Criminal Law – FIR – Jurisdiction of Police Station – Anti-Corruption Bureau – High Court quashed FIRs registered under PC Act on ground that ACB Central Investigation Unit, Vijayawada was not notified as police station under Section 2(s) CrPC – Held: Approach hyper-technical and unsustainable – Declaration of ACB offices as police stations under G.O.Ms. No.268 dated 12.09.2003 continued to operate post bifurcation by virtue of Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 [Paras 3, 21–24].

Police Station – Meaning – Section 2(s) CrPC – Definition of “police station” includes any post or place declared by State Government – A post held by police officer itself sufficient – No requirement of rigid or ritualistic notification if substance of declaration satisfied – Held: High Court erred in insisting on formal gazette notification ignoring statutory scheme [Paras 4, 22–24].

State Reorganisation – Continuity of Laws – Legal Fiction – Notifications, Government Orders and circulars having force of law prior to appointed day continue to apply to successor States unless altered or repealed – Sections 100–102 of AP Reorganisation Act create statutory continuity to avoid legal vacuum – Held: No fresh adoption required for Andhra Pradesh post bifurcation [Paras 7–10, 26].

Anti-Corruption Bureau – Jurisdiction after Bifurcation – Office of Joint Director, Central Investigation Unit, ACB, Hyderabad earlier had jurisdiction over undivided State – Upon relocation to Vijayawada, jurisdiction deemed to extend to residual State of Andhra Pradesh – Clarificatory G.O.Ms. No.137 dated 14.09.2022 only reiterated existing legal position – Held: FIRs validly registered [Paras 6, 16, 24].

Clarificatory Government Orders – Retrospectivity – Government Order issued by way of clarification does not operate retrospectively but merely explains existing law – High Court’s view that 2022 G.O. cannot cure defect held erroneous – Held: Clarification cannot invalidate earlier lawful actions [Paras 24–25].

Judicial Review – Quashing FIRs – Limits – FIRs quashed solely on technical jurisdictional objection without indicating competent forum – Resulted in stalling of anti-corruption investigations – Held: Such approach amounts to travesty of justice and defeats object of PC Act [Paras 21–24].

Prevention of Corruption Act – Public Interest – Interpretation – Construction leading to vacuum in investigation of corruption offences impermissible – Courts must adopt pragmatic and purposive interpretation to advance anti-corruption regime – Held: Hyper-technical view undermines rule of law [Paras 22–26].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgment of High Court set aside – FIRs restored – Appellants permitted to proceed with investigation – No further challenge to FIRs maintainable before High Court – Investigation to be completed within six months – No coercive steps against respondents during investigation – Liberty granted to challenge charge-sheets on other grounds after investigation.

Taxation - Motor Vehicles Act – Section 2(28) – Definition of “Motor Vehicle” – Construction Equipment Vehicles – Exclusion Clause – Dumpers, loaders, excavators, dozers, surface miners and similar heavy earth moving machinery used exclusively within factory or enclosed premises – Though mechanically propelled and capable of movement, vehicles designed and adapted only for off-road industrial use – Second part of Section 2(28) expressly excludes vehicles of special type adapted for use only in factory or enclosed premises – Held: Such construction equipment vehicles stand excluded from definition of “motor vehicle” [Paras 36–39].

Constitution of India – Entry 57, List II – Power to Tax Vehicles – “Suitable for Use on Roads” – Taxing power confined to vehicles suitable for use on public roads – Vehicles not plying on roads and not deriving benefit from public road infrastructure cannot be subjected to motor vehicle tax – Gujarat Tax Act cannot travel beyond constitutional limitation under Entry 57 – Levy on off-road vehicles held unconstitutional [Paras 26–31, 44–45].

Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 – Section 3 – Charging Provision – Schedule I – Though Section 3 authorises levy on “all motor vehicles”, Schedule I does not prescribe any rate of tax for construction equipment vehicles – Absence of charging rate indicates legislative intent not to tax such vehicles – Tax demand unsustainable in absence of statutory rate [Paras 42–44].

Construction Equipment Vehicles – Rule 2(cab), Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 – Statutory recognition of construction equipment vehicles as a distinct class – Designed for off-highway operations in mining, industrial and construction activities – Merely having “on or off highway capability” does not convert them into ordinary motor vehicles – Nature, design and actual use decisive [Paras 40–41].

Motor Vehicle Tax – Registration under MV Act – No Estoppel Against Law – Mere registration of vehicles under Motor Vehicles Act does not create liability to pay road tax – If vehicles are otherwise excluded from tax under statute and Constitution, registration cannot validate illegal levy [Paras 45–46].

Precedent – Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa – Continued Applicability – Phrase “adapted for use upon roads” interpreted as “suitable for use on roads” – Vehicles used exclusively within enclosed premises not taxable – Principle reaffirmed – Later decisions distinguished for failure to consider exclusionary clause in Section 2(28) MV Act [Paras 45–52].

Distinction from Contrary Authorities – Decisions in Natwar Parikh, Western Coalfields, Jagannath Area etc. distinguished – Those cases did not examine statutory exclusion for special-type vehicles adapted for factory or enclosed premises – Not applicable to pure off-road construction equipment vehicles [Paras 47–53].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Judgments of Gujarat High Court set aside – Heavy earth moving machinery and construction equipment vehicles used exclusively within factory/enclosed premises held not liable for registration or road tax – Liberty reserved to authorities if such vehicles are found plying on public roads [Paras 55–56].

Criminal Procedure Code – Section 482 – Quashing of Proceedings – Scope and Limits – High Court quashed prosecution holding dispute to be purely civil and relying on prior civil decree upholding settlement deeds – Supreme Court reiterates that inherent powers cannot be used to conduct a mini-trial or evaluate credibility of allegations – At quashing stage, allegations in FIR/complaint must be taken at face value – Where factual foundation discloses commission of cognizable offences, proceedings must be permitted to continue [Paras 22–25, 30–31].

Civil Dispute and Criminal Offence – Coexistence – Not Mutually Exclusive – Allegations of cheating, forgery and use of forged documents in execution of settlement deeds – Mere existence or conclusion of civil proceedings does not bar criminal prosecution – Civil adjudication does not determine criminal intent or culpability – Pendency or dismissal of civil suit cannot by itself justify quashing of criminal case [Paras 26–28].

Settlement Deeds – Alleged Fraud and Forgery – Triable Issues – Complaint alleged abuse of advanced age and medical vulnerability of executants, misuse of Power of Attorney and fabrication of documents – Such allegations disclose dishonest intention at inception – Whether settlement deeds were fraudulently obtained is a matter requiring evidence – Issues to be decided in trial and not under Section 482 CrPC [Paras 25, 31].

Delay in Lodging Complaint – Not a Ground for Quashing – High Court relied on six-year delay and conduct of complainant in remaining ex parte in civil proceedings – Held: Delay by itself is not a valid ground for quashing criminal proceedings at threshold – Effect of delay and conduct of complainant is a matter of appreciation of evidence during trial [Paras 29–30].

Power of Attorney – Alleged Misuse – Criminal Liability – Allegation that PoA conferred limited authority but was misused to secure settlement deeds in favour of attorney holder – Such misuse, if proved, may attract offences under IPC – Requires adjudication on evidence and cannot be pre-judged at quashing stage [Paras 14–16, 31].

Abuse of Process – Test Misapplied by High Court – High Court erred in treating criminal proceedings as misuse solely on basis of civil decree and complainant’s conduct – Criminal law cannot be short-circuited where allegations disclose offences requiring trial – Findings of High Court amounted to impermissible appreciation of facts [Paras 30–31].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Order of Madras High Court quashing proceedings set aside – Criminal Case No. 2 of 2023 restored for trial – All defences left open – Observations not to prejudice trial [Paras 32–33].

Service Law – Appointment to Public Post – Ayurvedic Staff Nurse – Legitimate Expectation – Mere admission to training course not conferring right to appointment – Respondents completed Ayurvedic Nursing Training from Government institutions and claimed appointment as a matter of right based on past practice – High Court directed consideration of candidature on doctrine of legitimate expectation – Held: Advertisement and Government Orders never assured automatic appointment – Bond condition applied only if candidate was selected and appointed – No vested right accrued merely on completion of training [Paras 19–21].

Service Jurisprudence – Policy Change – Expansion of Training Institutions – Increased availability of candidates – Initially only one Government institution with 20 seats and appointments were given due to surplus vacancies – Subsequent policy change permitting private institutions resulted in exponential rise in trained candidates – Held: Past practice based on old factual matrix cannot create enforceable expectation after substantial policy shift [Paras 18, 20–21].

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Scope and Limitations – Legitimate expectation is not a legal right but an expectation based on consistent promise or practice – To succeed, claimant must establish legitimacy of expectation and violation of Article 14 – Respondents failed to show any promise of appointment or discriminatory treatment – Doctrine held inapplicable in changed policy regime [Paras 21, 25–27].

Equality Clause – Article 14 – No Discrimination Established – No candidate admitted after 2010–11 was granted appointment under old system except pursuant to court orders – Respondents unable to point out any similarly situated person appointed directly – Held: No unequal treatment of equals and no arbitrariness by State [Paras 22, 27].

Recruitment Process – Statutory Rules and Selection Authority – Post of Ayurvedic Staff Nurse brought under UPSSSC after notification dated 15.12.2014 – Statutory service rules notified only in 2021 – Recruitment thereafter to be only through prescribed selection process – Direct appointment without selection impermissible [Paras 8, 22, 27].

Precedent – Distinction from N. Suresh Nathan Case – Earlier decision dealt with interpretation of service rules based on consistent departmental practice – Present case involved absence of statutory rules earlier and complete policy shift – Reliance held misplaced [Paras 23–24].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgments of the High Court set aside – No direction for appointment – Respondents may participate in future selection subject to eligibility – Pending applications disposed of [Para 28–29].

Provident Fund – Nomination – Release of GPF Amount – Rule 33(ii) of GPF Rules, 1960 – Primacy of Nominee – Respondent claimed GPF amount of his deceased brother as the sole valid nominee – Central Administrative Tribunal directed release of GPF amount to respondent – High Court dismissed writ petition filed by Union of India – Held: Rule 33(ii) of the GPF (Central Services) Rules, 1960 mandates payment of GPF amount to a valid nominee when subscriber leaves no family – Said Rule framed by Central Government not challenged by petitioners and binding on authorities [Paras 2–6, 11].

Provident Funds Act, 1925 – Sections 4 and 5 – Harmonious Construction with GPF Rules – Union of India contended that where GPF amount exceeds Rs. 5,000/-, nominee is entitled to payment only upon production of succession certificate/probate under Section 4(1)(c)(i) – Held: Literal interpretation of Section 4 leading to insistence on succession certificate even in cases of valid nomination would render nomination otiose – Sections 4 and 5 of the Act, 1925 must be read harmoniously with Rule 33(ii) – Section 5(1) contains a non-obstante clause conferring exclusive right on valid nominee to receive the amount [Paras 7, 10–13].

Nominee – Nature of Right – Trustee for Legal Heirs – Nominee under Provident Fund law is not the beneficial owner but merely a trustee to collect the amount – Release of GPF to nominee does not bar legal heirs or holders of probate/letters of administration/succession certificate from asserting their rights in appropriate proceedings – Law reiterated from Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi [Para 14].

Statutory Interpretation – Obsolete Monetary Threshold – Rs. 5,000/- Limit under 1925 Act – Classification under Sections 4(1)(b) and 4(1)(c) based on amount of Rs. 5,000/- may have been relevant in 1925 but has lost significance due to inflation – Recognising this reality, Central Government framed Rules in 1960 providing for release of PF amount to nominee irrespective of quantum – Court declined to accept interpretation defeating legislative and executive intent [Paras 9, 12].

Government Litigation – Provident Fund Claims – Avoidance of Protracted Disputes – Court observed that Government should not embroil itself in private disputes concerning succession to provident fund amounts – Requirement of succession certificate even in cases of valid nomination would unnecessarily make Government a litigating party in inter se disputes of private claimants [Para 15].

Decision: Special Leave Petition dismissed – Orders of Central Administrative Tribunal and Calcutta High Court upheld – GPF amount directed to be released to the valid nominee – Liberty reserved for competing claimants to pursue remedies before competent court – Pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law – Bail – Section 319 CrPC – Appellant summoned as additional accused based on eyewitness testimony after being dropped during investigation – Arrested pursuant to non-bailable warrant – High Court denied regular bail – Supreme Court held that stronger threshold of “cogent evidence” must be satisfied to deny bail under Section 319 – Bail granted subject to conditions [Paras 4–14, 17].

Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Parity – Co-accused summoned under Section 319 and granted anticipatory bail by High Court – State sought cancellation – Supreme Court declined to interfere, noting compliance with bail conditions and regular court appearance – No case made out for cancellation [Paras 9, 15, 18–19].

Section 319 CrPC – Summoning Additional Accused – Charges framed against newly summoned accused – Trial to proceed afresh – Court clarified that evidence at this stage must be stronger than prima facie case for framing charges but need not reach conviction standard – Observations not to influence trial [Paras 11, 14, 21].

Decision: Appeal filed by Md. Imran @ D.C. Guddu allowed – Bail granted – Appeal by State against anticipatory bail to Md. Samsher and Md. Arshad dismissed – All three accused to cooperate with trial [Paras 17–20].

Specific Performance – Validity of Power of Attorney – Ratification – Appellant entered agreement for purchase of co-owned land through unregistered POA holder of co-owner – Respondent executed later registered POA in favour of her son – However, she later executed an affidavit (Exh. A5) ratifying earlier POA and consenting to transfer – Held: Affidavit constituted binding ratification, and respondent is estopped from denying authority of previous POA holder – Registered POA does not automatically revoke earlier unregistered POA if ratified later [Paras 17–18, 35–38].

Contract Law – Limitation – Agreement to sell executed in 2007, extended thrice – Suit filed in 2013 – Trial Court and High Court held suit barred under Article 54 – Supreme Court held limitation runs from date of final refusal, i.e., affidavit ratifying POA dated 30.04.2013 – Suit held within limitation [Paras 13, 36–37].

Readiness and Willingness – Plaintiff paid full sale consideration and obtained sale deed from other co-owners – Respondent failed to execute her part despite ratification – Supreme Court found plaintiff demonstrated continuous willingness – Trial Court and High Court erred in denying decree [Paras 34, 38–39].

Equity – Respondent declined reasonable offer of Rs.75 lakhs for 1/11th share and attempted to leverage school’s land requirement – Court invoked equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 to avoid unjust enrichment and ensure school’s continued functioning [Paras 30–31, 39].

Education Law – Kerala Education Rules – Minimum land requirement of 3 acres for higher secondary school – Withholding of 1/11th share by respondent could jeopardize school recognition – With decree of specific performance granted, school’s land compliance now secured [Paras 29, 51–52].

Interim Management – Kerala DEO appointed to manage school during pendency of writ – After decree granted, no justification for interim DEO management – Interim order of High Court set aside [Paras 49–54].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court and Trial Court judgments set aside – Decree for specific performance granted – Trial Court to compute balance consideration with 9% simple interest – Registered sale deed to be executed – Interim management arrangement revoked.

Arbitration Law – Commencement of Arbitral Proceedings – Interim Protection – Appellant obtained ad-interim injunction under Section 9 of the Act on 17.02.2024 – High Court vacated injunction holding arbitration not “initiated” within 90 days under Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of the 2001 Rules – Supreme Court held “commencement” under Section 21 refers to the date the arbitration notice is received by respondent – Held: Respondent No. 2’s reply dated 23.04.2024 to notice dated 11.04.2024 evidences receipt and therefore arbitration was commenced within 90 days – Interim relief could not be vacated [Paras 16(A), 23–24, 29–31].

Interpretation – Rule 9(4) vs. Section 21 – High Court erroneously treated filing of Section 11 petition as commencement – Supreme Court clarified that “initiation” in Rule 9(4) must be read harmoniously with “commencement” in Section 21 – Legislative intent and UNCITRAL Model Law support receipt of arbitration notice as sole determinant of commencement – Court harmonised procedural rule with statutory provision [Paras 25–27].

Contract and Consent – Franchise Agreement Validity – Respondent No. 2’s objection to being non-signatory rejected – Franchise Agreement dated 23.03.2019 held valid and acted upon – Finding of High Court on validity of Franchise Agreement attained finality as unchallenged by Respondents [Paras 12, 16].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s judgment and Trial Court’s order vacating interim relief set aside – Interim injunction order dated 17.02.2024 restored – Contempt petition disposed of without further proceedings [Paras 32–35].

Company Law – Condonation of Delay – Section 58(3), Companies Act, 2013 – Appeal Allowed – The Company Law Board (CLB), a quasi-judicial body operating between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016, lacked the power to condone delay in filing an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 – Section 10E(4C) of the Erstwhile Companies Act, 1956, restricted the CLB's powers to those of a court only for specific matters, not including the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 – The legislature consciously timed the coming into force of Section 433 of the Companies Act, 2013 (empowering NCLT/NCLAT to apply Limitation Act) with the creation of NCLT/NCLAT, indicating no intent to confer such power on the CLB – The High Court erred in affirming the CLB's order condoning delay – The appeal is allowed, and the impugned judgment is set aside [Paras 37, 38, 41, 52, 131, 132, 160(i), 160(ii), 161, 162].

Limitation Act, 1963 – Applicability to Quasi-Judicial Bodies – Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963 – Principles not applicable – The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, including Sections 4 to 24, apply only to suits, applications, or appeals made before 'courts' and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless expressly empowered by statute – There is no inherent power for statutory authorities or quasi-judicial bodies to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, unless specifically indicated by law – The CLB was not expressly empowered to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – The absence of express exclusion of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not, by itself, confer power to condone delay on a quasi-judicial body – The principles underlying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, cannot be analogously applied to quasi-judicial bodies due to the discretionary nature of the power and the requirement of 'sufficient cause' – The use of "may" in a statutory provision does not automatically render a prescribed period merely directory – The simpliciter limitation period under Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, is mandatory – The High Court's reliance on Nupur Mitra (supra) and Mackintosh (supra) was misplaced as those cases either dealt with different statutory provisions or did not conclusively affirm the CLB's power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 [Paras 42, 48, 51, 53, 55, 58, 65, 66, 68, 69, 75, 78, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 90, 101, 107, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 128, 147, 150, 153, 154, 156, 160(iii), 160(iv), 160(vi), 160(vii), 160(viii), 160(ix), 160(xv)].

Limitation Act, 1963 – Exclusion vs. Extension of Time – Section 5 vs. Section 14, Limitation Act, 1963 – Distinction – Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, deals with the 'extension' of the prescribed period, involving judicial discretion based on 'sufficient cause', effectively adjusting the limitation period – Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, deals with the 'exclusion' of time spent prosecuting a bona fide proceeding in a court without jurisdiction, which is mandatory upon fulfilling specific conditions, and does not alter the original limitation period but rather deems the time spent as not having occurred for limitation purposes – This distinction is crucial in determining the applicability of these provisions to quasi-judicial bodies – The principles underlying Section 6 (legal disability) are more akin to Section 14 (exclusion) than Section 5 (extension) due to their mandatory nature and focus on exclusion of time [Paras 62, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 160(vi), 160(vii), 160(viii)].

Retrospective Application of Law – Section 433, Companies Act, 2013 – Not Retrospective – Section 433 of the Companies Act, 2013, which empowers NCLT/NCLAT to apply the Limitation Act, 1963, came into force on 01.06.2016, coinciding with the constitution of these tribunals – This provision cannot be applied retrospectively to the CLB, which was a different body with distinct powers – The respondent's remedy was already time-barred under the Erstwhile Companies Act, 1956, before Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, or Section 433 came into force – Retrospective application of a procedural law like limitation is generally permissible, but not if it revives a dead remedy or extinguishes a vested right – In this case, applying Section 433 retrospectively would revive a dead remedy and affect vested rights of the appellant – Therefore, the change in law cannot benefit the respondent [Paras 130, 132, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144, 145, 146, 160(xvi)].

Company Law Board Regulations – Inherent Powers – Regulation 44, Company Law Board Regulations, 1991 – No power to condone delay – Regulation 44, saving the inherent powers of the CLB, does not empower it to circumvent mandatory time limits or condone delay in filing appeals under Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 – Inherent powers are complementary to specific statutory powers and cannot conflict with express legislative intent or provisions – Regulations 25 and 43 of the CLB Regulations deal with granting time for adjournments or enlargement of time for procedural acts within the regulations, not for extending statutory limitation periods for filing petitions or appeals [Paras 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 160(xi)].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The impugned judgment and order of the High Court are set-aside – [Paras 162].