Facts:

The landlords filed a suit seeking recovery of possession of their property from the tenants on various grounds, including bona fide requirement. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the landlords, which was upheld by the appellate court. However, the High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction, set aside the lower courts' judgments.

Issues:

The validity of the High Court's interference with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, and whether the landlords' claim for recovery of possession was bona fide.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interference was unjustified and beyond its jurisdiction. It emphasized that the High Court's revisional jurisdiction is limited to cases of illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction by subordinate courts. Since the lower courts had passed reasoned orders within their jurisdiction, the High Court had no grounds to overturn their decisions. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and allowed the landlords' appeal.

However, considering the tenants' long occupation of the premises, the Supreme Court granted them six months to vacate the premises.

Facts:

The Central Bank of India appealed against a judgment by the High Court directing them to release deposits made by Respondents 1 to 4.

The CBI had previously requested the bank not to release the deposits until they received any reference from the CBI or the Special Court, Akola.

Respondents 1 to 4 challenged this request in a Criminal Writ Petition No. 496 of 2006, which was allowed by the High Court in a judgment dated 23.07.2010, directing the bank to release the amounts.

During the appeal, the CBI informed the court that they have withdrawn their request to the bank, and they have no objection to the release of the amounts.

Issues:

Whether the Central Bank of India should release the deposits made by Respondents 1 to 4, as directed by the High Court, despite the earlier request by the CBI not to release them.

Whether any other reasons exist to withhold the release of the deposits.

Held:

The Court held that since the CBI has withdrawn its request, there is no need to address the various contentions raised by the appellant's senior counsel. Therefore, all questions of law are left open.

The main objection to the release of the deposits was the request made by the CBI. Since the CBI has withdrawn its objection, the appeal is disposed of with a direction to the appellant-bank to release the deposits made by Respondents 1 to 4, provided there are no other reasons to withhold them. This release should be done within a week from the date of receipt of the judgment. No costs were awarded in this matter.

Facts:

Jagdamba Devi, the appellant, sought dependent family pension under the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980, on behalf of her deceased husband, Late Hari Kant Jha, who was involved in the freedom struggle. However, the Central Government rejected her claim, citing non-compliance with the eligibility criteria of serving a minimum of six months in detention.

Issues:

Whether Jagdamba Devi's claim for dependent family pension meets the eligibility criteria under the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980.

Whether the authorities should adopt a lenient approach considering the sacrifices made by freedom fighters and their families.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Central Government was justified in rejecting Jagdamba Devi's claim for dependent family pension under the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980.

The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the eligibility criteria outlined in the scheme. The appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that Hari Kant Jha remained underground for more than six months, as required by the scheme. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

FACTS:

Mrs. Ivy C. D. Conceicao, the appellant, was a Grade-I teacher at Rosary Higher Secondary School in Goa, run by the Diocesan Society, respondent No.3. She had been teaching for 21 years and was eligible for the position of principal. However, despite her qualifications and seniority, she was passed over for promotion to the position of principal, which was filled by promoting other junior candidates in violation of certain rules.

ISSUES:

Whether the process of appointment of a principal in a minority institution is subject to judicial review?

If subject to review, on what grounds can such review be conducted?

HELD:

The Court held that while a minority institution has the autonomy to select a principal, it must do so fairly and reasonably, and its actions are subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The autonomy of minority institutions does not exempt them from the requirement to act fairly and transparently.

The Court emphasized that the right to administer does not include the right to maladminister, and decisions of the management of such institutions must be tested on the grounds of breach of principles of natural justice and fair play.

The Court referred to the decisions in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 and M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212, which reaffirmed the principle that the autonomy of minority institutions is not absolute and must be exercised within the framework of constitutional principles, including equality and fairness.

Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

REFERED CASES:

Belsi M. Vs. Corporate Management of Latin Catholic Schools, Diocese of Neyyattinkara, (2010) 2 KHC 220

Delhi Science Forum Vs. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 405

M. Nagaraj Vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212

Roberts Vs. Hopwood, (1925) AC 578

Secy. Malankara Syrian Catholic College Vs. T. Jose, (2007) 1 SCC 386

T.M.A. Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481

Facts:The respondent had been granted a lease for 10 years from 1992 under the Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1972, which was not renewed upon its expiry. The rate of royalty for certain minerals, including those used for making chips, was revised by a Notification dated 24.03.2001. Subsequently, a Notification dated 26.12.2001 identified specific areas where these minerals were found and clarified that the royalty rate would be applicable from 01.04.2001. The appellants sought to realize royalty at the enhanced rate from 01.04.2001, while the respondents argued that it should only be applicable from the date of the Notification, i.e., 26.12.2001.

Issues:

The retrospective application of the Notification dated 26.12.2001 and whether the enhanced royalty rate should be payable from 01.04.2001 or from the date of the Notification.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Notification dated 26.12.2001 was clarificatory in nature and declared only the areas from which the minerals concerned would be extracted. It concluded that the enhanced rate of royalty should be applicable from 01.04.2001, as per the original Notification dated 24.03.2001.

The Court rejected the argument that the enhanced rates would only be payable from the date of the Notification, holding that the respondents were liable to pay royalty accordingly (para 21-22). The High Court's decision was set aside, and the appeals were allowed.

The relevant cases cited in the judgment supported the principle that clarificatory statutes or notifications generally have retrospective effect.

Facts:The respondents were employed as conductors and drivers under statutory rules framed by the State of Haryana. They were engaged initially on different wage scales but later sought regular pay scales through writ petitions before the High Court. The High Court, in its judgment dated 1.4.2013, directed the payment of regular pay scales with arrears for a specified period. The State of Haryana challenged this judgment before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the respondents were entitled to regular pay scales and arrears.

From which date the arrears should be paid.

Held:

The Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court on the merits of granting regular pay scales to the respondents. It held that the principle of equal pay for equal work applies in this case. The Court modified the direction regarding the payment of arrears, stating that arrears should be payable from the date of the High Court's judgment, i.e., 1.4.2013. The Court considered the financial burden on the state and the rights of all employees similarly situated, including those who had not approached the courts and those who had entered into settlements. The judgment was thus upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The case revolves around the rejection of the highest bid for a commercial tower by HUDA. The petitioner, Orchid Infrastructure Developers P. Ltd., had submitted the highest bid of Rs. 111.75 crores, but the bid was rejected by the Development Authority. The petitioner alleged denial of a formal allotment letter pertaining to the property.

Issues:

Whether there was a concluded contract between the petitioner and HUDA.

The authority of the Administrator to reject bids.

The validity of the delegation of power by HUDA to the Administrator.

The legality of the rejection of bids by the Administrator.

The obligation of the petitioner to pay court fees.

Held:

The court held that there was no concluded contract between the petitioner and HUDA due to the absence of a formal allotment letter. Therefore, the suit for a mandatory injunction by the petitioner was misconceived.

The Administrator had the authority to reject bids as per delegation from HUDA. The rejection was justified, considering the interest of public revenue and to prevent undervaluation of property.

The petitioner had suppressed the delegation of power by HUDA to the Administrator. Failure to challenge the legality of delegation undermined the petitioner's position.

The rejection of bids by the Administrator was proper and justified. Due consideration was given to relevant aspects and reports.

The petitioner was directed to pay the required ad valorem court fees, and costs were imposed on the respondent.

Facts:

The case involved the acquisition of land by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority in 1990. Multiple rounds of litigation ensued after the issuance of notifications under Section 4 and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the subsequent passing of an award in 1996.

Issues:

The validity of the award and whether the delay in making the award rendered the acquisition proceedings invalid.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that once possession is taken under Section 17(1) of the Act, Section 11A is not applicable, and the acquisition proceedings do not lapse due to failure to make the award within the prescribed period.

The Court found fault with the High Court for entertaining writ petitions filed in 2004, as they were barred by law due to laches, delays, and provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act was invoked for the acquisition, and therefore, Section 11A did not apply. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court.

Facts:

The land of the respondents was acquired by the appellants under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966.

Proceedings were initiated under sections 28, 29, and 30 of the 1966 Act, but no award was passed under section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The respondents challenged the acquisition through a writ petition, arguing that since no award was passed under the 1894 Act, the proceedings had lapsed.

The Single Judge of the High Court rejected the respondents' plea and allowed the appellants to proceed with fixing the market value.

The respondents appealed this decision to a Division Bench of the High Court.

Meanwhile, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 came into force, repealing the 1894 Act.

The respondents argued before the Division Bench that, under section 24 of the 2013 Act, the acquisition had lapsed due to the absence of an award under section 11-A of the 1894 Act.

Issues:

Whether the absence of an award under section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, renders the acquisition proceedings lapsed.

Whether the Right to Fair Compensation Act, 2013, affects the ongoing acquisition proceedings initiated under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966.

Held:

The High Court misunderstood the effect of the non-applicability of section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The Court clarified that once proceedings are initiated under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would not be applicable.

On the parity of reasoning, the provision of section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation Act, 2013, is also not applicable.

Decision: The judgment of the Division Bench is set aside, and the direction passed by the Single Judge directing the appellant authorities to fix compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 29 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, is restored. We, thus, allow this appeal.