Appointment of Assistant Professors and Lecturers – Time-Barred Challenges – Under Section 53 of the Uttar Pradesh Chhatrapati Shahuji Maharaj Medical University Act, 2002, any challenge to the appointment must be made within three months. The respondent's challenge to the appellant’s appointment as Assistant Professor, made after more than three years, was time-barred and not maintainable. The High Court erred in entertaining the challenge [Paras 1-16].

Reference to Chancellor – Finality and Timeliness – Section 53 stipulates that any question regarding appointments must be referred to the Chancellor within three months, and the Chancellor's decision is final. The respondent’s delayed representation to the Chancellor, focusing on seniority rather than the initial appointment, was rightly rejected. The High Court’s intervention in quashing the Chancellor’s order was misplaced [Paras 10-15, 26-27].

Seniority Claims – Inappropriate Forum – The respondent's primary claim was seniority over the appellant, which should have been pursued through proper channels within the University and not as a belated challenge to the appellant’s appointment. The High Court’s decision to entertain this challenge was flawed [Paras 17-25].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court’s judgment dated 12.04.2018 set aside – Writ petition filed by respondent No. 4 dismissed [Paras 28].

Larsgess Scheme – Termination and Constitutional Compliance – The Larsgess Scheme, allowing certain wards of serving railway employees entry into service without competitive selection, was found inconsistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Union of India justifiably terminated the scheme. Claims under the terminated scheme do not warrant relief, as they would result in back door entry into service, contrary to constitutional principles [Paras 2-8].

Scheme Termination and Legitimate Expectation – Petitioners cannot claim a vested right or legitimate expectation under the discontinued scheme. The decision to terminate the scheme, effective from 27.10.2017, was upheld, and no further appointments should be made under it. The Union government's action to end the scheme was correct and consistent with constitutional requirements [Paras 6-7].

Reliefs Sought – Non-entertainable under Article 32 – Granting the reliefs sought by the petitioners would contravene the Court's orders and facilitate unauthorized entry into railway service. The Court upheld the termination of the scheme and dismissed the petition [Para 7].

Decision: Petition dismissed – No relief granted for appointments under the terminated Larsgess Scheme – Certified copy of the order to be forwarded to the Chairman of the Railway Board for intimation and compliance [Paras 8-9].

Recording of Evidence – Separate Trials – Appellate Court's scope – Appeals challenge convictions where separate trials for the same offence were conducted – The Supreme Court emphasizes the distinctiveness of evidence recorded in the presence of the accused or their pleader – Evidence from separate trials cannot be cross-utilized to establish culpability unless statutory exceptions apply [Paras 1-88].

Fair Trial – Presence and Cross-Examination – Statutory and jurisprudential emphasis on the right of an accused to have evidence recorded in their presence – Reiterates that evidence from one trial cannot be used against an accused in another trial without providing opportunity for cross-examination – High Court's error in considering evidence from one trial for deciding both appeals noted [Paras 19-41].

Statutory Interpretation – Sections 273, 275, 278 CrPC and Section 33 Evidence Act – Evidence to be taken in the presence of the accused unless exceptions under law – Fair trial principles and statutory interpretation discussed – Cites precedents emphasizing independent consideration of evidence in separate trials [Paras 20-23, 27-30].

Remand for Fresh Consideration – Procedural lapse by High Court in merging evidence of two trials – Supreme Court sets aside High Court judgment and remands the cases for fresh disposal, highlighting the importance of separating and distinctly considering evidence of each trial [Paras 42-46].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Judgment of the High Court dated 19.10.2019 set aside – Cases remanded to High Court for fresh decision in accordance with law, maintaining all questions of law and fact open for reconsideration [Para 46].

Summoning Order – Quashing – Appellant, a director of M/s. Writer Safeguard Pvt. Ltd., challenges the summoning order issued under the Minimum Wages Act for non-compliance with statutory provisions – Supreme Court quashes the summoning order, emphasizing the requirement of specific averments to establish vicarious liability and procedural propriety in issuing summons [Paras 1-33].

Vicarious Liability – Requirements under Section 22C – Court clarifies that vicarious liability under Section 22C(1) of the Minimum Wages Act requires specific allegations that the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business – General and presumptive accusations are insufficient – Emphasizes the prosecution's burden to prove these requirements before invoking the proviso that places the onus on the accused [Paras 10-13].

Prosecution of Companies – Precedents and Legal Standards – Discusses relevant precedents and legal standards for prosecuting company directors and officers, including the necessity of prosecuting the company itself for establishing vicarious liability – Cites judgments establishing that the absence of the company as an accused invalidates proceedings against individual directors or officers [Paras 19-27].

Procedure under CrPC – Judicial Responsibility – Reiterates the responsibility of the courts to ensure that summons are not issued in a mechanical manner – Courts must apply their mind to the allegations and evidence to determine a prima facie case before issuing summons – Highlights the exemption under Section 200 of CrPC for complaints filed by public servants but underscores the need for judicial scrutiny [Paras 31-32].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Summoning order and proceedings against the appellant quashed – Proceedings against co-accused Vinod Singh also quashed [Paras 33-34].

Land Acquisition – Re-notification Prohibited – Once an award is approved, compensation paid, and possession handed over to the Government, the acquisition proceedings cannot be reopened or re-notified. The Land Acquisition Act does not allow for reacquisition of land already vested in the Government [Paras 1-17].

Award Approval and Government Interest – The initial award approved on 05.03.2010 was valid, and subsequent re-notifications were invalid. The Government cannot acquire its own land, and the approval process completed in 2010 cannot be nullified by subsequent procedural missteps or correspondence indicating lapses [Paras 18-19].

Possession and Compensation – Finality – The first respondent's receipt of compensation and transfer of possession to the Government solidified the acquisition process, negating the need for any further notifications or awards. Subsequent claims under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act, 2013, do not apply once the original process is completed [Paras 13-15].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court’s orders set aside – Original award and acquisition proceedings upheld – Subsequent notifications and actions declared null and void [Para 19].

Review Petition – Maintainability Post Miscellaneous Application – The rejection of a Miscellaneous Application seeking recall of a judgment does not preclude filing a review petition under Article 137 of the Constitution. The review petition remains maintainable as it is a statutory proceeding distinct from an application for recall [Paras 13-15].

Review Jurisdiction – Error Apparent on the Face of Record – The review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be invoked in criminal proceedings only on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. The review power under Article 137 is granted to rectify manifest errors or omissions that lead to a miscarriage of justice [Paras 10-12, 16].

Non-Issuance of Notice – Violation of Natural Justice – The order transferring the criminal case was passed ex-parte without issuing notice to the review petitioner, violating principles of natural justice. This procedural lapse constituted an error apparent on the face of the record, warranting review and recall of the order [Paras 17-18].

Rectification of Judicial Errors – Principle of Justice – Rectifying judicial errors is fundamental to the justice system. The power to review under Article 137 of the Constitution is an acknowledgment of human fallibility and aims to correct such errors to ensure justice prevails [Para 16].

Decision: Review petition allowed – Order dated 18.05.2018 recalled – Transfer Petition (Crl.) No. 262 of 2018 revived – Review petitioner impleaded as respondent No. 4 – Time granted for filing counter affidavits and rejoinders – Contempt petition closed [Paras 20-22].

Voluntary Retirement – Eligibility and Notice Period – Regulation 29 of the Indian Bank Employees Pension Regulations, 1995, entitles an employee to voluntary retirement after 20 years of qualifying service by giving three months' notice. A request for waiver of the three-month notice period must be considered on merits. The High Court correctly found that the respondent’s request for voluntary retirement was in accordance with Regulation 29, and the bank's rejection of the request was unjustified [Paras 9-10].

Deputation vs. Transfer – Applicability of Proviso to Regulation 29(1) – The proviso to Regulation 29(1), which applies to employees on deputation, was found inapplicable to the respondent, who was transferred to the Colombo Branch. The High Court rightly held that the respondent’s transfer did not constitute deputation, and thus the one-year service requirement after returning to India did not apply [Paras 11].

Rejection of Voluntary Retirement Application – Legality and Timing – Although the bank's decision to reject the voluntary retirement application was taken within the stipulated three-month period, the rejection was found to be legally flawed. The rejection did not comply with Regulation 29(3)(b), which requires the employer to consider the request for curtailment of the notice period on merits [Paras 12].

Departmental Enquiry – Nullity Post Voluntary Retirement – Once voluntary retirement is granted, all subsequent disciplinary proceedings become null and void due to the termination of the employer-employee relationship. The respondent is entitled to all retiral benefits based on the voluntary retirement application [Paras 13].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court’s decision upheld – Respondent entitled to retiral benefits based on voluntary retirement application [Para 13].

NDPS Act – Charges and Sections Invoked – Appellant was charged under Sections 21, 21(c), 27A, 27(b), and 29 of the NDPS Act. The primary issue was the invocation of Section 37, which imposes stringent conditions for bail in certain offenses. However, the proper application of these sections was in question, with the appellant primarily accused of drug consumption [Paras 2, 7-8].

Consumption of Drugs – Bail Provisions – The maximum sentence for consumption under Section 27(a) is one year and under Section 27(b) is six months. Given the charges, Section 37 was wrongly invoked, as the offenses under Section 27 do not attract the stringent bail conditions of Section 37 [Paras 7-8].

Evidence and Arrest – Basis for Bail – No drugs were found in the appellant's premises, and the case relied primarily on statements and the case diary. The arrest included a tenuous conspiracy charge, which needs to be proven at trial. The court noted that no chargesheet had been filed yet [Paras 6-7].

Decision: Bail granted to Ragini Dwivedi – The High Court’s judgment set aside – Appellant enlarged on bail subject to conditions imposed by the trial court. Anticipatory bail granted to Shivaprakash under similar conditions. Observations made will not affect the ongoing investigation or trial [Paras 8-10].

IBC and Limitation – Right to Sue and NPA – Applications under Sections 7 and 9 of the IBC are governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, and the right to sue accrues upon default. If the default occurred more than three years prior to filing the application, it is barred by limitation. Here, the account was declared NPA on April 1, 1993, making the application time-barred [Paras 18-19, 23].

Acknowledgment of Debt – Section 18 Limitation Act – An acknowledgment must be made before the expiration of the limitation period to renew the debt. The balance sheet dated August 16, 2017, and the letter dated April 23, 2019, do not constitute an acknowledgment of liability as required under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. The application remains barred by limitation [Paras 30-35].

Alternative Remedies – Recovery Forum – The IBC is not intended as a substitute for a debt recovery forum. Ongoing proceedings in the DRT provide an adequate remedy for the appellant, who has been substituted in place of the Assignor Bank in execution proceedings. Thus, the IBC proceedings were not appropriate for the recovery of dues [Paras 37-38].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – NCLAT’s judgment upheld – The application under Section 7 of the IBC was time-barred and not intended as a substitute for recovery proceedings [Paras 36-39].