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by sayum
16 May 2026 6:10 AM
"Under Section 138 of the NI Act, in case of issuance of cheque from joint accounts, a joint account-holder cannot be prosecuted unless the cheque has been signed by each and every person who is a joint account-holder," Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling dated May 6, 2026, held that a joint account holder who is not a signatory to a dishonoured cheque cannot be prosecuted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act).
A single-judge bench of Justice Sandeep Jain observed that criminal liability for the dishonour of a cheque primarily falls upon the drawer and cannot be extended to a non-signatory merely by virtue of sharing a bank account. The court emphasized that the concept of vicarious liability under Section 141 of the NI Act is restricted to companies and does not apply to individuals.
The matter arose from a criminal complaint filed by one Hari Om Pathak against the applicant, Madhu Singh, and a co-accused, Rahul Thind. The complainant alleged that he had advanced a loan of Rs. 8 lakhs to Rahul Thind, who subsequently issued two cheques from a joint account maintained with the applicant. When the cheques were dishonoured due to the account being closed, the trial court summoned both individuals under Section 138 of the NI Act. The applicant, Madhu Singh, moved the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, contending that she was not a signatory to the cheques.
The primary question before the court was whether a joint account holder who has not signed the dishonoured cheque can be held liable under Section 138 of the NI Act. The court was also called upon to determine whether Section 141 of the NI Act, which deals with vicarious liability, could be invoked to prosecute private individuals as an "association of individuals."
Signatory Alone Attracts Liability Under Section 138 NI Act
The court began by examining the essential ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi (2009). It noted that for an offence to be constituted, a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him. The bench observed that the legislative scheme requires that the person to be made liable must be the "drawer" of the instrument.
Justice Sandeep Jain emphasized that the penal provision of Section 138 must be strictly construed. The court noted that it is a fundamental principle of criminal law that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides for it. Since Section 138 refers specifically to the person who "draws" the cheque, a non-signatory joint account holder cannot be roped into criminal proceedings.
"It is only the drawer of the cheque who can be prosecuted. In the case on hand, admittedly, the applicant is not a drawer of the cheque and she has not signed the same."
Section 141 NI Act Limited To Companies And Firms
The court then addressed the complainant's attempt to invoke Section 141 of the NI Act to establish vicarious liability. It clarified that Section 141 is an exception to the general rule and applies only when the offence is committed by a company, partnership firm, or an association of individuals acting as a business entity. The bench held that two private individuals cannot be classified as an "association of individuals" for the purposes of this section.
Citing the Apex Court’s ruling in Alka Khandu Avhad v. Amar Syamprasad Mishra (2021), the court reiterated that Section 141 cannot be made applicable to individuals. The bench observed that the liability under the NI Act is individual in nature unless the account is maintained by a juristic person. Consequently, even if there is a joint liability to pay a debt, the criminal prosecution is limited to the signatory.
"Two private individuals cannot be said to be ‘other association of individuals’. Therefore, there is no question of invoking Section 141 of the NI Act against the applicant."
Strict Interpretation Of Penal Statutes Required
The High Court further relied on the precedent set in Aparna A. Shah v. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd. (2013), where the Supreme Court held that in the case of joint accounts, the non-signatory holder cannot be prosecuted. The court observed that the proceedings under Section 138 should not be used as "arm-twisting tactics" to recover money from persons who are not legally liable under the specific penal provision.
While the complainant argued that the applicant was jointly and severally liable to repay the loan, the court noted that such civil liability does not automatically translate into criminal culpability under the NI Act. The bench found that no specific role or overt act was attributed to Madhu Singh in the complaint, other than her status as a joint account holder.
"The culpability attached to the dishonour of a cheque can, in no case except in case of Section 141 of the NI Act, be extended to those on whose behalf the cheque is issued."
Exercise Of Inherent Powers Under Section 482 CrPC
Concluding the analysis, the court held that allowing the prosecution of the applicant to continue would be an abuse of the process of law. While acknowledging that the power to quash under Section 482 CrPC must be used sparingly, the court found this to be a "fit case" for interference since no prima facie offence was made out against the applicant. The bench noted that the trial court erred in summoning the applicant without verifying if she was a signatory to the cheques.
The court subsequently quashed the summoning order and the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No. 958 of 2006 insofar as they related to Madhu Singh. However, it clarified that the trial against the co-accused and signatory, Rahul Thind, would continue in accordance with the law.
The High Court allowed the application, reinforcing that joint account holders are protected from prosecution under Section 138 NI Act unless they have personally signed the cheque. The ruling clarifies that vicarious liability is a statutory creation limited to corporate entities and cannot be stretched to cover individual joint account holders in a private capacity.
Date of Decision: 06 May 2026