Electricity Act - Electricity Tariff – Scope of Note 3 of Regulation 55 – Contractual Obligation to Supply Free Power Beyond 13% Not Affected – Appeal Allowed – The appellant State challenged the High Court’s order that modified the agreed contractual free power supply from 18% to 13% in alignment with CERC Regulations, 2019 – The Supreme Court held that Note 3 of Regulation 55 of the 2019 Tariff Regulations only caps the extent of free power for purposes of tariff calculation recoverable from distribution licensees and beneficiaries – The cap does not restrain or extinguish the contractual obligation to supply free power beyond 13%, which forms part of negotiated consideration for resource allocation – Held: Contractual obligation to supply 18% free power continues unaffected by the 13% cap applicable for tariff computation [Paras 1-24].

Tariff Regulation – Limited Purpose of CERC Regulations – Contractual Free Power Obligations Not Regulated – The Court clarified that CERC Regulations govern tariff computation between generating companies and beneficiaries and cannot be relied upon to alter royalty-based free power obligations agreed with the State Government – Held: The free power clause forms part of the project allotment consideration and remains enforceable as such – The regulatory cap applies only to tariff pass-through and does not rewrite resource contracts [Paras 15-21].

Writ Jurisdiction – Not Maintainable to Modify Concluded Contracts Governed by Sectoral Regulation – The Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining a writ petition seeking to rewrite contractual terms based on tariff regulations – Disputes on tariff are within the exclusive domain of CERC and APTEL – Held: Constitutional Courts must refrain from entertaining parallel remedies when specialized statutory frameworks are available and operative [Paras 26-39].

Role of Sectoral Regulator – Judicial Deference to CERC in Tariff Matters – The Court reaffirmed the established principle that tariff-related determinations, including interpretations of applicable regulations, fall squarely within the regulatory domain of expert bodies like CERC and appellate bodies like APTEL – High Courts should not interfere where regulatory mechanisms exist and have not been duly exhausted – Writ petitions circumventing these remedies are impermissible [Paras 26-39].

Status of State Government – Not a Deemed Licensee – The Court observed that the High Court wrongly assumed the appellant State to be a deemed licensee and a regulated entity under the Electricity Act – Held: Supply of free power as royalty does not make the State a licensee as it involves no trading, transmission, or distribution activity – Obligations arising from sovereign contracts of natural resource allocation are distinct from regulated market relationships under the Electricity Act [Paras 35-38].

Final Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s judgment quashing part of the Implementation Agreement set aside – Contractual right of the State to receive 18% free power upheld – The High Court erred in modifying a sovereign contract through writ jurisdiction – Writ petition held not maintainable and dismissed [Paras 40-41].

Criminal Law – Murder - Section 302, 308, 325, 323 of the IPC - Standard of Proof – Conviction Set Aside – Section 302 IPC – Death Sentence Reversed – The Court allowed the appeals against concurrent conviction and death sentence for murder of four family members including two minor children – Held that prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt – Major contradictions in testimonies of key prosecution witnesses PW1, PW2 and PW17 rendered their evidence wholly unreliable – Material inconsistencies on presence at scene of crime, weapon used, and number of accused persons involved – Benefit of doubt extended to accused – Conviction unsustainable [Paras 1-32].

Evidence Act – Eyewitness Testimony – Contradictions in Depositions – Material Discrepancies Fatal to Prosecution Case – The Court found that depositions of PW1 and PW2 were full of contradictions regarding their presence at the scene, alarm raised, and timeline of events – Presence of PW1 at scene held improbable – Presence of PW2 found doubtful due to inconsistent narrations and absence in FIR – Statement of injured child witness PW17 clarified he was asleep and did not witness the crime – Held: prosecution version collapsed in absence of credible eyewitness evidence [Paras 25-35].

Evidence Act – Section 27 – Recovery of Weapon and Clothes – No Forensic Linkage – Investigative Lapses – The alleged recovery of blood-stained clothes and gandasi made after two months of the incident found untrustworthy in absence of independent witnesses and proper forensic corroboration – Chemical report only confirmed human blood, without linking it to the deceased – Courts below erred in accepting such evidence without formal exhibition of forensic report – Held: recovery evidence inadmissible for sustaining conviction [Paras 36-38].

Evidence Act – Section 106 – Reverse Burden of Proof – Not Applicable – The Court held that Section 106 Evidence Act could not be applied to infer guilt from unexplained injuries on the accused – Held that adverse inference under Section 106 requires prior establishment of foundational facts connecting the accused to the crime, which was absent in this case – Injuries on accused alone cannot replace prosecution’s burden to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 39-40].

Death Penalty – Rarest of Rare Doctrine – Inapplicability – Death Sentence Set Aside – The Court held that in absence of trustworthy eyewitness accounts, independent corroboration and reliable circumstantial evidence, the death sentence imposed on the appellant was wholly unwarranted – Case did not qualify as “rarest of rare” – Conviction and sentence quashed – Appellant directed to be released after more than eleven years of incarceration [Paras 41-45].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Judgments of Trial Court and High Court set aside – Conviction and death sentence under Sections 302, 308, and 325 IPC quashed – Appellant acquitted of all charges – Appellant to be released forthwith unless required in any other case [Para 44].

Criminal Law - Section 319 CrPC – Power to Summon Additional Accused – FIR Naming but Non-Charge-Sheeting – Summoning Restored – The complainant’s appeal arose from the High Court quashing the Trial Court’s summoning of Respondent No.2 under Section 319 CrPC – The Supreme Court held that the Trial Court was correct in summoning Respondent No.2, whose presence was consistently noted in the FIR and supported by statements of eyewitnesses PW1, PW2, and PW3 – Held: The High Court erred by applying the standard required at the conclusion of trial rather than the correct standard applicable under Section 319 CrPC, which requires more than a prima facie case but less than evidence for conviction – Summoning order restored [Paras 2-26].

Section 319 CrPC – Standard for Invoking Power – Deposition in Examination-in-Chief Sufficient – No Mini Trial Required – The Court reiterated that statements made in examination-in-chief before the court constitute valid evidence sufficient for invoking Section 319 CrPC – Cross-examination is not a prerequisite, and a mini-trial at this stage is impermissible – Held: The degree of satisfaction must be more stringent than framing charges but less than conviction – Trial courts must rely on courtroom evidence, not on police case diaries or statements under Section 161 CrPC [Paras 6-15].

FIR Named Accused – Role Reaffirmed in Court Depositions – Summoning Justified – The judgment clarified that even if a person is excluded from the charge sheet, their naming in the FIR and clear deposition by witnesses during trial implicating them with specific roles justifies their summoning under Section 319 CrPC – Held: High Court erred in discarding credible in-court testimony and relying on extraneous materials like affidavits before police [Paras 16-25].

Final Decision – Summoning Upheld – Appeal Allowed – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, and restored the summoning order passed by the Trial Court – Directed the trial to conclude within 18 months while ensuring cooperation of parties and avoidance of delays [Paras 26-28].

Tenancy Law - Landlord-Tenant Dispute – Ejectment Decree – Appellant landlord filed suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against respondent tenant for defaulting on rent and other charges from 1st June 1999 to 11th September 2000 – Trial Court decreed suit in favour of landlord, ordering eviction and payment of arrears along with mesne profits – High Court set aside the decree on ground that notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was not served since postal letter returned with endorsement “ND” (Not Delivered) – Supreme Court held High Court erred in ignoring Section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1887 which establishes deemed service through Registered Post unless contrary is proved – Reiterated that valid service is presumed once notice is sent to correct address through Registered Post [Paras 3, 9, 10, 11, 15].

Deemed Service of Notice – Applicability of Section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1887 – Court held service of notice by Registered Post at correct address is deemed valid, irrespective of actual delivery – Cited M/s Madan & Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Mouhammed, Vishwabandhu v. Srikrishna and other precedents – ‘ND’ endorsement cannot invalidate service when due procedure followed – High Court overlooked well-settled legal principle of deemed service by post [Paras 13, 14, 15].

High Court’s Revisional Jurisdiction – Misapplication – Supreme Court observed High Court exceeded revisional jurisdiction under CPC by interfering in a decree based on settled factual findings without jurisdictional error, procedural irregularity, or denial of opportunity – Referenced Ram Murti Devi v. Pushpa Devi and Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury – Found no circumstances justifying High Court’s interference under revision [Paras 16].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment and order of High Court set aside – Decree of ejectment passed by Trial Court restored – Tenant directed to handover vacant possession and clear all arrears within three months from date of judgment – Registry directed to ensure compliance through Allahabad High Court [Paras 17, 18].

Conviction for Rape, Kidnapping and Wrongful Confinement – Section 376, 363, 342 IPC – Conviction Set Aside – The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court under Sections 376, 363, 342 IPC, which was upheld by the High Court – The Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the age of the prosecutrix to be under 16 years as per the legal requirement – The only document relied upon was a school certificate (Exhibit P11) based on school register entries, which was not backed by primary evidence or the testimony of any family member – Held: Prosecution failed to establish the age conclusively; conviction for rape under Section 376 IPC unsustainable [Paras 7-12].

Kidnapping and Confinement – Section 363 and 342 IPC – Conviction Quashed – The prosecutrix had voluntarily stayed with the appellant for approximately two months without any evidence of inducement, threat, or confinement – The prosecution's claim of kidnapping failed due to absence of evidence showing force or deceitful means – Held: Conviction under Sections 363 and 342 IPC unsustainable in absence of credible evidence of kidnapping or wrongful restraint [Paras 13-17].

Rape Allegation – Absence of Proved Non-Consent – Section 376 IPC – Conviction Reversed – The prosecutrix did not allege forcible sexual intercourse and there was no medical evidence establishing recent forced intercourse – Her deposition contained inconsistencies and contradictions, with admissions of willingly cohabiting with the appellant – Held: Prosecution failed to establish absence of consent, leading to acquittal under Section 376 IPC [Paras 18-20].

Principle of Benefit of Doubt – Standard of Proof in Criminal Trials – Conviction Reversed – The Court reiterated the principle that criminal convictions must be based on proof beyond reasonable doubt – Mere suspicion or defective investigation cannot form the basis for conviction, especially in cases involving grave charges – Held: Benefit of doubt must be given to the accused where prosecution fails to discharge burden of proof [Paras 21-22].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Conviction and Sentences Quashed – The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence under Sections 376, 363, and 342 IPC – The appellant was acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case [Para 22].

Criminal Law - Sections 302, 376AB, 377, 201 of the of the IPC - Rape and Murder of Minor – Last Seen, Recovery of Dead Body, and DNA Evidence – Conviction Upheld – The appellant was convicted for the brutal rape, unnatural sexual assault, and murder of a 10-year-old girl – Conviction based on last seen evidence by child witnesses, recovery of deceased’s body from appellant’s hut, and DNA report conclusively matching the appellant’s semen with biological samples – Supreme Court held that concurrent findings by Trial Court and High Court were based on reliable ocular, medical, and scientific evidence, and upheld conviction under Sections 302, 376AB, 377 IPC and Sections 5/6 POCSO Act [Paras 1-13].

Death Sentence – Sentencing without Proper Mitigation Inquiry Impermissible – Death Penalty Commuted – Though crime was heinous, the Supreme Court held that courts below failed to appreciate mitigating circumstances – Reports under directions of Supreme Court highlighted absence of prior criminal record, good behaviour in jail, socio-economic backwardness, and potential for reformation – Court applied principles from Bachan Singh and Manoj cases, holding that sentencing must not focus solely on crime’s brutality – Death penalty commuted to life imprisonment without remission till natural death [Paras 14-22].

Sentencing Guidelines – Adherence to Principles in Manoj Judgment – Comprehensive Inquiry Mandatory – Supreme Court reiterated sentencing procedure laid down in Manoj v. State of M.P. (2023) 2 SCC 353, mandating socio-economic, psychological, and behavioural analysis before awarding capital punishment – Courts below failed to conduct a meaningful analysis of such factors, warranting interference in sentence [Paras 15-21].

Decision – Conviction Affirmed, Death Sentence Commuted – Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal by commuting death sentence to life imprisonment without remission till the remainder of natural life, while confirming conviction on all counts [Paras 22-23].

Criminal Law – Criminal Review Jurisdiction –Abuse of Investigative Process – Review Jurisdiction – Interference by High Court – Appellant challenged the Division Bench’s order dated 13th May, 2025, passed on review petitions that were filed against the dismissal of writ appeals – Despite earlier finding no ground for review on 8th May, 2025, the Division Bench proceeded to pass substantive directions amounting to interference in the investigation process – Held: Division Bench’s order indefensible as it exceeded its jurisdiction and invoked review power without fulfilling conditions under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC – Such action amounted to reopening concluded proceedings under the guise of “interest of justice” without any legal justification [Paras 2, 4, 5(d), 7–9].

Criminal Writ – Improper Transfer of Investigation – CID Involvement Set Aside – On basis of impugned review order, investigation in FIR No. 588/2024 was transferred to CID – Supreme Court, noting the review order as invalid, directed restoration of investigation to original Investigating Officer – Evidence collected by CID to be handed over – Investigation to proceed uninfluenced by superior officers and in accordance with law [Paras 10–11].

Writ Jurisdiction – Intra-Court Appeal in Criminal Writ – Improper Relief by Single Judge – Court expressed doubt whether intra-court appeal was maintainable in a criminal writ under Article 226 in light of Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana – Even if maintainable, Division Bench should have confined itself to examining interim order, not expanded into review of investigation – Also held: Single Judge wrongly restrained holding of EGM in a criminal writ despite no such prayer by petitioner – Relief not sought should not be granted, as reiterated in Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi [Paras 6, 12–14].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court’s order dated 13th May, 2025 set aside – Investigation restored to original Investigating Officer – Interim injunction against company meetings not to apply to future meetings – Appellant may approach appropriate forum if affected by future decisions [Paras 9, 11, 14–15].

Civil Law - General Power of Attorney (GPA) – Validity of Registration – Sections 32, 33, 34, and 35 of the Registration Act, 1908 – Appeal Allowed for Reconsideration - The appellants challenged the validity of the General Power of Attorney dated 15.10.1990 and the sale deeds executed by the attorney-holder on behalf of the original owners – The Supreme Court examined whether a power-of-attorney holder becomes an “executant” under Section 32(a), thereby bypassing the authentication requirements of Section 33 – Held: The power-of-attorney holder signs documents on behalf of the principal and remains an agent, not an executant under Section 32(a) – Therefore, the statutory requirements of authentication under Sections 32(c), 33, 34, and 35 are mandatory for valid registration [Paras 1-17].

Interpretation of Executant – Distinction between Agent and Executant – Clarification Made - The Court disapproved the interpretation laid down in Rajni Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar, (2009) 14 SCC 782, which held that a power-of-attorney holder executing a document becomes the “executant” under Section 32(a) – Held: Such an interpretation is erroneous as it overlooks statutory safeguards requiring verification of the agent’s authority and identity – Such power-of-attorney holders continue to fall under Section 32(c), necessitating adherence to authentication procedures [Paras 12-18].

Reference to Larger Bench – Conflict in Precedent – Matter Referred - Noting a direct conflict with previous binding precedent and its significant implications on property registration practices, the Court referred the matter to a larger bench to conclusively settle the legal position concerning the status of power-of-attorney holders under the Registration Act [Para 18-19].

Decision – Appeals Listed Before Larger Bench - The Supreme Court directed the Registry to obtain necessary orders from the Hon’ble Chief Justice for expeditious listing of these appeals before an appropriate larger bench for authoritative adjudication [Para 19].

Section 13(2), 13(4), 14, 17(4A), 18 and 35 of the of the SARFAESI Act - SARFAESI Proceedings – Tenant’s Rights and Restoration of Possession – Unregistered Lease – Appeal Allowed - The appellant, a secured creditor, took possession of a secured asset under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act following borrower’s default – Respondent claimed tenancy under unregistered lease from 1987 – High Court restored possession to respondent citing tenancy rights under rent laws – Held: High Court erred in entertaining challenge under Article 227 of Constitution despite availability of statutory remedy under Section 18 SARFAESI; tenancy claims must be adjudicated by DRT as per amended Section 17(4A) – Appeal allowed, possession retained by secured creditor pending DRT decision [Paras 11-13, 26].

Tenant Claims – Requirement of Documentary Evidence – Protection Limited for Unregistered Lease – The respondent failed to produce rent receipts, tax records, or electricity bills prior to issuance of demand notice under Section 13(2) SARFAESI Act – Reference to tenancy in sale deed or attornment letter insufficient without corroborative evidence – Citing Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal v. Central Bank of India, held unregistered tenancy not protected beyond one year from notice under SARFAESI – Mandatory order restoring possession unjustified – Appeal allowed [Paras 23-25].

High Court Jurisdiction – Alternate Remedy and Misapplication of Pre-Amendment Law – Error Noted – The High Court misapplied the ratio of Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd., which was based on pre-2016 SARFAESI Act and did not consider introduction of Section 17(4A) post-amendment – SARFAESI provides complete statutory remedy, writ jurisdiction not to be invoked – Appeal rightly entertained and allowed [Paras 11-13].

Non-Obstante Clause in SARFAESI – Applicability over Rent Control Act – Clarified – Following Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal, Court reiterated non-obstante clause under Section 35 SARFAESI overrides inconsistent tenancy claims unless validly established – Precedents in Vishal N. Kalsaria and V. Dhanapal Chettiar limited to legally protected tenancies and do not protect unregistered undocumented occupation in secured assets recovery proceedings [Paras 17-19, 23].

Conduct of Respondent – Delay in Asserting Rights – No Equitable Relief – Respondent failed to contest symbolic possession despite newspaper notice in 2021, approached DRT only after physical possession in 2023 – Collusive litigation with borrower not ruled out – Absence of proactive assertion of rights bars relief under equitable jurisdiction – Appeal allowed, possession retained by secured creditor [Paras 24-25].

Decision of the Case – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s direction restoring possession set aside – Status quo maintained with secured creditor till DRT adjudication within two months – No costs awarded [Paras 26-27].