Facts:

The case involved the seizure of gold biscuits concealed in meal trolleys at IGI Airport, New Delhi.

Two passengers, Varyam Singh and Ranbir Singh, were involved in smuggling, and the respondent, Pramod Kumar Dhamija, was implicated in the investment of money in seized gold.

Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution were initiated simultaneously.

The Commissioner of Customs initially imposed a penalty on the respondent, but the Appellate Authority set it aside.

The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings based on the respondent's exoneration in adjudication proceedings.

Issues:

Whether exoneration in adjudication proceedings implies complete innocence in criminal prosecution.

The validity of quashing criminal proceedings based on adjudication proceedings.

Held and Decision:

The exoneration of the respondent in adjudication proceedings was not on merits or indicative of complete innocence in criminal prosecution (Para. 8).

The statement of Kanwar Bhan, the brother of the respondent, suggested the respondent's presence in Delhi in April 1996, contradicting the claim of not visiting India after September 1994. The finding in the appellate order regarding two Pramod Kumars was incorrect (Para. 8).

The High Court's decision to quash criminal proceedings was not justified, and the case was directed to proceed in accordance with the law (Para. 9).

Referred Cases:

Collector of Customs Vs. L.R. Melwani, (1969) 2 SCR 438

K.G. Premshankar Vs. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87

Radheshyam Kejriwal Vs. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581

Facts:

The case involves the Chikotra project and the acquisition of lands from zones benefitted by the project.

Dispute arose regarding the requirement of notice when there is a change in the slab or area to be acquired after the publication of the first notification.

Original notification had Slab III, and a subsequent notification changed it to Slab I, impacting the extent of land available for acquisition.

Issues:

Whether there should be a notice to affected persons when there is a change in the slab or area to be acquired after the first notification.

The interpretation of Sections 13 and 14 of the Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1986.

Held:

The High Court was not correct in holding that notice is not required for a change in the slab.

Notice and hearing are essential when there is a change in the slab, as it affects the extent of lands in the benefitted zone.

Procedure under Section 13(2) of the Act is required to be followed in case of a change in the slab reducing the exempted area.

Appellants were permitted to submit objections or suggestions on the change of slab within one month.

The Collector was directed to inquire into objections, forward a report to the State Government within two months, and the State Government to pass orders within two months.

Depending on government orders, the Collector should revise awards already passed, if necessary.

The appeals are allowed.

FACTS:

Original holder alienated Thalavari Inamthi land on 13.05.1971 to an alienee.

The land was re-granted to the original holder on 31.03.1982.

The Tehsildar initiated eviction proceedings against the alienee.

Plaintiff, successor-in-interest of the alienee, claimed ownership in a suit.

ISSUES:

Validity of alienation between 01.02.1963 and 07.08.1978.

Applicability of the doctrine of "feeding the grant by estoppel."

Competency of the Tehsildar to initiate eviction proceedings.

HELD:

Upon re-grant, the title of the predecessors of the Respondents would relate back. Alienation between 01.02.1963 and 07.08.1978, by principles of "feeding the grant by estoppel," enures to the benefit of the alienee. The Tehsildar was not competent to initiate eviction proceedings under Section 7 of the Act against the alienee. The High Court erred in setting aside the concurrent view.( Para 15)

The appeals are allowed. The judgment and orders of the High Court are set aside, and the Trial Court's judgment in OS No. 19 of 2004 is restored.( Para 16)

REFERRED CASES:

Lakshmana Gowda Vs. State of Karnataka, (1981) 1 Karnataka Law Journal 1

Syed Bhasheer Ahamed Vs. State of Karnataka, (1994) 1 KLJ 385

Facts:

Dattaraj, the respondent-accused No. 1, married Savita.

Monetary demands were made, including Rs. 21,000 at the time of marriage and Rs. 20,000 for agricultural land.

Alleged harassment and demands continued, including gifts during ceremonies and a sewing machine.

Savita died of burn injuries on 1.9.2006, leading to the filing of a complaint against the accused.

The trial court convicted all accused, and the High Court acquitted three, upholding Dattaraj's conviction.

Issues:

Whether the demands made constituted dowry under relevant legal provisions.

Whether there was sufficient evidence of cruelty and harassment leading to Savita's death.

Held:

The court, after examining the evidence, held:

The demand of Rs. 20,000 for agricultural land was too remote from the occurrence to satisfy the "soon before her death" requirement under Section 304B(1) of the IPC.

The sewing machine was a gift to Savita and not part of a dowry demand.

The evidence did not establish harassment or violence against Respondent-accused Nos. 2 to 4.

The High Court's acquittal of Respondent-accused Nos. 2 to 4 was justified, and the appeal was dismissed.

Referred Cases:

Appasaheb Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721

Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207

Rajinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477

Tummala Venkateswar Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 240

Facts:

The Armed Forces Tribunal considered a case involving the restructuring of officers' cadre in the Army based on recommendations by the AVS Committee. The issue revolved around the allocation of additional vacancies in the rank of Colonel and the distribution among different branches of the Army.

Issues:

Whether the restructuring policy discriminated against officers serving in the Arms Support and Service Corps of the Army.

Validity of the distribution of additional vacancies on a pro-rata basis.

Scope of judicial review concerning the command tenure for officers in Arms and Arms Support.

Held:

Committee's Recommendations and Allocation of Vacancies: The AVS Committee recommended the lowering of the age profile and the creation of additional vacancies for Arms and Arms Support Operational Units. The distribution of the first tranche of vacancies on a pro-rata basis did not violate the recommendations, and there was no illegality or unfairness.

Allocation on "Command Exit Model" Basis: The Committee's recommendation of allocating vacancies on a "Command Exit Model" basis was accepted by the Government. The allocation of the first tranche on a pro-rata basis did not negate the Command Exit Model. However, the allocation of the second tranche on a standalone basis was deemed the right method.

Command Tenure and Judicial Review: The command tenure is a policy matter with limited scope for judicial review. The decision to prescribe a four-year tenure for Arms Support Officers was not arbitrary. The Government's flexibility to consider a three-year tenure for command was accepted.

Creation of Additional Posts: The tribunal directed the creation of 141 additional posts of Colonel to be allocated to the 'Combat Support' stream over a five-year period from 2009 to 2014.

Service Streams and Promotion Cadres: Officers in service streams do not constitute a single cadre with those serving in Arms and Arms Support. Allocation of vacancies should be based on distinct cadres.

Legitimate Expectation: The argument of legitimate expectation was rejected as there was no factual basis for officers to expect simultaneous promotions with Combat Arms or Combat Arms Support. Regulations provided for retrospective promotions to restore seniority.

Policy Not Unreasonable: The policy of lowering the age profile was deemed reasonable, and the argument based on legitimate expectation could not unsettle the laudable policy.

Final Result : Partly Allowed

Referred Cases:

Attorney General for New South Wales, (1990) 64 Aus LJR 327

Chakradhar Paswan Vs. State of Bihar, (1988) 2 SCC 214

Confederation of Ex- servicemen Association Vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 399

Dr. Chanchal Goyal Mrs. Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 3 SCC 485

Food Corporation of India Vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71

K. S. Srinivasan Vs. Union of India UOI, AIR 1958 SC 419

M. Hara Bhupal Vs. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 561

Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1

Punjab Communications Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1999) 4 SCC 727

Ram Pravesh Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 381

S.I. Rooplal Vs. Lt. Governor through Chief Secretary, Delhi, (2000) 1 SCC 644

Sethi Auto Service Station Vs. Delhi Development Authority, (2009) 1 SCC 180

State of Bihar Vs. Kalyanpur Cements Ltd., (2010) 3 SCC 274

State of U.P. Vs. Bharat Singh, (2011) 4 SCC 120

Union of India Vs. Hindustan Development Corporation, (1993) 3 SCC 499

Facts:

Nineteen members, including the petitioners, faced suspension from the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly for allegedly obstructing proceedings.

A Privileges Committee, relying on a video recording, found a breach of privilege and recommended action against the petitioners.

Issues:

Challenge to the second Assembly Resolution, which suspended the petitioners for ten days and withheld salaries and benefits.

Alleged violation of fundamental rights, particularly those guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).

Held:

The court underscored the distinction between the freedom of speech available to citizens and the specific constitutional right of freedom of speech granted to members of legislative bodies (Para 18).

Emphasized that the right to participate in legislative proceedings is not a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) (Para 25).

Cited that the suspension, while limiting the constitutional right of free speech, did not violate fundamental rights as it was subject to other constitutional provisions, rules, and standing orders (Para 19, 20).

Highlighted that the economic benefits incidental to the office of a legislator do not constitute pursuing an 'occupation' under Article 19(1)(g) (Para 25, 26).

Rejected the argument that the deprivation of salaries and benefits during suspension amounted to a violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 (Para 29).

Acknowledged the limited scope of judicial review in matters relating to actions against members by legislative bodies, with non-compliance with principles of natural justice being a valid ground (Para 30).

Found a significant flaw in the process as the Privileges Committee relied on a video recording but failed to provide a copy to the petitioners, resulting in a denial of a reasonable opportunity to meet the case (Para 42, 43).

Consequently, set aside the second Assembly Resolution, restoring salaries and benefits to the six petitioners (Para 43).

Referred Cases:

Air India Statutory Corpn. Vs. United Labour Union, (1997) 9 SCC 377

Gujarat State Financial Corporation Vs. Lotus Hotel, (1983) 3 SCC 379

In re under Article 143 of Constitution of India, AIR 1965 SC 745

Jagjit Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1

P.V. Narasimha Rao Vs. State CBI/SPE, (1998) 4 SCC 626

Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184

Sodan Singh Vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1989) 4 SCC 155

T.M.A. Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481

Facts:

An FIR was lodged on 22.11.2005, alleging a murder incident.

Twelve accused were charged with offenses under various sections of the Indian Penal Code.

Trial Court convicted the accused based on eyewitness testimonies, conspiracy evidence, and weapon recovery.

High Court acquitted all accused, citing absence of proof of wrongness and certainty of guilt.

Issues:

Discrepancies in eyewitness testimonies.

Doubts about the recovery of weapons and articles.

Lack of substantial evidence to prove the alleged conspiracy.

Held:

Eyewitness testimonies presented discrepancies, and material alterations were found in their statements. Witness silence and unnatural conduct cast doubt on their credibility. The number of assailants was doubtful from the beginning.( Para 7)

Recovery of weapons and articles, pivotal to the prosecution, was disbelieved by the High Court. Lacuna in the investigation hit the root of the prosecution case. Attesting witnesses turned hostile, and the Forensic Science Laboratory Report could not aid the prosecution.( Para 8)

Alleged conspiracy lacked cogent and positive evidence. Proof of conspiracy required reasonable grounds, which were not established. Witnesses' conduct and cross-examination raised doubts about the veracity of conspiracy claims.( Para 9)

Other serious lacunae in the prosecution case were pointed out, including the reliance on the recovery of a mobile phone and the failure to link it to any accused. The recovery of weapons lacked proper evidence.( Para 10)

No compelling reasons found to interfere with the High Court's judgment. Appeals dismissed, upholding the acquittal.( Para 11,12,13)

Referred Cases:

Facts:

The State Government rejected applications under Section 5 of the 1969 Act, asserting that both the Act and the 1970 Scheme were applicable to the factories in question. Writ petitions were subsequently filed against this decision.

Issues:

The primary issues involved the ultra vires nature of the 1970 Scheme concerning the 1969 Act and the applicability of both to the specific factories in question.

Held:

The court held that Clause 5 of the Schedule to the 1969 Act is a residuary clause covering employment in factories related to loading, unloading, etc., by workers not covered by other entries. The provisions of the 1970 Scheme dealing with the manufacture of petro-chemicals in factories fall within the coverage of the residuary entry, and no part of the 1970 Scheme is ultra vires the 1969 Act.

The court analyzed Clause 2(1)(1) of the 1970 Scheme, determining it to be intra vires Section 1(4A) of the 1969 Act. The expression "products including fertilizers" in the 1970 Scheme was deemed wider than "chemical products including fertilizers," making the 1970 Scheme consistent with the 1969 Act.

The court recognized "petrochemical products" as a species of "chemical products," citing the appellant's admission to manufacturing polystyrene. References were made to official reports and inquiry officer findings supporting the conclusion that petrochemicals are a subset of chemical products.

Sections 3 and 4 of the 1969 Act were interpreted to allow for a composite scheme covering various employments contained in more than one entry of the Schedule to the 1969 Act. The nomenclature of the 1970 Scheme as a grocery market or shop scheme was deemed inconsequential.

The court emphasized the broad definition of "establishment" in the 1969 Act, covering places where the manufacture of petrochemicals is carried out, including transportation within the factory precincts.

Taking cues from the Objects and Reasons of the Act as social legislation, the court upheld the High Court's decision. The 1970 Scheme's objective of providing work and amenities to registered workers was highlighted.

The court rejected the plea that the appellant's purchasers, not the appellant company itself, were the principal employer. Even if the Central Parliamentary Act impliedly repealed the 1969 State Act, Section 30(1) of the 1970 Act was cited to support continued entitlement to more favorable benefits for contract labor.

The High Court's decision was affirmed, and the writ petition filed by the appellant company was dismissed.

The court rejected the argument to find the meaning of the expression "grocery" based on the date of the Act's extension in 1983, emphasizing that in 2005, the term included soft drinks and bottled water.

Referred Cases:

Decided on : 12-02-2016

Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 - Section 24, Section 24(1)

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226, Article 254

Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 - Section 1(4A), Section 13, Section 14, Section 2(11), Section 2(12), Section 2(3), Section 2(4), Section 2(7), Section 3, Section 3(1), Section 4, Section 4(1), Section 5, Section 6

Applicability of Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and Other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 and Grocery Markets or Shops Unprotected Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 1970 — It was incumbent upon the writ Petitioner not only to take up the plea of repugnancy and implied repeal but also to state as a fact that what the workmen would be entitled to under the 1969 State Act would not be as beneficial as what they would be entitled to under the 1970 Central enactment. This would then give the Respondent Board, in turn, an opportunity of either admitting or denying this factual averment. There being no pleading to this effect in the writ petition before the High Court, it is clear that it is not possible for us to accede to Shri Cama's request to go into the argument on repugnancy and implied repeal. — Court thus find that the High Court was absolutely correct in not interfering with the State Government order and in dismissing the writ petition filed by the Appellant company. For the same reasons given in Civil Appeal, Court therefore reject this appeal as well. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

J.P. Cama, V. Giri, Sr. Advocates, Kirti Chandra, Amit Dhingra, Amandeep Bawa, Divyam Agarwal, Kunal Mimani, Dheeraj Nair, Advocates for Dua Associates, for the Appellant; R. Basant, Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Advocates, Sushil Karanjkar, K.N. Rai, Jayashree Wad, Ashish Wad, Jayant B. Shaligram, Paromita Majumdar, Jaya Khanna, Advocates for J.S. Wad & Co., Jitendra Kumar, Sunil M. Chinchwadkar, Nitin S. Tambwekar, B.S. Sai, K. Rajeev, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Advocates, for the Respondent

Cases Referred

Bhuwalka Steel Industries Limited Vs. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board, (2010) 2 SCC 273

The Senior Electric Inspector Vs. Laxmi Narayan Chopra, (1962) 3 S.C.R. 146

Final Result : Dismissed

Facts:

Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (Appellant) awarded a transportation contract to Prathyusha Resources and Infra Private Limited (Respondent).

The contract, initially set to expire on 31.03.1993, extended several times and completed on 23.10.1997.

Dispute emerged over the rate of escalation based on the base year of 1992 or 1994.

Issues:

Determination of the base year for escalation.

Disagreement on calculations and rejection of a part of the final bill by the Appellant.

Appellant claimed the relief was barred by the law of limitation.

Held:

The Court emphasized that the cause of action arises when the real dispute occurs, specifically when one party asserts and the other denies any right. In this case, the dispute over the determination of the base year and calculations emerged in the letter dated 15.7.1996.( Para 5)

The Court further clarified that the bills raised in 1998, resulting in a dispute and forming the base of the disagreement, were not finalized as per letters dated 7.2.2000 and 9.5.2000. The cause of action was determined to have arisen on or after 4.9.1998.( Para 6)

The civil appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, affirming the correctness of the High Court's decision.( Para 7)