Facts:

The appellant, Sujoy Mitra, was facing trial in a case related to Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.

The complainant was a citizen of Ireland residing in Dublin.

The trial court permitted the testimony of the complainant (PW5) to be recorded via video conference.

Issues:

The appellant challenged the procedure adopted by the trial court for recording the testimony of PW5.

Held and Decision:

The Supreme Court granted leave for the appeal and considered the challenges raised by the appellant regarding the procedure adopted by the trial court in recording the statement of PW5.

The Court laid down additional procedures and safeguards to be followed while recording PW5's statement through video conferencing, ensuring fairness and compliance with legal requirements.

These procedures included provisions for video conferencing facilitated by the National Informatic Centre (NIC) using "VC Solution" software, nomination of a responsible officer from the Indian Embassy in Ireland to be present during the recording, and ensuring no other person is present in the room during the recording.

The Court rejected the appellant's contention that the recorded video-graphic testimony should be furnished to him, stating it could lead to a cumbersome process and unnecessary duplication of records.

The appeal was disposed of, with instructions for the trial court to fix a hearing date after the video conferencing facilities were set up and synchronized between the trial court and the Indian Embassy in Ireland.

The trial court was directed to forward the order to the Ambassador of the Indian Embassy in Ireland for compliance.

The parameters outlined by the Court were to be followed for recording PW5's testimony afresh, in addition to the procedures and safeguards provided in the impugned order.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) regarding the imposition and execution of sentences, particularly life imprisonment, as well as the power of remission granted to the executive authorities under the Constitution of India.

Issues:

Interpretation of "imprisonment for life" under the IPC.

Consideration of a special category of sentence and exclusion of remission in certain cases.

The authority to exercise the power of remission by the Appropriate Government under the CrPC.

Determination of primacy in the exercise of remission power between the Union Government and State Government.

Clarification on the suo motu exercise of power of remission under the CrPC.

Interpretation of "consultation" vs. "concurrence" in the context of executive powers.

Held:

The court held that "imprisonment for life" under Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC means imprisonment for the rest of the convict's life. However, the right to claim remission, commutation, or reprieve as provided under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution remains available.

The principle of establishing a special category of sentence, excluding remission in certain cases, was endorsed by the court.

The Appropriate Government, whether at the Union or State level, can exercise the power of remission under Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC, even if similar considerations were made earlier by the President or the Governor.

The court clarified that the status of the Appropriate Government depends on the order of sentence passed by the criminal court. In cases where specific executive powers are conferred on the Centre, the Union Government holds primacy as the Appropriate Government for remission.

The court ruled out the suo motu exercise of power of remission under Section 432(1) of the CrPC, stating that it can only be initiated based on an application from the convicted person as provided in Section 432(2).

In situations falling within the jurisdiction of the Central Government under Section 435(1) of the CrPC, the term "consultation" should be construed as "concurrence," giving primacy to the Central Government.

These Writ Petitions and Criminal Appeal are disposed of in terms of the decision in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 48 of 2014.

Facts:

The marriage between the petitioner and respondent was solemnized in April 2010.

The respondent-husband filed a suit for dissolution of marriage in 2015, citing cruelty by the petitioner-wife.

A Settlement Agreement was reached, wherein the respondent agreed to pay Rs. 12,50,000/- towards alimony and maintenance for the petitioner.

The petitioner-wife is suffering from breast cancer and urgently requires funds for medical treatment.

Concern arises regarding the validity of the consent for divorce by mutual consent due to the petitioner's medical condition.

Issues:

Whether the consent for divorce by mutual consent was freely given by the petitioner-wife, considering her medical condition and urgent need for funds for treatment.

Held:

The transfer petition to transfer the matrimonial suit from the Family Court at Bombay to the Family Court at Hyderabad is allowed.

The respondent-husband is directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- out of Rs. 12,50,000/- to the petitioner-wife immediately within a week for her treatment and other medical expenses.

After the petitioner-wife is fully cured from her illness or within six months, whichever is earlier, the Family Court at Hyderabad shall take up the case along with any fresh application filed by the parties under Section 13B for divorce by mutual consent.

The court shall dispose of these petitions in accordance with the law after recording its satisfaction and providing an opportunity for both parties to be heard.

Facts:

The Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) allotted Civic Amenity Site No. 2 for a petrol retail outlet.

The High Court set aside the allotment, citing a violation of Section 38A of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976.

The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which initially upheld the High Court's decision but later reviewed the judgment due to factual inaccuracies.

Issues:

Whether the allotment of Civic Amenity Site No. 2 for a petrol pump violated the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976.

Interpretation of Section 38A of the Act.

Determining the classification of a petrol pump as a civic amenity.

Held:

"In that view of the matter, there is no merit in the writ petitions filed before the High Court. They are, accordingly, dismissed. The civil appeals are allowed as above."

This paragraph signifies that the Supreme Court found no grounds to support the writ petitions challenging the allotment of Civic Amenity Site No. 2 for a petrol pump. Therefore, the writ petitions were dismissed, and the civil appeals were allowed, affirming the legality of the allotment.

Facts:

The Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. allocated a gas agency to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 jointly, subject to conditions mentioned in the 'Letter of allotment'. However, the 'Standard agreement' referred to in the letter was not provided to the respondents.

Issues:

The key issues revolved around the termination of the distributorship by the Corporation and the legality of such termination considering the absence of the 'Standard agreement' and the unilateral termination clause in the letter of allotment.

Held:

The court held that the 'Standard agreement' was never supplied to the respondents nor executed by them, rendering it legally non-binding upon them.

Since the agreement was not supplied to the respondents, it cannot be considered a concluded contract under Section 7 of the Contract Act.

Condition No. 8 of the letter of allotment, allowing unilateral termination without assigning any reason, was deemed unconscionable and liable to be read down in the light of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.

The Corporation, being a government undertaking, is bound to act fairly and reasonably, subject to scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution.

The court ruled that the provision under section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act is not applicable to the case since the contract was not revocable and had not become void.

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were awarded costs of Rs. 1 lakh due to the arbitrary termination of distributorship after years of litigation. The court emphasized the importance of justice for ex-servicemen like the respondents.

Facts:

The land of the appellants was compulsorily acquired under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, by the Jaipur Development Authority for the Indian Army's "Field Firing Range". Despite promises made by the State Government to allot developed land in lieu of compensation, the plots offered to the appellants remained undeveloped for over three decades. The appellants sought adequate reparation for the delay and non-compliance with the promises made by the State Government.

Issues:

Whether the circular dated 13.12.2001, promising developed land to the landowners, is enforceable against the State Government?

Whether the delay in fulfilling the promises made by the State Government can be attributed to the appellants?

Whether the Supreme Court can intervene under Article 142 of the Constitution to ensure complete justice in the case?

Whether the State Government's persistent failure to fulfill its commitment constitutes manifest injustice to the appellants?

Held:

The Court held that the circular dated 13.12.2001 is a valid executive decision enforceable against the State Government. The State's attempt to disown the policy was rejected.

The delay in fulfilling the promises made by the State Government cannot be attributed to the appellants, as they had no control over the State's actions. Therefore, the delay does not affect their entitlement to compensation.

The Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to ensure complete justice in the case, emphasizing the importance of fairness, justice, and equity.

The State Government's persistent failure to fulfill its commitment constitutes manifest injustice to the appellants, and the Court intervened to ensure that the landowners receive the compensation and allotment promised to them.

Facts:

Saraswati Kumari, daughter of the appellant, went missing after attending a festival.

Her dead body was found the next day with signs of strangulation and sexual assault.

The appellant sought custody of the body for cremation and later addressed letters to authorities seeking compensation and action against the alleged perpetrators.

Statements of witnesses were recorded by the police, but no action was initially taken.

A private complaint was filed by the appellant before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, leading to investigations being conducted.

The High Court quashed the summoning order issued by the Magistrate based on doubts regarding the recorded statements of witnesses.

Issues:

• Whether the statements of witnesses disclosed a prima facie case leading to offenses under the Indian Penal Code.

• Whether the High Court's decision to quash the summoning order was justified.

Held:

The Court held that the delayed recording of statements had reasons, which could only be fully evaluated after evidence was recorded. It was found that the statements did disclose a prima facie case leading to offenses under the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the High Court's decision to quash the summoning order was set aside, and the accused were directed to appear before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate.

The observations made by the Supreme Court should not be construed as expressing an opinion on the merits of the controversy. The appeal was allowed accordingly.

Facts:

Mediciti Institute of Medical Sciences (MIMS), seeking to increase its MBBS student intake from 100 to 150 for the academic year 2015-16, faced deficiencies noted by the Medical Council of India (MCI) during inspections in December 2014 and May 2015.

The MCI's Executive Committee recommended against renewing permission for increased student intake based on these deficiencies.

MIMS challenged this decision in the Delhi High Court, which directed the MCI to conduct another inspection to verify if the deficiencies had been rectified.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had the authority to direct the MCI to conduct a re-inspection of MIMS despite deficiencies noted in previous inspections.

Whether MIMS should be permitted to increase student intake based on the existing deficiencies.

Held and Decision:

It was not appropriate for the High Court to direct another inspection by the MCI as the norms set by the MCI had not been fulfilled by MIMS.

Diluting the minimum standards in medical education could produce inadequately trained doctors, which would be detrimental to society.

The laws governing permission for medical colleges, including increasing student intake, were regulated by the Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999, and the High Court's direction did not align with the prescribed schedule of dates.

Therefore, the High Court's direction for a re-inspection was set aside, and the appeals filed by the MCI were allowed.

Facts:

The Poona Employees Union filed an application before the Industrial Court seeking registration as a recognized union, replacing the existing recognized union, BKS Union, in the undertaking.

The Industrial Court initially granted recognized union status to the appellant union, considering factors like membership and compliance with relevant sections of the Act.

However, the High Court overturned this decision, ruling that the appellant union was not eligible for recognized union status.

Issues:

Whether the appellant union met the eligibility criteria for recognized union status under the Act.

Whether the decision of the High Court was justified in overturning the Industrial Court's decision.

Held:

The exercise of examining an application for recognized union status is not a mere formality but requires a thorough assessment of eligibility and bona fides.

The report of the Investigating Officer revealed discrepancies regarding the appellant union, including failure to deposit membership fees and incomplete submission of required information.

Affidavits submitted by the appellant union did not overwhelmingly support its claim of majority membership.

The adjudication on issues like deduction of bonus amount by the company did not conclusively support the appellant union's case.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, stating that its analysis of the evidence and application of the law was logical and rational.

The Court emphasized the limited scope of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, stating that it would only intervene in cases of manifest illegality or serious miscarriage of justice.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision regarding the recognized union status of the appellant union.