Facts:

The appellant availed an overdraft facility from the respondent bank by pledging shares. Subsequently, the appellant requested the bank to sell a portion of the pledged shares to clear the overdraft. However, the bank delayed the sale, resulting in a decline in share prices and financial loss for the appellant.

Issues:

Whether the grant of an overdraft facility by a bank constitutes 'service' under the Consumer Protection Act?

Whether the delay in disposing of pledged shares amounts to a 'deficiency' in service?

Whether the appellant is entitled to claim compensation?

Held:

Grant of overdraft facilities by a bank qualifies as 'service' under the Consumer Protection Act, as the bank charges interest for providing such facilities.

The delay in disposing of pledged shares, causing financial loss to the customer, constitutes a 'deficiency' in service by the bank.

The appellant is entitled to claim compensation for the loss incurred, along with interest.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's decision dismissing the claim is set aside.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 filed a suit for partition of a dwelling house in Indore.

Two portions of the house belonged to an undivided family; one portion was sold to a stranger (non-applicant No. 3), and the other portion was bought in a court auction by the appellant.

A preliminary decree was passed in appeal for partition, followed by a final decree.

Execution proceedings were initiated by respondent No. 1, and a Commissioner was appointed for partition.

Issues:

The crucial question was the maintainability of the application under Section 4 of the Partition Act filed by respondent No. 1, the decree-holder.

Held:

The appellant, a stranger purchaser, had not filed any application for separating his share throughout the proceedings.

The conditions for the applicability of Section 4, as laid down in a previous decision, were not met, particularly the requirement that the stranger transferee must sue for partition.

The absence of an application from the appellant for separating his share rendered respondent No. 1's application under Section 4 not maintainable.

The decision of the Trial Court, treating the application as not maintainable, was upheld.

Facts:

Students who qualified for medical degree courses under the All India quota of 15% migrated to different states for their undergraduate studies. They encountered difficulties when seeking admission to postgraduate courses, as various states had framed admission rules that restricted their ability to pursue studies either in the migrated state or their home state.

Issues:

The challenge to admission rules that hindered students who migrated for undergraduate studies from pursuing postgraduate courses in their home state.

Held:

The court held that students who had pursued undergraduate courses outside their home state should be allowed to participate in the entrance examination held in their home state for postgraduate courses, irrespective of any preference criteria adopted for selection. The court emphasized the need for uniformity in postgraduate courses across the country.

University-wise preference is permissible, but college-wise preference is not. Reservation of 70% to 80% has been sustained even when students from different universities appear for a common entrance test.( Para 9)

Different criteria adopted by states for admission encroach upon the rights of students who qualified under the 15% All India quota, leading to difficulties in pursuing postgraduate studies in their home state.( Para 11)

Allowing students of the home state to participate in the entrance test for postgraduate courses would bring about uniformity and remove a small disadvantage, thereby striking a balance.( Para 13)

The court directed states, union territories, and universities to allow students who had pursued courses outside their home state to participate in the entrance examination held in their home state.( Para 14)

Facts:

The deceased, a woman, was married three years prior to the incident.

She was found dead in her matrimonial house, and marks of asphyxia were observed.

Accusations under Sections 304-B, 306, and 498-A IPC were made against the husband and close relatives.

The Trial Court convicted the accused, but the High Court acquitted them.

Issues:

Applicability of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act regarding dowry death presumption.

Admissibility of the deceased's statements under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act.

Whether the accused could be held guilty without direct evidence of the cause of death.

Held:

The law stipulates that in the case of a woman's death within 7 years of marriage, with evidence of cruelty or harassment related to dowry, a presumption of dowry death arises under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.

The term "soon before" is relative, implying proximity, and not synonymous with "immediately before." The prosecution must establish a proximate and live link between cruelty/harassment and the consequential death.

The prosecution proved persistent dowry demands and continuous cruelty by the husband. Contradictions were minor and did not affect credibility.

Death by suicide within 7 years of marriage, not under normal circumstances, leads to the applicability of Section 304-B IPC.

Section 32 of the Evidence Act allows statements of the deceased, if connected with the cause of death, to be admissible. Proximity to the actual occurrence is essential.

Respondents 3, 4, and 5, being in-laws, cannot be held guilty solely for the husband's fault. Overt acts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The High Court erred in acquitting the accused-husband based on minor discrepancies. Conviction under Section 304-B IPC upheld, but the sentence reduced to 7 years. Conviction under Section 306 IPC upheld, sentence reduced to 5 years. Conviction under Section 498-A IPC confirmed.

Facts:

The appellant challenged the order of assessment of the rateable value of his property for property tax, based on the construction of his house on a specific plot in New Delhi.

Issues:

Validity of the order of assessment dated March 12, 1991.

Applicability of the principles laid down in Dr. Balbir Singh's case to the determination of rateable value.

Disparity in rateable value for old and newly constructed premises.

Held:

The Court examined the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and the Delhi Rent Control Act. It emphasized the importance of determining rateable value reasonably, considering factors such as size, situation, locality, and amenities. The upper limit was set by the standard rent, but the Court acknowledged the need to avoid significant disparity in rateable values between old and newly constructed premises.

Court examined Dr. Balbir Singh's case and highlighted the principles for determining rateable value for self-occupied residential and non-residential premises.( Para 5)

Emphasized the need to avoid illogical and irrational disparity in rateable values, considering the surge in land and building material prices.( Para 6)

Rejected the High Court's reasoning that Municipal Corporation had no means to follow the principles laid down by the Court, affirming the availability of assessment records and the quasi-judicial nature of the assessing authority's role.( Para 7)

Allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the High Court, and directed the Assessing Officer to determine the rateable value in accordance with the principles laid down in Dr. Balbir Singh's case.( Para 8)

FACTS:

The appellant was charged with various offenses, including acts of terror and attempted murder. Allegations included storing lethal weapons, committing theft, and threatening individuals to extract money.

ISSUES:

Whether the actions of the accused constituted terrorist acts under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act.

Whether the accused's actions amounted to an attempt to commit murder under Section 307 of the IPC.

The admissibility and reliability of the confessional statement (Exh. P-7) recorded by the Superintendent of Police.

HELD:

The court emphasized the specific intent required for an act to be considered a "terrorist act" under Section 3 of the TADA. The acts attributed to the appellant, such as storing weapons and making vague allegations of extortion, were found insufficient to establish a terrorist act.( Paragraph 4)

The court critically examined the confessional statement (Exh. P-7) and concluded that the acts described in the statement did not meet the requirements of Section 3(1) of the TADA. Mere allegations of criminal activities, including theft and threats, were insufficient to establish the necessary intent for a terrorist act.( Paragraph 5)

The court discussed the requirements for conviction under Section 307 IPC, emphasizing that bodily injury capable of causing death is not essential. However, the evidence presented did not support a charge of attempted murder, as there was only a threat to assault the victim, and no actual injury occurred.( Paragraph 6)

The court further clarified the stages of a crime, highlighting that an attempt to commit a crime must be distinguished from an intent to commit it or preparation for its commission. The evidence presented regarding the appellant's actions did not amount to an attempt to murder.( Paragraph 7)

Concluding that none of the charges under TADA or IPC had been established, the court set aside the appellant's conviction and acquitted him of all charges.( Paragraph 8)

REFERRED CASES:

Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 1994 SC 2623 : (1995) CriLJ 517 : (1994) 2 Crimes 916 : (1994) 4 JT 255 : (1994) 3 SCALE 109 : (1994) 3 SCALE 105 : (1994) 4 SCC 602 : (1994) 1 SCR 360 Supp : (1994) 2 UJ 786

Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi and Others Vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja and others, AIR 1990 SC 1962 : (1990) CriLJ 1869 : (1990) 3 JT 408 : (1990) 2 SCALE 193 : (1990) 4 SCC 76 : (1990) 3 SCR 633

Facts:

Challa Chinnappa Reddy and his son Challa Ramkrishna Reddy were involved in a criminal case, resulting in their arrest and imprisonment. In the night between 5th and 6th May 1977, a bomb attack occurred in the prison, causing injuries and death. The family filed a suit against the State of Andhra Pradesh, claiming damages for negligence.

Issues:

Whether the suit is barred by limitation.

Whether the State is immune from legal action for sovereign acts.

Violation of the right to life and fundamental rights.

Held:

The trial court contended that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 72 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court, however, applied Article 113 as the residuary article, stating that the suit was within limitation. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that Article 72 applies when the act is in pursuance of statutory authority, and in this case, the act was not.

The question of immunity of the State was argued vehemently. The State claimed immunity for sovereign acts, especially in the establishment and maintenance of jails. The High Court, while recognizing the sovereign functions, concluded that negligence leading to violation of fundamental rights cannot be protected. The Supreme Court agreed, emphasizing that the State cannot claim immunity for acts that violate fundamental rights.

The judgment underscored the prisoners' right to life, a basic human right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court rejected the outdated defense of immunity and held that even prisoners retain their fundamental rights, and the State is not above the law.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 24th April 1986, involving the deaths of Shamsher Singh and Amar Singh.

The prosecution alleged that the appellants were involved in the murders due to enmity and rivalry.

The victims were shot at close range, and the motive was linked to the de-listing of Swaran Singh's truck from the Truck Union.

Issues:

The credibility of eyewitness accounts.

The involvement of Mittar Pal Singh.

Discrepancies in the evidence related to the time of occurrence.

Inconsistencies in the investigating officer's testimony.

Held:

The prosecution established the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

Swaran Singh shot Shamsher Singh, and Jagjit Singh shot Amar Singh. The evidence was conclusive.

Enmity between the accused and Shamsher Singh was admitted, supporting the motive.

Eyewitness accounts were consistent and corroborated by material evidence, such as the site plan, photographs, and blood-stained earth.

The defense's version of the incident was not substantiated, and the medical evidence supported the prosecution's case.

The court dismissed the appeals and ordered the accused, if on bail, to be taken into custody to serve their sentences.

Facts:

The case involves the sale of a flat in Bombay, where an agreement was entered into on 1-5-1994 between the transferor (Hemant Chawla) and the six appellants (Transferees).

An amount of Rs. 4,55,000 was paid as earnest money on the execution of the agreement, and the balance of Rs. 41 lakhs was to be paid upon completion of the sale, subject to obtaining a 'no objection certificate' from the Appropriate Authority.

The Appropriate Authority issued a notice under Section 269UD(IA) of the Income Tax Act, alleging significant undervaluation and calling for a show cause.

On 30-8-1994, the Appropriate Authority ordered compulsory purchase by the Central Government for a discounted value of Rs. 44,25,680.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 269UG of the Income Tax Act and the entitlement of the transferees to the consideration amount.

Dispute arises regarding the non-tendering of the amount claimed by the transferees and the release of the amount to the transferor by the Appropriate Authority.

Held:

The judgment clarifies the nature of the rights of transferees under Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act, particularly regarding the creation and enforcement of a charge on the property.

The court emphasizes that the Central Government must tender the consideration amount to the person or persons entitled thereto within the stipulated period.

The court discusses the provisions of Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, highlighting the buyer's entitlement to a charge on the property for the purchase money pre-paid.

The court observes that the Appropriate Authority must deposit the consideration amount with the Appropriate Authority if there is a dispute or if the person entitled does not consent to receive it.

The judgment emphasizes that the property vests in the Central Government subject to existing encumbrances and leasehold rights unless annulled by the Appropriate Authority.

Decision: The court dismisses the appeal, holding that the transferees are not entitled to any relief in these proceedings. It suggests that they seek a remedy against the transferor for the return of the money paid under the agreement.