Facts:

The incident occurred on 12.8.1995, where the deceased, a social worker, was shot in a Ganesh festival Pandal.

Charges were framed against 13 accused persons, and the trial proceeded against the remaining accused.

The Trial Court initially convicted certain accused, but the High Court acquitted all the accused.

The State of Maharashtra filed appeals challenging the High Court's decision.

Issues:

The proper establishment of the identity of the accused through eyewitness testimonies and the conduct of Test Identification Parades.

Held:

The testimonies of eyewitnesses suffered from various infirmities and contradictions.

The Test Identification Parade was not conducted properly and was delayed.

The incident occurred in circumstances where there was little time for eyewitnesses to clearly see the accused.

Emphasized the importance of conducting prompt and proper Test Identification Parades.

Dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court's decision to give the benefit of doubt to the accused.

Referred Cases:

Siddanki Ram Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2010) 7 SCC 697

Facts:

The appellant, the State of Jharkhand, had granted tax exemptions to industrial units for a specified period. Subsequently, the Jharkhand Value Added Tax (JVAT) Act withdrew the exemption, offering deferment of tax for the remaining period. The respondent, Tata Steel Ltd. & others, applied for the conversion from tax exemption to deferment, challenging the withdrawal of exemption.

Issues:

The eligibility for the conversion from tax exemption to deferment, the repayment schedule for the deferred tax amount, and the imposition of penalties.

Held:

Section 95(3)(ii) of the JVAT Act allows a registered dealer to convert the facility of tax exemption into deferment for the unexpired period. The respondent had availed deferment and paid the tax amount.

Deferment of tax comes with specific terms and conditions, including the repayment of the deferred tax amount. In this case, the period of deferment was for 8 years, and the repayment schedule was for 5 years from the expiry of the eligibility period.

The repayment schedule, as per the notification, should be completed within 13 years from the date of start of deferment. The court clarified that the repayment period must end on 31.08.2013 within 5 years from the expiration of the eligibility period.

Rule 66 of the Rules provides for payment for breach, but the court decided not to apply it due to the special features of the case. Instead, the respondent was directed to pay 12% interest per annum within three months.

Decision: The court disposed of the appeal, upholding the grant of deferment but rejecting the challenge to the withdrawal of exemption. The respondent was directed to pay 12% interest per annum within three months.

Referred Cases:

Chandavarkar S.R. Rao Vs. Ashalata, (1986) 4 SCC 447, 476

Hansraj Gordhandas Vs. H.H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Surat and Two, (1969) 2 SCR 252

K.P. Varghese Vs. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173

Keshavji Ravji and Co. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1990) 2 SCC 231

Luke Vs. IRC, (1964) 54 ITR 692

M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 299

Mahadeo Prasad Bais Dead Vs. Income-Tax Officer `A' Ward, Gorakhpur, (1991) 4 SCC 560

Maunsell Vs. Olins, (1975) 1 All ER 16, 21, 18

Nokes Vs. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Limited, (1940) AC 1014, (1022)

Oxford University Press Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2001) 3 SCC 359

State of T.N. Vs. Kodaikanal Motor Union P Ltd., (1986) 3 SCC 91

Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 7 SCC 242

Telangana Steel Industries Vs. State of A.P., (1994) Sup 2 SCC 259

Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 279

Facts:

The respondents filed a Claim Petition seeking compensation for the death of Raj Kumar Gautam in a vehicular accident involving the appellant's bus. The Tribunal partly allowed the claim, and the High Court affirmed the decision. The appellant challenged the High Court's judgment in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The negligence in the accident, contributory negligence, and the adequacy of compensation awarded by the Tribunal.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court failed in its duty as a first appellate court. It did not adequately address the factual details, grounds raised by the appellant, and failed to appreciate the evidence and legal principles involved. The Court referred to precedents emphasizing the duty of the first appellate court to decide the appeal by giving reasons on both facts and law.

The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits. The High Court was directed to decide the appeal within six months. The Supreme Court clarified that it had not delved into the merits of the case, and the High Court should decide it strictly in accordance with the law, providing an opportunity for both parties to be heard.

Referred Cases:

B.V. Nagesh Vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530

H.K.N. Swami Vs. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243

Jagannath Vs. Arulappa, (2005) 12 SCC 303

Kurian Chacko Vs. Varkey Ouseph, AIR 1969 Kerala 316

Madhukar Vs. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756

National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Naresh Kumar, (2000) 10 SCC 158

Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari Deceased, (2001) 3 SCC 179

State Bank of India Vs. Emmsons International Ltd., (2011) 12 SCC 174

State of Punjab Vs. Navdeep Kuur , (2004) 13 SCC 680

Facts:

The case involves the appellant Mukund Dewangan and the respondent Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. The primary issue pertains to whether drivers with licenses for light motor vehicles must obtain an endorsement to drive transport vehicles, especially when the transport vehicle belongs to the category of light motor vehicles.

Issues:

The interpretation of licensing requirements, particularly whether a separate endorsement is necessary for drivers holding licenses for light motor vehicles when driving transport vehicles.

Held:

The Court observes that there is a distinct syllabus for light motor vehicles and medium/heavy vehicles, but no separate syllabus is provided for transport vehicles. It notes the significance of vehicle weight in licensing and registration procedures.

In accordance with Rule 16, Form 6 issues driving licenses, including separate categories for light motor vehicles and transport vehicles. The Court highlights the emphasis on gross vehicle weight and unladen weight in the registration particulars to determine the class of the vehicle.

The Court opines that, prior to the 2001 amendment, a person with a license to drive a light motor vehicle could also drive light passenger carriage vehicles and light goods carriage vehicles. It points out a conflict in previous decisions regarding the pre-amended and post-amended positions.

Given the conflicting interpretations, the Court decides to refer the questions raised in the case to a larger bench for further clarification.

Referred Cases:

Ashok Gangadhar Maratha Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 1999 6 SCC 620

Glynn Vs. Margetson & Co., (1893) AC 351, 357

Kulwant Singh Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2015) 2 SCC 186

Nagashetty Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 56

National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Annappa Irappa Nesaria alias Nesaragi, (2008) 3 SCC 464

National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Prabhu Lal, (2008) 1 SCC 696

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir, (2008) 8 SCC 253

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Angad Kol, (2009) 11 SCC 356

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Zaharulnisha, (2008) 12 SCC 385

S. Iyyapan Vs. United India Insurance Co., (2013) 7 SCC 62

Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan, (1987) 2 SCC 654

Sohan Lal Passi Vs. P. Sesh Reddy, (1996) 5 SCC 21

Suissee Atlantique Societe d' Armement Maritime S.A. Vs. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale, (1967) 1 AC 361, 393, 412-413, 427-428, 430

Facts:

The appellant was convicted under Section 376 IPC for raping a blind and illiterate girl on the promise of marriage.

The victim, being physically disadvantaged, was already in a socially disadvantaged position, exploited by the accused.

The victim's blindness made her susceptible to the accused's malicious actions.

Issues:

The main issue revolved around the conviction of the accused under Section 376 IPC.

Victim compensation and the need for a special rehabilitation scheme for physically handicapped victims were additional issues.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding no infirmity in the lower courts' judgments.

The court directed the state to pay Rs. 8,000 per month to the victim for her lifetime, treating it as interest on a notional fixed deposit of Rs. 10,00,000.

The court recommended that all states and union territories formulate a uniform scheme for victim compensation in cases of rape/sexual exploitation, especially for physically handicapped women.

Due to the victim's unique circumstances, the court emphasized the need for a special rehabilitation scheme.

Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the conviction, and provided a detailed decision on victim compensation and the need for a special rehabilitation scheme, emphasizing the unique circumstances of the physically handicapped victim.

FACTS:

The appellant, Hamant Yashwant Dhage, was the respondent in two criminal appeals arising from a common judgment of the High Court of Bombay.

The Supreme Court, in its order dated April 12, 2010, directed the concerned magistrate to ensure proper investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The appellant, acting as a complainant, approached the Judicial Magistrate F.C. Court No. 2, Pune, who rejected the prayer for the registration of an F.I.R., citing the absence of specific direction from the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the earlier order of the Supreme Court dated April 12, 2010, warranted the registration of an F.I.R. by the police before commencing investigation.

Whether the delay in lodging the F.I.R. after April 12, 2010, should affect the investigation already carried out by the police.

HELD:

In view of the broad consensus among the counsel for the parties, the court directs the concerned magistrate and the police officer to rectify their mistake by ensuring the registration of an appropriate F.I.R. The court emphasizes that the delay in lodging the F.I.R. after April 12, 2010, shall not affect the already conducted investigation. The police are instructed to complete the investigation within six months and submit their final views to the magistrate through a proper report. The learned magistrate is directed to handle the matter strictly in accordance with the law based on the materials available on record, without being influenced by orders passed by different courts.

REFERRED CASES:

Mohd. Yousuf Vs. Afaq Jahan Smt., (2006) 1 SCC 627

Facts:

Richa Mishra, an Excise Sub Inspector, participated in the selection process for the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police (Dy.S.P.). Despite qualifying at each stage, her name was excluded from the list of successful candidates due to exceeding the age limit of 25 years.

Issues:

The appellant claimed entitlement to age relaxation under Rule 8 of the 2000 Rules, citing her status as a government servant.

The initial writ petition was dismissed on the grounds that she entered government service after the specified cut-off date.

The subsequent appeal sought age relaxation under Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules.

Held:

The selection process began before the promulgation of the Chhattisgarh Police Executive (Gazetted) Service Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2005. The requisitions and advertisement specified that appointments would be made under Rules, 2000, making the recruitment validly undertaken under those rules.

The appellant's failure to challenge the advertisement precluded her from arguing that recruitment should have been made under Rules, 2005. Therefore, the recruitment was rightfully conducted under Rules, 2000.

Rule 8 of Rules, 2000 did not provide specific age relaxation for women candidates. However, the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Special Provision for Appointment of Women) Rules, 1997, along with State Services Examination Rules, 2003, allowed for a 10-year age relaxation for women candidates, which was applicable to the appellant.

Rules, 1997, being specific and framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, aimed to encourage women's participation in public employment. Rule 4 of Rules, 1997, should be universally applied for women candidates seeking appointments in public service in Chhattisgarh.

The competitive examination for Dy.S.P. was conducted under State Services Examination Rules, 2003, which incorporated Rules, 1997, filling the lacuna in Rules, 2000. The omission of Rules, 1997, in Rule 8 of Rules, 2000 was not intentional but rectified in Rules, 2005.

Interpreting subordinate legislation aims to achieve social justice. The intention of the rule-making authorities was always to grant age relaxation to women candidates, as evidenced by subsequent amendments to Rules, 2005.

The appellant was entitled to age relaxation under Rule 4 of Rules, 1997, read with Examination Rules, 2003. The court directed the respondents to appoint her as Dy.S.P. from the date her juniors in the merit list were appointed.

Referred Cases:

A.A. Calton Vs. Director of Education 1983 3 SCC 33

B.L. Gupta Vs. M.C.D., (1998) 9 SCC 223

Badshah Vs. Sou. Urmila Badshah Godse, (2014) 1 SCC 188

Capt. Ramesh Chander Kaushal Vs. Veena Kaushal, (1978) 4 SCC 70

N.T. Devin Katti Vs. Karnataka Public Service Commission, (1990) 3 SCC 157

P. Ganeshwar Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1988) Sup SCC 740

Rajasthan Public Service Commission Vs. Keilla Kumar Palliwal, (2007) 10 SCC 260

Rameshchandra Daga Vs. Rameshwari Daga, AIR 2005 SC 422

Shailesh Dhairyawan Vs. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2015) 11 SCALE 684

State of Punjab Vs. Arun Kumar Aggarwal, (2007) 10 SCC 402

Y.V. Rangaiah Vs. J. Shreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284

Facts:

The Appellant, an employee of Bank of India, applied for voluntary retirement on 16.11.2000.

Prior to the introduction of the voluntary retirement scheme, the Bank had issued a memo to the Appellant regarding irregularities.

Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the Appellant through a charge-sheet served on 02.03.2001, to which the Appellant admitted the charges.

The Bank accepted the voluntary retirement application on 19.06.2001 after imposing a penalty of reduction in basic pay on 20.03.2001.

Issues:

Whether the Bank had the right to initiate disciplinary proceedings after the introduction of the voluntary retirement scheme.

Whether the voluntary retirement application could be considered only after the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings.

Whether the punishment imposed on the Appellant was legal and justified.

Held:

Bank's Right to Initiate Disciplinary Proceedings: The Court held that the Bank was within its rights to issue a charge-sheet to the Appellant even after the introduction of the voluntary retirement scheme. The disciplinary proceedings were rightly initiated as the memo was served prior to the scheme's introduction.

Consideration of Voluntary Retirement Application: The Court affirmed that the voluntary retirement application could be considered only after the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings, and the Bank's acceptance on 19.06.2001 was justified.

Continuation of Employee-Employer Relationship: The relationship of employee and employer between the Appellant and the Bank continued until 19.06.2001. The Bank had the right to take disciplinary actions against the Appellant until that date.

Imposition of Punishment: The Court found no illegality or perversity in the disciplinary proceedings or the punishment order dated 20.03.2001. The Appellant's admission of charges justified the imposed penalty of reduction in basic pay.

Deemed Retirement and Application Date: The Court rejected the argument that the Appellant was deemed retired on 31.12.2000 due to non-compliance by the Bank. The Scheme did not provide for automatic acceptance, and the retirement date was rightly considered as 19.06.2001.

Unblemished Career and Quantum of Punishment: The Court dismissed the claim that an unblemished career warranted no disciplinary proceedings. It upheld the punishment's leniency, considering the nature of the charges and the Appellant's overall performance.

The appeal was dismissed. The impugned order was upheld, though on reasons other than those given by the High Court. No costs.

Referred Cases:

Decided on : 08-02-2016

Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 - Regulation 4(1)

Service Law — Application for Voluntary Retirement — Appellant applied for voluntary retirement on whereas he was served with the charge-sheet. He, however, admitted the charges. This resulted in imposition of punishment on the Appellant. It was followed by acceptance of his application for voluntary retirement by the Bank. — Bank was within its rights to issue a charge-sheet to the Appellant, the Appellant was in the employment of the Bank and, therefore, he could be subjected to face disciplinary proceedings as per the Rules. Secondly, since the memo was served on the Appellant prior to introduction of the Scheme, the disciplinary proceedings were rightly initiated by serving a charge-sheet on the Appellant after coming into force of the Scheme on 01.11.2000. Thirdly, in terms of the Scheme, the Appellant's application could be considered only after conclusion of disciplinary proceedings and, therefore, the Bank was right in considering the application and eventually accepting it on 19.06.2001. Fourthly, the relationship of employee and employer between the Appellant and the Bank continued till 19.06.2001 and, therefore, the Bank was within its rights to take any action under the service rules against the Appellant up to 19.06.2001. It is not in dispute that the Bank took all the disciplinary actions prior to 19.06.2001 and then accepted the application for voluntary retirement on 19.06.2001. Such action, in our view, was just, legal and proper.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Mehul M. Gupta, Shrinath Agrawal and R.P. Gupta, Advocates, for the Appellant; S. Gopakumaran Nair, Sr. Adv., T.G. Narayanan Nair and K.N. Madhusoodhanan, Advocates, for the Respondent

Cases Referred

Balwant Singh Vs. Anand Kumar Sharma, (2003) 3 SCC 433

Visitor, AMU Vs. K.S. Misra, (2007) 8 SCC 593

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

The case involves the construction of the Millennium Bus Depot near Nizamuddin Bridge and behind J.P. Power Station. A writ petition was filed in the public interest seeking the demolition of the bus depot, citing a violation of the Master Plan 2021 for Delhi, which designated the area as 'river flood plain.'

Issues:

Whether the construction of the bus depot violates the Master Plan 2021 for Delhi.

Whether the authorities were granted sufficient time to amend the Master Plan.

Held:

Although the High Court granted the appellants an opportunity to amend the Master Plan, almost four and a half years had passed, and no amendment had occurred. The Millennium Bus Depot, as per the existing Master Plan, cannot legally operate. The Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) failed to adhere to an undertaking to vacate the Bus Depot, and its application for an extension was dismissed due to the failure to amend the Master Plan.

A meeting chaired by the Chief Minister of the Government of NCT of Delhi highlighted the urgent need to protect the land along the river bed of the Yamuna River. The Chief Minister suggested relocating the Bus Depot to an alternate location in a time-bound manner.

The chance given to the appellants to amend the Master Plan was based on their submission that the Bus Depot served a greater public purpose and did not pose an environmental threat. The exercise to consider this aspect did not take place, possibly due to disputes between L&DO and DDA on land ownership. Recent developments, including orders from the National Green Tribunal, indicated movement in addressing the issue.

Given the ongoing studies by an Expert Committee to determine the viability of the area for the Bus Depot, the court deferred the decision to demolish the Bus Depot. One year was granted to the DTC, during which it must either amend the Master Plan or shift the Bus Depot.