Dowry Death – Conviction under Section 304-B IPC set aside – Lack of evidence of cruelty or harassment connected with dowry demand – Death within seven years of marriage and under abnormal circumstances established, but no proximate link between cruelty and death. [Para 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]

Cruelty – Conviction under Section 498-A IPC upheld – Evidence of cruelty by the appellant towards the deceased, including mental torture, as indicated in the letter Ext.4 written by the deceased to her father. [Para 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]

Marital Dispute – Evidence of domestic problems and assault, but no conclusive proof of dowry-related harassment – Letters and statements fail to establish dowry demand as a motive for cruelty. [Para 5, 6, 7, 8]

Judicial Analysis – Appreciation of circumstantial evidence and letters – Importance of analyzing evidence in its entirety to ascertain the truth in dowry death cases. [Para 8, 9]

Decision – Conviction U/S 304-B set aside  –  found guilty u/s 498-A IPC - Appellant has already served the sentence for the offence under Section 498-A IPC – No further custody required. [Para 10]

Cheque Dishonour – Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – Reversal of conviction by the appellate court challenged – Trial court convicted the accused for dishonour of cheque amounting to ₹1,75,000; Appellate court acquitted the accused – High Court finds misappreciation of evidence by appellate court, reinstates trial court's conviction. [Para 1, 18-42]

Delay in Filing Appeal – Condonation of delay in filing appeal – Accused's application for condonation of delay erroneously allowed by the appellate court without proper justification – High Court finds accused's conduct and reasons for delay unjustifiable, reverses appellate court's decision on this point. [Para 16-17, 37]

Presumption Under Section 139 of NI Act – Accused admitted to issuing the cheque in question – High Court observed that once signature on cheque is admitted, presumption under Section 139 is in favour of the complainant – Accused failed to probabilize his defence adequately. [Para 20-27, 31-34]

Appeal Judgment Misappreciation – Appellate court's judgment based on conjectures and surmises – High Court finds that appellate court misread evidence and ignored crucial admissions by accused – Appellate court's judgment set aside. [Para 36, 41]

Sentence Restored – Conduct of the accused considered – High Court finds no infirmity in trial court's order of sentence, thereby restoring the same – Accused directed to surrender within 15 days. [Para 43-44]

Decision – Appellate Court's judgment set aside – Trial Court's conviction and sentence order restored – Accused directed to surrender for serving sentence. [Para 42-44]

Public Interest Litigation – Violation of Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (the RPwD Act) – Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS) issued Advertisements No.15/2022 & 16/2022 for various posts – Alleged violation of statutory provisions under the RPwD Act concerning reservation for Persons with Disabilities (PwD), especially for deaf and hard of hearing persons – Matter brought before the High Court of Delhi. [Para 1-7]

Statutory Provisions – Sections 2(f), 17, 34 of the RPwD Act mandating reservation for Persons with Disabilities (PwD) – 4% reservation mandated, with 1% reserved for deaf and hard of hearing persons – KVS alleged to have ignored these provisions in its advertisements for various posts. [Para 10-11]

Reservation Compliance – KVS relied on an outdated notification dated 29.07.2013 for reservation calculation, ignoring the operative notification dated 04.01.2021 – No reservation provided for deaf and hard of hearing persons in certain posts as required by the RPwD Act – KVS’s action found contrary to the mandatory statutory provisions. [Para 13-25]

Recruitment Process – Completed recruitment process under the challenged advertisements – Court’s concern over discontinuation of services for selected candidates if advertisements quashed – Direction to KVS to provide 1% reservation against total vacancies for deaf and hard of hearing persons and initiate a special recruitment drive to fill the vacancies reserved for various categories of disabled persons. [Para 30-31]

Reasonable Accommodation – Emphasis on the legislative vision of providing reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities – KVS criticized for viewing Persons with Disabilities (PwDs) from a lens of inconvenience rather than facilitating their rights under the RPwD Act. [Para 32]

Judicial Precedent – Reference to a recent judgment directing KVS to provide 1% reservation to blind and low vision persons in line with the notification dated 04.01.2021 – Similar direction issued to KVS in the present case to clear the backlog of vacancies for deaf and hard of hearing persons within a stipulated timeframe. [Para 33-34]

Appointment Directive – Identification of specific posts like Principal, Vice-Principal, Post Graduate Teacher (PGT), etc., in the notification dated 04.01.2021 for reservation – Direction to KVS to appoint deaf and hard of hearing persons on these identified posts in accordance with the statutory provisions of the RPwD Act. [Para 35]

Regular Second Appeal – Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C) – Appeal under Order XLII Rule 1 read with Section 100 of the C.P.C against the decree and judgment in A.S.No.35 of 2018 dated 21.08.2023 by the Additional District Judge-II, Palakkad, which confirmed the decree and judgment in O.S.No.511/2014 by the Munsiff Court, Alathur – Appellant, being the plaintiff, challenges the decree and judgment on grounds of erroneous negation of co-ownership claims over plaint `D’ schedule property. [Para 1]

Injunction – Permanent Prohibitory Injunction – Plaintiff sought a permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant to restrain obstruction of the peaceful use of plaint `D’ schedule motorable way for ingress and egress to plaint `A’ to `C’ schedule properties and to the common tank – Claim based on asserted co-ownership of the plaint `D’ schedule property by the plaintiff. [Para 5]

Title Dispute – Co-ownership Claim – Defendant disputes plaintiff’s title over plaint `A’, `B’ and `C’ schedule properties, and particularly, the co-ownership claim over plaint `D’ schedule property – Contention that plaint `D’ schedule is not a common motorable road and plaintiff has no rights over it either as co-owner or otherwise. [Para 8]

Evidence – Title Establishment – Trial and appellate court’s negation of plaintiff’s co-ownership claim due to lack of cogent evidence establishing title over plaint `D’ schedule property – Reference to plaintiff’s admission during cross-examination regarding the absence of documentary evidence to support co-ownership claim. [Para 11-12]

Substantial Question of Law – Second Appeal Admissibility – Emphasis on the mandatory formulation of substantial question/s of law to admit and maintain a second appeal under Section 100 of the C.P.C – Absence of substantial question of law leading to the dismissal of the appeal without admission. [Para 13-20]

Appointment and Termination - Interpretation of terms of appointment and service agreement - Appellant appointed as a Junior Medical Representative (Trainee) with a mandatory training period - Training period extendable for a further 12 months - Appellant claimed automatic confirmation after the initial 12 months - Respondent rejected claim and extended training - Appellant's performance deemed unsatisfactory - Training eventually terminated - Industrial dispute and conciliation process followed - Labour Court held termination illegal - Ld. Single Judge affirmed reinstatement but denied automatic confirmation. [Para 1-15]

Employment Contract – Termination during Training Period – Interpretation of terms of appointment and service agreement – Whether non-extension of training period before the lapse of 12 months led to automatic termination of training and automatic confirmation of the appellant as a regular Medical Representative on probation – Service agreement and terms of appointment clearly indicate that successful completion of the training period is a pre-requisite for consideration as a regular employee – No provision for automatic extension or automatic confirmation – Offer of regular appointment to follow satisfaction of the respondent during the training period – Appellant's contention of automatic confirmation rejected. [Para 16-23]

Principle of Deemed Confirmation – Deemed confirmation can only apply in exceptional cases where rules prescribe a maximum period of probation or training, and no overt or positive act for confirmation is stipulated – In this case, rules require a positive act for extension of training and confirmation – Maximum period of training had not expired, and training was extended by express order – No basis for automatic confirmation. [Para 27-28]

Literal Interpretation of Terms – Terms of an agreement or rules governing the parties must be construed in their simple and grammatical sense unless a different construction is warranted to prevent absurd consequences or protect constitutionality – No reason to deviate from the literal meaning of the terms of appointment and service agreement in this case. [Para 29]

Backwages – Appellant not eligible for backwages as he was gainfully employed during the period in question – Appellant did not provide evidence to the contrary – Finding of the Ld. Single Judge on this issue upheld. [Para 31]

Appeal Dismissed – No infirmity in the order of the Ld. Single Judge – Appeal dismissed. [Para 32]

Recruitment Process – Eligibility Criteria – Determination of Cut-off Date – The Union Public Service Commission (‘UPSC’) had advertised for recruitment to the post of Principal under the Directorate of Education, Government of NCT of Delhi. The advertisement was initially issued on April 24, 2021, with a closing date of May 13, 2021, but was reissued on July 10, 2021, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, with a new closing date of July 29, 2021. The eligibility criteria, however, were to be considered as on May 13, 2021. Respondents contended that eligibility should be determined as of July 29, 2021, in line with the reissued advertisement. [Para 1-5]

Central Administrative Tribunal – Interpretation of Advertisement – The Tribunal, through its order dated May 15, 2023, directed the UPSC to allow the respondents to participate in the selection process, considering the eligibility as of July 29, 2021, based on a clause in the advertisement. The Tribunal found the advertisement self-contradictory regarding the closing date of eligibility criteria. [Para 6-9]

High Court – Review of Tribunal’s Order – The High Court reviewed the Tribunal’s order and the clauses of the advertisement in detail. The Court noted that due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the initial advertisement could not be taken forward, and thus it was reissued with only the closing date for receipt of applications changed to July 29, 2021, while other conditions remained unchanged from the initial advertisement dated April 24, 2021. [Para 15-19]

Intent of UPSC – Protection of Eligibility – The Court observed that the intent of the UPSC was to protect the eligibility of candidates as of May 13, 2021, given that some candidates who were eligible on May 13, 2021, might become ineligible by July 29, 2021, due to age or other factors. The Court upheld the UPSC’s determination that eligibility should be considered as of May 13, 2021, and not July 29, 2021. [Para 17-19]

Decision – Setting Aside Tribunal’s Order – The High Court set aside the common order of the Tribunal dated May 15, 2023, thereby upholding the UPSC’s stance of considering eligibility as of May 13, 2021. The Court found that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of the advertisement clauses. [Para 20-26]

Appeal Against Premature Retirement and Pension Denial – Appeal lodged by Punjab National Bank challenging the order of learned Single Judge, allowing the writ petition of the Respondent for release of pension post premature retirement – Dispute surrounds the interpretation and application of Punjab National Bank (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979 and Punjab National Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995, alongside a Joint Note/Bipartite Settlement signed at industry level allowing a second option to join the pension scheme. [Para 1-3]

Eligibility for Pension upon Premature Retirement – Respondent, prematurely retired in 2004, sought to exercise the 2nd option for pension following a Circular in 2018 – Appellant Bank's refusal based on distinction between "premature retirement" and "compulsory retirement" under Pension Regulations, claiming the Subject Circular for 2nd pension option applicable only to compulsorily retired employees. [Para 4-9]

Joint Note/Bipartite Settlement Interpretation – No distinction made in Joint Note between premature and compulsory retirement regarding eligibility for 2nd pension option – Subject Circular and IBA Circular not to be read restrictively, extending benefits of Joint Note to all qualifying employees regardless of retirement type. [Para 17-19]

Judicial Endorsement of Pension Eligibility – Court holds Respondent met criteria set in Joint Note for 2nd pension option, rejecting Appellant’s restrictive interpretation – Recognizes the Respondent's right to pension benefits, thereby upholding Single Judge's directive for release of retiral benefits to the Respondent. – Appeal Dismissed.[Para 20-23]

Second Appeal – Civil Property Dispute – Hiba (Gift) - Appellants challenge the decision of the 2nd Additional District Judge, Shajapur, in RCA No.20A/2014 which upheld the lower court's judgment in RCS No.32A/2013. The suit was initiated for a declaration of title and permanent injunction concerning a property purportedly gifted ('Hiba') by Sugrabai to the plaintiffs. [Para 1-3]

Validity of 'Hiba' – Oral Gift – Plaintiffs' Witnesses - Appellants claim that Sugrabai's oral 'Hiba' to them fulfills all legal requisites. Citing testimonies of witnesses PW-4 and PW-5 and Apex Court precedent in Hafeeza Bibi and others Vs. Shaikh Farid, they contend that the courts below failed to properly assess evidence supporting the 'Hiba'. [Para 4]

Respondents' Counterclaim – No Prior Claim on 'Hiba' - Respondents argue that the appellants never claimed the property based on the 'Hiba' in any prior proceedings. Contend that the 'Hiba' claim is an afterthought and thus both lower courts rightly dismissed the appellants' suit and appeal. [Para 6]

High Court's Scope of Interference – Concurrent Findings of Facts - High Court questions when it may interfere with concurrent findings of facts by the lower courts. Cites Apex Court decisions detailing circumstances under which High Court may overturn lower courts' findings. [Para 9]

Jurisdictional Limitations – Second Appeal Under Section 100 CPC - Apex Court's clarification that a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC is permissible only when it involves a 'substantial question of law'. Draws attention to the High Court's limited jurisdiction in re-examining facts under this section. Appeal Dismissed. [Para 10]

Debts Recovery Tribunal Jurisdiction - Interpretation of Section 13(10) of the SARFAESI Act - Whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal constituted under the RDB Act exercises original jurisdiction for the recovery of debts under the SARFAESI Act - Examination of the legislative intent - Applicability of pecuniary jurisdiction under the RDB Act to applications made under Section 13(10) of the SARFAESI Act - Legislative amendments and their impact - Right of borrowers and creditors to file appeals and counterclaims under the RDB Act - Interplay between the SARFAESI Act and the RDB Act - Consideration of jurisdiction in light of threshold limits - The role of Debts Recovery Tribunals in original and appellate proceedings - Clarity on the applicability of the RDB Act in cases involving the SARFAESI Act. [Para 18-25]

Interpretation of Section 1(4) of the RDB Act - Applicability of pecuniary limits to the jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunals - Amendment to Section 1(4) and its impact - Examination of the legislative framework - Jurisdictional implications of Section 13(10) of the SARFAESI Act - The need for a comprehensive reading of relevant provisions - Ensuring access to remedy for debtors - Distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunals - Clarification on the scope of the RDB Act in cases involving the SARFAESI Act. [Para 26-36]

Impact of legislative amendments on the jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunals - Analysis of Section 249 of the IBC - Amendments to the RDB Act - Introduction of the phrase "save as otherwise provided" - Implications for the jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunals - Examination of Sections 3 and 17 of the RDB Act in light of amendments - The role of Debts Recovery Tribunals as Adjudicating Authorities - Determination of jurisdiction in cases involving insolvency of individuals and firms - Clarity on the extent of jurisdiction conferred on Debts Recovery Tribunals. [Para 30-36]

Role of Debts Recovery Tribunals in adjudicating claims under the SARFAESI Act - Provisions governing the procedure for recovery of shortfall of secured debt - Analysis of Rule 11 of the SIE Rules - Debts Recovery Tribunal's jurisdiction in relation to applications under Section 13(10) of the SARFAESI Act - Consideration of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction - Need for clarity in specifying the relevant Debts Recovery Tribunal - Implications for the rights of creditors and borrowers - Ensuring access to justice and the right to appeal - Distinction between actions under the RDB Act and the SARFAESI Act - Legislative intent and its impact on jurisdiction. [Para 37-48]

Impact of jurisdictional limits on debtor's remedies - Comparison with provisions under the RDB Act - Analysis of Section 19(5)(1) of the RDB Act regarding set off and counterclaims - Need to harmonize remedies for debtors under different statutes - Ensuring equitable treatment of secured and unsecured creditors - Importance of addressing lacunae in legislation - Implications for debtor's access to justice and remedies - Role of Debts Recovery Tribunals in issuing recovery certificates - Contrast with SARFAESI Act provisions - Clarification on the availability of remedies and appeals. [Para 49-52]

Decision – Jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunal under SARFAESI Act clarified – Debts Recovery Tribunal's jurisdiction extends to cases under Section 13(10) of the SARFAESI Act – Pecuniary jurisdiction under the RDB Act not applicable to SARFAESI Act claims – Borrower's right to file counterclaims recognized – Appeal against Debts Recovery Tribunal's orders available – SARFAESI Act provides for remedies and procedure for debt recovery – Debts Recovery Tribunal empowered to issue recovery certificate – RDB Act's pecuniary limits do not restrict SARFAESI Act claims – Borrowers have a remedy under SARFAESI Act for amounts less than ₹10,00,000 – Judgment upholds jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunal for original SARFAESI Act claims and appeals.