Facts:

Vinod Kumar Subbiah (Appellant) filed a divorce petition against Saraswathi Palaniappan (Respondent) under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, alleging various instances of cruelty.

The Trial Court granted divorce to the Appellant based on evidence of cruelty by the Respondent.

The High Court set aside the Trial Court's decision, considering the allegations as ordinary wear and tear of married life.

Issues:

Whether the instances of cruelty alleged by the Appellant warrant divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the divorce petition on grounds of ordinary wear and tear of married life.

Held:

We have carefully considered the matter, and find that we are unable to uphold the conclusions of the High Court. The Appellant had duly pleaded instances of mental cruelty which he proved in evidence and documents. An examination of the divorce petition makes it abundantly clear that various allegations of cruelty were made out and a number of incidents were mentioned therein...After a cursory discussion of the evidence which the Trial Court had discussed threadbare, the High Court was not justified to set aside the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court without giving substantiated reasons.

We thus allow these Appeals and set aside the Impugned Order, but desist from imposing costs. The Trial Court's decision granting dissolution of the marriage between the parties is hereby restored.

Facts:

Nanda Gopalan was the appellant, convicted under Sections 324 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for attacking Sukumaran (PW1) with a bat made of coconut leaf stem.

The trial court convicted the appellant based on the prosecution's case, which was affirmed by the High Court with a reduced sentence.

During the appeal in the High Court, the parties reached a settlement, and an application for compounding the offense under Section 324 and quashing the charge under Section 326 was filed, but it was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether a compromise between parties could lead to a reduction in sentence despite the non-compoundable nature of the offense under Section 326?

Whether the charges could be altered to Sections 323 and 325, which are compoundable offenses, based on the nature of the weapon used?

Held:

The Court acknowledged the potential for a compromise to influence a reduction in sentence but found no grounds to interfere with the conviction.

The Court emphasized the need to evaluate the nature of the weapon used and its potential to cause harm on a case-by-case basis.

Despite arguments for altering the charges, the Court upheld the original conviction.

The Court reduced the appellant's sentence to the period already served but increased the compensation to be paid to the victim.

The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The dispute arose regarding the entitlement of a contractor to additional payments due to an upward revision in royalty for minor minerals pursuant to subsequent legislation. The arbitration tribunal had to interpret the relevant clauses of the contract to determine the contractor's entitlement.

Issues:

The interpretation of the contract terms concerning cost escalation and compensation for additional costs resulting from subsequent legislation.

The court also had to determine the scope of judicial review over the arbitral award.

Held:

The court reiterated that the interpretation of contract terms primarily falls within the arbitrator's domain. The arbitrator is entitled to construe the contract based on the material before them and their understanding of the provisions. The court should not interfere with the arbitrator's findings unless the interpretation is so unreasonable that no fair-minded person could arrive at it.

The Arbitral Tribunal's award considered the distinct categories of cost escalation and additional costs resulting from subsequent legislation. It concluded that the latter fell under a separate category from the former, based on a reasonable interpretation of the contract terms. The tribunal's decision was upheld as it was a possible view supported by the evidence and contract interpretation.

Facts:

Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. initiated proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 11th Court, Calcutta. The appellant contested the jurisdiction of the magistrate to entertain the case.

Issues:

Whether the Metropolitan Magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings initiated by Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Held:

The Court analyzed the judgment in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod Vs. State of Maharashtra, which provided clarification on the jurisdictional issue in cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The Court observed that proceedings initiated prior to the judgment in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case would be preserved at the place they were filed if the recording of evidence had commenced post-summoning and appearance of the accused, in accordance with Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Upon examining the facts of the case, the Court found that evidence had commenced in the matter, meeting the criteria set forth in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the Metropolitan Magistrate, 11th Court, Calcutta, was deemed to have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Facts:

Nirlon Ltd. is the manufacturer of Tyre Cord Yarn (TCY) and Tyre Cord Fabric (TCB).

TCY and TCB are manufactured at Nirlon's Goregaon factory and are either sold at the factory gate or removed for captive consumption to its Tarapur factory.

Dispute arose regarding the valuation of TCY removed for captive consumption to be used at Tarapur factory.

Nirlon had been declaring the wholesale price of TCY under Section 4(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, but authorities disputed this declaration.

Two show cause notices were issued demanding differential duty and penalties on Nirlon.

Nirlon appealed the Commissioner's orders, which were upheld by CESTAT.

Issues:

Whether there was any mala fide intention on the part of Nirlon in filing the declaration under Rule 6(b)(i) to evade excise duty.

Whether the extended period of limitation invoked by the Revenue was justified.

Held:

The Court held that there was no mala fide intention on the part of Nirlon in filing the declaration under Rule 6(b)(i) to evade excise duty, as the goods were believed to be comparable due to identical raw materials and processes. The Court also observed that the exercise was revenue-neutral, and thus, there was no purposeful evasion of duty. Consequently, the demand beyond the limitation period prescribed under Section 11A(1) of the Act was set aside, and the penalty was waived.

Facts:

The appellant, Raj Singh, claimed self-defense after an altercation where shots were fired, resulting in the death of the victim. However, the injuries sustained by the appellant were not serious, and the complainant party was unarmed. The incident occurred in the complainant's house, not the appellant's.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had a legitimate claim to self-defense.

Whether the actions of the appellant constituted culpable homicide or fell within the exceptions under the Indian Penal Code.

Whether the acquittal of other accused individuals was justified.

Held:

The court clarified the parameters of the right to private defense, emphasizing that it applies only in situations where there is reasonable apprehension of death or grievous harm. This right does not necessitate fleeing for safety but is contingent upon the presence of real or apparent danger (Para 17).

The appellant's claim of self-defense was rejected as the injuries sustained were not serious, and the complainant party was unarmed. The court concluded that the appellant's actions were disproportionate to the threat posed by the complainant party, indicating aggression on the appellant's part (Para 20-22).

Exception 2 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code provides leeway in cases of culpable homicide if the offender acts in good faith to defend themselves or their property, without premeditation or intention to cause more harm than necessary. However, the appellant could not claim the benefit of this exception as they were deemed the aggressors, and the incident occurred in the complainant's house.

Decision: The appellant's conviction under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment were upheld. The acquittal of other accused individuals was deemed justified as the lower courts' findings were reasonable and not warranting interference (Para 23).

Facts:

K.R.C.D. (I) Pvt. Ltd. (the Appellant) manufactured duplicate CDs from master tapes/CDs provided by a distributor holding copyright.

The distributor sold the duplicate CDs in the market.

The dispute arose when the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise demanded duty on royalty charges incurred by the distributor/copyright holder.

Issues:

• Whether royalty charges incurred by the distributor should be included in the assessable value of the duplicate CDs for the purpose of excise duty.

Held:

The court analyzed Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules and held that while the music/picture component embedded in the master tape could be considered in the value of the CDs, the royalty payable for such content should not be included in the assessable value.

The court distinguished cases where intellectual property directly contributed to the value of the goods, which was not the case here.

Since the Appellant sold the CDs only to the distributor who was the copyright holder, any royalty paid was not used in connection with the sale of the CDs and should not be included in their value.

The court set aside the judgment of the Tribunal and allowed any refund of additional duty collected pursuant to the earlier decision.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the Customs Act, 1962, in the context of exclusion of time and the applicability of limitation periods in legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies.

Applicability of the limitation period under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962, pre and post-amendment.

Conditions for condonation of delay.

Interpretation of relevant provisions of the Limitation Act and the distinction between "court" and "tribunal".

Application of principles of advancing justice even where specific statutory provisions may not apply.

Effect of abortive proceedings on limitation periods.

Held:

The Court held that while Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to suits, appeals, and applications filed before courts, the principles underlying Section 14, which advance the cause of justice, may still apply to exclude time in quasi-judicial proceedings.

Regarding the limitation period under Section 128 of the Customs Act, the Court determined that periods of limitation are procedural and would ordinarily be applied retrospectively. In this case, the pre-amended limitation period under Section 128 was deemed applicable.

The Court concluded that the appellant's assertion of pursuing a remedy before another appellate forum, which ought to be excluded, was sufficient for condonation of delay under Section 14. The conditions for condonation of delay were met by the appellant.

It was clarified that the Limitation Act applies only to proceedings filed in courts, not quasi-judicial bodies, and emphasized the distinction between "court" and "tribunal".

The Court emphasized that even if specific statutory provisions may not apply, the principles of advancing justice underlying those provisions would still be relevant.

The judgment discussed the effect of abortive proceedings on limitation periods and held that time from the cause of action until the institution of appellate or revisional proceedings from original proceedings, which prove abortive, should be excluded.

Facts:

The respondent, M/S Roofit Industries Ltd., was accused of evading central excise duty by not properly computing the assessable value of finished goods.

The dispute arose over the deduction of freight, insurance, and unloading charges from the price of excisable goods, claiming that the place of removal of finished goods was different from the factory gate.

Issues:

• Whether the deduction of freight, insurance, and unloading charges from the price of excisable goods is permissible for valuation for excise duty purposes.

• Determining the time and place of sale for excisable goods.

Held:

The duty of excise is charged based on the value of goods, deemed to be the normal price at which such goods are ordinarily sold by the assessee to a buyer in the course of wholesale trade at the time and place of removal.

The place of removal is crucial for valuation, and if goods are cleared at the factory gate, excise duty is charged based on the valuation at the factory gate, excluding post-removal expenses such as freight and insurance charges.

The ownership of goods transfers either at the factory gate or at the buyer's premises upon delivery, depending on the terms of the sale agreement and the Sale of Goods Act. In this case, it was determined that the sale of goods did not take place at the factory gate but at the buyer's premises upon delivery.

The Central Excise and Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) did not consider all relevant aspects and merely relied on precedent. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside CESTAT's decision and restored the order passed by the adjudicating authority, upholding the demand for excise duty based on the valuation at the buyer's premises upon delivery.