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by Admin
01 February 2026 12:20 PM
“No automatic condonation of delay under Section 34(3); Commercial Court must apply judicial mind to pleadings before treating petitions as within limitation” – Justice Jaspreet Singh
Allahabad High Court in a detailed and significant ruling set aside a Commercial Court order that had refused to entertain a preliminary objection on limitation in a challenge to an MSME Facilitation Council award. The Court categorically held that the issue of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a jurisdictional one and cannot be bypassed by casual or mechanical reasoning. The judgment also clarified the role of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in such proceedings and reaffirmed the importance of judicial application of mind when exercising discretion on condonation of delay.
High Court Faults Commercial Court for Mechanical Rejection of Limitation Objection Without Considering Statutory Preconditions
The main legal controversy arose from an arbitral award dated 27.09.2023 issued by the MSME Facilitation Council in favour of M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., which was challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act by Paradigm Enterprises on 16.01.2024 before the Commercial Court, Lucknow. The award was passed under Section 18 of the MSME Development Act, 2006.
Genebio Healthcare raised a preliminary objection before the Commercial Court, stating that the challenge under Section 34 was barred by limitation and not accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, as required by the statutory framework under Section 34(3). This objection was rejected by the Commercial Court, which relied on the Munsarim’s report and presumed that a High Court order had the effect of condoning the delay. This reasoning was termed by Justice Jaspreet Singh as "a clear case of misreading and misconstruing the order passed by the High Court."
“The issue of limitation was a jurisdictional issue which was to be considered with utmost seriousness, which is not reflected from the reasoning of the Court,” observed Justice Singh, emphasizing that “a report of the Munsarim is subservient to the judicial determination and cannot override the legal requirement under Section 34(3).”
“Delay Beyond Three Months Can Be Condoned Only on Satisfaction of Judicial Mind” – High Court Emphasizes Principle of ‘Unbreakability’ in Section 34
While acknowledging that the Section 34 petition was filed beyond three months but within the additional thirty days permitted under the proviso to Section 34(3), the Court underscored that “mere filing within 120 days does not ipso facto justify condonation.”
The Court noted that “what the Court is required to do is to ascertain whether the cause shown for approaching the Court within the condonable period constitutes sufficient cause. This necessarily means applying the judicial mind to the cause shown, the contention of the opposing party and the reason recorded by the Court to reach its conclusion.”
Referring to the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470, the Court reiterated that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded for Section 34 proceedings, and “no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in Part I of the Act.”
Section 14 of the Limitation Act Can Be Invoked But Only Upon Specific Pleadings and Satisfaction of Pre-Conditions
The High Court accepted that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which allows exclusion of time spent bona fide in proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, is applicable to arbitration matters under Section 34. However, it held that the party invoking such a benefit must plead and establish all five statutory conditions — including due diligence and good faith.
In this case, the contesting respondent had failed to plead any case for Section 14 exclusion. As the Court observed, “there was no prayer, nor pleadings to seek benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act,” and thus “the Commercial Court failed to examine statutory conditions.”
The Court emphasized, “Section 14 provides for exclusion of time; it does not grant an automatic fresh limitation period,” distinguishing it from discretionary powers under Section 5.
Separate Application for Condonation Not Mandatory, But Cogent Pleadings and Judicial Scrutiny Are Essential
While rejecting the petitioner’s argument that failure to file a separate application for condonation is per se fatal to the maintainability of a Section 34 petition, the High Court clarified that such an application — even if embedded in the main petition — must contain sufficient material for judicial scrutiny.
Referring to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Shesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Coop. Bank (2021) 7 SCC 313 and Chintal (India) Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders (2021) 4 SCC 602, the Court observed that “though it is a prudent course to file a separate application, its absence is not fatal if sufficient cause is pleaded and a prayer is made in the main petition.” However, in the present case, “there was neither prayer nor pleading, nor any judicial examination of the same by the Commercial Court,” rendering its order unsustainable.
Plea of 'Approbate and Reprobate' Inapplicable to Jurisdictional Bar Under Section 34
Rejecting the respondent’s contention that Genebio Healthcare had waived its right to raise limitation by seeking release of pre-deposit under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, the Court held that “doctrine of approbate and reprobate is inapplicable to jurisdictional objections.”
The High Court observed, “once an award is challenged under Section 34, the pre-deposit under Section 19 is mandatory. Merely participating in proceedings or availing benefit of release of funds does not preclude the opposite party from raising a jurisdictional bar based on limitation.”
Order Releasing 75% of Deposited Amount Upheld; Section 19's Proviso Allows Balanced Judicial Discretion
In the connected Petition No. 5145 of 2024, the contesting respondent had challenged the Commercial Court’s order dated 27.09.2024 allowing release of the 75% pre-deposit amount to the supplier (Genebio), and directing the respondent to furnish security for the remaining 25%.
Rejecting the challenge, the High Court held that the Commercial Court “acted within the mandate of Section 19, Proviso of the MSMED Act,” which permits release of deposited amount “as deemed reasonable under the circumstances.”
The Court noted, “There was no patent fraud, nor was the award ex facie void. The Commercial Court protected the respondent’s interest by requiring the supplier to furnish an indemnity bond with 6% interest, and simultaneously securing the remaining 25% by ordering a valuable security. This is a legally sound and equitable approach.”
No Interference Warranted Where Commercial Court Followed Judicial Directions and Protected Parties’ Interests
Emphasizing the settled legal position that “a money decree is ordinarily not stayed,” the High Court cited Lifestyle Equities C.V. v. Amazon Technologies, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2153, and India Glycols Ltd. v. MSEFC, (2025) 5 SCC 780, to affirm that unless egregious fraud or manifest illegality is shown, courts should respect the statutory finality of money awards and ensure interim compliance.
The order of the Commercial Court to release funds to Genebio and require security for balance was, according to the High Court, “an appropriate course of action which cannot be faulted.”
Commercial Court Must Re-Decide Limitation with Judicial Mindfulness and Reasoning
In conclusion, the High Court partly allowed Writ Petition No. 3886 of 2024 filed by M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., setting aside the Commercial Court’s order dated 20.06.2024 to the extent it rejected the limitation objection. The matter has been remanded back for fresh adjudication on the issue of limitation “by a reasoned and speaking order,” preferably within four weeks.
Petition No. 5145 of 2024, filed by Paradigm Enterprises, was dismissed, upholding the Commercial Court’s order dated 27.09.2024 releasing the 75% deposit and securing the balance.
The judgment sets a critical precedent in arbitration jurisprudence by reinforcing the judicial rigour required in determining limitation under Section 34, particularly when awards under the MSMED Act are in question.
Date of Decision: January 21, 2026
