Facts:

The appellant, Gurpal Singh, was convicted under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC for a shooting incident arising from a land dispute.

His co-accused, Harpartap Singh, was acquitted due to lack of evidence against him.

The incident resulted in the death of one individual and injuries to others.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the conviction under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC was appropriate.

Held:

The Court examined the evidence presented, including witness testimonies and medical reports, and found it consistent and convincing. Additionally, the recovery of the firearm and other evidence corroborated the prosecution's case.

The Court considered the circumstances of the case, including the passage of twelve years since the incident and the appellant's state of mind at the time of the offense. It concluded that while the appellant was guilty of causing harm, his actions did not demonstrate an intention to commit murder.

Therefore, the Court modified the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part 1, which deals with culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The sentence was reduced to the period already served.

Consequently, the appellant was ordered to be released unless detained for other reasons.

This decision was based on a comprehensive examination of the facts and legal principles involved, ensuring justice was served while considering the specific circumstances of the case.

Facts:

The case involved the suicide of Surjit Kaur and her two daughters. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, along with others, had subjected them to harassment and deprivation, leading to their suicides.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution established the elements of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court carefully examined the evidence presented. It noted discrepancies in the prosecution's case, particularly regarding the alleged deprivation of property and harassment. The court found that there was no concrete evidence linking the appellant or his family members to the suicides. The court emphasized the elements of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, highlighting the need for clear intent and active involvement on the part of the accused. It cited previous judgments to underscore the requirement for a direct causal link between the accused's actions and the suicide.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the essential elements of abetment of suicide against the appellant. It found no evidence of cruelty, oppression, or inducement by the appellant or his family members. Therefore, the court acquitted the appellant and set him at liberty. The appeal is thus allowed.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, concerning a Sale Deed executed between the appellants-defendants and the respondent-plaintiff. The Sale Deed was challenged on the grounds that it constituted a mortgage as security for a loan taken by the respondent-plaintiff.

Issues:

The court was to determine whether the Sale Deed executed by the appellants-defendants was indeed a sale or whether it constituted a mortgage as security for the loan.

Held:

The court, after examining the Sale Deed and accompanying agreements, found that the Sale Deed did not incorporate any conditions typical of a mortgage by conditional sale as stipulated in Section 58(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Additionally, the court noted the inadequacy of the sale consideration, further supporting the conclusion that the transaction was not intended as a sale by the respondent-plaintiff. The court upheld the findings of the lower courts, affirming that the Sale Deed was executed merely as security for a loan and that the respondent-plaintiff had fulfilled their repayment obligations. Thus, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Khokan Giri, along with three other accused persons, was convicted under Sections 302, 34, 120B, and 394 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the murder of Girish Navalkha and Bina Navalkha.

The prosecution's case relied heavily on the confessional statement of one of the co-accused, Raju Rao, who became an approver.

The trial court and the High Court found sufficient corroborative evidence to support the prosecution's case.

Issues:

Whether the conviction based on accomplice testimony without independent corroboration is safe.

Whether there was sufficient corroborative evidence connecting the appellant with the crime.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while accomplice testimony can be admissible, it should be corroborated in material particulars, and such corroboration must connect the accused with the crime from an independent source.

There cannot be any dispute about the aforesaid principle of law. We have, therefore, examined the present case keeping in view the aforesaid legal principle, viz., whether there is corroborative evidence in material particulars substantiating the aforesaid confessional statement of Raju Rao and other material connecting the appellant with the crime.( Paragraph 16)

We, thus, do not find any error in the impugned judgment of the High Court affirming the conviction of the appellant herein. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.( Paragraph 18)

Facts:

The appellants were involved in various criminal cases, with the instant incident occurring in 1994. They were convicted under sections 302, 149, and 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellants raised a claim of juvenility for the first time before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The admissibility and reliability of medical opinion in determining the appellants' age.

The significance of age determination in applying the Juvenile Justice Act.

Whether the appellants provided sufficient evidence to support their claim of juvenility.

Held:

The court noted that age determination is crucial for applying the Juvenile Justice Act, especially in cases where there is a lack of documentary evidence. However, the reliability of ossification tests diminishes after the age of 30, as observed in this case.

Section 49 of the Juvenile Justice Act mandates the competent authority to ascertain the age of the person brought before it. While medical examination is a useful tool, it is not conclusive and must be considered alongside other circumstances.

Despite the medical opinion indicating an age range of 35-40 years for the appellants, the court found inconsistencies and lack of other cogent evidence to support their claim of juvenility.

The appellants' involvement in previous cases dating back to their childhood suggested they were treated as adults at that time, undermining their claim of juvenility.

Considering the circumstances and lack of compelling evidence, the court rejected the appellants' plea of juvenility.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals, emphasizing that the appellants failed to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim of juvenility, and thus, they were not entitled to the benefits under the Juvenile Justice Act.

Facts:

The appeal concerned allegations of medical negligence leading to the death of the respondent's wife. The appellant, along with other members of the West Bengal Medical Council, was accused of deliberately concealing evidence to protect the accused doctors.

Issues:

Whether the actions of the appellants constituted offenses under Sections 201, 120B, or 219 of the IPC.

Whether the departmental proceedings conducted by the Inquiry Committee constituted judicial proceedings.

Held:

The court examined the allegations and legal provisions, concluding that the actions of the appellants did not constitute offenses under the specified sections of the IPC. Paragraphs 12-22 were crucial in the court's analysis:

The court found that the evidence allegedly concealed by the appellants did not relate to the commission of the offense as required by Section 201.

The alleged conspiracy was not aimed at committing any offenses punishable under Section 120B.

The departmental proceedings conducted by the Inquiry Committee did not constitute judicial proceedings under Section 219. As a result, the court allowed the appeal and quashed the complaint filed by the respondent against the appellants.

Facts:

Multiple civil appeals arising from Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were before the Supreme Court. The appellants challenged the compensation awarded to them for land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Issues:

The adequacy of compensation awarded to the appellants and the delay involved in filing the appeals.

Held:

In a concise manner, the court condoned the delay in filing the appeals. It awarded compensation to the appellants based on previous judgments addressing similar issues. The compensation amounts were determined based on the location of the land and previous rulings. Additionally, the appellants were granted all statutory benefits under the Act, including interest.

In the case of Suresh Prasad @ Hari Kishan & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., the court granted Rs. 24 lakhs per acre as compensation.

In the case of Charan Singh & Ors. Etc. v. Union of India & Anr., the court awarded Rs. 25 lakhs per acre for land in Block 'A' and Rs. 22 lakhs per acre for land in Block 'B'.

In the case of Impulse India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., the court granted Rs. 21 lakhs per acre for land in Block 'A' and Rs. 19 lakhs per acre for land in Block 'B'.

The appeals were disposed of accordingly, and the costs were to be borne by the parties.

Facts:

The suit involved a dispute between the appellant (landlord) and the respondent (tenant) concerning the ownership and tenancy of a property known as the suit house.

The appellant claimed ownership over the suit house and served a quit notice to the respondent, seeking eviction on various grounds including arrears of rent and unauthorized construction.

The respondent contested the appellant's claim to ownership and denied the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship.

Issues:

Whether the appellant proved their title to the suit house and established a landlord-tenant relationship with the respondent?

Whether the appellant's quit notice to the respondent was valid?

Whether the case should be remanded to the Trial Court for deciding other grounds for eviction under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961?

Held:

The Court found that the appellant had sufficiently proven their title to the suit house and established a landlord-tenant relationship with the respondent. This was based on various pieces of evidence presented, including admissions made by the respondent.

The Court affirmed the validity of the appellant's quit notice, concluding that the respondent had failed to rebut the appellant's claim of ownership and tenancy.

The Court decided to remand the case to the Trial Court for a fresh decision on other grounds for eviction under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, allowing parties to amend pleadings and present additional evidence.

Facts:

The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) appealed against the High Court of Delhi's declaration that the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed due to the operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

The dispute centered around the transfer of land and the restrictions imposed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972.

Issues:

Whether the respondents had locus standi to challenge the land acquisition proceedings.

Interpretation of the transfer restrictions under the relevant Acts in relation to land acquisition proceedings.

Application of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act in the present case.

Held:

The court held that the writ petitioner did have locus standi to challenge the land acquisition proceedings, despite the transfer of the land prior to the declaration under Section 6(1) but after Section 4(1).

The court held that since the compensation had not been paid, the writ petitioner was entitled to the declaration under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

The court dismissed the appeal, as stated, and granted the appellant a period of one year to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. If no fresh proceedings were initiated within this period, and if the appellant was in possession of the land, they were ordered to return the physical possession to the owner.