].

Transitional Arrangement – Ongoing Treatments – Continuity Permitted – Patients already undergoing stem cell therapy for ASD are permitted to continue their treatment to avoid detrimental effects from abrupt cessation—The Secretary, MoHFW, in consultation with officials of AIIMS and the National Medical Council (NMC), is directed to provide the best possible solution within four weeks to ensure these patients can continue receiving therapy until re-routed to institutions conducting approved clinical trials [Paras 153-154].

Decision: Matter treated as part heard – Specific directions issued for regulatory clarity, patient safety, and continuation of ongoing treatments under a transitional arrangement – Secretary, MoHFW, to file submissions within four weeks [Paras 153-155].

Service Law – Regularization – Contractual Employees – Sanctioned Posts – Article 14 – Appellants appointed in 2012 as Junior Engineers (Agriculture) against sanctioned vacant posts through a duly advertised selection process – Engagement labelled as contractual with yearly renewals – Services continued uninterrupted for more than a decade with satisfactory performance – Respondent-State declined further extension in 2023 and refused regularization – High Court dismissed writ petitions and LPAs relying mechanically on contractual terms – Held: Prolonged contractual engagement on sanctioned posts followed by abrupt discontinuance is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 – State not justified in perpetuating ad-hocism under contractual nomenclature [Paras 9–14].

State as Model Employer – Constitutional Obligation – Fairness and Dignity in Public Employment – State bears heightened duty of fairness, probity and candour – Cannot exploit unequal bargaining power of employees – Mechanical reliance on contractual clauses ignoring constitutional mandate deprecated – High Court erred in reducing dispute to mere acceptance of contract divorced from constitutional context [Paras 11–11.2].

Constitutional Law – Waiver of Fundamental Rights – Contractual Terms – Acceptance of contractual stipulations barring regularization does not amount to waiver of fundamental rights – Fundamental rights under Article 14 incapable of waiver – Contractual clauses cannot immunize arbitrary State action from constitutional scrutiny – Reliance placed on Basheshar Nath and Central Inland Water Transport Corporation [Paras 11.3–12.3].

Contract Law – Unconscionable Contracts – Unequal Bargaining Power – “Lion and Lamb” Analogy – Contracts between State and employees marked by structural inequality – Employees compelled to accept standard form contracts to secure livelihood – Courts duty-bound to strike down unfair and unreasonable clauses – State cannot take advantage of dominant position to deny constitutional protections [Paras 12–12.3].

Legitimate Expectation – Long Continuous Service – Due Selection Process – Repeated extensions over a decade created legitimate expectation of recognition of service – Doctrine applicable where engagement followed a lawful selection process – Umadevi not an absolute bar where appointments are not illegal but at best irregular – Legitimate expectation operates to check arbitrariness in State action [Paras 13–13.1].

Service Jurisprudence – Limits on Perpetual Contractual Engagements – Practice of engaging employees on contractual basis for years deprecated – State cannot discard long-serving employees without cogent reasons or speaking order – Abrupt discontinuance after exploiting service during prime years held arbitrary – Reliance placed on Jaggo, Shripal, Vinod Kumar and Dharam Singh [Paras 13.2–13.10].

Article 136 – Interference with Concurrent Findings – Grave Injustice – Supreme Court may interfere with concurrent findings where non-interference results in substantial injustice – Mechanical application of precedents by High Court warranted correction – Exceptional circumstances made out for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 [Paras 9–9.3].

Relief – Regularization Directed – Judgments of Single Judge and Division Bench set aside – Respondent-State directed to forthwith regularize services of appellants against sanctioned posts – Appellants entitled to all consequential service benefits from date of judgment [Paras 14–16].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Writ petitions allowed – Impugned High Court judgments set aside – Regularization directed with consequential benefits.

Service Law – Appointment to ITAT – Institutional Bias – Doctrine of Bias – Natural Justice – Petitioner, ranked All India Rank One by Search-cum-Selection Committee in 2014 for appointment as Member (Accountant), ITAT, was repeatedly denied appointment through withholding of vigilance clearance, disciplinary proceedings, and compulsory retirement – Compulsory retirement under FR 56(j) earlier quashed by Supreme Court holding action to be punitive and mala fide – In fourth reconstituted SCSC, candidature rejected where one member of Committee had earlier faced contempt proceedings at petitioner’s instance – Held: Participation of such officer created reasonable apprehension of bias – Selection process vitiated – Justice must not only be done but must appear to be done – Minutes of SCSC dated 01.09.2024 set aside [Paras 36–46].

Administrative Law – Bias – Reasonable Apprehension – Selection Committees – Actual proof of bias not required – Presence of even one biased member sufficient to vitiate collective decision-making – Officer against whom serious allegations and contempt proceedings existed ought to have recused – Failure to do so violated principles of natural justice – Selection rendered coram non judice [Paras 41–45].

Service Jurisprudence – Mala Fide Exercise of Power – Departmental Vendetta – Continuous obstruction of petitioner’s appointment despite judicial mandates – Repeated initiation of vigilance and disciplinary actions on baseless grounds – Compulsory retirement passed at fag end of service to short-circuit disciplinary proceedings – Earlier findings of Supreme Court on mala fides and arbitrariness relied upon – Allegations in present writ remained uncontroverted due to absence of counter affidavit – Held: Conduct of respondents bordered on vendetta [Paras 36–40, 44–45].

Judicial Review – Selection Process – Scope – Court can interfere where decision-making process is tainted by bias, extraneous considerations, or mala fides – Review directed at process rather than merits of selection – Fresh consideration directed to restore fairness and public confidence [Paras 42–46].

Relief – Directions – Costs – Minutes of fourth SCSC quashed insofar as petitioner concerned – DoPT directed to convene fresh SCSC within four weeks excluding the biased officer – Decision to be communicated within two weeks thereafter – Costs of ₹5 lakhs imposed on respondents for deliberate procrastination and harassment of petitioner [Paras 46–47].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Impugned minutes of SCSC set aside – Fresh SCSC directed – Costs imposed – Pending applications disposed of.

University Governance – Appointment of Vice-Chancellor – Search-cum-Selection Committee – Conflict between State University Act and UGC Regulations – Appointment of Vice-Chancellor of Puducherry Technological University challenged on the ground that Search-cum-Selection Committee was not constituted in accordance with Regulation 7.3 of UGC Regulations, 2018 – Committee lacked nominee of Chairman, UGC and included Secretary (Higher & Technical Education), connected with the University – Held: Regulation 7.3 is mandatory and binding – Section 14(5) of PTU Act, to the extent inconsistent, declared ultra vires – Appointment process vitiated [Paras 31–44].

Constitution of India – Legislative Competence – Entry 66 List I vs Entry 25 List III – UGC Act and Regulations traceable to Entry 66 List I relating to coordination and determination of standards in higher education – State legislation under Entry 25 List III cannot dilute or override standards prescribed by Parliament – Composition of Selection Committee for Vice-Chancellor forms part of standards in higher education – State law contrary to UGC Regulations invalid for lack of legislative competence [Paras 36–41].

Repugnancy – Article 254 – Inapplicability – Doctrine of repugnancy applies only when both Union and State laws operate in Concurrent List – Where Central legislation occupies exclusive field under List I, State law inconsistent therewith is void due to lack of competence, not repugnancy – Presidential assent under Article 254(2) irrelevant in such cases – High Court correct in not resting decision solely on Article 254 [Paras 45–48].

UGC Regulations – Statutory Force – Mandatory Nature – UGC Regulations framed under Sections 26(1)(e) and (g) of UGC Act and laid before Parliament – Form integral part of Central legislation – Any appointment made in violation thereof is illegal and amenable to writ of quo warranto – Reliance placed on Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi reaffirmed [Paras 40–44].

Relief – Exercise of Power under Article 142 – Continuance of Vice-Chancellor – Despite illegality in constitution of Selection Committee, appellant found fully qualified and had served as Vice-Chancellor since 2021 without blemish – Immediate removal would cause stigma and administrative disruption – Held: Appellant permitted to continue till completion of tenure or appointment of new Vice-Chancellor in accordance with UGC Regulations, whichever earlier – Liberty granted to participate in fresh selection process [Paras 50–52].

Decision: Appeals dismissed on merits – Declaration of illegality of Section 14(5) of PTU Act and selection process upheld – However, appellant allowed to continue as Vice-Chancellor by invoking Article 142 – Appeals disposed of accordingly [Paras 49–54].

Constitutional Law – Right to Education – Article 21A, Constitution of India, 1950 – Affirmed – The right to education is a fundamental human right and a 'multiplier right' that enables the exercise of other human rights – it forms an integral part of the broader framework of the right to life and human dignity, which cannot be fully realized without meaningful access to education – the quality of education extends beyond textbooks and classrooms to include all conditions enabling effective learning and continuous schooling – inaccessibility of menstrual hygiene management (MHM) measures disrupts attendance, hinders concentration, and breaks the continuity of schooling, thereby violating Article 21A [Paras 17-20, 39, 128, 137, 172(a), 172(f)].

Constitutional Law – Right to Equality – Article 14, Constitution of India, 1950 – Affirmed – The substantive approach to equality under Article 14 demands that treatment be accorded with due regard to individual, institutional, systemic, and contextual barriers that impede the translation of rights in reality – the State, as a benefactor, is under a positive obligation to remedy such structural disadvantages – lack of menstrual hygiene management measures acts as a significant barrier to girls' participation in school and impedes equality of opportunity, perpetuating systemic exclusion and discrimination – differential treatment is constitutionally permissible when directed towards securing equal outcomes for the disadvantaged [Paras 41-47, 53-58, 99-102, 115-117, 126, 172(b), 172(e)].

Constitutional Law – Right to Dignity and Privacy – Article 21, Constitution of India, 1950 – Affirmed – The right to life under Article 21 encompasses the right to live with dignity, which is an essential and inseparable facet of human existence – dignity finds expression in conditions that enable individuals to live without humiliation, exclusion, or avoidable suffering – privacy is inextricably linked with dignity and secures the autonomy of human beings, enabling choices in intimate and personal matters – the inaccessibility of menstrual hygiene management measures undermines the dignity and bodily autonomy of a girl child, compelling unsafe practices or absenteeism – the State has a positive obligation to protect individual dignity and privacy [Paras 69-75, 77-83, 172(c)].

Constitutional Law – Right to Health – Article 21, 47, Constitution of India, 1950 – Affirmed – The right to life under Article 21 includes the right to health, which extends to the right to menstrual health – access to safe, effective, and affordable menstrual hygiene management measures helps a girl child attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health – Article 47 imposes a primary duty on the State to improve public health, which includes ensuring the availability of and enhancing access to MHM products – lack of MHM measures violates reproductive health and impedes the physical well-being and overall development of menstruating girl children [Paras 84-85, 91-94, 98, 172(d)].

Education Law – Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Sections 3, 19 – Interpreted – Section 3 of the RTE Act, guaranteeing free and compulsory education, implies the removal of all financial barriers, including expenses related to menstrual hygiene products, which, if not provided, convert a guaranteed right into a conditional one – Section 19 mandates that all schools, whether government-run or privately managed, must adhere to prescribed norms and standards, including "barrier-free access" and "separate toilets for boys and girls" – "barrier-free access" is interpreted substantively to include the provision of sanitary napkins, safe disposal mechanisms, and awareness programs, as their absence constitutes a constitutional failure and impedes effective education – the State cannot plead absence of funds as a justification for non-compliance with these mandatory norms and standards [Paras 134, 138-146, 147-153, 159-163, 172(f), 172(g)].

Social Justice – Menstrual Hygiene Management – Mandatory Implementation – Directed – Menstrual hygiene management is a shared responsibility, not solely a woman's issue, requiring education and sensitization for boys, parents, and male teachers to break stigma and foster an empathetic environment – the Court issued a continuing mandamus directing all States and Union Territories to ensure functional, gender-segregated, accessible toilets with water and hand-washing facilities in all schools – provide free oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins (ASTM D-6954 standards) readily accessible through vending machines or designated authorities – establish MHM corners with essential supplies – ensure safe, hygienic, and environmentally compliant disposal mechanisms for sanitary waste – incorporate gender-responsive curricula on menstruation and related health concerns by NCERT/SCERT – adequately train and sensitize all teachers on menstrual hygiene – widely disseminate information on sanitary napkin availability and child helplines – District Education Officers (DEOs) must conduct annual periodic inspections, obtain anonymous student feedback, and ensure compliance, with NCPCR/SCPCR overseeing implementation [Paras 164-171, 173-176, 178-179].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Directions issued for mandatory implementation of menstrual hygiene management measures in all schools across India, with a continuing mandamus to the Union for compliance reporting – Paras [173-182].

Public Interest Litigation – Demolition of Construction – Scope and Limits – High Court directed demolition of a completed residential building on privately owned land on the assumption that it was constructed on “khoai” land and in violation of environmental norms – Supreme Court held that demolition is a drastic and extreme measure which cannot be ordered on conjectures, assumptions or inferential reasoning without clear statutory backing and unimpeachable evidence – Interference with property rights must satisfy Article 300A of the Constitution [Paras 41–44, 56].

Land Use and Town Planning – “Khoai” Land – Legal Status – No category of land known as “khoai” exists under the revenue laws of West Bengal – Subject plot recorded as “danga” land and earmarked as “residential” under the Land Use and Development Control Plan, 2002 – Held: Descriptive, literary or ecological notions of “khoai” cannot substitute statutory classification or notification for imposing construction restrictions [Paras 6–7, 24(D), 40–43, 47].

Environmental Law – Reliance on Inspection Reports – District Magistrate and Pollution Control Board – High Court relied on reports to conclude that construction was illegal – Supreme Court found that neither report conclusively established that the subject plot itself was “khoai” land – Reports were based on conjectures, lacked scientific or technical assessment, and at best referred to adjacent areas – Held: Adjacent ecological sensitivity cannot automatically render privately owned residential plots non-developable [Paras 45–47].

Local Self-Government – Building Permission – Competent Authority – Gram Panchayat, Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samiti – High Court held Panchayat Samiti alone competent to grant permission – Supreme Court held that during the relevant period, consistent practice showed building plans were approved by Gram Panchayat with vetting by Zilla Parishad – Even assuming lack of competence, it constituted a curable procedural irregularity – Held: Such irregularity cannot justify demolition of a completed structure undertaken bona fide [Paras 33–36].

Conversion of Land – “Danga” to “Bastu” – Timing of Conversion – Conversion granted after commencement of construction – Supreme Court held that land-use classification is a revenue entry – Subsequent approval and regularisation by competent authorities, in absence of fraud or mala fides, cannot be ignored – No statutory mandate requiring demolition as an inevitable consequence of delayed conversion [Paras 34–35].

Environmental Jurisprudence – Sustainable Development – Santiniketan Area – Sui Generis Character – Court reaffirmed heightened responsibility of authorities in Santiniketan as laid down in Sushanta Tagore – However, preservation must operate within statutory framework – Held: No equality in illegality, but equally no presumption of illegality without law – Past or existing constructions cannot be selectively ignored to target one builder [Paras 12–13, 36–37, 55].

Public Interest Litigation – Bona Fides – Burden of Proof – PIL petitioners themselves owned residential structures within the same tract of land – Selective targeting of one construction undermined bona fides – Burden lies on PIL petitioners to establish illegality with clear, cogent and contemporaneous material – PIL cannot be used to resolve disputed questions of fact requiring evidentiary adjudication [Paras 48–55].

Adverse Remarks against Statutory Authorities – Expunction – High Court directed initiation of proceedings against officers of SSDA, Panchayat and Revenue Authorities – Supreme Court held such directions unsustainable in absence of deliberate violation or mala fide conduct – Subsequent compliance and corrective measures by SSDA noted – Adverse remarks and consequential directions expunged [Paras 57, 21].

Costs – Abuse of PIL Jurisdiction – Writ petition found lacking bona fides – Supreme Court imposed costs of Rs.1,00,000/- on writ petitioners payable to West Bengal Legal Services Authority [Para 58].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Judgment and order dated 21–22 August 2013 passed by the Calcutta High Court set aside – Directions for demolition, compensation and costs quashed – Adverse remarks against SSDA expunged – Costs imposed on writ petitioners – No order as to costs in appeals.

Election Law – Scope of Interference in Appeal – Tenure Lapsed – Merits Not Examined – High Court declared appellant’s 2012 election void on ground of improper rejection of 955 postal ballots – Supreme Court notes tenure (2012–2017) already lapsed and declines to go into merits of election dispute – Held: Appeal not to be adjudicated on merits in present circumstances [Paras 1-2, 4, 8].

Election Petition – Interim Stay – Effect – Protection of Benefits – High Court’s operative directions not implemented due to Supreme Court stay dated 05/09/2016 – Appellant contended that benefits flowing from stay should not be denied if merits are not examined – Held: In interests of justice, adverse observations/directions of High Court in paras 53-56 set aside in view of subsisting interim stay and lapse of tenure [Paras 6-8].

Judicial Directions – Expunging Observations – Costs/Adverse Remarks – Withholding Benefits/Pension – Action Against Returning Officer – High Court’s observations included alleged delaying tactics by returned candidate – directions/observations that appellant should not get election benefits/pension as ex-MLA for 2012 election period – and recommendation of strict action against Returning Officer – Held: Observations in paras 53-56 of impugned order set aside while leaving merits untouched [Paras 3, 8].

Decision: Appeal allowed in part – High Court observations in paragraphs 53 to 56 set aside – Merits of election petition not examined due to lapse of tenure and in view of interim stay operating since 05/09/2016 [Para 8].

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 29A – Extension of Time for Arbitral Award – Jurisdiction of Court – Divergent views of High Courts on whether application under Section 29A(4) lies before High Court or Principal Civil Court depending on mode of appointment of arbitrator – Supreme Court reframed issue holding distinction to be artificial and unnecessary – Held: Application under Section 29A lies before “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e), irrespective of whether arbitral tribunal was appointed by High Court under Section 11 or by parties by consent [Paras 5–6, 16, 20–24].

Statutory Interpretation – Defined Term “Court” – Section 2(1)(e) – Contextual Interpretation – High Courts relied on perceived hierarchy and conflict of power to exclude Civil Courts from Section 29A jurisdiction – Supreme Court rejected interpretation based on notions of superiority or hierarchy of courts – Held: Jurisdiction flows solely from statute and not from perceived institutional status – Definition under Section 2(1)(e) must apply unless statute expressly provides otherwise [Paras 17–20].

Arbitration Law – Section 11 – Nature of Jurisdiction – Appointment of Arbitrator – Scope – Power of High Court or Supreme Court under Section 11 is special, limited and stands exhausted upon appointment – Appointing Court becomes functus officio thereafter – Held: Section 11 does not confer any continuing supervisory or controlling jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings or over applications under Section 29A [Paras 13–15, 23–24].

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 29A(6) – Power to Substitute Arbitrator – Concern that Civil Court may substitute arbitrator appointed by High Court – Supreme Court held such concern legally unfounded – Power of substitution is statutorily vested in Court defined under Section 2(1)(e) – Appointment under Section 11 does not alter statutory curial jurisdiction [Paras 16, 20, 24].

Arbitration Proceedings – Section 42 – Exclusive Jurisdiction – Applicability – Argument that Section 11 application before High Court attracts Section 42 rejected – Held: Section 42 does not apply to Section 11 proceedings as Chief Justice or designate is not a “Court” within meaning of Section 2(1)(e) – Extension application under Section 29A must therefore lie before Principal Civil Court having jurisdiction [Paras 25–26].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of the Division Bench and Single Judge of the Bombay High Court at Goa set aside – Order of the Commercial Court extending time under Section 29A restored – Parties at liberty to seek further extension before Commercial Court – No order as to costs.