Facts:

Complaint filed regarding theft of jewels from a religious institution.

FIR registered against unknown persons.

Petitions filed for transfer of investigation to the CBCID.

Previous rejections of similar petitions not disclosed.

Appellant alleges suppression of relevant facts in obtaining the impugned order.

Issues:

Whether the impugned order was obtained by suppression of relevant facts.

Whether the case was still pending before the police authorities at the time of the order.

Held:

In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are constrained to and hereby set aside the impugned order as it has been passed on account of suppression of material facts and under a wrong impression that Crime No. 147 of 2009 was still pending before the police authorities at the investigation stage. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed.

Facts:

The case concerns the retrospective addition of an explanation to Section 26(4) of the Karnataka Agricultural Income Tax Act. This explanation deems a dissolved firm to be in existence as an Assessee for certain assessment purposes.

Issues:

Whether the retrospective addition of the explanation to Section 26(4) of the Karnataka Agricultural Income Tax Act is constitutionally valid?

Whether the retrospective withdrawal of relief granted by statute to an Assessee can be justified in this case?

Held:

The Court examined the constitutionality of the retrospective amendment and the withdrawal of statutory relief, considering various legal principles and precedents.

The retrospective addition of the explanation to Section 26(4) is constitutionally valid. The legislature has the authority to enact laws retrospectively, and in this case, it expressly made the impugned provision retrospective (para. 3).

The withdrawal of relief granted by statute to an Assessee cannot be justified unless there are strong and exceptional circumstances. However, in this case, there is no withdrawal of any vested statutory right. The retrospective amendment merely continues the legal fiction of a dissolved firm for assessment purposes (para. 4).

Decision: The Court upheld the validity of the retrospective amendment to Section 26(4) of the Karnataka Agricultural Income Tax Act. It ruled that the retrospective provision does not deprive the Assessee of any vested statutory rights and is constitutionally valid.

Facts:

The case pertains to an appeal by M/S. Queen's Educational Society against the Commissioner of Income Tax regarding the exemption status of the educational institution under Section 10(23c)(iiiad) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the educational institution existed solely for educational purposes.

Whether the institution operated for profit.

Whether the aggregate annual receipts of the institution exceeded the prescribed limit.

Held:

The court emphasized that for an educational institution to qualify for exemption under Section 10(23c)(iiiad), it must fulfill three requirements as specified in the provision. These include: a. Existing solely for educational purposes. b. Not operating for profit. c. The aggregate annual receipts not exceeding the prescribed limit.

It was clarified that if an educational institution primarily engages in the activity of education with the primary intention of educating individuals, the mere existence of a surplus does not automatically disqualify it from being considered solely for educational purposes.

The court stressed the application of the "predominant object test," asserting that the primary purpose of education should not be overshadowed by profit-making motives.

A distinction was drawn between generating a surplus and operating "for profit," with the court highlighting that the mere existence of a surplus resulting from educational activities does not negate the institution's status as one existing solely for educational purposes.

It was reiterated that the ultimate criterion is to ascertain whether the institution's primary objective in the relevant assessment year is profit-making or educational.

Decision: The court disposed of the appeals by providing the aforementioned clarifications on the interpretation of Section 10(23c)(iiiad) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Facts:

The case revolves around the murder of 'V', with seven individuals, including the appellant, standing trial. Key witness PW64 initially participated in the conspiracy to kill 'V' but later withdrew from it. The appellant sought to summon PW64 as an additional accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C., which was dismissed by the trial court. The High Court upheld the dismissal but suggested separate prosecution for PW64 under Section 120B IPC. The appellant appealed this decision.

Issues:

Whether PW64 could be summoned as an additional accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

Interpretation of the connection between different conspiracies in the case.

Application of the rule against self-incrimination under Section 132 of the Evidence Act.

Consideration of granting pardon to PW64 under Section 307 Cr.P.C.

Held:

The evidence and statement u/s. 164 Cr.P.C. of PW64 indicate his involvement in the conspiracy to kill 'V' initially, justifying the trial for an offense punishable under Section 120B IPC.

The High Court's conclusion that the conspiracies involving PW64 were not part of the same transaction as other accused was erroneous. Joint trial of PW64 with other accused is permissible.

The statutory immunity against self-incrimination, as embodied in Section 132 of the Evidence Act, protects PW64 from prosecution based on compelled testimony.

The trial court is directed to grant pardon to PW64 under Section 307 Cr.P.C. and record his evidence afresh.

Decision: The Court upheld the dismissal of summoning PW64 as an additional accused but directed the trial court to grant him pardon and record his evidence anew under Section 307 Cr.P.C.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the constitutional validity of regulations established by the University Grants Commission (UGC) regarding the recruitment and appointment of lecturers in universities, colleges, and affiliated institutions. Specifically, the regulations require passing the National Eligibility Test (NET) or State Level Eligibility Test (SLET) as the minimum eligibility condition.

Issues:

The main issues before the court are the validity of the UGC regulations in light of earlier exemptions granted to PhD/MPhil holders from the eligibility test, and whether the regulations should be applied retrospectively or prospectively.

Held:

The court held that until a candidate is actually appointed to the position of lecturer/assistant professor, they only have a right to be considered for the post, subject to prevailing minimum eligibility conditions.

The court rejected the argument that the UGC was obliged to prescribe the NET qualification without providing any exemption, stating that the language of the government directive allowed for exemptions.

Emphasizing the objective of maintaining excellence in higher education, the court upheld the validity of the regulations requiring the NET/SLET as a minimum eligibility condition.

The court ruled that any legitimate expectation of exemption from the eligibility test must yield to the larger public interest of selecting the most meritorious candidates for teaching positions.

The court clarified that the regulations would be prospective, applying only to appointments made after the regulations came into effect.

Decision: Dismissing the appeals and disposing of the contempt petition, the court upheld the constitutional validity of the UGC regulations, clarifying their prospective application.

Facts:

Taramani Parakh, the appellant, alleged harassment and cruelty by her husband and his parents for dowry.

An FIR was registered, and a charge sheet was filed against the husband and his parents.

The respondents sought to quash the proceedings, claiming the allegations were false.

The High Court quashed the proceedings, finding the allegations vague and an abuse of the court's process.

Taramani Parakh appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the allegations made by Taramani Parakh warranted quashing of the criminal proceedings.

Whether there were triable issues in the case justifying the continuation of the proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court reiterated the principles regarding the quashing of criminal proceedings, emphasizing the need for sparing exercise of this power and refraining from delving into the veracity of allegations at the quashing stage.

Decision: The Supreme Court analyzed the allegations and found them sufficient to establish a case of harassment and cruelty. It ruled that the question of whether Taramani Parakh was actually harassed and treated with cruelty would be determined during the trial. Therefore, the court held that quashing of proceedings before the trial was not permissible.

Facts:

The case involved a complaint before a magistrate alleging forgery and seeking investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. However, the magistrate directed the police to provide a report under Section 202(1) instead. The High Court upheld this decision, declining to interfere.

Issues:

The proper interpretation and application of Sections 156(3) and 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Held:

The court emphasized that the parameters for exercising power under Sections 156(3) and 202(1) are different.

Section 156(3) allows for a direct investigation when there is credible information or when it is deemed appropriate in the interest of justice. On the other hand, Section 202(1) deals with cases where the available material is not clear for further proceedings.

The magistrate should exercise discretion based on the nature of the case, considering factors like matrimonial disputes, commercial offenses, medical negligence cases, corruption cases, or significant delays in reporting.

During investigation under Section 202, the police do not have the authority to arrest. Their role is limited to providing a report to the magistrate to determine whether further proceedings are warranted.

The court clarified that Section 202(3) does not grant the police the power of arrest. It empowers certain individuals to exercise other powers of a police station in charge, but not the power of arrest.

In the case at hand, the magistrate rightly opted for a report under Section 202 instead of a direct investigation under Section 156(3) due to the primarily civil nature of the allegations and insufficient material to proceed against the accused.

Decision: The court upheld the decision of the magistrate and the High Court, finding that the report under Section 202 was the appropriate course of action in the given circumstances.

Facts:

The appellant, Tukaram Dnyaneshwar Patil, was attacked by the respondents, accused 1 to 3, resulting in the death of Dnyaneshwar Patil.

The High Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the respondents and altered their conviction and sentence.

Issues:

Whether the alteration of sentence by the High Court was appropriate considering the gravity of the offense.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the respondents under Section 304 Part-II IPC.

The Court found the sentence awarded by the High Court to be inadequate.

The Supreme Court set aside the sentence of imprisonment for the period already undergone and instead sentenced each of the respondents to undergo five years of rigorous imprisonment.

The Court emphasized the importance of imposing appropriate and proportionate sentences to uphold justice and deterrence.

Facts:

The case involved a fatal accident under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, where the deceased was a 45-year-old self-employed individual. The lower courts had computed compensation without including future prospects. The appeal sought enhancement of compensation, arguing for the inclusion of future prospects.

Issues:

Whether future prospects should be considered in compensation calculations for self-employed individuals.

Whether the matter should be referred to a larger bench for a final decision on the inclusion of future prospects in compensation calculations.

Held:

Justice R. Banumathi, in her judgment, held that while the Motor Vehicles Act empowers courts to determine just and reasonable compensation, it must not be arbitrary. She computed compensation based on the deceased's income tax returns, deducting taxes and personal expenses, and awarded enhanced compensation of Rs. 19,32,310/-.

Justice V. Gopala Gowda, in his partially dissenting opinion, emphasized the need to consider future prospects for self-employed individuals in compensation calculations, citing previous cases. He recommended referring the matter to a larger bench for a final decision.

Decision:The disagreement between the two justices led to the decision to refer the issue of future prospects to a larger bench for a final decision. Pending the decision from the larger bench, enhanced compensation, along with interest, was ordered to be paid within four weeks. (Para 28)