Factual Aspects: Appellant, an entity selling country liquor under the label "Tango Punch," filed a suit claiming copyright infringement and passing-off against the respondent, who sold country liquor under the label "Two Punch Premium." The appellant alleged that the artistic label on their liquor bottles was copyrighted, and they sought a permanent injunction against the respondent from using a deceptively similar label. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the appellant, granting a permanent injunction against the respondent and damages. The respondent appealed this decision. [Para 1-4]

Civil Appeal – Infringement of Copyright and Passing-off – Appellant challenges High Court's interim order staying execution of a decree – Examination of evidence regarding reputation and goodwill crucial in passing-off action – Lack of evidence on appellant's part regarding sales and advertisement expenses – Stay justified on passing-off aspect. [Para 11-14]

Acquiescence: During the proceedings, it was revealed that the appellant had initially raised objections to the respondent's label during permission proceedings but later withdrew these objections. The Trial Court found this withdrawal significant, indicating possible acquiescence. The appellant filed the suit nearly one and a half years after withdrawing these objections. [Para 15-16]

Conduct of Bar – Disruptive conduct by advocate during cross-examination – Need for cooperation and fair conduct in trials – Delay caused by frequent objections – Advocates expected to act as officers of the Court and maintain fairness. [Para 18-19]

Decision – High Court's order of stay justified – Appeal dismissed with a clarification that observations made in this judgment and the impugned judgment should not influence the pending appeal's decision – No order as to costs. [Para 20]

Civil Appeal – Income Tax – Deduction under Section 80P of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Appellant, a co-operative society, claims deduction of profits and gains attributable to banking and credit facilities provided to its member co-operative societies – Interpretation of Section 80P – Dispute regarding the appellant's classification as a co-operative bank – Detailed analysis of the appellant's registration history and governing laws – Comparison with provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Reference to relevant judgments – Clarification of the appellant's status as a co-operative society engaged in providing credit facilities – Question of whether the appellant qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) – Examination of the provisions of the State Act, 1969 and State Act, 1984 – Evaluation of the appellant's activities in relation to banking business – Assessment of the appellant's eligibility for deduction under Section 80P of the Act – Consideration of legal arguments and submissions by both parties – Dispute over the appellant's classification and its entitlement to the deduction – [Para 10.1-10.13]

Income Tax Act – Deduction under Section 80P – Whether the appellant entity qualifies as a co-operative bank under Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (BR Act) – Examination of relevant provisions of BR Act and NABARD Act – Interpretation of the term "co-operative bank" – Kerala State Co-operative Bank's status as a state co-operative bank – Determination of the appellant's eligibility for deduction under Section 80P. [Para 14-15]

Interpretation – Examining the definitions of "co-operative bank" in Section 56 of the BR Act and related provisions in the NABARD Act, 1981 – Distinction between co-operative banks and other co-operative societies engaged in banking business. [Para 14.1]

Legislative Intent – Section 80P of the Income Tax Act as a beneficial provision to encourage and promote the co-operative sector – Need for a liberal interpretation in favor of the assessee. [Para 14.2]

Eligibility Criteria – Key points to consider for eligibility for deduction under Section 80P – Requirement of a co-operative society being engaged in the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members – The burden of proof on the assessee to establish eligibility. [Para 14.3]

Banking Business – Definition of "banking" under Section 5(b) of the BR Act – Requirement for a co-operative society to engage in banking business as defined in the BR Act – Necessity of holding a license under Section 22 of the BR Act for carrying on banking business. [Para 15.4]

State Co-operative Bank – Significance of being declared a state co-operative bank under the NABARD Act, 1981 – Kerala State Co-operative Bank's status as a state co-operative bank as opposed to the appellant's non-declaration as such. [Para 15.12]

Conclusion – Determination that the appellant, although an apex co-operative society, is not a co-operative bank under the BR Act, 1949, and, therefore, entitled to the benefit of deduction under Section 80P of the Income Tax Act. [Conclusion]

Decision – Allowance of the appeals filed by the appellant and setting aside of the orders of the Kerala High Court and other authorities – Holding that the appellant qualifies for deduction under Section 80P of the Act.

Special Leave Petition – Bail Request – Petitioners charged under FIR No. 342 of 2021 for carrying 100 bottles of Phensedyl Cough Syrup containing Codeine Phosphate – In custody for over 2 years – Trial yet to commence – Petitioners seek bail. [Para 1-3]

Prosecution's Stand – State counsel indicates that 12 prosecution witnesses are scheduled for examination, with the first to testify on 14.12.2023 – No known criminal antecedents against the accused. [Para 4-5]

Decision – Given the prolonged custody and nature of the contraband, Court grants bail to petitioners, Badsha SK and Rafikul Islam @ Kalu, subject to conditions to be imposed by the trial court – Special Leave Petitions disposed of accordingly. [Para 6-7]

Criminal Appeal – Conviction and Sentence – Challenge to Judgment – Appellants convicted under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code – High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence – Appellants contesting the verdict – Emphasis on the lack of conclusive evidence regarding the cause of death by poisoning. [Para 1-41]

Viscera Reports – Role in Establishing Cause of Death – Discussion on the significance of viscera reports and their potential limitations in detecting poison in cases of suspected poisoning. [Para 23-35]

Presumption under Section 113B – Dowry Death – Reference to Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, which raises a presumption of dowry death when cruelty or harassment for dowry is proven. [Para 18-19]

Reliance on Circumstantial Evidence – Court’s reliance on circumstantial evidence, including expert opinions, to uphold the conviction of the appellants for the offense of dowry death. [Para 38]

Upholding Conviction – Final Verdict – Conclusion of the case with the dismissal of the appeal and affirmation of the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants. [Para 39-40]

Employee Benefits - Grant of UGC Pay Scale - Discrepancy in granting UGC pay scale benefits to retired employees - Benefit granted to similarly placed retired employee previously - Inconsistent application of government orders - Writ petition filed challenging denial of UGC pay scale benefits - High Court judgment relied on Government Order dated 4th July 2008 - In another case, a similar benefit granted to a retired employee - Government allowed the previous order to become final - Appellants entitled to benefits under Government Order dated 15th November 1999 - Impugned judgment quashed, and State Government directed to extend benefits within three months. [Para 1-11]

Judicial Precedent - Applicability of judgment to similarly situated employees - Applicability to cases pending before Administrative Tribunal or High Court - No reopening of concluded cases - Clarification on the scope of the judgment. [Para 12]

Societies Registration Act – Power of Registrar to cancel registration – Conflict over control of a school between Chinese tannery owners in Kolkata – Registrar's authority to cancel registration questioned – Appellant claims no connection between Chinese Tannery Owners’ Association and Pei May Chinese High School – Allegations of forgery and fabrication – Civil suit and criminal proceedings initiated – Order of Registrar challenged – Difference of opinion in High Court – Reference to third Judge. [Para 3-13]

Procedural Review vs. Substantive Review – Referee Judge’s analysis – Power of Registrar to cancel order – Section 22 of Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 – Requirement to prove suppression of material fact – Lack of information on the record – Referee Judge finds Registrar’s exercise of power incorrect – Dispute to be decided by civil court – Previous judgments not appealed against – No constructive res judicata. [Para 10-13]

Land Ownership – Chinese Tannery Owners’ Association ownership of school's land – Factor to be considered for cancellation of registration – Subject to final adjudication by civil court if necessary. Appeal dismissed [Para 16-19]

Criminal Appeal – Conviction based on a Single Witness – Appeal by Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi against his conviction and sentence – Appellant convicted based on the testimony of PW-2 Gitaben, who identified him as the person who snatched her gold chain during a mob event – Questions raised about the reliability of a single witness's testimony. [Para 1-3]

Identification of Accused – Sole Testimony of Witness – PW-2, the only witness to identify the appellant, points to him in court approximately two years after the incident – Lack of previous acquaintance and the presence of a large mob at the time of the incident call into question the reliability of the identification. [Para 6]

Testimony of Single Witness – Conviction based on a single eyewitness permitted under the law – However, the testimony must be wholly reliable and unimpeachable to stand alone as sufficient proof of guilt – Reference made to Vadivelu Thevar & Anr. v. State of Madras. [Para 7]

Quality of Evidence – Court’s duty to weigh the quality of evidence over the quantity – Classifies the testimony of witnesses into wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, and neither – Explains that in the case of 'neither,' corroboration is necessary for conviction. [Para 7-8]

Lack of Corroboration – No corroborative evidence to support the sole testimony of PW-2 – Due to the lack of corroboration and the questionable reliability of PW-2’s testimony, the conviction of the appellant deemed unsafe and unsustainable. [Para 8]

 Identification Parade – Testimony Reliability – Accused identified by two prosecution witnesses, PW-25 and PW-26, without a test identification parade for some. Court questions the reliability of these witnesses’ identification given the complexities of identifying individuals in a large mob. [Para 9-11]

Evidence – Rejection of Testimony – Court rejects the testimony of PW-25 and PW-26 in its entirety, holding that their evidence does not inspire confidence. [Para 12]

Section 149 IPC – Unlawful Assembly – Court discusses the theory of prosecution based on accused being part of a mob. Reference to past case law to emphasize that mere presence in a mob does not indicate sharing a common unlawful object. [Para 13-15]

Principle of Parity – Identical Evidence for Different Accused – When the evidence against two or more accused is identical or similar, the Court cannot convict one and acquit the other. It discusses the principle of parity and its applicability to the case. [Para 15, 17, 19]

Article 136 and Article 21 of the Constitution – Suo Motu Powers and Personal Liberty – Court highlights its suo motu powers under Article 136 in rarest of rare cases and mentions that failure to extend relief to similarly placed accused would violate Article 21 of the Constitution. [Para 16, 17]

Doctrine of Merger – Non-speaking Orders – Discusses that an order refusing special leave to appeal by a non-speaking order does not attract the doctrine of merger. Principle from case law cited to emphasize the importance of parity in sentences for co-accused. [Para 18, 19]

Decision – Acquittal and Setting Aside Convictions – Court acquits various accused based on unreliable testimony and the principle of parity. [Para 20-21]

Criminal Appeal – Conviction based on events of 7^th November 2003 – Appellant, accused no.6, convicted for various offenses – Sole eyewitness testimony of PW­2 Gitaben questioned – Test identification parade not held – Identification after two years of the incident and in a large mob raises doubts – Evidence not wholly reliable – Conviction of appellant set aside. [Para 6-8]

Parity Principle – Accused nos. 2, 3, and 4 similarly placed with accused nos. 1, 5, and 13 – All convicted based on testimony of PW­25 and PW­26 – Coordinate Bench of Supreme Court discarded their testimony – Benefit of this finding extended to accused nos. 2, 3, and 4 – Principle of parity applied. [Para 15-16]

Review of Previous Order – Accused no.2’s special leave petition summarily dismissed earlier – His case identical to acquitted accused – Doctrine of merger not applicable to non-speaking orders – Order recalled, and leave granted to accused no.2 – Benefit of acquittal extended to him. [Para 18-19]

Acquittal and Release – Appellant acquitted, bail bonds canceled – Accused nos. 3 and 4 acquitted and to be set at liberty – Accused no.2 acquitted, granted leave, and to be released unless detained for other offenses – Appeal allowed on these terms. [Para 21]

Criminal Appeal – Reversal of Acquittal – The Supreme Court examines the legality of the High Court's decision to reverse the Trial Court's acquittal of the appellant-accused under Section 302 of IPC and sentence him to life imprisonment. The appeal questions whether the reversal is valid given that the Trial Court had acquitted the appellant based on his plea of insanity. [Para 1-4]

Prosecution Case – Homicide of Grandfather – The prosecution alleges that the appellant killed his 81-year-old grandfather, Krishna Bahadur Rai, using a sharp-edged weapon. The FIR was lodged by the deceased's daughter, Reeta Rai (PW-1). [Para 2]

High Court's Rejection of Insanity Plea – The respondent argues that the High Court rightly rejected the plea of insanity, after thoroughly examining medical records and other evidence. [Para 7]

Central Issue – The Supreme Court focuses on whether the case falls within the exceptions laid down under Section 84 of IPC. [Para 8]

Eyewitness Accounts – Testimonies of Reeta Rai (PW-1) and Geeta Chettri (PW-13) confirm the appellant-accused's involvement in the crime. Medical Evidence – Autopsy reports and medical examinations corroborate the violent nature of the crime and the cause of death of the deceased [Para 10-14]

Insanity Defense – Plea of insanity raised by the appellant-accused supported by the testimony of the mother and corroborated by medical evidence – Appellant's abnormal behavior at the time of the incident and thereafter cited. [Para 15-18]

Medical Evidence – Central Referral (Manipal) Hospital records and the testimony of Dr. Netra Thapa confirm the appellant-accused had been treated for acute and transient psychotic disorder and major depressive disorder with psychotic feature – The possibility of relapse acknowledged. [Para 16, 20]

Legal Precedents – Reference to previous Supreme Court judgments outlining the standards for proving insanity under Section 84 of the IPC – Distinction made between legal insanity and medical insanity – Burden of proof lies on the accused to a level of 'reasonable doubt.' [Para 19-23]

Judgment Reversal – High Court reversed the Trial Court’s acquittal without finding perversity – Question on the legality of the High Court's approach in overturning the acquittal based on reappreciation of evidence rather than finding perversity. [Para 24-25]

Section 84 IPC – Scope and interpretation of Section 84 of the IPC which deals with the act of a person of unsound mind – Emphasis on the need for the court to adopt a remedial approach in such cases, as outlined in previous Supreme Court judgments. [Para 19, 23]

Appellate Review – Principles governing the reversal of an acquittal judgment by the Appellate Court outlined – Emphasis on the need for finding perversity rather than reappreciation of evidence for reversing an acquittal. [Para 24-26]