Facts:

The appellants challenged a notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and subsequent actions, including a declaration and award. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the grounds that the award had already been passed. During the proceedings, the appellants asserted that the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as compensation had not been paid.

Issues:

The validity of the notification under the 1894 Act, the applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, and the question of compensation payment to the appellants.

Held:

The court held that under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, if compensation has not been paid to the landowner after an award under the 1894 Act, the acquisition proceedings stand lapsed. The court rejected the argument that the appellants should have approached the authorities for compensation, emphasizing the responsibility of the Requisitioning Authority to make the payment. As no compensation had been paid to the appellants, the acquisition proceedings, including the award, were set aside as lapsed.

Facts:

The appellants were accused of violations related to contract labor, including not providing overtime slips, not issuing leave books, and deficiencies in canteen facilities. The Court provided opportunities for rectification and considered the responsibilities of the contractor.

Issues:

The responsibility for violations, rectification of defects, and the imposition of penalties under Section 92 of the Factories Act.

Held:

The Court, considering the seriousness of the violations, imposed a penalty of Rs. 50,000 each on the appellants under Section 92 of the Factories Act. The judgment affirmed the decision of the High Court, which had declined the appellants' plea for quashing the proceedings. The penalty was to be deposited before the trial court within four weeks.

Facts:

Respondents 4 to 7 filed a complaint against respondents 1 to 3, alleging misappropriation of funds of the All Kerala Chemists and Druggists Association.

Appellant No. 2 filed a similar complaint against respondents 1 to 3.

The police filed a final report based on the complaint of respondents 4 to 7, charging respondents 1 to 3 with offenses under Sections 406, 408, 409, 477A, and 120B of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the offenses alleged were of a purely personal nature or involved public policy.

Whether the settlement between the parties justified quashing the criminal proceedings.

Held:

The High Court, in view of the settlement between the parties, quashed the proceedings, considering the offenses as purely personal and not in the interest of justice to continue the prosecution.( Paragraph 5)

The complainants and the accused admitted in a joint petition that there was no misappropriation, and the offenses alleged were purely personal in nature.( Paragraph 8)

The Supreme Court clarified that the power under Section 482 of the CrPC is not limited to offenses compoundable under Section 320 and can be exercised based on settlements between private parties.( Paragraph 15)

The allegations against respondents 1 to 3 involved misappropriation of funds of the Association, making the offenses non-compoundable and not purely personal.( Paragraph 17)

The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. The trial court was directed to proceed further with the matter in accordance with the law.( Paragraph 23)

Facts:

Four accused persons prosecuted under various sections of the TADA Act and the Explosive Substances Act.

Prior approval for recording information about the offense under TADA was taken from the Additional Director General of Police instead of the District Superintendent of Police.

Acquittal of two accused (M. Jamal Alvi and Habib Ahmed) and conviction of two accused (Abre Rehmat Ansari @ Qari and Dr. Mohd. Jalees Ansari).

Appeals filed by the State against acquittal and by the convicted persons challenging their conviction.

Issues:

Whether the approval from an authority higher than the District Superintendent of Police is valid under Section 20A(1) of the TADA Act?

Held:

The Supreme Court, relying on precedent, held that only the District Superintendent of Police is competent to give the required approval under Section 20A(1) of the TADA Act. Since the higher authority's approval was taken in this case, the trial was vitiated. The appeals filed by the convict persons were allowed, setting aside their conviction, while the appeals filed by the State were dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves the State of West Bengal and others versus Calcutta Club Limited, with Civil Appeal No. 4184 of 2009. The central issue is the imposition of sales tax on the sale of food and drinks to permanent members of incorporated clubs.

Issues:

The primary legal issues revolve around the interpretation of the 'doctrine of mutuality' in the context of Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India.

Specifically, the court is concerned with when a club can be considered an agent of its members and whether the principle of mutuality still applies after the 46th amendment to Article 366(29A).

Held:

The decisions in the Fateh Maidan Club case and Cosmopolitan Club case have drawn a distinction between when a club acts as an agent of its members and when the property in the goods is sold. However, these decisions do not sufficiently clarify the circumstances under which a club can be considered an agent of its members. The concepts of "acting as an agent of the members" and the transfer of property in the goods sold need elucidation for a clearer understanding.

The controversy in the present case warrants an authoritative decision by a larger Bench. Therefore, the court decides to refer the matter to a larger Bench to address three crucial questions:

Whether the doctrine of mutuality is still applicable to incorporated clubs or any club after the 46th amendment to Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India.

Whether the judgment in the Young Men's Indian Association case remains valid after the 46th amendment, and whether the decisions in the Cosmopolitan Club case and Fateh Maidan Club case, which applied the doctrine of mutuality after the constitutional amendment, state the correct principle of law.

Whether the 46th amendment, by deeming fiction, establishes that the provision of food and beverages by incorporated clubs to permanent members constitutes a sale, making it liable to sales tax.

Facts:

The appellant, engaged in the production of refined edible oil, filed a Revised Annual Return for the assessment year ending March 31, 2003.

Assessment involved the sale of Sunflower De-oiled Cake (SF DOC) and other goods in inter-State trade, using 'C' Forms.

Initial assessment accepted 'C' Forms and granted a reduced tax rate based on a notification.

Subsequent assessing officer, claiming an escapement of tax, levied tax at a higher rate on inter-State sales of SF DOC.

Issues:

Whether oil-cake and de-oiled cake are the same product for tax purposes.

The validity of reopening the assessment.

Interpretation of the relevant notification and its applicability.

Held:

The High Court held that oil-cake and de-oiled cake are different products, based on the notification, but did not address the reopening of assessment.

The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's distinction but concluded that there should not have been a reopening of the assessment.

The appellant is allowed to benefit from the initial assessment, and no costs are awarded.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Central, challenging the High Court's dismissal of an appeal regarding the time-barred assessment order for the Assessment Year 1981-82. The dispute revolves around the forwarding of a draft assessment order to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (IAC) and the concurrent jurisdiction conferred on the IAC.

Issues:

Whether the assessment order was time-barred, considering the provisions of Section 153 and the conferment of concurrent jurisdiction on the IAC.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that the IAC and ITO can have concurrent jurisdiction, but the crucial factor is whether the IAC actually exercises the powers or performs the functions of the ITO. Section 144B does not apply if the IAC exercises these powers. However, in this case, the IAC had not exercised the powers or functions of an ITO. The High Court had failed to consider a prior judgment (CIT v. Shree Digvijay Woollen Mills Ltd., 1995) supporting the Supreme Court's view. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and affirmed the view in CIT v. Shree Digvijay Woollen Mills Ltd.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 144B were applicable, and the assessment order was not time-barred. The appeal filed by the Revenue was allowed, and costs were awarded to the Revenue.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the validity of certain provisions governing admissions and fee fixation in private medical colleges. The appellants contested the absolute right of private medical colleges to make admissions and fix fees.

Issues:

The legislative competence of the State to conduct common entrance tests, determine fees, and the overall validity of the impugned legislation. Additionally, the Court needs to address the consistency of the High Court's judgment with earlier decisions and the need for regulations to ensure fairness and transparency in admissions.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that private medical colleges do not possess an absolute right to make admissions or fix fees.

The previous judgment by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was deemed inconsistent with earlier decisions of the Court.

The State was acknowledged to have legislative competence to conduct common entrance tests and determine fees for professional educational institutions.

The impugned legislation's validity was upheld by the Court.

Regulations on admission through a common entrance test and fee determination were found to be in compliance with the Court's directions and observations.

The Court emphasized the necessity of regulations in the larger public interest, ensuring fairness, transparency, and promoting merit and excellence.

Fee fixation regulations were considered essential to protect students' rights and prevent exploitation in the form of profiteering.

Decision: The Court, therefore, concluded that the State has the authority to regulate admissions and fees for professional educational institutions, and the impugned legislation is valid and in compliance with the Court's directives.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over a deed dated 30.12.1960, labeled as a conditional sale, between Patel Ravjibhai Bhulabhai (deceased) and Rahemanbhai M. Shaikh (deceased) and others.

The plaintiffs argued that the deed was a mortgage, allowing them the right to redeem the property, while the defendants claimed it to be a conditional sale with no redemption rights after a specified period.

Issues:

Whether the deed in question is a mortgage by way of a conditional sale or a sale with an option to repurchase.

Interpretation of the condition in the deed regarding the right to reclaim the property within a specified time.

Held:

The court, after considering the nature of the transaction and the distinguishing features between a mortgage by conditional sale and a sale with an option to repurchase, held that the deed in question was a mortgage by way of a conditional sale. The debtor-creditor relationship was found to exist, and the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem the property. The High Court's decision in favor of the plaintiffs was upheld. The appeal is dismissed.