Facts:

The case involves the tariff determination for power procurement in Gujarat from Solar Energy Projects. The first tariff order (January 29, 2010) considered accelerated depreciation under Section 32 of the Income Tax Act. A second tariff order (January 27, 2012) determined separate tariffs for projects not availing accelerated depreciation. GUVNL entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with EMCO Limited for electricity sale and purchase. EMCO failed to commence power generation within the control period stipulated in the first tariff order.

Issues:

Whether EMCO is entitled to the tariff as per the second tariff order, given its failure to commence power generation within the control period specified in the first tariff order.

Held:

The court established that an undertaking engaged in power generation has the option to claim depreciation under Section 32(1)(i) of the Income Tax Act. This option can be exercised as indicated in the second proviso to Rule 5(1) of Income Tax Rules, 1962.( Para 15)

The court asserted that the second respondent (power producer) proposed a tariff, assuming all projects would claim accelerated depreciation. The tariff under the first tariff order is applicable to all projects, regardless of eligibility for accelerated depreciation.( Para 18 and 16)

The Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) does not provide an option for the power producer to opt out of its terms. It contemplates the producer not commissioning the project within the control period and specifies the applicable tariff in such an event. The PPA does not entitle the power producer to the tariff determined by the second tariff order.( Para 26)

The right of the power producer not to avail accelerated depreciation stems from the Income Tax Act. The first tariff order provides an option to the power producer not to sell power at the specified price but seek a separate tariff if they choose not to avail accelerated depreciation.( Para 26)

The Income Tax Act allows power producers the option to avail accelerated depreciation. However, the PPA does not reference this benefit. The availability of this option does not relieve the power producer of contractual obligations under the PPA.( Para (28 and 29))

EMCO, as the power producer, knowingly entered into the PPA, which stipulated that tariffs were determined by the Commission under the first tariff order. The overlooked stipulation in the PPA acknowledged the possibility of not commencing generation within the control period, with provisions for subsequent tariffs.( Para 30 and 31)

Facts:

Late Hazi Azimuddin executed a gift deed on 24th February 1976, granting a one-third share of property to the plaintiff, Rafiuddin.

The plaintiff filed a suit for rent recovery from the defendants, who were brothers of the plaintiff.

The trial court and the high court held the gift to be invalid under Muslim Law, emphasizing the lack of possession delivery and the applicability of hiba-bil-musha.

Issues:

Validity of the gift deed under Muslim Law, especially in the context of hiba-bil-musha.

Requirement of possession for a gift of an undivided share.

Whether exceptions to hiba-bil-musha, such as freehold property in a large commercial town, applied.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment, decreeing the suit in favor of the plaintiff. The key points in the decision are as follows:

The gift deed was held to be genuine and validly executed.

Possession was deemed to be delivered as the right to collect rent was assigned to the plaintiff under the gift deed itself.

The court emphasized exceptions to hiba-bil-musha, highlighting that the property was freehold in a large commercial town (Jaipur), justifying the validity of the gift.

The lower courts were criticized for misapplying the law and erroneously holding the gift to be invalid.

The decision clarified that there was no absolute bar to a gift of an undivided share, especially when exceptions applied.

Facts:

The respondent, a car dealer, was accused of incorrectly recording the sale of cars from its Mahe Branch, registering them under the Motor Vehicles Act at Mahe, and remitting taxes under the Pondicherry Sales Tax Act. The allegation suggested an attempt to benefit from lower tax rates in Pondicherry and evade taxes under the KGST Act in Kerala. A penalty of Rs. 86 lakhs was imposed by the Department, but the High Court set it aside.

Issues:

whether the respondent had engaged in tax evasion by registering sales in Mahe, Pondicherry, instead of Kozhikode, Kerala.

Held:

Co-Terminus Nature of Sale and Registration: The court emphasized the close link in time between the sale of a motor vehicle and its registration. Although registration is a post-sale event, the sale practically coincides with the registration. The Motor Vehicles Act prohibits the dealer from permitting the purchaser to use the vehicle until valid registration is obtained, making possession transferable just before or at the registering authority's office.

Article 286(2) and Section 4(2) of Central Sales Tax Act: Article 286(2) empowers Parliament to formulate principles for determining the place of sale. Section 4(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act addresses the place of sale, stating that in the case of unascertained or future goods, the sale is deemed to occur where the goods are at the time of their appropriation.

Sale of Goods Act - Ascertained Goods: The court rejected the argument that motor vehicles remain unascertained goods until their engine or chassis numbers are entered in the registration certificate. It emphasized that possession can only be handed over at the registration office, making the sale co-terminus with registration. The motor vehicles were considered ascertained goods at the Mahe registration office.

Sale of Goods Act - Conditions for Transfer of Property: Referring to Section 18 of the Sale of Goods Act, the court highlighted that the conditions for transfer of property in the case of motor vehicles include handing over possession at or near the office of the registering authority. This ensures that the vehicle is in a deliverable state, allowing the property to pass to the buyer.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the respondent was not guilty of tax evasion. The High Court's decision to set aside the penalty was deemed correct.

Referred Cases:

Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax Vs. Sehgal Autoriders Pvt. Ltd., (2011) SCC OnLine Bom 872

Association of Registration Plates Vs. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 364

Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, (1970) 1 SCC 622

Facts:

The case involved an appeal by Dharam Pal against the High Court's decision denying the transfer of investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The appellant argued negligence in the investigation, failure to examine crucial witnesses, and sought CBI intervention.

Issues:

The fairness of the investigation, the request for CBI involvement, and the High Court's refusal to transfer the case based on the commencement of the trial.

Held:

The Court emphasized the singular and collective nature of the cry for a fair trial, sometimes motivated by vengeance and, in this case, by the distressing disappointment faced by the victim. The Court highlighted the need for collective justice.( Paragraph 2)

The judgment cited the constitutional principles of justice, the duty to uphold human rights, and the power of the courts to intervene for fair investigation. The need for instilling confidence in the investigation process was underlined.( Paragraph 3)

Reference to the conclusions of the Constitution Bench in the State of West Bengal case, emphasizing the protection of fundamental rights, the role of the judiciary, and the power to order CBI investigations in exceptional cases.( Paragraph 10

The Court rejected the argument that the commencement of trial and examination of witnesses was an absolute impediment to exercising the power of transferring investigation. The focus was on ensuring a fair and just investigation.( Paragraph 12)

The appeal was allowed, and the Court directed the CBI to conduct the investigation. The trial judge was instructed not to proceed until the CBI report is filed, underscoring the importance of a fair trial.( Paragraph 20)

Referred Cases:

Bhagwant Singh Vs. Commr. Of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537

K.V. Rajendran Vs. Superintendent of Police, CBCID South Zone, Chennai, (2013) 12 SCC 480

Narmada Bai Vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 5 SCC 79

Rama Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 6 SCC 346

State of West Bengal Vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal, (2010) 3 SCC 571

Vinay Tyagi Vs. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762

Facts:

The Appellant, Kothari Industrial Corporation Ltd., proposed to set up a caustic soda manufacturing unit in Tamil Nadu.

The State promised a concessional tariff for the first five years after the commencement of production in a Government Letter dated 29.6.1976.

The Tamil Nadu Revision of Tariff Rates on Supply of Electrical Energy Act, 1978, came into force on 23.2.1979, and the tariff rates were subsequently amended by G.O. No. 861 dated 30.4.1982.

Issues:

Whether the principles of promissory estoppel can be invoked in favor of the Appellants to entitle them to the benefit of the concessional tariff.

Validity of the withdrawal of concessional tariff by the State.

Held:

The principle of promissory estoppel would not apply in this case. The court relied on the precedent (Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh) and held that there can be no estoppel against the statute. The withdrawal of the concessional tariff, being a concession granted by the State, was defeasible and could be taken away.

The Appellants' argument that their industries had not made profits and, therefore, should not be subjected to the withdrawal, was rejected. The court held that the assessment of profit/loss was made for the industry as a whole, and it was not an arbitrary basis for the withdrawal of concessional tariffs.

All the appeals were dismissed as the principles of promissory estoppel did not apply, and the withdrawal of concessional tariffs was held to be valid.

Referred Cases:

Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCC 193

State of Rajasthan Vs. J.K. Udaipur Udyog Ltd., (2004) 7 SCC 673

Facts:

The case involved the application of the SARFAESI Act and SICA to the recovery of debts by secured creditors from a sick industrial company, MIS Madras Petrochem Ltd.

Issues:

The precedence of the SARFAESI Act over SICA, the applicability of SICA to secured and unsecured creditors, and the circumstances under which a reference under SICA may abate.

Held:

SARFAESI Act Prevalence: The SARFAESI Act prevails over the SICA, particularly in situations where conflicting provisions arise. It was established that the SARFAESI Act takes precedence to the extent of inconsistency with SICA.

Role of Secured Creditors: Secured creditors, representing a significant percentage (60% or more) of the outstanding amount, have the authority to enforce their security under the SARFAESI Act, overriding the provisions of SICA.

Applicability of SICA to Unsecured Creditors: SICA continues to apply to unsecured creditors seeking debt recovery from a sick industrial company, as SICA overrides the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.

Abatement of Reference: A reference under SICA may abate if secured creditors, constituting at least 75% of the outstanding amount, decide to enforce their security under the SARFAESI Act.

Decision: The court, in dismissing the appeals, held that the SARFAESI Act prevails over SICA in cases of secured creditors seeking debt recovery from sick industrial companies. The decision clarified the circumstances under which each statute applies, emphasizing the rights of secured creditors under the SARFAESI Act.

Referred Cases:

BPL Ltd. Vs. R. Sudhakar, (2004) 7 SCC 219

Gujarat Steel Tube Co. Ltd. Vs. Virchandbhai B. Shah, (1999) 8 SCC P.11

Jay Engineering Works Ltd. Vs. Industry Facilitation Council, (2006) 8 SCC 677

Kailash Nath Agarwal Vs. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corpn. of U.P. Ltd., (2003) 4 SCC 305

Kihoto Hollohan Vs. Zachillhu, (1992) Sup 2 SCC 651

KSL & Industries Ltd. Vs. Arihant Threads Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 166

LIC Vs. Vijay Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315

M/s. Salem Textiles Limited Vs. The Authorized Officer, AIR 2013 Madras 229

Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. Vs. State Industrial And Investment, (1993) 2 SCC 144

Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Etc. Vs. Union of India UOIEtc. Etc., (2004) 4 SCC 311

Morgan Securities and Credit Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Modi Rubber Ltd., (2006) 12 SCC 642

NFEF Ltd. Vs. Chandra Developers P Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 219

Noble Aqua Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India, AIR 2008 Orissa 103

Raheja Universal Limited Vs. NRC Limited, (2012) 4 SCC 148

Ravi S. Naik Vs. Union of India, (1994) Sup 2 SCC 641

Real Value Appliances Ltd. Vs. Canara Bank, (1998) 5 SCC 554

Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Assn., (1992) 3 SCC 1

Solidaire India Ltd. Vs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 71

Tata Motors Ltd. Vs. Pharmaceutical Products of India Ltd., (2008) 7 SCC 619

Union of India Vs. R, Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1

Facts:

The Railway Board issued Commercial Circular No. 37 on 09.08.2010, emphasizing the renewal of licenses for existing licensees under the Catering Policy, 2010. Circular dated 23.08.2011 further directed the renewal of licenses for GMUs and SMUs at certain category stations every 3 years, subject to satisfactory performance and payment of dues. Licenses of the respondent Association members were renewed till July 2013.

Issues:

The denial of renewal of licenses to pre-existing licensees under the 2010 Policy and its potential impact on the constitutional rights to freedom of occupation and livelihood.

Held:

The provisions of the 2010 Policy are applicable to pre-existing licensees, and denial of renewal would amount to deprivation of constitutional rights. Article 14 mandates that state action must not be arbitrary and discriminatory.( Para 20)

As a welfare state, India has a duty to generate employment, and the right to livelihood is integral to the right to life. The court, as the countermajoritarian institution, is duty-bound to protect the rights of vulnerable minorities and weaker sections of society.( Para 21, 22, and 23)

The policy of not renewing licenses for those dependent on self-earning is deemed unfair, unreasonable, and arbitrary. The court emphasizes the duty of the state in tackling rising unemployment and criticizes the handover of public functions to private entrepreneurs exploiting government policies against the poor.( Para 24)

Considering the evolving concept of social justice, the court allows the members of the respondent Association, who are licensees, to continue their petty business, given the lack of employment potential in the country.( Para 26)

The Catering Policy, 2010, applies to the respondents. The Railway's action in not granting renewals is deemed arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, and discriminatory, and cannot be sustained in law.( Para 27)

Eligibility for renewal clarified - only those licensees declaring on affidavit that they do not have licenses for more than one shop or kiosk are eligible, with a periodic reasonable increase of the license fee.( Para 28)

Referred Cases:

Decided on : 29-01-2016

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14, Article 19(1), Article 21, Article 37, Article 38, Article 39, Article 41

Renewal of License — Appeals arise out of the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, whereby the Division Bench of the High Court upheld the order of the learned single Judge, wherein it was held that the Respondents are entitled to get their licenses renewed under the Catering Policy, 2010. — Appellants under the guise of the policy are permitted to deny renewal of licenses in favour of the licensees, it would amount to deprivation of their right to freedom of occupation guaranteed Under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as well as the right to livelihood, which action of the Appellants would be diametrically opposed to their constitutional duty towards social justice as well as uplifting the weaker sections of the society and the unemployed youth of the country. — Keeping in view the evolving concept of social justice, we allow the members of Respondents who are the licensees to continue their petty business, especially in the absence of employment potentiality in the country on account of non-governance and non-implementation of the constitutional philosophy of an egalitarian society, which provides the opportunity to all individuals to lead a life of dignity. — Court hold that the provisions of the Catering Policy, 2010 are applicable to the concerned Respondents. The action of the railways in not granting renewals of the licenses to the members of the Respondents is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair and discriminatory, and the same cannot be allowed to sustain in law.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

N.K. Kaul, ASG, Shilpa Nair, R.M. Bajaj, S.N. Bhat and Shreekant N. Terdal, Advocates, for the Appellant; P.K. Goswami, Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Advocates, V.K. Shukla, Anchal Mehrotra, Rajeev Sharma, Advocates for Intervenor, Venkateswara Rao Anumolu, Goli Rama Krishna, Shashwat Goel, Arunabh Chaudhary, Parthiv K. Goswami, Kaustav Talukdar, Yashraj Singh Bundela, Diksha Rai, Ranjeeta Rohtagi, Mythili Vijay Kumar T. and Vikram Aditya Narayan, Advocates, for the Respondent

Cases Referred

Bank of India Vs. K. Mohandas, (2009) 5 SCC 313

Charu Khurana Vs. Union of India, (2015) 1 SCC 192

Consumer Education & Research Center Vs. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 42

Francis Coralie Mullin Vs. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608

Jivan Das Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1994) Sup 3 SCC 694

Lala Ram Vs. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 813

LIC Vs. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315

Munn Vs. Illinois, (1877) 94 U.S. 113

Olga Tellis Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545

People's Union for Democratic Rights Vs. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235

R.D. Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority, (1979) 3 SCC 489

Ram & Shyam Company Vs. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267

Sadhuram Bansal Vs. Pulin Sarkar, (1984) 3 SCC 410

The North Eastern Railway Company Vs. L. Hastings 1900 AC 260

Final Result : Dismissed

Facts:

The case involves the detention of an individual under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. The High Court held that the decision of the competent authority was not communicated to the detenu, leading to a violation of the detenu's rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

Issues:

The central issues in the case include the adequacy of communication of the detention order to the detenu and the alleged violation of the detenu's rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

The High Court, based on these issues, granted a writ of habeas corpus.

Held:

The Supreme Court rejected the High Court's decision, stating that treating the communication of rejection of representation as a constitutional safeguard is incorrect. The Court emphasized the need to assess whether the representation submitted by the detenu was rejected in a mechanical manner without the application of mind.

The Court determined that the competent authority passed the order based on the material before it, demonstrating subjective satisfaction. The High Court's order granting habeas corpus was deemed incorrect and set aside.

The Court directed the detaining authority to re-examine the matter within two months, considering certain principles. The detenu's initial detention for one year and subsequent release were considered, and it was decided that the appropriate course would be for the detaining authority to reassess the matter.

The appeal is allowed.

Referred Cases:

A. Sowkath Ali Vs. Union of India, (2000) 7 SCC 148

A.C. Razia Vs. Government of Kerala, AIR 2004 SC 2504

Ahamed Nassar Vs. State of T.N., (1999) 8 SCC 473

Ashadevi Vs. K. Shivraj, Addl. Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Gujarat, (1979) 1 SCC 222

Ashok Narain Vs. Union of India, (1982) 2 SCC 437

Babu Vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 1 KLT 230

Bhut Nath Mete Vs. State of West Bengal, (1974) 1 SCC 645

Chandrakant Baddi Vs. ADM & Police Commr., (2008) 17 SCC 290

Commissioner of Police Vs. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16

Devji Vallabhbhai Tandel Vs. The Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR 1982 SC 1029

Emperor Vs. Shibnath Bannerji, AIR 1943 FC 75 : 45 CriLJ 341

Gurdev Singh Vs. Union of India, (2002) 1 SCC 545

Haradhan Saha Vs. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 198

John Martin Vs. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 836

K.M. Abdulla Kunhi Vs. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 476

Khudiram Das Vs. The State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 81

Lekha Nandakumar Vs. Government of India, (2004) 2 KLT 1094

Machindar Vs. King, AIR 1950 FC 129

Pratap Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72

Raj Kishore Prasad Vs. State of Bihar, (1982) 3 SCC 10

Saliyal Beevi Vs. State of Kerala, (2011) 4 KHC 422

Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal Vs. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 309

Simms Motor Units Ltd. Vs. Minister of Labour and National Service, (1946) 2 All ER 201

State of Gujarat Vs. Adam Kasam Bhaya, (1981) 4 SCC 216

State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Alagar, (2006) 7 SCC 540

State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Kethiyan Perumal, (2004) 8 SCC 780

Sunil Fulchand Shah Vs. Union of India, (2000) 3 SCC 409

Ujagar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1952) SCR 756

Union of India Vs. Arvind Shergill, (2000) 7 SCC 601

Vijay Kumar Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1982) 2 SCC 43

Facts:

An agreement dated 22.04.1993 was executed between Bharat Aluminium Company (Appellant) and Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (Respondent) regarding equipment supply and production facility up-gradation.

Disputes arose, leading to arbitration proceedings in England, resulting in two awards in favor of the Respondent on 10.11.2002 and 12.11.2002.

The Appellant filed Section 34 applications before the District Judge, Bilaspur, which were dismissed, leading to appeals before the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the applications under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act were maintainable against foreign awards?

Whether Indian law applies to the arbitration agreement despite the express choice of English Arbitration Law?

Held:

The Constitution Bench resolved conflicting views on the applicability of Part I of the Arbitration Act, clarifying its applicability to arbitrations within the territory of India.

The proper law of the contract was Indian law, and Article 22 of the Arbitration Agreement clearly indicated the application of English Law to arbitration.

The intention of the parties to apply English Law to the arbitration agreement was evident from the terms of Article 22.

The High Court's view that Section 34 applications were not maintainable against the foreign awards was upheld.

Appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.

Referred Cases:

Aircraft Employees' Housing Cooperative Society Limited Vs. Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayat Raj, Government of Karnataka, Bangalore, (1996) 11 SCC 475

Bharat Aluminium Company Vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552

Bhatia International Vs. Bulk Trading S.A., (2002) 4 SCC 105

Cargill International S.A. Vs. Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Corporation, (1998) 1 W.L.R. 461

Fabianich Vs. Hart, D.C. Mun App., 31A.2d 881, 883

Palm Shipping Vs. Kuwait Petroleum, (1988) 1 Lloyds Rep 500 at 502

Reliance Industries Limited Vs. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 603

Sumitomo Heavy Industries Limited Vs. ONGC Limited, (1998) 1 SCC 305

Union of India Vs. Reliance Industries Limited, (2015) 10 SCALE 149