Pleadings Must State Material Facts, Not Evidence; Deficiency In Pleading Cannot Be Raised For First Time In Appeal: Supreme Court

"There is distinction between facta probanda (the facts required to be proved i.e. material facts) and facta probantia (the facts by means of which they are proved i.e. particulars or evidence). It is settled law that pleadings must contain only facta probanda and not facta probantia." Supreme Court, in a significant ruling dated May 15, 2026, held that a plaintiff in an eviction suit is only required to plead material facts (facta probanda) and not the evidence (facta probantia) by which those facts are to be proved.

A bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan observed that if the parties are aware of the case and have led evidence on the issues, a technical deficiency in the pleadings cannot be used as a ground to set aside concurrent findings in an appeal or revision.

The dispute involved an eviction suit filed in 1993 by the Appellant-landlord regarding a premises in Chembur, Mumbai, under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. While the Small Causes Court and its Appellate Bench concurrently decreed the eviction on grounds of bona fide requirement and acquisition of alternative accommodation by the tenants, the Bombay High Court set aside these decrees in a revision application. The High Court had primarily ruled that the Appellant failed to specifically plead a "family arrangement" that formed the basis of her exclusive claim to the suit premises.

The primary question before the Court was what constitutes a sufficient pleading in an eviction suit and whether the distinction between "material facts" and "evidence" was maintained. The Court was also called upon to determine whether a High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact by citing a deficiency in pleadings that was never raised during the trial.

The Fundamental Distinction Between Pleading And Proof

The Court delved deep into the definition of "pleading" under Order VI Rule 1 and Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). It reiterated that a pleading must state material facts in a summary form but must never include the evidence by which those facts are to be proved.

Citing the precedent in Virender Nath Gautam vs. Satpal Singh & Ors. (2007), the bench explained that facta probanda are the facts in issue which, when proved, establish the claim. In contrast, facta probantia are the particulars or evidence required to prove those facts and are not required to be set out in the plaint.

"Pleading and proof represent distinct stages in legal proceedings. Pleading is the formal assertion of material facts with the intent to define the case, whereas proof is the evidence adduced to establish those facts as true."

Deficiency In Pleadings Cannot Be Raised For The First Time In Appeal

The Supreme Court expressed strong disapproval of the High Court’s interference with concurrent findings based on an alleged lack of specific pleadings regarding a family arrangement. The bench noted that the enquiry should not be about the form of the pleadings but whether, in substance, the parties knew the case they were contesting.

Referring to Ram Sarup Gupta vs. Bishun Narain Inter College (1987), the Court held that once parties proceed to trial knowing the issues and produce evidence, it is not open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings at the appellate stage.

"Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings; instead, the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial."

Co-owners Fall Within The Statutory Definition Of 'Landlord'

The Court addressed the Respondent's contention that the Appellant had no locus to file the suit as the share certificates for the building stood in joint names. The bench clarified that under Section 5(3) of the Act, a 'landlord' includes any person receiving or entitled to receive rent.

The Court further linked Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to the share certificates, noting that an interest in land necessarily implies an interest in the building situated thereon. Since the Appellant was a co-owner and was receiving rent on behalf of her mother, she squarely fell within the definition of a landlord.

Courts Must Take Cognizance Of Subsequent Events For Substantial Justice

The bench emphasized that while relief is generally judged based on the date of institution, courts must take "cautious cognisance" of events occurring during the long pendency of litigation. The death of the Appellant's father and the subsequent oral family arrangement were relevant developments that the courts below rightly considered.

Relying on Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. The Motor & General Traders (1975), the Court observed that to make a remedy just and meaningful, it is often necessary to align legal findings with current realities.

Oral Family Settlements Are Legally Enforceable

The Court reiterated the settled law from Kale & Ors. vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1976) that family arrangements can be entered into even by way of unregistered oral agreements. Such settlements are governed by special equity principles to maintain peace and harmony within a family.

The Appellant was, therefore, entitled to rely on the oral arrangement earmarking the suit premises for her exclusive use, even in the absence of a formal decree of partition.

"Technical considerations should give way to peace and harmony in the enforcement of family arrangements or settlements."

Tenant Cannot Dictate Suitability Of Premises To Landlord

On the issue of bona fide requirement, the Court noted that the Appellant’s temporary stay with her mother in other flats did not negate her need. The bench reaffirmed that a tenant has no legal right to dictate which property the landlord should utilize or suggest that the tenanted premises are not suitable.

Furthermore, the Court found that the tenants had acquired multiple alternative accommodations during the pendency of the suit. One tenant had even sold a property during the litigation to defeat the eviction claim, a conduct the Court found telling in the assessment of comparative hardship.

The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court had erred in setting aside the concurrent decrees by adopting a hyper-technical approach to pleadings. The bench held that the Appellant had successfully proved both her status as a landlord and her bona fide requirement. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court’s judgment was set aside, and the eviction decree passed by the Small Causes Court was restored.

Date of Decision: May 15, 2026