Facts:

The three lady appellants, along with two men, were accused in a case involving various offenses. The trial court convicted all accused, and the High Court affirmed the decision. The appeal contended that contradictions in the victim's statements were not properly considered, and the defense of the appellants was overlooked.

Issues:

Contradictions in the victim's statements regarding the actions of the lady accused.

Applicability of Section 149 of the IPC to the appellants.

Adequacy of medical evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized the need for careful scrutiny of an injured witness's testimony, especially when there are circumstances suggesting potential false implication. The Court found errors in the analysis of evidence by both lower courts, particularly in not considering the specific defense raised by the appellants. The medical evidence did not support the specific allegations against the appellants.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence against the appellants were set aside, and they were acquitted of all charges due to the benefit of doubt. The Court emphasized the need for a more careful consideration of evidence in cases involving potential false implication.

Facts:

The appellants made a payment totaling Rs. 14,89,349.00, taking into account the duty payable under Section 3(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, considering the cum-duty benefit. An additional amount of Rs. 11,19,775.00 was payable if the benefit of a specific notification was applied.

Issues:

The extension of the benefit of cum-duty price, the invocation of a wrong section or rule in the show cause notice, and the eligibility of the appellant for treatment under Section 3(1) of the Act.

Held:

The benefit of cum-duty price was not extended, and the incorrect invocation of a section or rule in the show cause notice did not bar the imposition of a penalty under the correct rule or section. The expression "allowed to be sold in India" in the proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act applied exclusively to sales in the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) of production by 100% Export Oriented Units (EOUs) as per the provisions of the Exim Policy. Consequently, the assessee (appellant) was held liable to pay excise duty as per Section 3(1) of the Act.

Decision: The appeal stands allowed in favor of the appellant.

Facts:

Rekha alias Baby died of poisoning and was pregnant at the time of her death.

Appellant Satish Shetty was the husband of the deceased.

Appellant and his parents were initially acquitted but were later convicted by the High Court for offenses under Sections 498A, 306, and other IPC sections.

Charges included harassment for dowry and demanding money and gold.

Issues:

Validity of the judgment and order of acquittal by the High Court.

Conviction under Section 306 in the absence of a specific charge.

Sufficiency of evidence to justify the appellant's conviction.

Held:

The High Court found the trial court's approach erroneous in ignoring crucial facts, leading to a reversal of acquittal. The trial court's errors, including undue focus on financial details and ignoring available documents, rendered the judgment perverse. The Court rejected the contention that the acquittal was not perverse, affirming the High Court's findings.

The High Court, relying on K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, established that in cases involving cruelty under Section 498A and dowry death under Section 304B, a charge under Section 306 can be inferred from the evidence. The High Court's exercise of discretion under Section 113A of the Evidence Act was deemed justified in light of the established cruelty. The Supreme Court upheld this view, citing the discretionary nature of the presumption.

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that there was insufficient evidence. It upheld the High Court's findings of harassment based on the mother's testimony, supported by a cousin's statement. The appellant's failure to explain the deceased's injuries and the subsequent demand for money for investment in a wine business were crucial factors. The Court found the evidence compelling and upheld the convictions under Sections 498-A and 306.

Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions under Sections 498-A and 306. The judgment emphasized the discretionary nature of invoking presumptions under Section 113A and affirmed the High Court's findings on cruelty and abetment of suicide. The appellant was ordered to be taken into custody to serve the remaining part of the sentence.

Facts:

Star Sports India Pvt. Ltd. shared the live broadcast signal of a sporting event, including enhancing features and logos of event sponsors ("On-Screen Credits"), with Prasar Bharati.

The shared feed contained advertisements in the form of On-Screen Credits, which were logos of event sponsors.

Issues:

Whether the logos in the shared feed constituted advertisements and whether the sharing of live broadcasting signals must be without advertisements.

Held:

The logos (On-Screen Credits) were acknowledged as advertisements of event sponsors, intending to promote their companies for commercial purposes. The court emphasized that such commercials should be treated as advertisements.

Section 3 of the Sports Act imposes an obligation on content rights owners, content holders, and broadcasting service providers to share live broadcasting signals without advertisements. No distinction is made between different types of advertisements.

The purpose of the Sports Act is to provide free access to sporting events of national importance to the largest audience. Revenue generated from advertisements during the broadcast on Prasar Bharati is meant to be shared between the broadcaster and Prasar Bharati.

Sharing of signals must be without any advertisements. If advertisements are included, revenue sharing becomes mandatory. The court emphasized that the word 'its' in Section 3 should not be limited to advertisements of the broadcasting service provider.

Facts:

Writ petitions filed by private tour operators (PTOs) under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

Apprehension that applications for Hajj Yatra for 2016 may be rejected.

PTOs seek relief, including mandamus to accept applications and issue Registration Certificates.

Issues:

Whether the applications of PTOs for Hajj Yatra 2016 are likely to be rejected.

Relief sought under Article 32, including mandamus to accept applications.

Held:

The court dismisses the writ petitions.

No opinion expressed on the issues raised in previous orders.

The Additional Solicitor General states that no decision has been taken on the PTOs' applications.

Each PTO directed to make a fresh application by a specified date.

The concerned authority to examine, consider, and decide each application on its merit in accordance with the law.

Writ petitions disposed of with liberty granted to each petitioner to make a fresh application.

The concerned authority to decide each application with a reasoned order communicated to the applicant by a specified date.

Facts:

The employee (respondent No.1) worked as a Branch Manager at Ghat Branch of the Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Ltd.

Charge sheet dated 03.07.1992 was issued, alleging 19 charges, including unauthorized payments and issuance of overdrafts.

Employee responded, and an Inquiry Officer submitted a report on 21.09.1992.

Without further action, a fresh charge sheet with additional charges was issued on 16.01.1993.

Employee replied on 04.02.1993, but no inquiry proceedings were conducted.

Disciplinary Authority passed a resolution on 11.07.2000, stating charges were proved, and dismissal order was issued on 01.02.2002.

Issues:

Whether a proper disciplinary inquiry, as mandated by U.P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations Act, 1975, was conducted before dismissing the employee.

Whether the dismissal order was in violation of the principles of natural justice.

Held:

The Division Bench quashed the dismissal order, finding that no proper inquiry was held. The Court held that the second charge sheet (issued on 18.01.1993) rendered the earlier proceedings obsolete, and no inquiry was conducted thereafter. The Court emphasized the importance of conducting a fair and bona fide inquiry, observing that the principles of natural justice were not followed.

The Court directed the Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Ltd. to hold a de-novo inquiry within six months if they desired to proceed with disciplinary action. The employee was deemed to be under suspension, and the High Court's directions on suspension allowance were upheld. The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

Firoz Khan was accused of murdering an 11-year-old named Liley Khan.

The trial took place in Sessions Trial Case No. 48 of 2002 in the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Jaisalmer.

The Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent on 13.08.2004, giving the benefit of doubt.

The State of Rajasthan, dissatisfied with the acquittal, filed an application for leave to appeal before the High Court under Section 378(3) of the CrPC.

The High Court dismissed the application without assigning any reasons.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's dismissal of the application for leave to appeal without providing reasons was justified.

Whether there were discrepancies and errors in the judgment of the Sessions Judge.

Held:

The Supreme Court, while partially agreeing with the State's submission, criticized the High Court's order for a clear case of non-application of mind. The Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the High Court for deciding the application for leave to appeal afresh on merits within three months. The Court emphasized the need for the High Court to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or arguable points have been raised. The Supreme Court clarified that it had not applied its mind to the merits of the case and urged the High Court to decide the matter uninfluenced by any of the observations made in the order.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a Contract of Affreightment dated 18.1.2008 between Eitzen Bulk A/S (Appellant) and Ashapura Minechem Limited (Respondent).

The Contract included an Arbitration Clause (Clause No. 28) stating that any dispute under the Contract would be settled through Arbitration in London, governed by English Law.

The Arbitration was held in London, and Ashapura was held liable to pay a specified amount along with compound interest.

Ashapura filed a suit in Gujarat challenging the legality of the Contract and the Arbitration Clause but failed to obtain an injunction.

Eitzen initiated proceedings to enforce the Foreign Award in various jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, the USA, Belgium, and the UK.

Ashapura, having failed in the Arbitration proceedings, filed objections in India under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to challenge the Award.

Issues:

Whether Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act applies when the juridical seat of Arbitration is outside India, and the Arbitration is governed by a foreign law.

Whether objections under Section 34 can be raised before a Court in India in such cases.

Held:

The Court held that by choosing London as the seat of Arbitration and specifying English Law as the governing law in the Arbitration Clause, the parties intended to exclude the application of Part I of the Arbitration Act to the proceedings. Therefore, objections under Section 34 were not tenable before a Court in India. The jurisdiction to decide such objections lies with the courts of the juridical seat. The Gujarat High Court's decision allowing objections under Section 34 was deemed incorrect. The Bombay High Court's decision enforcing the Foreign Award under Part II of the Arbitration Act was upheld.

Facts:

Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (HSIIDC) invited bids for the Kundli-Manesar-Palwal Expressway.

Consortium of banks, including IDBI Bank and State Bank of India, financed the project, with outstanding dues of approximately Rs. 1419.15 crores.

Due to delays and non-completion of work, the concessionaire was replaced by a new one as directed by the Supreme Court in its order dated 30.01.2015.

Disputes arose regarding the termination payment of RS. 1300.00 crores to the outgoing concessionaire and the obligation to take over the debts due to the lenders by the new concessionaire.

Issues:

Whether HSIIDC failed to adhere to the contractual obligations under the substitution agreement?

Whether the unilateral revocation of termination payment by HSIIDC caused prejudice to the rights of the lender banks?

Held:

All disputes between the lender banks, HSIIDC, and the outgoing concessionaire stand referred to the arbitral tribunal.

Eighty percent of the toll collected for the Manesar-Palwal Expressway is to be deposited in an escrow account, with the remaining 20 percent available for HSIIDC for maintenance.

The amount in the escrow account is to be disbursed by the arbitral tribunal based on its interim arrangements or as deemed appropriate after hearing the parties.

The pendency of arbitration shall not impede the new concessionaire from commencing its work, subject to a committee's measurement of the work done by the outgoing concessionaire.

Decision: The disputes are referred to arbitration. The escrow account mechanism is established for the toll collections. The new concessionaire can commence its work, and the measurement of work is to be determined by a committee.