Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Clause 1A and 1B of Schedule 'F' of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules, 1954, regarding the liability of transferees to pay salami upon the transfer of leasehold interest. It also addresses the resumption of land as surplus under the Act. The respondent held land within the ceiling limit, and the State Government had issued a notice for resumption.

Issues:

Interpretation of Clause 1A and 1B of Schedule 'F' of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules, 1954.

Validity of the notice issued by the State Government for resumption of land as surplus.

Held:

The Court interprets Clause 16(a) of the lease deed, which mandates renewal of lease subject to the terms and conditions imposed by the State Government. The State Government introduced amendments in 1994, including Clause 1A and 1B, which govern the payment of salami upon transfer of leasehold interest. The respondent is exempted from salami payment during the unexpired period of lease under Clause 1B.

The respondent, having held land within the ceiling limit at all times, is not liable for resumption of land as surplus. The High Court rightfully set aside the order for resumption, as the respondent's landholding remained within the prescribed limits under the Act.

Decision: The Court upholds the demand for salami for the renewal of lease after the expiration of the existing period, in accordance with the Rules. It also affirms the High Court's decision to set aside the resumption order, considering the respondent's compliance with the ceiling limit regulations.

Facts:

The appellant issued a notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to a company regarding a dishonoured cheque, but no separate notices were issued to the directors of the company.

The complainant filed a case against the company and its directors, alleging their involvement in the offence under Section 138.

The trial court convicted the company but acquitted the directors, stating that separate notices to the directors were mandatory.

The appellant challenged this decision in the High Court, arguing that separate notices to the directors were not required under Section 138.

The High Court upheld the trial court's decision, citing the judgment of the Madras High Court, which stated that separate notices to the directors were necessary to fix vicarious liability.

Issues:

Whether separate notices to the directors of a company are mandatory under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It held that Section 138 only requires notice to be given to the drawer of the cheque, i.e., the company in this case.

The Court clarified that Section 141 imposes vicarious liability on directors and other persons responsible for the conduct of the company's business. It does not mandate separate notices to directors.

The Court emphasized that directors, being in charge of the company's affairs, would be aware of the notice served on the company under Section 138.

Therefore, the Supreme Court held that there is no necessity or scope for reading into Section 138 the requirement of issuing separate notices to directors. The Court overruled the decision of the Madras High Court.

The matter was remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration, emphasizing that the summary remedy created by Section 138 should not be rendered cumbersome.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against a conviction under Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for dacoity with murder.

The incident occurred on a night with no moonlight, making visibility extremely poor.

Witnesses claimed to have identified the accused using torchlight and lanterns, despite being in a panicked state and at a distance from the scene.

The prosecution primarily relied on the identification evidence from a test identification parade.

No significant recovery of stolen items was made to connect the accused with the crime.

Issues:

Whether the identification evidence provided by witnesses in a test identification parade was reliable.

Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, beyond identification, to establish the guilt of the accused.

Held:

The court found that the conviction was solely based on the identification of the accused in the test identification parade, without substantial corroborating evidence. It emphasized the unreliability of identification in cases of dacoity, especially in poor visibility conditions and emotionally charged situations.

The court cited previous judgments highlighting the potential for errors in identification, especially when witnesses are in a panicked state and at a distance from the scene. Regarding the test identification parade, the court noted that it is not substantive evidence and cannot solely be relied upon for conviction. The prosecution needed to provide additional evidence, such as the recovery of stolen items, to strengthen its case. However, in this instance, no significant recovery was made to connect the accused with the crime.

Additionally, the court considered the defense's argument of false implication due to village rivalries, viewing the identification of the accused with caution. Ultimately, the court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it set aside the conviction and ordered the appellants to be released unless required in any other case.

Facts:

IRCON International Ltd. (the Appellant) won a contract from SIPCOT for construction work and subcontracted parts of it to Vinay Heavy Equipments (the Respondent). Vinay completed 67% of the work but ceased further progress. IRCON canceled the subcontracts and completed the remaining work through other means. Vinay claimed an unpaid balance of arrears, leading to arbitration. IRCON challenged the award passed by the arbitrator under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the "back-to-back" nature of the contracts between IRCON and SIPCOT absolves IRCON of its primary liability to Vinay under the subcontracts.

The implications of conflicting claims and admissions made by IRCON in different arbitration proceedings.

Whether IRCON, as the main contractor, can be held liable to Vinay, the subcontractor, despite attempts to shift liability onto SIPCOT.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the lower courts and dismissed IRCON's appeals. The court found that IRCON's claims regarding the "back-to-back" nature of the contracts with SIPCOT did not absolve it of its primary liability to Vinay under the subcontracts.

IRCON's conflicting statements in different arbitrations were deemed determinative, and the court rejected IRCON's attempt to shift liability onto SIPCOT. The court emphasized that in the absence of a contrary clause in the main contract, the liability of the main contractor (IRCON) to the subcontractor (Vinay) remains distinct and separate from the liability of the main contractor to the employer (SIPCOT). IRCON's concession of liability before the arbitrator was considered unconditional, despite attempts to make it conditional upon the outcome of another arbitration.

The court rejected IRCON's argument that it was merely a consultant and could not be held liable, citing a previous judgment.

Facts:

The respondent, working as a Sub Registrar, was accused of demanding a bribe for registering a Will deed.

A trap was laid where tainted money was allegedly recovered from the respondent's possession.

Initially convicted by the trial court, the respondent was acquitted by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the High Court erred in acquitting the respondent.

Held:

The Court found that the High Court's acquittal of the respondent was erroneous. It disagreed with the High Court's assessment of the evidence, particularly the testimony of key witnesses and the recovery of tainted money.

The Court emphasized that the demand and acceptance of the bribe were crucial for constituting an offense under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It noted that the prosecution had successfully established these elements based on testimonies and evidence.

The Court rejected the respondent's plea of alibi, stating that it was not sufficiently proven. It also dismissed other suggestions made by the defense, such as inimical relations with document writers, as lacking in evidence.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution had established the demand and acceptance of tainted money by the respondent. It reinstated the judgment of the trial court, convicting the respondent under relevant sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Facts:

The police intercepted a truck carrying poppy husk and arrested several individuals, including the appellants.

The accused appellants were found guilty of possessing the poppy husk under Section 15 of the NDPS Act.

Key witnesses identified the accused in court, despite a lack of a formal identification parade.

The appellants argued lack of conscious possession and non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act.

Certain independent witnesses were not examined by the prosecution, which was explained as their unreliability.

Issues:

Whether the lack of a formal identification parade affects the validity of witness identification in court.

Whether the accused were in conscious possession of the contraband.

Whether non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act vitiates the conviction.

Whether the absence of certain independent witnesses impacts the prosecution's case.

Held:

The court affirmed that identification in court can serve as corroborative evidence, even without a formal identification parade.

The court held that the accused were in conscious possession of the contraband based on their presence in the truck, flight from the scene, and subsequent absconding.

The court clarified that Section 50 of the NDPS Act, dealing with searches of persons, does not apply to searches of vehicles or containers.

The court ruled that the absence of certain independent witnesses does not undermine the prosecution's case if the evidence of official witnesses is trustworthy and credible.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentencing of the appellants under Section 15 of the NDPS Act.

Facts:Secure Meters Ltd. imported LCD Modules and Liquid Crystal Displays (LCDs) from Hong Kong. They sought clearance of the LCDs under Chapter Heading 9013.80, claiming a Nil rate of basic custom duty. However, the customs authorities classified the LCDs under Chapter Heading 9028.90, considering them as parts of electricity meters. The appellant contested this classification.

Issues:

The classification of the LCDs imported by Secure Meters Ltd. Whether they should be classified under Chapter Heading 9013.80 as claimed by the appellant or under Chapter Heading 9028.90 as decided by the customs authorities.

Held:

The court examined the relevant provisions, including Note 2 to Chapter 90, which stipulates that parts and accessories included in any headings of Chapter 90 are to be classified in their respective headings. Considering this, the court concluded that since the LCDs were goods used as parts in electricity supply meters, they should be classified under their respective heading, which is 9013.

Furthermore, the court referred to Part-III of Chapter Notes to Chapter 90, which supports the view that parts or accessories constituting articles falling in a particular heading of Chapter 90 are to be classified in that heading.

Therefore, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the authorities below and holding that the LCDs imported by Secure Meters Ltd. were classifiable under Chapter Heading 9013.80.

Facts:

Coal Handlers Private Limited, acting as agents for Gujarat Ambuja Cements Limited and Ambuja Cements Eastern Limited, facilitated the movement of coal, a key raw material for cement production. The Ministry of Coal allocated coal to these companies, and Coal Handlers assisted in logistics, including liaison with railways for coal movement, supervising loading, sampling, payment formalities, and dispatch.

Issues:

Whether the services provided by Coal Handlers qualify them as Clearing and Forwarding Agents (C and F Agents) and thus subject to service tax under the Finance Act, 1994.

Held:

For a service to qualify as C and F Agent, it must be connected with clearing and forwarding operations, involving activities like receiving goods, warehousing, arranging dispatch, and maintaining records. Coal Handlers' activities didn't fit this criterion. They weren't involved in clearing goods from suppliers or dispatching them to specified destinations; instead, their role was supervisory in nature.

Decision: The court ruled in favor of Coal Handlers, overturning the demand for service tax. The Commissioner of Service Tax's appeal was also dismissed by the High Court, citing the pending appeal of Coal Handlers, which has been allowed by the Supreme Court.

Facts:

Uttam Steel Ltd. exported galvanized corrugated sheets in two lots but filed claims for rebate of duty beyond the six-month period stipulated under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Section 11B was subsequently amended, providing for a one-year period for filing rebate claims.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent amendment to Section 11B could revive claims already time-barred?

Whether arguments based on Rule 12 and Rule 13 of the Central Excise Rules, as well as the provision for export with a bond under Rule 13, were applicable?

Held and Decision:

A period of limitation being procedural or adjectival law would ordinarily be retrospective in nature.

An amended provision should not revive a claim that was already time-barred before the amendment.

Since the claims for rebate were filed beyond the original six-month period, the Respondents couldn't avail of the extended one-year period provided by the amendment to Section 11B.

Arguments based on Rule 12 and Rule 13 of the Central Excise Rules were dismissed as the requirements of Section 11B for filing rebate claims within the prescribed period were not fulfilled.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court, and ruled in favor of the appellant, Union of India and Others, stating that the Respondent's claims for rebate were time-barred.