Criminal Law - Murder Trial – Acquittal Challenged – Eyewitness Evidence Unreliable – Appeal Dismissed – The trial Court acquitted all accused in the murder of Mahadevan, citing contradictions, lack of corroboration, and absence of credible eyewitness testimony – The High Court held that the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent, lacked credibility, and their accounts contradicted the medical and forensic evidence – Appeal against acquittal dismissed [Paras 6–10, 39–40].

Section 302 IPC – Eyewitness Testimony Contradictory – No Direct Witness to Murder – The alleged eyewitnesses to Mahadevan's murder (PW1–PW5) gave conflicting accounts – Independent witnesses turned hostile – Trial Court rightly held that no conclusive evidence established guilt – Appellate Court declined to interfere with acquittal [Paras 33–36].

Trespass and Property Damage – Partial Proof – Damage Established but Accused Not Identified – While evidence (PW2, PW3) and recovered materials supported property damage at deceased’s home, identity of persons who caused damage was not proven – Held: Charges under TNPPDL Act failed for lack of credible identification [Paras 27–33].

Conspiracy Allegation – No Supporting Evidence – Accused A10 and A11 Added Later – Alleged conspiracy to murder at cashew grove uncorroborated – Prosecution failed to establish motive or link with actual assault – Trial Court rightly found conspiracy charge under Section 120B IPC not proved [Paras 16–25].

Evidentiary Gaps – FIR Registration Doubtful – Timeline Discrepancy – Altered complaint and delayed registration of FIR, lack of corroboration from medical/investigative records for claimed injuries of key witnesses (PW20, PW23), weakened prosecution case significantly [Paras 17, 22, 37].

Decision: Criminal appeal dismissed – No perversity or illegality found in trial Court’s acquittal order – Prosecution failed to prove charges beyond reasonable doubt – View taken by trial Court held plausible – No interference warranted [Paras 39–40].

Taxation Law - Income Tax Act - Transfer Pricing – Selection of Most Appropriate Method – RPM vs. TNMM – ITAT’s Decision Upheld – The Revenue challenged the ITAT’s finding that Resale Price Method (RPM) was the correct method for determining the arm’s length price (ALP) of the assessee's international transactions, arguing that Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) should have been applied – The assessee, a pure distributor of solar products, purchased goods from its Associate Enterprise (AE) and resold them without any value addition – The Court held that RPM is the preferred method for distribution activities where no significant value is added to the goods before resale – Held: ITAT correctly applied RPM, and the High Court found no substantial question of law requiring interference [Paras 12-14].

Transfer Pricing – Aggregation of Transactions – Purchase Price and Warranty Cost Claim are Unrelated – The Revenue argued that the warranty cost claim and reimbursement of expenses should be aggregated with the purchase of solar products, justifying the application of TNMM – The Court rejected this argument, holding that the warranty cost was reimbursed by the AE and was not an additional service provided by the assessee – Held: Transactions were not inextricably linked and should not be clubbed together for transfer pricing purposes [Paras 13-14].

Functional Profile – Distributor vs. Manufacturer – RPM Confirmed as the Appropriate Method – The assessee acted as a pure distributor and did not engage in manufacturing or value addition – The Court emphasized that RPM is the most suitable method for distributors who simply purchase and resell goods without modification – Citing Burberry India Pvt. Ltd. (2024) and Matrix Cellular (2018), the Court reiterated that TNMM is more appropriate for value-adding entities, not for distribution businesses – Held: ITAT correctly applied established jurisprudence in selecting RPM over TNMM [Paras 15-16].

Income Tax – No Substantial Question of Law – High Court Declines to Interfere with ITAT’s Findings – The Court held that the Revenue’s appeal did not raise a substantial question of law, as ITAT’s decision was based on settled legal principles and factual appreciation – Held: The ITAT's order was well-reasoned, and the High Court found no grounds to interfere under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act [Paras 19-20].

Decision: Appeal Dismissed – The High Court upheld the ITAT’s order and dismissed the Revenue’s appeal – ITAT correctly determined RPM as the most appropriate method for benchmarking the assessee’s international transactions – No costs awarded [Paras 19-20].
 

Public Interest Litigation – Locus Standi – Bona Fide of Petitioner in Question – The petitioner, an investigative journalist, sought cancellation of a contract awarded to MEIL on the ground that it submitted fraudulent bank guarantees from Euro Exim Bank, which is not recognized by the Reserve Bank of India – The respondents argued that the petitioner had a personal vendetta due to prior civil and criminal disputes with MEIL and had suppressed material facts about these disputes – Held: A petitioner in a PIL must come with clean hands, and suppression of relevant litigation history indicates a lack of bona fide intention – PIL dismissed [Paras 5-7, 25].

Scandalizing the Court – Social Media Posts by Petitioner – Contempt of Court Avoided – The petitioner published tweets making allegations against government authorities and the High Court – The Court noted that the tweets amounted to scandalizing the judiciary, but since the petitioner deleted them within five days on legal advice, no contempt proceedings were initiated – Held: The tweets were inappropriate and undermined the integrity of the judicial process, but the Court exercised judicial magnanimity in not initiating contempt proceedings [Paras 23, 28].

Suppression of Material Facts – Failure to Disclose Prior Litigation – The petitioner failed to disclose multiple pending civil and criminal cases against MEIL, including defamation suits, FIRs, and financial disputes – The Bombay High Court Public Interest Litigation Rules, 2010, require full disclosure of relevant litigation – Held: Non-disclosure of material facts and failure to comply with procedural requirements justified dismissal of the PIL without examining its merits [Paras 24-26].

Judicial Review of Government Contracts – Scope of PIL – The Court reiterated that judicial intervention in government contracts should be limited to cases involving clear arbitrariness, corruption, or mala fide actions – The bank guarantees issued by Euro Exim Bank had been authenticated by scheduled banks, and the petitioner failed to establish any illegality – Held: A PIL cannot be used as a tool for personal vendettas or business rivalries [Paras 14-15].

Decision: PIL dismissed. No costs imposed.
 

Negotiable Instruments Act – Deposit of 20% Compensation – Judicial Discretion – Orders Set Aside – The petitioner, convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act, challenged the ASJ’s order requiring him to deposit 20% of the compensation amount for suspension of sentence – Petitioner contended that the ASJ erroneously treated the deposit as mandatory and failed to exercise discretion – Held: The phrase “may order” in Section 148 of the NI Act grants discretion to the appellate court – Imposition of deposit must be reasoned and not automatic – ASJ failed to consider the petitioner’s financial capacity and wrongly assumed ownership of a business in its reasoning – Orders directing deposit quashed, and matter remanded for fresh consideration [Paras 15-20].

Criminal Procedure – Right to Appeal – Unjustified Financial Burden Not Permitted – Appellate courts must ensure that financial conditions do not unjustly deprive the convicted person of their right to appeal – Held: Courts must assess financial capacity before directing deposit – Blanket imposition of deposit without application of mind is not permissible – ASJ’s order lacked proper assessment, warranting remand for reconsideration [Paras 22-24].

Judicial Precedents – Applicability of Supreme Court Rulings – Failure to Follow Established Law – Petitioner relied on Jamboo Bhandari v. MP State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 446, and Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi, (2019) 11 SCC 341 – Held: Supreme Court has clarified that while deposit under Section 148 is generally required, exceptions can be made where the deposit would be unjust or deprive the appellant of their right to appeal – ASJ failed to apply these principles, necessitating fresh consideration [Paras 21-22].

Final Decision – Orders Quashed – Case Remanded for Fresh Consideration – High Court set aside the ASJ’s orders dated 27.01.2025 and remanded the matter for reconsideration of the deposit requirement in light of the petitioner’s financial condition and Supreme Court precedents – ASJ directed to pass fresh orders after proper evaluation [Paras 30-35].

Service Law – Resignation Under Duress – No Break in Service – Writ Petition Allowed – The petitioner, an Assistant Engineer in the Howrah Municipal Corporation, was required to resign before being released for deputation as an Executive Engineer under the Ministry of Surface Transport – Upon termination of deputation, he was reappointed as an Assistant Engineer but was denied continuity of service due to an alleged break – Held: The resignation was not voluntary but imposed as a condition for deputation – Resignation letter was conditional and does not constitute a valid resignation – The break in service must be condoned [Paras 19-26].

Employment Law – Conditional Resignation – Not a Voluntary Relinquishment of Office – A valid resignation requires an unconditional intention to relinquish office – Held: Since the resignation was a forced precondition for deputation and not voluntary, it cannot be treated as a resignation in law – Relying on Dr. Prabha Atri v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 701 and Moti Ram v. Param Dev, (1993) 2 SCC 725, the court held that an employee cannot be deemed to have resigned if the act was compelled by the employer [Paras 20-22].

Continuity of Service – Break in Service Unjustified – Petitioner Entitled to Benefits – The Howrah Municipal Corporation imposed the resignation condition, which led to the break in service – Held: Since the break was due to the Corporation’s actions, the petitioner must be treated as being in continuous service from his original appointment date – Following Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 325, the court directed reinstatement with full financial and retirement benefits [Paras 30-40].

Final Decision – Writ Petition Allowed – Break in Service Condoned – Financial Benefits Granted – High Court quashed the Corporation’s decision treating the period as a break in service – Directed the Corporation to restore continuity of service and pay arrears and retirement benefits within six weeks [Paras 41-42].

Criminal Law – Attempt to Commit Rape – Prima Facie Case Not Made Out – Summoning Order Modified – The revisionists were summoned for attempt to commit rape (Section 376 read with Section 18 of POCSO Act) based on allegations that they grabbed the victim’s breasts, broke the string of her lower garment, and attempted to drag her beneath a culvert – The Court held that these acts did not establish a prima facie case of attempt to rape, as there was no evidence of an intent to commit penetrative sexual assault – Held: Summoning order modified; accused to be charged under Sections 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act instead [Paras 26-29].

Standard for Attempt to Commit Rape – Distinction Between Preparation and Attempt – The Court applied the test for attempt in sexual offences, holding that an attempt requires an overt act beyond mere preparation – Citing Rex v. James Lloyd (1836) 7C & P 817 and Express v. Shankar (1881) ILR 5 Bom 403, the Court ruled that mere disrobing or touching without further decisive action does not constitute an attempt to rape – Held: The accused’s conduct did not indicate an unequivocal intent to commit rape, and therefore, the charge under Section 376 IPC was unsustainable [Paras 24-25].

POCSO Act – Aggravated Sexual Assault – Conviction Under Section 9/10 of POCSO Act Justified – The Court held that the allegations against Akash and Pawan constituted aggravated sexual assault under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act, as the victim was below 12 years of age – The punishment for aggravated sexual assault under Section 10 of POCSO Act is imprisonment for not less than five years but up to seven years – Held: The accused shall face trial under Section 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of POCSO Act instead of Section 376 IPC [Paras 27-28].

Criminal Intimidation – Summoning Under Sections 504 and 506 IPC Upheld – The victim’s family was allegedly threatened with a country-made pistol, and the victim's mother was abused and intimidated when she complained – The Court held that these acts justified summoning the accused Ashok under Sections 504 and 506 IPC – Held: No modification required in summoning for criminal intimidation charges [Paras 22-23].

Decision: Revision Partly Allowed – The Court modified the summoning order, holding that the accused Akash and Pawan should be charged under Sections 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act, instead of Section 376 IPC read with Section 18 of POCSO Act – The summoning of Ashok under Sections 504 and 506 IPC remains unaltered – Trial court directed to issue fresh summons accordingly [Paras 29-30].

Landlord-Tenant Law – Eviction on Termination of Tenancy – Appeal Dismissed – Plaintiff, the owner of the suit premises, initiated eviction proceedings after serving a valid quit notice – Defendant claimed lower rent and denied arrears – Trial court decreed eviction, which was upheld by the first appellate court – Held: The tenancy was month-to-month and duly terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act – The tenant failed to provide evidence of regular rent payments – Eviction order upheld [Paras 16-19].

Civil Procedure – Second Appeal – No Substantial Question of Law – Appeal Not Maintainable – Appellant sought to challenge concurrent findings of fact – Held: A second appeal under Section 100 CPC can only be admitted on substantial questions of law – No legal issues warranting interference were raised – High Court cannot reappreciate factual findings of lower courts unless there is a manifest error or violation of law – Appeal dismissed at admission stage [Paras 20-22].

Judicial Precedents – Scope of Second Appeal – Limited to Substantial Questions of Law – Following Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi, (2007) 8 SCC 155, and Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, AIR 2006 SC 1975, the court held that factual determinations by lower courts are binding unless there is a legal infirmity – Mere dissatisfaction with concurrent judgments does not justify a second appeal [Paras 13-15, 22].

Final Decision – Second Appeal Dismissed – Three Months Time for Tenant to Vacate – High Court dismissed the second appeal, confirming the eviction order – Granted three months for the appellant/tenant to vacate the premises – No costs imposed [Para 23].

Service Law - Promotion and Direct Recruitment – Vacancy Allocation – Rule Interpretation – The learned single judge directed that 50% of Sub-Inspector (Traffic) posts be reserved for departmental promotion and the rest be filled through direct recruitment – The High Court noted that under Rule 4 of the 2013 Rules, vacancies are to be split equally between promotion and direct recruitment, but if eligible candidates for promotion are not available, those vacancies are to be filled through direct recruitment – Held: Since the respondents were not eligible for promotion as of January 2024, the Transport Department was justified in proceeding with direct recruitment for all vacancies – Order of single judge reversed [Paras 2-7].

Right to be Considered for Promotion – No Absolute Right to Promotion – The respondents argued that denial of promotion consideration violated their fundamental right under Articles 14 & 16(1) – The Court clarified that the right under Article 16(1) extends only to being considered for promotion, not to an absolute right to be promoted – Since the respondents were ineligible at the time of the recruitment process, no legal violation occurred – Held: The respondents’ reliance on Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Hardev Singh v. Union of India was misplaced as those cases dealt with candidates eligible for promotion, unlike the present case [Paras 8-9].

Recruitment Process – Committee’s Role in Promotion Eligibility – The rules mandate that the committee meets annually in January to assess and recommend eligible candidates for promotion – The Court reaffirmed that the recruitment process must adhere to this schedule and that the Transport Department acted correctly in initiating direct recruitment due to the lack of eligible departmental candidates in January 2024 – Held: Department’s decision to proceed with direct recruitment was valid and justified [Paras 7-9].

Decision: Appeal allowed. The single judge’s order was set aside, and the Transport Department’s decision to proceed with direct recruitment was upheld.
 

Land Acquisition – Delay and Laches – Writ Petition Dismissed – The petitioner challenged the acquisition of land in Village Akurdi, Pune, which was acquired under the MID Act in 1971, with possession taken in 1972 – Petition filed in 2010, nearly 38 years after the acquisition – Held: Delay of over three decades is unexplained and renders the petition non-maintainable – Principles of delay and laches bar the challenge, as acquisition proceedings had attained finality [Paras 1-4, 10-12].

Property Law – Land Acquisition and Possession – Once Vested, Cannot Be Reversed – The petitioner’s father had agreed to the acquisition in consent terms recorded before the High Court in 1968 – Held: Once land vests in the government upon acquisition, it cannot be challenged after decades on the ground that the petitioner was unaware of the process – Petitioner’s plea that possession was not taken is contradicted by official records – Land deemed lawfully acquired [Paras 8-10, 15-17].

Judicial Review – High Court Cannot Interfere After Conclusion of Acquisition Process – Petitioner argued that no compensation was paid, and therefore, the acquisition lapsed – Held: The remedy for non-payment of compensation lies in seeking proper legal recourse, not in challenging acquisition decades later – Supreme Court rulings reaffirm that land acquisition cannot be nullified solely on non-payment of compensation [Paras 20-25].

Final Decision – Writ Petition Dismissed – No Relief Granted – High Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the validity of the acquisition – Held: No case for interference as the petitioner’s challenge was barred by delay, acquiescence, and past judicial orders – Costs imposed on the petitioner for abuse of legal process [Paras 30-32].