Facts:

The case involves a civil appeal regarding the amendment of pay scales for employees, specifically within the Prosecution Department. The respondent, Vijay Shankar Dubey, was initially appointed as an Assistant Public Officer and was later promoted to the position of Joint Director, Prosecution. The Fifth Pay Commission recommended revised pay scales, and the pay scale for the post of Joint Director, Prosecution, was increased from Rs. 3700-5000 to Rs. 12000-16500.

Issues:

Whether the cut-off date of April 1, 2001, for the amendment of pay scales was rational and valid.

Whether the respondent, who retired on January 31, 1997, was entitled to the benefit of the higher pay scale from January 1, 1996.

Held:

The Supreme Court considered arguments from both sides and concluded that the decision to fix the cut-off date for the benefit of amended pay scales was rational. The decision was based on the analogy of the CBI organization's pay scales. The Court held that when a benefit is extended for the first time, the State can set a reasonable cut-off date. The Court found that it was not obligatory for the State to extend the benefit based on the Fifth Pay Commission's recommendations, dated January 1, 1996. As the respondent was not covered by the Government order dated 02.02.2007 and had retired before the implementation date, the Court held that he was not entitled to the benefit of the amendment in the pay scale.

Facts:

The petitioner, Mukesh, has been convicted, and his conviction was upheld by the High Court. Various appeals and petitions challenging the conviction have been dismissed by the courts, including this Court. The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the rejection of the Mercy Petition.

Issues:

The writ petition include improper evidence consideration, the disability and subsequent suicide of Ram Singh, doubts about the petitioner's arrest, and other related matters.

Held:

The petitioner was given sufficient opportunity, and his conviction has been upheld by the High Court.

The petitioner's points were considered in detail in Crl. Appeal Nos. 607-608 of 2017 Mukesh & Anr. v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors. and were dismissed by this Court's judgment dated 05.05.2017.

Review Petition (Crl.) No.570 of 2017 and Curative Petition (R) No.6 of 2020 were also dismissed by this Court.

The Mercy Petition of Mukesh was rejected by the President of India, and the writ petition challenging the rejection was dismissed by this Court.

The petitioner's criminal revision petition and subsequent appeals were also dismissed by lower courts.

Considering the submissions of the petitioner's counsel and the series of dismissals by various courts, no grounds were found to entertain the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

Facts:

Akshay Kumar Singh, the appellant, filed a writ petition (criminal) under Article 32 challenging the rejection of his mercy petition by the President of India. The petitioner raised various grounds for review, including issues related to the consideration of the petition, alleged miscarriage of justice, solitary confinement, torture in prison, and influence of media interviews on the decision.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the mercy petition suffered from any procedural or substantive irregularities that warranted judicial review.

Whether subsequent events like the filing of divorce petitions were relevant grounds for reviewing the rejection.

Held:

The court began by stating that the exercise of judicial review over decisions made by the President of India in mercy petitions is limited. The scope of judicial review can be invoked based on specific grounds, such as lack of application of mind, mala fide, consideration of irrelevant factors, exclusion of relevant materials, and arbitrariness. The court referred to the importance of indicating reasons in pardon/remission orders and the power to withdraw such orders if relevant materials are not considered (Para 5).

The court rejected the petitioner's arguments that there was a miscarriage of justice, torture in prison, and that media interviews influenced the rejection of the mercy petition. The court held that the President's decision was based on the case records and no evidence indicated non-application of mind. Allegations of prison torture were not valid grounds for reviewing the rejection (Para 6-7).

Regarding subsequent events, such as the filing of divorce petitions by the petitioner's wife, the court ruled that these could not be considered grounds for judicial review of the President's decision. The court emphasized that the President had already gone through the case records and evidence in making the decision (Para 9).

The court concluded that the petitioner's grounds did not meet the criteria for judicial review, and there was no valid reason to warrant a review of the rejection of the mercy petition by the President (Para 10-11).

Writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit seeking relief and injunction related to a property dispute. The respondents were accused of disobeying the injunction orders issued by the Single Judge, which led to the initiation of contempt proceedings. Repeated undertakings were given by the respondents but not adhered to. The respondents' compliance with court orders, their residence details, and the clearance of charges on the property were under question.

Issues:

The breach of injunction orders, validity of undertakings, surrender of passport, and compliance with court directions. The question of jurisdiction and appropriateness of the Single Judge's orders were also addressed.

Held:

The learned Single Judge, observing the respondents' failure to comply with undertakings and injunction orders, directed respondent No.1 to surrender his passport to ensure his presence in court and compliance with court orders. The Division Bench set aside this order, which led to this appeal. The Supreme Court reinstated the Single Judge's order, emphasizing that the intent was to secure respondents' presence and order compliance. The Court confirmed that the authority to direct passport deposit lies with the court to ensure parties' presence during proceedings.

The Court ordered an expeditious disposal of the civil suit while maintaining the passport directive for respondent No.1. The Division Bench's decision was overturned, and the appeal was allowed.

Cases Referred

David Jude vs. Hannah Grace Jude and Another, (2003) 10 SCC 767

FACTS:

The case involved the West Bengal Small Industries Development Corporation Ltd. as the appellant and M/S. Sona Promoters Pvt. Ltd. as the respondent.

The dispute centered around whether the eviction proceedings initiated by the Corporation against the respondent were valid under the West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976.

The Corporation leased out three plots of land to the respondent, which did not have any structures on them.

The issue was whether these leased plots of land constituted "Government premises" under the Act and whether the eviction proceedings were legally justified.

ISSUES:

Whether the leased plots of land without any structures were considered "Government premises" as defined by the West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976.

Whether the eviction proceedings initiated by the Corporation against the respondent were valid under the Act.

HELD:

The Corporation is a government undertaking as defined in Section 2(b) of the Act.

However, the leased plots of land without any structures do not meet the criteria for "Government premises" as defined in Section 2(a) read with Section 2(c) of the Act.

The Act's definition of "premises" includes various structures, and since the leased plots were bare land without any structures, they do not fall under the category of "Government premises."

Consequently, the eviction proceedings initiated by the Corporation against the respondent under the Act were without jurisdiction.

The Court suggests that the Corporation should pursue eviction under the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1962.

The appeal is dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

A notice inviting tender was issued by the appellant, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (BCCL), for hiring Heavy Earth Moving Machinery (HEMM) for coal extraction and transportation. The bidding was conducted online, and technical issues led to connectivity problems during the auction. The last bid by respondent No. 1 went unresponded for thirty minutes, resulting in the auction's automatic closure. The auction was later restarted due to technical issues and communicated to all bidders. Respondent No. 6 was ultimately declared the successful bidder.

Issues:

The scope of judicial review in tender matters.

Allegations of illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety.

Whether larger public interest was affected by the auction process.

The existence of technical problems and connectivity issues during the auction.

Interpretation of contractual terms and authority's decision-making process.

Held:

The scope of judicial review in tenders has been extensively discussed. Courts are concerned with lawfulness, not soundness, of decisions. Allegations of illegality and procedural impropriety warrant judicial intervention. The decision-making process is subject to scrutiny, but not the end result.

Writs are appropriate remedies when a constitutional right is infringed, such as treating all equally or challenging actions in contravention to trade and commerce freedom. Writs are impermissible when allegations concern contractual rights or duties.

The Division Bench of the High Court failed to evaluate whether larger public interest was affected. Respondent No. 1's interest was private and monetary, not a public law right.

After an inquiry report by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), it was clear that BCCL and others acted bona fide. Technical issues and connectivity problems were established, and no fraudulent decisions were proven .

The Division Bench erred in holding no technical difficulties existed, contrary to the findings of various entities. Multiple bids were received after the resumption of the auction process, indicating technical issues

The uniform communication about the extension of the auction time placed all bidders on equal footing. Respondent No. 1's interpretation was moot since they did not object to the email's wording during the resumed auction .

Courts must defer to the authority's interpretation of contractual terms unless it is patently perverse or mala fide. BCCL's interpretation was plausible, and mere differences in interpretation are not grounds for finding illegality.

Facts:

On 21st April, 2007, during a marriage ceremony, the appellant fired celebratory gunshots that resulted in injuries to five individuals, leading to the deaths of two. The appellant's defense was accidental firing caused by a ball hitting the gun. The appellant was convicted under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's act constituted 'culpable homicide' or 'murder'?

Whether celebratory firing with unintended consequences falls under Section 304 Part-2 of the IPC?

Held:

The appellant's act of firing towards the roof during the marriage ceremony, although unintentional, was found to be an act of 'culpable homicide' under Section 299 of the IPC, punishable under Section 304 Part-2. The appellant carried a loaded gun in a crowded event, aiming towards the roof, which resulted in injuries and fatalities. While he may not have intended to kill, his actions invited risk and likely consequences. The sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC was reduced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment, and the conviction under Section 307 IPC was altered to Section 308 IPC. The fine remained unchanged.

The Court referred to the case of Kunwar Pal vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2014) 12 SCC 434, wherein the intention to kill was not proven, and the accused was given the benefit of doubt, resulting in a lesser conviction.

Facts:

The appellant, Ex-Gunner Virender Prasad, was found guilty of murdering Gunner-Sushil Kumar while posted in a sensitive area during a time of heightened terrorist threats. The appellant claimed he had shot the deceased under the belief of a militant attack.

Issues:

Whether Section 433-A of the CrPC applies to a case tried under Section 69 of the Army Act, regarding the minimum imprisonment term before release for a life convict.

To determine an appropriate sentence for the appellant considering factors such as the nature of the offence, circumstances, prior criminal record, age of the offender, rehabilitation prospects, and community needs.

Held:

The Court confirmed the appellant's guilt but focused on the sentence.

The Court referred to previous cases, such as Santa Singh v. The State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190, which established that a proper sentence involves considering multiple factors.

The Court acknowledged that Section 433-A of the CrPC, which mandates a minimum imprisonment term before release for life convicts, applies to cases under Section 69 of the Army Act. However, the appellant had already served over 16 years and 6 months in prison, exceeding the 14-year requirement.

Taking into account the appellant's conduct, the circumstances, and the time served, the Court found that the sentence served was proportionate to the offence. As a result, the Court ordered the appellant's immediate release.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's release was directed.

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1, a judicial officer, was appointed as Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate. During the probationary period, allegations of misdemeanour and corruption in discharge of judicial functions were received. The Registrar (Vigilance) of the Rajasthan High Court submitted a report detailing these allegations. The Full Court evaluated probationary judges' suitability, based on integrity, knowledge, conduct, and behaviour. Respondent No. 1's services were not confirmed based on overall assessment.

ISSUES:

• Whether the termination during the probationary period was punitive or due to unsatisfactory performance?

• Whether specific allegations or overall performance were the basis for the termination?

• Whether principles of natural justice apply in this case of non-confirmation?

HELD:

The purpose of probation is to evaluate suitability for a position, and probationers do not have an indefeasible right to continue in employment.

The High Court's role in judicial review of administrative decisions is cautious and should not substitute for an appellate role.

Termination based on overall performance during probation, rather than specific misconduct, may not be treated as punitive.

In this case, the termination was based on an overall assessment of performance, not specific misconduct.

The Court can consider overall suitability and relevant factors when assessing probationers' performance.

DECISION:

The appeals are allowed. The High Court's judgment is set aside, and the order of discharge of Respondent No. 1's services during probation is approved.