Stray Revenue Entries Can't Create Tenancy in Surplus Land Already Vested in State: Punjab & Haryana High Court

“A Trespasser Cannot Seek Injunction Against the True Owner Once Rights Are Judicially Adjudicated — Due Process of Law Ends with Judicial Determination”, In a significant ruling that reinforces the boundaries of tenancy claims on surplus agricultural land and clarifies the scope of legal protection available to persons in unauthorised possession, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Randhir Singh (since deceased) through LRs v. Jagdish and Another, decided on 27 January 2026, dismissed two Regular Second Appeals filed by the plaintiff and allowed the appeal filed by the defendants, bringing closure to a decades-old land dispute.

Justice Parmod Goyal ruled that “mere stray entries in revenue records cannot substitute proof of lawful tenancy, particularly when the land stood vested in the State much before such entries were made.”

The Court held that the plaintiff had utterly failed to establish any legal tenancy over the suit land and had, instead, intruded upon State-owned surplus land that was lawfully allotted to the defendant Jai Singh under the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972. Refusing protection to the plaintiff, the Court held him to be a trespasser with no enforceable right.

“Jamabandi Entry Without Rent Is No Proof of Tenancy; Plaintiff's Claim Based on 1977-78 Entry Ignores Prior Vesting in State”

The central controversy before the Court revolved around the claim of Randhir Singh that his father, Risala, was a tenant under the original landowners Parsani Devi and Bohti Devi for over 30 years and that he inherited that tenancy. However, the Court rejected this narrative as unsupported by evidence.

The Court observed: “Except for a single jamabandi entry for 1977-78, there is no evidence of rent fixation, rent payment, or consent of the alleged landlords. Subsequent entries mention ‘Gair Marusi’ without lagan, which negates any inference of tenancy.”

Highlighting that the land had already been declared surplus and vested in the State under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, and subsequently allotted to defendant Jai Singh in 1978 through official mutation and possession records, the Court held: “A claim of tenancy surfacing only after the vesting of land in the State cannot defeat the statutory process of land redistribution.”

It was further noted that the plaintiff never claimed ownership, only pre-emption as a tenant — an assertion entirely dependent on proving tenancy. “In absence of a legally recognised tenancy, the claim of pre-emption collapses by its own weight,” the Court concluded.

“Trespasser Cannot Invoke ‘Due Process’ to Resist Dispossession After Court Declares True Ownership”

Addressing the plaintiff’s repeated attempts to seek permanent injunction against the defendants under the pretext of “due course of law”, the Court delivered a powerful restatement of settled principles. Quoting the Supreme Court's ruling in Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria, the Court emphasized:

“The expressions ‘due process of law’ or ‘due course of law’ are satisfied once a court of competent jurisdiction adjudicates upon the rights of parties. It does not matter who initiated the proceedings.”

Justice Parmod Goyal decisively held that once a court has declared that a person is in unlawful possession, no further injunction can be granted to shield that person from the rightful owner. The Court noted: “A judicial determination having already taken place in the present matter, the plaintiff cannot now seek to delay or frustrate possession by raising the bogey of ‘due process.’ The remedy ends where the adjudication concludes.”

“Once Found to Be a Trespasser, No Equitable Relief Survives”

The Court categorically ruled that injunctive relief is not available to a person in unlawful possession, especially after the court has ruled on the ownership dispute. Observing that:

“The plaintiff failed not only to prove tenancy but even his possession through cogent evidence. Stray entries made after land had vested in the State cannot create lawful rights.”

The Court found that the 1977-78 jamabandi was nothing more than a tactical insertion aimed at disrupting utilization of surplus land by the State. The findings of both the Trial and First Appellate Courts, which rejected the plaintiff’s tenancy claim and recognised the lawful allotment in favour of Jai Singh, were affirmed.

“Tenancy Cannot Be Fabricated Post Vesting — Surplus Land Allotment Is Final Unless Set Aside”

With regard to the sale of the land by Jai Singh to Jagdish, the Court also rejected the plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption, noting that he had no right to challenge the sale once tenancy had not been established. The Court declared:

“Since plaintiff has failed to prove his tenancy over suit property, he has got no right to pre-empt the sale in favour of defendant Jagdish.”

The pre-emption suit (RSA-1491-1988) and the injunction suit (RSA-1168-1989) were accordingly dismissed, while the defendants’ appeal (RSA-2180-1988) was allowed, leading to complete rejection of the plaintiff's claims in all three matters.

Legal Possession Prevails Over Opportunistic Claims — Rule of Law Requires Adjudication, Not Obstruction

In this consolidated decision, the High Court reaffirmed vital legal principles under tenancy and land ceiling laws:

1. Stray or fabricated entries in revenue records do not create tenancy rights, especially when made after the land vests in the State.
2. Once a person is judicially found to be a trespasser, no injunction can be granted against the true owner under the guise of “due process of law.”
3. Tenancy must be established by concrete evidence — oral assertions and isolated entries are insufficient.

Summing up its findings, the Court held:

“The plaintiff, having failed to establish tenancy, cannot claim either pre-emption or protection of possession. The legal process has run its full course, and no further indulgence can be extended.”

Date of Decision: 27 January 2026