Territorial Jurisdiction – Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Cause of Action Partially Arising in Lucknow – Application Dismissed – The applicant challenged the cognizance order and chargesheet on the grounds that no part of the cause of action arose in Lucknow, where the case was filed – Held: Part cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Lucknow as the victim visited the co-accused’s residence in Lucknow, and crucial incidents linked to the allegations occurred in Lucknow – Territorial jurisdiction upheld [Paras 4, 43].

Criminal Conspiracy – Section 120-B IPC – Sufficiency of Evidence for Cognizance – Application Dismissed – The applicant contended that no direct or circumstantial evidence established a conspiracy between him and the co-accused – Held: Prosecution can rely on circumstantial evidence to establish conspiracy, and in the absence of manifest injustice or abuse of process, the trial court must decide the evidentiary merits – Cognizance upheld [Paras 13-20, 44].

Abetment of Suicide – Section 306 IPC – Ingredients of Instigation and Mens Rea – Application Dismissed – The applicant argued the absence of intent or positive act to instigate the victim’s suicide – Held: The victim’s live statements on social media and her dying declaration alleging instigation by the applicant and co-accused, coupled with supporting evidence, established a prima facie case – Whether the accused had requisite mens rea is a matter for trial – Application dismissed [Paras 22-24, 38, 44].

Inherent Powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Limits of Exercise – Application Dismissed – The applicant sought quashing of the proceedings citing lack of evidence and abuse of process – Held: Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be exercised sparingly, and only in cases of manifest injustice or where allegations fail to constitute any offense – The materials on record disclose prima facie offenses, justifying trial – Application dismissed with directions to expedite trial [Paras 39-42, 47].

Decision: The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed, upholding the cognizance order, chargesheet, and trial proceedings. The trial court was directed to expedite and conclude the trial without unnecessary adjournments. [Paras 46-48].

Criminal Law - Dowry Harassment and Attempt to Murder – Evidentiary Standards – Conviction Reversed – Accused Acquitted – Allegations of dowry harassment, assault, and attempt to murder by pouring kerosene and setting fire – Evidence of P.W.1 (complainant) insufficient as she neither witnessed the act nor directly implicated the accused – No corroboration from neighbors (P.Ws.2-4), and medical report (Ex.P.7) revealed no injuries – Benefit of doubt extended – Conviction set aside [Paras 8-10].

Harassment – Absence of Corroboration – Evidence of Neighbors Not Supporting Prosecution Case – Neighbors alleged to have rescued complainant failed to corroborate allegations – Held: Sole testimony of P.W.1 insufficient to establish harassment or assault in the absence of corroboration from independent witnesses [Paras 9, 10].

Attempt to Murder – Medical Evidence Inconsistent – Acquittal Justified – Medical report (Ex.P.7) noted no external or burn injuries on complainant – Prosecution failed to prove accused poured kerosene and set fire – Conviction under Section 307 IPC erroneous [Paras 10, 11].

Burden of Proof – Panchayat’s Advice to Husband Irrelevant to the Alleged Incident – Evidence of P.W.6 and P.W.10 regarding earlier family disputes and panchayat advice insufficient to establish guilt – Acquittal warranted [Para 9].

Decision: Appeal Allowed: The judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 17.12.2011 in S.C. No. 343/2010 passed by the Fast Track Court, Devanahalli, is set aside. Acquittal Ordered: Appellants (accused Nos. 1 to 4) acquitted of offenses under Sections 498-A, 323, and 307 IPC.
 

Discharge of Accused – Lack of Evidence – Section 227 of Cr.P.C. – The petitioners (Accused Nos. 9 & 10) sought discharge, claiming that the prosecution failed to establish sufficient evidence linking them to the crime – Held: The prosecution's case against Accused Nos. 9 & 10 was based solely on the statements of CW41 and CW42, who claimed to have seen the accused standing on a bridge, and alleged call data records – This Court found no credible evidence to connect the petitioners with the alleged crime, as the call data records were unavailable, and there was no indication that CW41 and CW42 overheard any incriminating conversations – Accused Nos. 9 & 10 were discharged under Section 227 of Cr.P.C., as they stood on the same footing as Accused Nos. 8, 12, and 13, who were earlier discharged in a related revision petition [Paras 6-7].

Precedent Applied – Parity in Treatment of Similarly Placed Accused – The Court relied on its earlier order dated 01/08/2019 in Crl.R.P.Nos.157 & 169/2019, wherein Accused Nos. 8, 12, and 13, who were similarly placed as Accused Nos. 9 & 10, were discharged due to lack of evidence – Held: Consistency in judicial treatment requires that the present petitioners also be discharged, as they are on the same pedestal as the previously discharged accused [Paras 4-7].

Decision:  The criminal revision petition was allowed, and the impugned order of the Sessions Judge dated 30/11/2018 was set aside to the extent it pertained to Accused Nos. 9 & 10.

Accused Nos. 9 & 10 were discharged under Section 227 of Cr.P.C., as there was no evidence to connect them to the crime.
The reasoning applied in the earlier order dated 01/08/2019 for Accused Nos. 8, 12, and 13 was extended to Accused Nos. 9 & 10, ensuring parity.
[Para 7]
 

Family Law – Mental Cruelty – Definition and Threshold – Appellant alleged mental cruelty based on respondent’s behavior, including verbal insults regarding financial status and refusal to observe certain societal norms – Held: Such behavior, absent any evidence of harm or impact on the appellant, does not meet the threshold of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act – Allegations rejected [Paras 5–6].

Family Law – Desertion – Long-Term Separation – Constitutes Desertion – Parties had been separated for over 23 years, with no cohabitation since 2001 – Respondent expressed no willingness to reconcile or cohabit – Held: Long-term separation without reasonable cause constitutes desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Act – Divorce granted on this ground [Paras 8–10].

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Recognition of Prolonged Separation – While irretrievable breakdown is not an explicit ground under the Act, prolonged separation and the inability to sustain the marital relationship justify dissolution of marriage – Held: Continuation of the marriage would amount to cruelty for both parties, warranting divorce [Paras 9–10].

Permanent Alimony – No Need for Alimony – Both parties were gainfully employed, and the only child had reached adulthood – Held: No grounds for awarding alimony existed in the circumstances [Para 11].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the Family Court set aside – Marriage dissolved – No order as to costs [Para 12].

Quashing of Proceedings – Absence of Prima Facie Case – Application Allowed – The petitioner was charged under the IPC and Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, after being apprehended at a location allegedly used as a brothel. Examination of the case diary revealed that the petitioner was present as a customer, with no allegations or evidence indicating involvement in managing or aiding the brothel or living on prostitution earnings – Held: The FIR and chargesheet failed to establish the ingredients required under Sections 120B and 370 of IPC and Sections 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act against the petitioner. Proceedings quashed under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of process of law [Paras 3, 6-10].

Scope of Section 482 CrPC – Prevention of Harassment and Abuse of Process – The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC are to be exercised to prevent harassment through frivolous or malicious prosecution – Held: The proceedings against the petitioner, as a mere customer without any direct involvement in illegal activities, amount to harassment and abuse of process of law. Principles laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, applied [Paras 11-13].

Applicability of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act – Ingredients Not Satisfied – The charges under Sections 3 (keeping a brothel), 4 (living on prostitution earnings), 5 (procuring for prostitution), and 7 (prostitution near public places) of the Act of 1956 require specific evidence of active involvement – Held: No evidence or allegations in the complaint indicated that the petitioner committed any act under the aforementioned provisions. The FIR failed to make out any cognizable offence against the petitioner [Paras 5-10].

Presumption of Malafide Intent – Criminal Proceedings Quashed – In light of the absence of allegations and evidence implicating the petitioner, the prosecution appeared to have been initiated without just cause – Held: Proceedings quashed as continuing them would constitute harassment and violate the petitioner’s rights [Paras 12-13].

Decision: The criminal revisional application (CRR 1739 of 2024) was allowed. The proceedings against the petitioner in Tollygunge PS Case No. 146 of 2016 under Sections 120B and 370 IPC read with Sections 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, were quashed. Proceedings against other accused persons in CGR No. 1497 of 2016 were directed to continue.
 

Presumption of Joint Ownership – Application of Mohammedan Law – Appeal Allowed – The appellant claimed exclusive ownership of seven properties, while the respondent asserted joint ownership inherited from their father. Both lower courts relied on the concept of a "karta" and presumption of joint ownership akin to Hindu law principles – Held: Under Mohammedan law, there is no presumption of joint ownership, and each property must be individually assessed based on title, possession, and evidence. The lower courts erred in applying Hindu joint family principles to Mohammedan property disputes, leading to a perverse finding [Paras 22-23].

Declaration of Title – Weight of Evidence – Records of Rights and Tax Receipts Given Due Weight – The lower courts dismissed the appellant's claims of ownership despite registered deeds, records of rights (CS & RS ROR), and tax receipts in the appellant's name. Reliance on a Local Commissioner’s report for determining possession was improper – Held: Official records of rights and tax receipts carry a presumption of correctness unless rebutted with substantive evidence. Lower courts erred in disregarding such documentary evidence [Paras 21, 27].

Doctrine of Adverse Possession and Gifts – Misapplication of Mohammedan Law – The appellant’s claim of title through adverse possession and oral heba (gift) was rejected by the lower courts based on procedural technicalities and lack of registration – Held: Under Mohammedan law, gifts (heba) need not be in writing or registered but require declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession. The lower courts failed to apply this standard and incorrectly rejected the appellant's claim without evaluating compliance with the essentials of a valid Mohammedan gift [Paras 25-26].

Bar Under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act – Improper Dismissal of Suit – The suit was dismissed for lack of a prayer for recovery of possession, with reliance placed on the Local Commissioner’s report showing the defendant’s possession over certain properties – Held: In disputes between co-sharers, mere possession by one party does not amount to ouster unless hostile title is established. Absence of such pleading or evidence makes dismissal under Section 34 unsustainable. Relief could also have been molded under Order VII Rule 7 of the CPC [Paras 29-30].

High Court's Role in Second Appeal – Concurrent Findings Overturned – The lower courts ignored settled principles of Mohammedan law and made findings based on inadmissible or no evidence, amounting to perversity – Held: High Court, in second appeal, has jurisdiction to interfere where findings are based on no evidence, ignore material evidence, or apply incorrect legal principles [Paras 16-17].

Decision:

The second appeal was allowed. The judgments of the Trial Court (28/11/1979) and First Appellate Court (03/04/1984) were set aside. The case was remanded to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication on merits within six months, after giving both parties an opportunity to contest [Paras 31].

Conviction Based on Dying Declaration – Omnibus Accusations – Reversal of Conviction – The trial court convicted accused Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 302 IPC based on the sole reliance on the dying declaration of the deceased. The dying declaration (Ex.P8) attributed a vague and omnibus accusation to both the accused for pouring kerosene and setting the deceased on fire – Held: The dying declaration lacked specific attribution of overt acts to the accused and suffered from infirmities, including doubts on the deceased's fitness to make the statement given her 97% burns. In the absence of corroborative evidence, the conviction was unsafe and overturned [Paras 20-27].

Reliability of Dying Declaration – Medical Endorsements and Conscious State – Conviction Set Aside – The deceased suffered 97% burns, and initial medical observations recorded her as unconscious. Her alleged recovery of consciousness within an hour to give a coherent statement was doubtful. Coupled with a lack of corroborative evidence, the dying declaration did not inspire confidence to sustain a conviction – Held: The conviction under Section 302 IPC based solely on the dying declaration was unsafe, and appellants were acquitted [Paras 26-27].

Standard of Proof in Criminal Cases – Absence of Specific Allegations and Corroborative Evidence – The prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the specific involvement of the accused in the alleged acts of murder. The dying declaration attributed generic allegations to both accused without specifying individual roles – Held: Failure to specify overt acts in the dying declaration undermined the credibility of the evidence. The case did not meet the standard of proof required for a criminal conviction [Paras 24-27].

Dying Declaration as Sole Evidence – Necessity of Corroboration in Case of Suspicion – Courts should exercise caution in relying solely on a dying declaration, especially when there are doubts regarding its correctness – Held: Ex.P8-dying declaration lacked corroborative support and exhibited suspicious circumstances. In such cases, courts should look for corroborative evidence before recording a conviction [Paras 25-27].

Decision: The appeal was allowed. The conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC recorded against appellants/accused Nos. 1 and 2 by the trial court in Sessions Case No. 66 of 2015 were set aside. The accused were acquitted in terms of Section 235(1) CrPC. Any fine amount paid by the appellants was ordered to be refunded.

Grant of Bail – Intermediary Quantity under NDPS Act – Rigor of Section 37 Not Applicable – Bail Granted – The applicant was charged with possession of 14.700 grams of Mephedrone, which is below the commercial quantity threshold. The court held that the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act were inapplicable and considered the completion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet, along with no prior antecedents of the applicant – Held: Bail granted with conditions [Paras 6.0, 8.0].

Consideration of Bail Principles – Article 21 of the Constitution – Bail Granted – The court reiterated the principle that "bail is the rule and jail is the exception" and emphasized the personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. In light of the applicant's pre-trial incarceration and the delay in trial proceedings, bail was deemed appropriate – Held: Bail granted [Paras 7.0, 7.1, 8.0].

Conditions for Bail – Safeguards Imposed to Prevent Misuse of Liberty – The applicant was directed to comply with specific conditions, including surrender of passport, restrictions on travel outside Gujarat, marking monthly presence before the police station, and avoidance of illegal activities – Held: Non-compliance with conditions would entitle the trial court to cancel bail [Paras 8.0, 9.0].

Decision: The application was allowed. The applicant was ordered to be released on regular bail in connection with FIR C.R. No. 11210050240845 of 2024, subject to furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 25,000 with one surety of the like amount, and compliance with the stipulated conditions. Rule was made absolute to the extent specified [Paras 8.0, 12.0].

Writ Jurisdiction – Disputed Questions of Fact – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Appeal Allowed – The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that disputed questions of fact regarding the delivery of possession of land cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction – Held: The High Court is competent to adjudicate disputed facts in writ jurisdiction where facts are supported by documentary evidence and no elaborate oral evidence is required – Cited precedents affirming that arbitrary actions of public authorities can be addressed in writ petitions [Paras 40-45].

Industrial Land Allotment – Failure to Deliver Possession – Refund with Interest Ordered – The petitioner had paid Rs.11,11,705 for allotment of industrial land but was denied actual physical possession due to disputes with third parties – Respondent authorities issued contradictory statements and failed to provide evidence of possession – Held: The failure to deliver possession constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable act by the authorities – Refund of the full amount with 9% interest per annum and additional costs ordered [Paras 34-47].

Public Authorities – Model Litigant Obligations – Arbitrary and False Defenses Criticized – Respondents raised false, frivolous, and technical defenses to obstruct legitimate claims of the petitioner – Held: The State and its instrumentalities must act fairly, refrain from vexatious defenses, and fulfill their obligations as model litigants – Arbitrary action violating Article 14 of the Constitution was set aside [Paras 45-46].

Refund of Deposits – Applicability of Regulations – Clause 22(1)(i) of the Jharkhand Industrial Area Development Authority Regulations, 2016, cited by respondents for refunding only 55% of the allotment price, was held inapplicable as the case was not one of voluntary surrender but failure to deliver possession by respondents [Paras 23, 46].