Facts:

The case revolves around the selection process initiated in August 2008 for filling up the posts of Additional District Judges in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services. The selection process involved a combination of promotions based on merit-cum-seniority and recruitment through Limited Competitive Examination and direct recruitment from the Bar.

Issues:

The contention was the interpretation of the rules governing the selection process, particularly regarding the allocation of vacancies between promotees and direct recruits.

Held:

The amended Rules, specifying the ratio between promotees and direct recruits, had prospective application from August 20, 2004. Therefore, the factual position as of that date became relevant in determining the validity of the selection process.

Prior to the amendment of August 20, 2004, appointments were governed by different rules where the direct recruit quota was 33% of the total posts, exceeding the 25% specified in the amended Rules. The affidavit filed by the State of Jharkhand confirmed the absence of vacancies against the direct recruit quota as of August 20, 2004. This fact was crucial in understanding the selection process initiated in 2008.

Since no vacancy existed against the direct recruit quota as of April 30, 2008, the selection process for promotion through Limited Competitive Examination was found to be proper. The High Court's oversight of the effect of filling vacancies in a 25:25 ratio, exceeding the direct recruit quota, was noted as impermissible.

Candidates eligible for direct recruitment alone and not promotion had no standing to challenge the 2008 selection process, as vacancies against the direct recruit quota were unavailable at that time.

Decision: The leading Civil Appeal was allowed, and the connected writ petitions were dismissed. The Court emphasized the importance of considering the factual background and relevant rules in determining the validity of the selection process.

Facts:

Late Ramabhakta started a business of manufacture and sales of 'Beedi' under the name 'M/s Neo Subhash Beedi Works'. After his demise, his six sons constituted the partnership firm.

Several changes occurred in the partnership due to retirements, deaths, and admissions of new partners over the years.

A Suit No. 5 of 2014 was filed by three Plaintiffs against six Defendants, seeking permanent prohibitory injunction and possession and enjoyment of 'A' schedule property.

The Defendants filed I.A.No.IV under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, praying to refer the parties to arbitration.

Original retirement deed and partnership deed were not initially filed with the application but were later produced by the Defendants.

Issues:

Whether non-filing of original or certified copies of the retirement deed and partnership deed along with application I.A.No. IV dated 09.05.2014 entailed dismissal of the application under Section 8(2) of the 1996 Act.

Whether the fact that all parties to the suit were not parties to the retirement deed/partnership deed precluded the court from making a reference relying on the arbitration agreement.

Whether a dispute pertaining to an unregistered partnership deed could be referred to arbitration despite there being an arbitration agreement.

Held:

The Court shall not entertain any application under Section 8(1) unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. However, the filing of the application without such original or certified copy, but bringing the original arbitration agreement on record at the time when the Court is considering the application, shall not entail rejection of the application under Section 8(2) (para. 22).

Since all parties to the suit, except Defendant No. 6, were parties to the arbitration agreement, and Defendant No. 6 did not inherit any share or rights in the partnership, the dispute could still be referred to arbitration (para. 26).

There is no statutory provision prohibiting the reference of a dispute concerning an unregistered partnership deed to arbitration. Therefore, the argument that such disputes cannot be referred to arbitration is not valid (para. 29).

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed as the Court found no merit in it (para. 30).

Facts:

The appellant, IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd., filed a summary suit against the respondent, Hubtown Ltd., based on the invocation of a Corporate Guarantee. The guarantee was issued by the respondent on behalf of its subsidiary 'V' in favor of the appellant. The respondent raised the defense that the investment made by 'V' in Optionally Partially Convertible Debentures (OPCDs) was to circumvent FEMA Regulations.

Issues:

Whether the principles established in Mechelec's case regarding the grant of leave to defend in summary suits still hold post-amendment of Or. XXXVII, r.3?

Whether the defendant's defense regarding FEMA Regulations raised a substantial defense to the claim made in the suit?

Held:

Relevance of Mechelec's case: The Court acknowledged the importance of determining whether the principles laid down in Mechelec's case continue to be the law post-amendment of Or. XXXVII, r.3. (Para 9)

Change in Law: The Court recognized that there has been a change in the law regarding summary suits after the amendment of Or. XXXVII, r.3 in 1976. The discretion of the trial judge is emphasized to ensure justice in each case. (Para 17)

Supersession of Previous Case Law: The Court held that the principles stated in Mechelec's case no longer govern summary suits under Or. XXXVII, r.3. Instead, the guidelines provided in the Milkhiram case, which followed the amended provision, prevail. (Para 18)

Application to the Present Case: The Court considered the defense raised by the respondent regarding FEMA Regulations. Despite the triable issue raised, the Court found doubt about the defendant's good faith and the genuineness of the defense. Therefore, the defendant was granted leave to defend the suit only upon depositing the principal sum invested by FMO or providing security for the said amount. (Para 20)

Facts:

Dhirendra Pal Singh, an Assistant Store Superintendent with the Irrigation Department of the State of Uttar Pradesh, retired on 30.06.2009. Upon retirement, certain amounts including GPF, leave encashment, and 70% of gratuity and pension were cleared. However, the remaining 30% of gratuity and the computation of pension were withheld by the state authorities.

Issues:

Whether the withholding of gratuity and pension without a departmental inquiry and proper legal procedure is justifiable.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court to quash the orders withholding the gratuity and pension. However, the interest rate awarded by the High Court was modified. The appellants were directed to pay 6% per annum interest on the unpaid pension amount from the date it was due and 8% per annum interest on the unpaid gratuity from the date of Singh's retirement. The appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

The petitioners approached the Supreme Court seeking urgent relief concerning the extreme air pollution in the National Capital Region (NCR), particularly attributed to the use of fireworks during festivals and weddings. The severe air pollution had reached alarming levels, posing significant risks to public health and the environment.

Issues:

The Court was to address the harmful effects of fireworks on air quality and public health, especially during festive seasons, and to balance these concerns against commercial interests.

Held:

The Court, after considering the arguments and evidence presented, issued interim directions to address the urgent issue of air pollution in the NCR. It directed the suspension of licenses permitting the sale of fireworks in the NCR until further notice, based on the provisions of Rule 118 of the Explosives Rules, 2008. Additionally, the Court instructed the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) to conduct a study on the harmful effects of materials used in fireworks manufacturing within three months and submit a report to the Court.

The Court emphasized the paramount importance of prioritizing public health over commercial interests and recognized the duty of both the State and citizens to ensure a healthy environment, as enshrined in the Constitution of India.

The decision aimed to mitigate the adverse effects of air pollution on the well-being of citizens, including children and the elderly, and to uphold constitutional rights to life, health, and a healthy environment.

Facts:

The Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (Appellant) challenged the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi affirming the Central Administrative Tribunal's (CAT) direction to consider the respondent's candidature for the post of Teacher (Primary) in MCD Schools with age relaxation. The respondent sought relief based on a precedent, Sachin Gupta v. DSSSB & Ors., which allowed age relaxation for candidates facing sudden changes in age limits.

Issues:

Whether the precedent case of Sachin Gupta v. DSSSB & Ors. can be universally applied to the respondent's case.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after analyzing the precedent and the respondent's situation, concluded that the judgment in Sachin Gupta's case cannot be universally applied to all cases. As the respondent applied for the post in 2009, not being a candidate in the recruitment process of 2008, the Court held that the age relaxation granted in Sachin Gupta's case does not extend to the respondent's situation. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the High Court and CAT.

Facts:

The case involves the challenge to state enactments regarding the imposition of entry tax.

Issues:

Whether state enactments concerning entry tax should be evaluated with reference to both clauses (a) and (b) of Article 304 of the Constitution.

Whether clause (a) of Article 304 is interconnected with or distinct from clause (b) of the same article.

Held:

The Constitution includes provisions such as Article 304(b), which subject state legislation to Presidential sanction. This framework aligns with the Constitutional scheme and does not encroach upon the separation of powers between the Legislature and the judiciary.

Article 304(b) grants state legislatures the authority to enact laws containing restrictions on trade, commerce, and intercourse, provided they comply with the provisions outlined in the proviso to Article 304(b). Judicial review is only relevant when such legislation is challenged, and it does not undermine the separation of powers.

The imposition of non-discriminatory taxes does not contravene Article 301, which guarantees freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse within India. Only taxes displaying discriminatory characteristics are prohibited by Article 304(a) of the Constitution.

Decision: In conclusion, the Supreme Court upholds the validity of state enactments related to entry tax under the Constitution of India, provided they adhere to the provisions outlined in Article 304 and do not discriminate against trade, commerce, or intercourse.

Facts:

The states of Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan entered into an agreement in 1981 regarding the reallocation of Ravi and Beas Waters.

Punjab failed to comply with the terms of this agreement, leading to litigation.

The Supreme Court issued a decree directing Punjab to fulfill its obligations under the 1981 agreement.

Punjab enacted the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, to terminate the 1981 agreement and nullify the Supreme Court decrees against it.

Issues:

Whether Punjab's unilateral termination of the 1981 agreement and nullification of the Supreme Court decrees were legal.

The appropriateness of Punjab's action in using legislative power to nullify the decree instead of approaching the appropriate authority under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956.

The constitutionality of the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004.

Held:

The Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, cannot be considered legal and valid. Punjab cannot absolve itself from its duties/liabilities arising out of the 1981 Agreement (Para 31).

Punjab's unilateral action to nullify the effect of the decree was deemed illegal. Once a binding decree is passed by a Court of law, a party cannot act unilaterally to nullify its effect (Para 32).

Instead of seeking relief from the appropriate authority under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, Punjab used legislative power to nullify the decree, which was inappropriate (Paras 33, 39).

The unilateral termination of the 1981 agreement by Punjab was against the Constitution and provisions of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 (Para 36).

The Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, was deemed contrary to the Constitution of India. Punjab cannot nullify the judgment and decree issued by the Supreme Court or terminate the 1981 Agreement (Para 41).

Decision: The Court held that the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, was unconstitutional, and Punjab cannot nullify the judgment and decree issued by the Supreme Court or terminate the 1981 Agreement.

Facts:

The appellant, Manganese Ore India Ltd., contested the definition of "mine" under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949, particularly concerning the inclusion of processing activities within mining.

The appellant also argued against the classification of ferro manganese alloy manufacturing as a mining activity.

Issues:

Whether the term "processing" in the definition of "mine" should include manufacturing activities.

Whether the manufacturing of ferro manganese alloy should be considered a mining activity for the purpose of electricity tariff rates.

Held:

The court interpreted the term "processing" narrowly, restricting it to activities directly connected to mining, such as those aimed at making the mined mineral marketable, saleable, and transportable without substantially changing its identity (Para 20).

Processes resulting in a substantial change in the mined mineral, producing a different commodity, fall outside the scope of "processing" (Para 20).

Manufacturing activities, including those producing a different commodity, should not be considered mining activities for the purpose of electricity tariff rates (Para 20).

The Ferro Manganese Plant, involved in manufacturing ferro manganese alloy, does not qualify as a mining unit as it is not engaged in activities directly linked to mining (Para 24).

The manufacturing of ferro manganese alloy results in a different product from the raw material manganese ore, both physically and chemically (Para 30).

Therefore, the Ferro Manganese Plant should be treated as a manufacturing unit rather than a mining unit for electricity tariff purposes (Para 31).

Appeals are allowed (Para 32).