Facts:

The appellants commenced construction of a multiplex in accordance with the New Package Scheme of Incentives for Tourism Projects, 1995-2000, and applied for Temporary Registration Certification (TRC).

The progress of the appellants' project was impeded by a major earthquake in the State on January 26, 2001, and large-scale communal riots in February 2002.

The State Level Committee initially granted an extension to the appellants but rejected their subsequent request for further extension.

The High Court held that the operative period of the scheme ended on November 30, 2000, and denied the appellants' entitlement to benefits under the scheme.

Issues:

Whether the appellants are entitled to benefits and incentives under the New Package Scheme of Incentives for Tourism Projects, 1995-2000, despite the curtailment of the scheme's period.

Whether the principle of promissory estoppel applies to bind the State Government to the promises made in the scheme.

Held:

The Scheme promised incentives, including tax holidays, and provided for extensions subject to satisfactory progress, forming the core of the Scheme.

The State Government is estopped from going back on the promise made in the Scheme, and the curtailment of the scheme's period by subsequent government resolutions is ineffective.

The Scheme's core components had acquired statutory status, and subsequent government resolutions could not detract from its effect.

The appellants' project progress was significantly hindered by external factors like the earthquake and communal riots, justifying their request for extension.

The High Court's order that the operative period of the scheme ended on November 30, 2000, is set aside, and the State Level Committee is directed to reassess the appellants' eligibility for extension under the Scheme.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the appellants are entitled to have their eligibility for incentives and benefits under the New Package Scheme of Incentives for Tourism Projects, 1995-2000, reassessed by the State Level Committee.

Facts:

On 3.2.2006, a police team received secret information about Ganja being stored in the house of the accused. A raid was conducted, during which the male accused managed to escape while the female accused, Asha Devi, was apprehended. Ganja was recovered from her possession, and she was charged under the NDPS Act. The trial court acquitted the accused due to various reasons, including doubts about the possession of the seal used to seal the contraband.

Issues:

Whether the lower courts erred in their assessment regarding the absence of independent witnesses and the accused's flight.

Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the movement and integrity of the seized samples, despite doubts raised about the possession of the seal.

Held:

The High Court and Trial Court both relied on three main points to decide the matter against the State-(i) no independent witness; (ii) doubts about the accused fleeing the scene; and (iii) discrepancies regarding the possession of the seal used to seal the contraband. The Supreme Court found errors in the lower courts' reasoning concerning these points. It disagreed with their assessment regarding the absence of independent witnesses and the accused's flight. There was sufficient evidence to support that the accused fled upon seeing the police party.

Regarding the possession of the seal, while there were doubts about its movement from one person to another, the prosecution sufficiently proved the movement and integrity of the seized samples. The samples were properly handled throughout, and there was no evidence of tampering.

Citing the case of Allauddin Mian and Others Vs. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of following procedural requirements, particularly in sentencing. The accused were convicted under Section 20 of the NDPS Act and sentenced to five years of simple imprisonment. The court considered mitigating factors, including the accused's conduct after the incident.

Facts:

Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Limited (IPCL) and Indian Oil Corporation were involved in the manufacture of various petrochemical products.

IPCL claimed partial exemption from excise duty under Notification No. 6/2000 for its product C4 Raffinate, while Indian Oil Corporation was manufacturing propylene.

The dispute arose over the interpretation of the notification regarding the classification and taxation of these products.

Issues:

• The interpretation of the phrase "Liquefied Petroleum Gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons other than natural gas, ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene" in Notification No. 6/2000.

• The secondary issue pertained to whether the interpretation should be based on the plain meaning of the words in the notification or on the intention of the legislature.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the phrase "other than" in the notification only qualifies "natural gas," not the entire list of hydrocarbons mentioned. Therefore, the exemption includes LPG and all other hydrocarbons except natural gas, ethylene, propylene, butylene, and butadiene. Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that the interpretation should be based on the intention of the legislature rather than the plain meaning of the words in the notification.

Decision: The appeals by the Department were dismissed, affirming IPCL's entitlement to partial exemption from excise duty under the notification.

Facts:

The respondent, Manjeet Singh, joined the Army service on April 6, 1999, after being adjudged fully fit. However, soon after joining, he fell ill and was diagnosed with "Generalised Tonic Clonic Seizure" and "Neurotic Depression." He was hospitalized multiple times during his short tenure, which lasted until January 1, 2002, when he was invalided from service. Despite actively serving for about a year, he spent most of his tenure under medical treatment.

Issues:

Whether Manjeet Singh was wrongfully denied disability pension despite developing disabilities during his Army service.

Held:

The Court held that there is a statutory presumption, as per Regulation 173, that any disease or disability contracted by a member of the Army service during their tenure is presumed to have been acquired during their service, unless there are compelling reasons recorded by the Medical Board to the contrary.

It emphasized that the burden to disprove the correlation of the disability with Army service lies with the authorities, and any decision to deny disability pension must be supported by cogent reasons.

The Court noted that the Medical Board's conclusion that Manjeet Singh's disabilities were constitutional or genetic in nature and not related to Army service lacked adequate reasoning and justification. It highlighted the importance of thorough assessment and documentation by the Medical Board.

Emphasizing the necessity for stringent adherence to statutory provisions and the presumption in favor of the member of the Army service, the Court held that the denial of disability pension to Manjeet Singh was unjustified and repugnant to relevant statutory provisions.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals and ruled in favor of Manjeet Singh, holding that he was wrongly denied the benefit of disability pension.

Facts:

The incident involved the accused luring a minor girl into his house and attempting to rape her.

The victim's cries alerted a passerby, leading to the accused fleeing the scene.

Legal proceedings ensued, resulting in the trial court's acquittal of the accused and the subsequent appeal by the State of Rajasthan.

Issues:

Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish attempted rape beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the accused should be granted the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Held:

The Court found discrepancies and shortcomings in the prosecution's case, including a delay in filing the FIR, lack of medical examination of the victim, and absence of crucial witnesses.

Despite the victim's consistent testimony, the Court concluded that it was insufficient to establish attempted rape beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused's actions, fleeing when confronted, did not conclusively prove his intent to commit rape.

The Court referred to legal precedents highlighting the requirement of penetration for the offense of rape or attempted rape.

Considering the gravity of the offense and the vulnerability of the victim, the Court disagreed with the trial court's decision to grant the accused probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Consequently, the Court upheld the conviction under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code for outraging the modesty of a woman and sentenced the accused to rigorous imprisonment for two years.

Facts:

The case revolves around the promotion process initiated in 1999 for constables and head constables to be promoted to the rank of sub-inspectors in Uttar Pradesh.

There were disputes concerning the number of candidates to be called for interviews and the procedures followed during the interview process.

Various government orders were issued, including those dated 23.01.1999, 03.02.1999, and 27.02.1999, which altered the promotion process.

Issues:

The conflict between Regulation 445 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, 1976, and the Government Order dated 27.02.1999 regarding the number of candidates to be called for interviews.

Other issues involved the fairness of the interview process, the use of consolidated marks, and the failure of candidates to challenge the process immediately after participating.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Regulation 445 could not prevail over the Government Order dated 27.02.1999 in determining the number of candidates to be called for interviews.

Candidates who participated in the interview process without raising objections could not challenge the process at a later stage.

The sealed cover procedure and the use of consolidated marks in interviews were found to be acceptable, and there was no evidence of prejudice or miscarriage of justice.

The Court dismissed the appeals and the writ petition, as there was no evidence of oblique motives or miscarriage of justice warranting interference.

Facts:

The Tamil Nadu Housing Board initiated land acquisition proceedings for the Ambattur Neighborhood Housing Scheme.

Various legal challenges were raised, including objections to compensation and procedural irregularities.

A.S. Naidu challenged the acquisition, leading to court decisions partially quashing the declaration under Section 6 but leaving the notification under Section 4 intact.

Subsequent legal battles arose, including challenges from land purchasers after the completion of acquisition and utilization of acquired land by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

Issues:

Interpretation of court orders regarding land acquisition proceedings.

Rights of parties involved in land acquisition disputes, including landowners and purchasers.

Application of legal principles in determining the validity of land acquisition proceedings and subsequent transactions.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that unless the declaration under Section 6 or the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is explicitly quashed entirely by the court, the relief granted by the court would only apply to the parties involved in the specific case.

Parties who did not challenge acquisition proceedings timely could not later benefit from favorable court orders obtained by others.

Purchasers of land after acquisition completion could not acquire rights against the state, except for seeking enhanced compensation.

The court allowed the Tamil Nadu Housing Board's appeal, dismissing the respondents' writ petitions as devoid of merit and setting aside the High Court judgments.

Facts:

The appeals seek to challenge the decision of the Guwahati High Court in a batch of Writ Appeals filed by the Respondents, aggrieved by the dismissal of their respective writ petitions questioning the refusal of the Appellants to sanction financial assistance under the 'Scheme of Promotion of Industries in North East' (SPINE) due to delay and laches.

Issues:

Whether the Respondents were entitled to the benefit of adjudication in earlier litigation despite delay and inaction on their part.

Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies in this case.

Held:

The Respondents' deliberate delay and inaction disentitled them to the benefit of adjudication in the earlier lis. The Court found it iniquitous and repugnant to entertain their belated claim based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

The Court held that the withdrawal and closure of SPINE with effect from 23-02-2007 were established through official notifications and media coverage, and the Respondents were aware of these developments.

The Court emphasized that delay must be explained by cogent and persuasive reasons to justify its condonation. As the Respondents failed to provide such reasons, their claims were rightly rejected.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel was held inapplicable in this case, considering the deliberate delay and the overriding public interest against enforcing such promises.

Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and allowed the appeals.

Facts:

The victim, a female worker, was raped and murdered while commuting in a cab hired by her company during a night shift. The accused driver, along with another individual, perpetrated the crime. The conviction rested on circumstantial evidence, and the court sentenced the accused to death.

Issues:

The severity of the crime, the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, adherence to the rule of proportionality in sentencing, and the applicability of the "rarest of the rare" doctrine.

Held:

The court upheld the death sentence for the accused individuals, considering the extreme depravity of the crime, the lack of remorse shown by the accused, and the need for deterrence in cases of violent crimes against women.

The court emphasized the importance of proportionality in sentencing and stated that punishment should be commensurate with the culpability of the criminal act.

The absence of mitigating circumstances, such as age, family background, or lack of criminal antecedents, did not warrant a reduction in the sentence due to the heinous nature of the offense.

The crime fell within the category of "rarest of the rare" cases, as it shocked the collective conscience of the court and community, justifying the imposition of the death penalty.

Decision: Dismissing the appeal, the court affirmed the death penalty for the accused individuals, noting the gravity of the offense and the necessity of ensuring justice for the victim and society. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.