Mining Lease - Dispute over the grant of mining lease for Dolomite - Multiple applications filed by different parties - Various orders issued by state authorities - Confusion over the status of the land and the mining lease - Appellants challenging the grant of mining lease to Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih. [Para 1-2]

Background - A detailed account of the historical applications, orders, and disputes related to the mining lease for Dolomite in the specified area - Repeated applications, rejections, and recalls of orders - Legal proceedings initiated by Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih to obtain the mining lease. [Para 2.1-2.14]

Mining Lease - Eligibility under Concession Rules and MMDR Act, 1957 - Interpretation of Rule 61 of the Concession Rules, 2016 and Section 10-A of the MMDR Act, 1957 - Rule 61 of Concession Rules, 2016 makes applications for mining lease of minor minerals ineligible if received prior to the rules' effect, with an exception if a Grant Order or Letter of Intent had been issued - Analysis of whether the respondents' case falls under the proviso to Rule 61 - High Court's findings that the proviso does not apply to the facts of the case. [Para 5-8]

Policy Change and Revocation of Orders - Impact on eligibility - Reference to a policy specifying the mandatory requirement of a Conversion Certificate for mining lease - Dismissal and revocation of earlier orders - Irrelevance of earlier orders after revocation - Disposition of Writ Petition No. 7505 (W) of 2003 exparte - Claim that the application dated 06.03.1998 should be considered in accordance with the law. [Para 9-10]

Amendment Act, 2015 - Object and purpose - Shift towards auctioning mineral resources - Section 10-A of the MMDR Act, 1957 mandates ineligibility of applications received before 12.01.2015 - Exceptions for specific situations - Protection for applications under Section 11-A, reconnaissance permit or prospecting license holders, and those with previous approvals or Letters of Intent issued before the Amendment Act. [Para 14]

Mining Lease – Interpretation of the State Government's letter of approval – Whether the letter constitutes a Letter of Intent – Examination of legal definitions and relevant cases – Rejecting the contention that the letter is a Letter of Intent due to the lack of previous Central Government approval – Clarification that the letter was recommendatory and not a commitment to enter into a future contract – Not covered by clause (c) of Section 10-A of the Act. [Para 15-16]

Raiyat Land – Restrictions on the use of Raiyat land for mining – Provisions of the WBLR Act, 1955, regarding Raiyat land and its usage – The contradiction in classifying land as 'Dungri' and granting it as Raiyat land for cultivation – Legal issues surrounding the consent letters of landowners (Raiyats) and changes in ownership – Uncertainty regarding the Respondent's eligibility for Rule 61 benefits – Non-impleadment of WBMDTCL – The remand order is not appropriate at this stage. [Para 17-19]

Ownership of Land – The appellants' claim of ownership of 20.87 acres of the land in question – No obstacle to granting a mining lease for this portion to Respondent No. 1 – The remainder of the claim is rejected – No costs awarded. [Para 20-22]

Appeal is partly allowed, and the impugned judgment is set aside, with directions for the execution of a mining lease for 20.87 acres of land in favor of Respondent No. 1. The rest of the claim by Respondent No. 1 is dismissed. No costs are awarded. [Para 22]

Civil Appeal – Rejection of Plaint Under Rule 11 of Order VII of CPC – Appellant sought rejection of the plaint based on bar of res judicata – Learned Single Judge rejected the plaint, while the Division Bench of High Court reversed the decision – Supreme Court held that the issue of res judicata could not be decided under Rule 11 of Order VII of CPC at this stage. [Para 2-6]

Scope of Rule 11 of Order VII of CPC: The Court clarified that Rule 11 allows it to only look into the averments made in the plaint and, at most, documents produced along with the plaint. Defense and documents relied upon by the defendant cannot be considered while deciding an application under Rule 11 of Order VII of CPC. [Para 5]

Res Judicata: The Supreme Court clarifies that the plea of res judicata could not be decided at this stage. The issue involves consideration of pleadings in the earlier suit, the judgment of the Trial Court, and the judgment of the Appellate Courts. The issue will be framed for future proceedings. [Para 4,6]

Final Conclusion and Disposition: The Supreme Court agrees with the Division Bench's final conclusion that the suit needs to be decided on merits, with a modification that the issue of res judicata remains open for future proceedings. The appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs. [Para 7-8]

Criminal Appeal – Constitutionality of Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – Whether retrospective or prospective application of the declaration of unconstitutionality – Reference to a larger bench for determination – Arguments regarding the applicability of Article 20 of the Constitution – Section 6A as a procedural provision – Nature of Section 6A – Protection provided under Article 20 – Declaration of unconstitutionality renders the law unenforceable and relates back – Judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy considered applicable to all cases irrespective of their stage of pendency unless explicitly stated otherwise. [Para 1-11]

Constitutional Validity – Section 6A of the DSPE Act – Questions requiring consideration - (i) Whether Section 6A of the DSPE Act is part of procedure or it introduces a conviction or sentence? (ii) Whether Article 20(1) of the Constitution will have any bearing or relevance in the context of declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional? (iii) The declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution would have a retrospective effect or would apply prospectively from the date of its declaration as unconstitutional? [Para 14]

Scope of Reference – Limitations on the scope of reference – Bench clarifies that it would only answer the specific questions referred and not enlarge the scope of the reference – Emphasis on not dealing with the merits of individual cases – Matters to be reverted to regular Bench for hearing and disposal after answering the questions. [Para 15]

History of Sanction Requirement – Evolution of the requirement for sanction before launching prosecution – Single Directive issued in 1969 – Striking down of the directive in Vineet Narain case – Introduction of Section 6A in DSPE Act in 2003 – Continuation of the protection regarding sanction before prosecution. [Para 16-19]

Applicability of Article 20(1) of the Constitution – Analysis of Article 20(1) in the context of Section 6A of the DSPE Act – Article 20(1) prohibits conviction or sentence under an ex post facto law – Trial under a different procedure or court not unconstitutional unless it violates other fundamental rights – Section 6A of DSPE Act held to be a part of procedure and not introducing conviction or sentence. [Para 20-32]

Constitutional Law – Interpretation of Article 20(1) of the Constitution – Protection against self-incrimination – Scope of Article 20(1) limited to conviction and sentence, not procedural aspects of investigation or trial – Marginal note and Article 20(1) cannot be stretched to cover procedural matters – Settled law since 1953 affirms that Article 20(1) pertains solely to conviction and sentence – Article 20(1) not applicable to the validity or invalidity of Section 6A of the DSPE Act. [Para 34-36]

Application of General Clauses Act – Inapplicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 in the present case – Declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional by a court, not a situation of repeal or revival by the Parliament. [Para 32]

Constitutional Law – Retrospective or Prospective Application of Judgment – Declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional – Whether such declaration has retrospective effect – Interpretation of Article 13(1) and 13(2) of the Constitution – Clear distinction between pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws – Pre-Constitution laws declared void under Article 13(1) only from the date of the Constitution's commencement – Post-Constitution laws declared void ab initio under Article 13(2) if they contravene constitutional prohibitions – The doctrine of eclipse does not apply to post-Constitution laws – A statute declared unconstitutional by a court of law is non est for all purposes – Declaration in Subramanian Swamy case has retrospective operation – Section 6A of the DSPE Act held to be not in force from the date of its insertion on 11.09.2003. [Para 37-45]

Unconstitutionality of Legislative Provisions – Retrospective Application of Judicial Decisions: The Supreme Court declared Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 unconstitutional for violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The decision, made in the context of Article 20, applies retrospectively, rendering the provision non-existent from its inception in 2003. [Para 43]

Article 20 of the Constitution – Scope and Application: Article 20(1) of the Constitution, safeguarding against retrospective penal legislation, does not extend to procedural aspects leading to conviction or acquittal. The Supreme Court clarified that Article 20(1) solely concerns conviction and sentence, not encompassing procedural changes or pre-requisites like investigation or trial. [Para 35]

Distinction in Constitutional Interpretation – Pre- and Post-Constitution Laws: Distinguishing between pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws, the Supreme Court elucidated that while pre-Constitution laws inconsistent with fundamental rights are rendered ineffectual, post-Constitution laws contravening constitutional prohibitions are void ab initio. The distinction is crucial for understanding the applicability of constitutional amendments and the doctrine of eclipse in different contexts. [Para 42]

Doctrine of Eclipse – Inapplicability to Unconstitutional Laws: The doctrine of eclipse, which allows for the revival of pre-Constitution laws upon removal of constitutional inconsistencies, does not apply to laws declared unconstitutional post-Constitution. Such laws are considered "still-born" and cannot be revived by subsequent constitutional amendments. [Para 42]

Judicial Decisions on Constitutional Invalidity – Impact and Enforcement: When a law is declared unconstitutional, it is treated as non-existent from its inception. This principle applies regardless of whether the unconstitutionality arises from legislative incompetence or violation of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court emphasized that unconstitutional laws are void ab initio and non-enforceable for all intents and purposes. [Para 43]

Decision – The Supreme Court's declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional applies retrospectively, invalidating the provision from its introduction in 2003. The cases are to be returned to the appropriate bench for merits consideration. [Para 45]

Bail Application – Rejection by High Court Petitioner appeals against the High Court's decision, which had denied his bail in connection to a case registered under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. [Para 1]

Representation by Counsel Learned senior counsel for the petitioner argues that Rs. 30 lakhs in the petitioner's bank account cannot be considered as proceeds from the alleged crime; the Additional Solicitor General opposes the bail application. [Para 2-5]

Scope of Bail Application The Court notes that the bail application should focus on the basic facts of the case, avoiding detailed arguments that could affect the main trial. [Para 6]

Petitioner’s Explanation The petitioner provides an explanation for the Rs. 30 lakhs in his bank account, indicating that it was for a property transaction. This aspect is deemed by the Court as a subject for trial. [Para 7]

Comparative Proceedings The Court mentions that the main accused Pankaj Mishra has withdrawn his bail application; the petitioner has been incarcerated for over a year, and the trial has begun. [Para 8]

Decision The Supreme Court directs the petitioner's release on bail, subject to conditions to be imposed by the trial court. The petitioner is obligated to participate diligently in the ongoing trial. [Para 9]

Civil Contempt – Violation of Court Undertaking – Appellants sold plots in violation of a court undertaking not to sell until the main petition is heard and decided – Contempt proceedings initiated – Appellants argue they were not aware of the undertaking and tendered unconditional apology – High Court rejects apology and holds appellants guilty of contempt – Appellants appeal the High Court's decision. [Para 25-34]

Civil Contempt - Wilful disobedience of court orders - High Court declaring sale deeds executed by contemnors in favor of appellants as non est or void - Appellants argue that such transfers are not void, and they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice - Contempt court's jurisdiction and principles governing contempt discussed - Analysis of whether the High Court committed an error in its judgment - Key issues considered, including the wilfulness of disobedience and the power of the contempt court to declare transactions void. [Para 35-56]

Contempt of Court – Nature of Undertaking – Interpretation of the term "undertake" – Black's Law Dictionary defines "undertaking" as a promise, engagement, or stipulation given in legal proceedings, generally as a condition for obtaining a concession from the court or the opposite party – Judicial opinions regarding the technical meaning of "undertake" – Distinction between an undertaking to the court and an undertaking to the other party – Bombay High Court's view that the term "undertake" has a technical meaning as an undertaking to the court, supported by long-standing practice – Calcutta High Court's contrary view – Supreme Court's preference for the Bombay High Court's view in Rama Narang case – Interpretation of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Distinction between wilful disobedience to a court process and wilful breach of an undertaking given to the court – Contempt proceedings and the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt – Importance of distinguishing between the standard of proof and the manner of proof in contempt proceedings.

Contempt Proceedings – Breach of Undertaking – Effect of wilful breach of an undertaking given to the court – Definition of civil contempt as per Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – The breach of an undertaking given to the court constitutes "civil contempt" – Delhi High Court's decision in Suman Chadha case emphasizing that in cases of reasonable doubt, contempt proceedings should not be initiated – The standard of proof in contempt proceedings as beyond all reasonable doubt – The distinction between standard of proof and manner of proof in contempt proceedings – Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal and should follow a fair and just procedure.

Contemptuous Transactions – Voidness of Transactions – Power of the contempt court to declare contemptuous transactions void – Supreme Court's observation in the State Bank of India v. Dr. Vijay Mallya case – Contemptuous conduct may demand directions to nullify any advantage gained from it – The court may declare contemptuous transactions void or issue directions to prevent any unjust advantage – Clarification that the effect of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is not to render transfers during the pendency of a suit void but to render them subservient to the court's final decision – Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. case's view that the legal consequences of acts done in violation of court orders should be undone, and parties should be restored to their previous positions – Overcoming procedural or technical objections to ensure justice.

Interpretation of "undertake" in the context of contempt proceedings – Breach of an undertaking given to the court constitutes civil contempt – Distinction between wilful disobedience to court processes and breach of an undertaking – Power of the contempt court to declare contemptuous transactions void to nullify any unjust advantage gained from contumacious conduct. [Para 57-85]

Contempt of Court - Disobedience of Court Orders - Acceptance of Apology - Effect of Accepting Apology - Courts must exercise discretion judiciously in accepting apologies for contempt - Leniency should not embolden unscrupulous litigants to disobey court orders - Apology should be evidence of real contriteness and consciousness of wrongdoing - Delayed apologies may lack sincerity - Accepting an apology may allow contemnors to escape legal consequences and retain benefits obtained through contemptuous actions. [Para 98-106]

Contempt of Court – Breach of Counsel's Undertaking – Consequences of wilful breach or disobedience of an undertaking given by a counsel to the court – Such breach amounts to "civil contempt" as defined under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. [Para 116(i)]

Distinction – Undertakings given to parties vs. Undertakings given to the court – Distinction between an undertaking given to a party involved in the case and an undertaking given to the court – Breach of an undertaking given to the court attracts the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – In this case, the undertaking was given to the High Court, and its breach or disobedience falls under the Act. [Para 116(ii)]

Voidability of Transfers – Power of the court in contempt proceedings to declare transactions void – Court's authority to declare transactions void when examining them in contempt proceedings – Purpose of such declaration is to uphold the majesty of the law and nullify any advantages gained through contumacious conduct – May involve reversing transactions or issuing directions to prevent unjust enrichment. [Para 116(iii)]

Third-Party Involvement – Role of beneficiaries of contumacious transactions in contempt proceedings – Third parties claiming to be bona fide purchasers have no right or standing to be heard in contempt proceedings – Contempt is a matter between the court and the contemnor. [Para 116(iv)]

Acceptance of Apology – Discretion of the court in accepting apologies – Apology should not be accepted as a matter of course – Even if unconditional, unqualified, and bona fide, the court may reject it if the conduct causing damage to the court's dignity is serious – Courts should not show compassion when disobedience is deliberate and conscious. [Para 116(v)]

Decision – Emphasizes the importance of maintaining the majesty of the law in contempt proceedings and the consequences of wilful breach of undertakings – Appeals are dismissed, and appellants are given two weeks to surrender for serving the imposed sentence. [Para 117-119]

Facts - appellant won an auction for a property conducted by a Liquidator. However, the Liquidator later cancelled the highest bid, leading to legal proceedings. The Appellate Tribunal set aside the original Tribunal's order, prompting the appellant to appeal to the higher court.

Auction and Liquidation — Highest Bid — Rejection by Liquidator - held that the highest bid in an auction should ordinarily be accepted by the Liquidator unless marred by statutory infirmities, collusion, or fraud. Mere expectation of a higher price is not a valid ground for cancellation of a valid auction. The Liquidator had no objective materials to cancel the auction and opt for another round. [Para 35-42]

Administrative Law — Discretionary Powers — Liquidator's Discretion - Court clarified that the Liquidator does not possess absolute or unfettered discretion to cancel an auction. The Liquidator must act within an administrative framework governed by the rule of law. [Para 42]

 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 29A — Related Party — Eligibility to Participate in Auction - appellant was not disqualified as a 'related party' under Section 29A. The related party had ceased to be in control of the corporate debtor more than a decade ago. [Para 43-51]

Appellate Review — Appellate Tribunal — Decision Overturned - Court set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal, restoring the original order of the Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal was not justified in setting aside the order of the Tribunal. [Para 51]

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Appellate Tribunal's order and restoring the original Tribunal's order. No order as to costs was made.

Negotiable Instruments Act - Complaints under Section 138 - Legally recoverable debt - Cheque issued within the period of limitation - Complaints filed within time - No grounds for quashing the complaint - High Court erred in quashing the proceedings - Orders set aside. [Para 2-18]

Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 of NI Act - Power of Magistrate under Section 322 of CrPC - Jurisdiction of Trial Court - Stay of proceedings when informed of lack of jurisdiction - Validity of the complaint - Examination of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act in the context of Explanation to Section 138 of NI Act - Presumption under Section 139 of NI Act - Question of whether debt or liability is legally enforceable to be determined based on facts and circumstances of each case. [Para 11-13]

Limitation Act - Article 34 - Period of limitation for promissory note payable at a fixed time - Commencement of limitation period - Complaint filed within the period of limitation - Complaints restored to the Trial Court for expeditious disposal. [Para 15-18]

Costs - Appeals allowed with no order as to costs. [Para 20]

Insurance Policy Assignment - Legality of levying service charge for recording assignment - Appellant-insurer imposed a registration charge for policy assignments - Constitutional challenge on grounds of contravention of the Insurance Act and Article 265 of the Constitution - High Court found the levy unconstitutional - Nature of the levy determined as service charge or fee - Appellant's contention that it's a legitimate part of a business transaction - Analysis of statutory provisions under Section 38 of the Insurance Act - Absence of statutory authorization for the levy - No contractual provision for such charge - Regulations governing the fee for acknowledgement of assignment notice explicitly prohibit additional fees for recording assignments - High Court's decision upheld, appeal dismissed. [Para 1-13]