Facts:

Jayaswal Neco Ltd. (Appellant) was engaged in manufacturing pig iron and availed MODVAT credit on various capital goods and parts under Rule 57Q.

The Commissioner proposed to deny MODVAT credit on items including railway track material, arguing they did not qualify as "capital goods."

Despite explaining the integral role of railway tracks in the manufacturing process, the Commissioner and CEGAT denied the credit.

Issues:

Whether railway track material used for handling raw materials and processed goods qualifies as "capital goods" under Rule 57Q.

Whether the decision of the Commissioner and CEGAT to deny MODVAT credit was justified.

Held:

The Court analyzed the definition of "capital goods" under Rule 57Q and referred to a previous judgment establishing that goods integral to the manufacturing process, even if not directly involved in production, could qualify as capital goods. The Court found that the railway tracks were indeed integral to the manufacturing process of pig iron, facilitating the transportation of hot metal and raw materials within the plant.

Therefore, they qualified as capital goods under Rule 57Q. The Commissioner's reasoning for denial, based on incidental use for other purposes, was deemed erroneous. Since CEGAT failed to address the issue properly, the Court set aside their decision and ruled in favor of the Appellant, allowing MODVAT credit for the railway track material.

Facts:

Grasim Industries purchased Electro Static Precipitators (ESPs) at a concessional rate of duty meant for pollution control purposes.

A dispute arose regarding whether Grasim was entitled to this concessional rate, leading to the payment of extra duty.

Grasim sought a refund of the additional duty paid, which the revenue department refused, citing the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

Issues:

Whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment applies in the case of refunding duty paid on capital goods used captively.

Whether Grasim Industries can prove that the cost of capital goods was not included in the costing of the machinery.

Held:

The court held that the doctrine of unjust enrichment applies even when goods are used for captive consumption, including capital goods used in manufacturing. The burden lies on the assessee to prove that the cost of capital goods was not included in the costing of the final product. The tribunal's decision was set aside, and Grasim Industries was granted an opportunity to demonstrate to the assessing authority that the cost of the capital goods was not included in the costing of the machinery. Only upon proving this aspect would Grasim be entitled to the refund.

Facts:

Amarkant Rai was appointed temporarily as a Night Guard on daily wages in 1983 by the Principal of Ramashray Baleshwar College.

Attempts were made for the regularization of his service, but it was terminated in 2001. Legal proceedings followed, culminating in an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether Rai's appointment was irregular or illegal under the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976?

Whether Rai's long-term service warranted regularization despite the irregularity of his appointment?

What precedent rulings apply to Rai's case?

Held:

The appointment of Amarkant Rai as a Night Guard was deemed irregular, not illegal, considering the circumstances and the long duration of his service.

The court referenced the precedent set in Umadevi's case, which allows for the regularization of irregular appointments under certain conditions.

Rai's service was ordered to be regularized retrospectively from 2002, with monetary benefits awarded from 2010.

The court emphasized the importance of continuity of service for pensionary benefits.

The appeal was allowed, directing the authorities to regularize Rai's service and provide monetary benefits accordingly.

Facts:

Maruti Suzuki India Limited (formerly Maruti Udyog Limited) received a show cause notice alleging that they cleared spare parts after EDC processing without paying duty on the increased value due to EDC.

Maruti Suzuki contended that EDC didn't constitute "manufacture" as it didn't create a new marketable commodity, arguing that the spare parts remained the same despite EDC.

The case involved interpretation of Rule 57F(1) of the Central Excise Rules during different periods and relevant case laws distinguishing between "manufacture" and "processing".

Issues:

Whether the process of EDC on spare parts constitutes "manufacture" under the Central Excise Rules, thus attracting duty on the value addition.

Held:

The court analyzed Rule 57F(1) of the Central Excise Rules during different periods and relevant case laws, emphasizing the distinction between "manufacture" and "processing" established in Union of India vs. Delhi Cloth and General Mills.

It reiterated that mere processing doesn't amount to manufacture unless it results in a new product with distinct name, character, or use, as established in Siddartha Tubes Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise and Union of India vs. J.G. Glass Industries Ltd.

The court examined Rule 57F(3) and (3A) regarding the removal of partially processed inputs and subsequent duty implications but concluded that these rules didn't apply to the case at hand.

Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of Maruti Suzuki, holding that EDC didn't amount to manufacture, and the spare parts retained their original identity despite value addition. Therefore, Maruti Suzuki wasn't liable to pay duty on the value addition due to EDC. The penalty imposed by the Commissioner was also set aside.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over a mining lease between M/s. Muneer Enterprises and Mis Ramgad Minerals and Mining Ltd. & Ors. The original lessee, M/s. Dalmia, surrendered a significant portion of the leased area and expressed its intention to determine the lease for the remaining area. The surrender process involved notifying the Director of Mines and Geology, surrendering the lease book, and making necessary payments (Para 68).

Issues:

The validity of the surrender of the mining lease by M/s. Dalmia, compliance with legal requirements under relevant Acts and Rules, and the legitimacy of the subsequent transfer of the lease to the first respondent.

Held:

The surrender of the mining lease by M/s. Dalmia effectively terminated its leasehold rights. The court found that the surrender process, including notification to the Director of Mines and Geology, surrender of the lease book, and payment of arrears, complied with legal requirements.

Compliance with statutory provisions, particularly the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act and Mineral Concession Rules, is paramount in the grant, operation, and termination of mining leases. Violations of mandatory requirements render the lease void.

The transfer of the mining lease to the first respondent lacked bona fides, as there was a clear lack of compliance with legal requirements and a prior surrender of the lease by M/s. Dalmia.

Managing mines and minerals as national wealth in the public interest is crucial. Any actions by state authorities deviating from legal provisions governing the disposal of mining rights are condemnable.

Decision: The court ordered a survey and demarcation of the leased land, ensuring physical possession by the appropriate authorities. Refunds were directed for payments made in compliance with invalidated approvals.

Facts:

The case involves an application under Section 41D of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, filed by Charu Kishor Mehta, one of the trustees of a public trust. The application sought the dismissal of other trustees (respondent Nos. 2 to 9), including a deceased trustee, from their trusteeship, alleging nonfeasance and malfeasance. The Joint Charity Commissioner dismissed the application, which was affirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the delegation of powers and functions by the respondent-trustees to the managing trustee was permissible under the Trust Deed of the Trust?

Whether the provisions of Sections 46 and 47 of the Trusts Act, 1882, regarding the renunciation of office by trustees and delegation of duties, are applicable to public charitable trusts?

Whether the respondent trustees are complicit in the alleged transactions, warranting their dismissal or punishment under Section 41D of the Act?

Held:

The Court examined clauses 9 and 11(h) of the Trust Deed of the Trust, which provided for the delegation of powers and functions by the trustees to other trustees. By a resolution dated August 30, 2001, the trustees, including the appellant, had delegated their powers and functions to the deceased managing trustee. The Court found that such delegation was permissible under the Trust Deed, as it provided ample scope for such actions.

The Court held that the provisions of Sections 46 and 47 of the Trusts Act, 1882, regarding renunciation of office and delegation of duties, are not applicable to public charitable trusts.

The Joint Charity Commissioner rightly concluded that the respondent trustees were not complicit in the alleged transactions. While they were negligent in delegating their powers and functions to the managing trustee, they were not directly responsible for the alleged actions. Therefore, their dismissal or punishment under Section 41D of the Act was unwarranted.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decisions of the lower courts as reasonable and fair based on the evidence presented.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over penalties imposed on Development Officers by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). The Central Government had referred the matter for adjudication to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur.

Issues:

Whether Development Officers in LIC could be classified as 'workmen' under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined various precedents and held that Development Officers in LIC cannot be considered as 'workmen' under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court declared that the decision in R. Suresh was rendered per incuriam, meaning it was made in ignorance of relevant legal principles or precedents. The Court emphasized that a decision is only authoritative for what it explicitly decides, not what might logically follow from it. Therefore, any inference drawn from R. Suresh suggesting Development Officers as workmen would be incorrect.

The Court concluded that the Development Officers in LIC are not 'workmen' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, affirming the decision of the High Court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants, Home Guards (Grah Rakshak), claimed regularization of their services, citing their extended tenure ranging from 10 to 30 years.

Issues:

Whether the services of the appellants, who are Home Guards, should be regularized?

Whether the appellants are entitled to regular appointments?

Held:

The appellants, despite serving as Home Guards for a significant duration, have not been appointed on a regular basis. They have been enrolled as volunteers without any provision for regular salary/wages. The duties they perform are on an as-needed basis, and they receive duty allowance and other allowances, not regular wages.

The enrollment of Home Guards was not illegal, and there's no concept of wages for them. They are paid duty allowance and other entitlements, and their duties are intermittent, not continuous throughout the year.

Consequently, the appellants are not entitled to regularization of service or regular appointments. However, considering their crucial role during emergencies and their empowerment with police powers during duty, the state governments are directed to ensure fair compensation by paying them duty allowance at rates equivalent to the minimum pay of police personnel for 30 days a month.

Decision: The judgments passed by the High Courts of Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, and Delhi are upheld, and no relief is granted to the appellants regarding regularization of services or grant of regular appointments.

Facts:

The case revolves around a property dispute between the deceased, Michaelraj, and the accused, who were residents of the same village.

On 10th December 1997, the accused attacked Michaelraj with deadly weapons while he was returning from his father-in-law's house, resulting in his severe injuries.

Michaelraj later succumbed to his injuries, and the case was registered Under Sections 147, 148, 341, 324, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, which was later altered to Section 302 after his demise.

The Trial Court convicted the accused based on the testimony of the sole eyewitness, PW-3, leading to their appeal before the Madras High Court, which partially allowed the appeal, convicting them under Section 304 Part II of IPC.

Dissatisfied with the High Court's judgment, the sole appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Reliability of the evidence provided by the eyewitness, PW-3.

Absence of medical evidence regarding the nature of treatment given to the deceased.

Validity of the conviction based on differences between ocular and medical evidence.

Held:

The court addressed the contention regarding the reliability of the eyewitness testimony and dismissed the notion of enmity between PW-3 and the accused, citing the case of Dalip Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab. The court found no evidence supporting PW-3's animosity towards the accused.

Referred to the case of Bipin Kumar Mondal Vs. State of West Bengal, emphasizing that conviction based on the testimony of a single reliable witness is permissible. The court concluded that there was no reason to doubt PW-3's reliability in the present case.

The court addressed the issue of medical evidence, stating that even if there were disparities between ocular and medical evidence, the presence of the accused at the scene with the common intention to attack the deceased was evident. Thus, such differences did not invalidate the prosecution's case.

Based on the above discussion, the court held that the facts and circumstances of the case did not warrant interference, and the appeals lacked merit. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.