Facts:

The appellant, Jugut Ram, was convicted by the lower courts under Section 302 IPC for murder based on an assault he committed using a lathi. The victim succumbed to his injuries one day after the incident. The appellant appealed the conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of India.

Issues:

The appropriate application of Section 304 (Part II) IPC in cases where the assault was carried out using a lathi, and to ascertain whether there was an intention to cause death or mere knowledge that death was likely to occur.

Held:

A lathi is a common item carried by villagers in India and is linked to their identity. While it can be used as a weapon of assault, it cannot be considered a weapon of assault simpliciter. In cases of assault using a lathi, the court must examine whether there was an intention to cause death or only knowledge that death was likely to occur. The court must consider various factors such as the circumstances of the assault, the manner of the assault, the nature and number of injuries inflicted, etc., to determine the intention or knowledge of the accused.( Para 7)

In the present case, the appellant's conviction is altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 (Part II) IPC, as it was held that the assault with the lathi did not amount to murder but constituted culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The appellant had already served the maximum period of sentence prescribed under this section since 2004. Hence, the appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless wanted in any other case.( Para 11)

The appeal is allowed.

FACTS:

The respondent, Medima LLC, placed 37 purchase orders in favor of the applicant, Balasore Alloys Limited.

Apart from the purchase orders, the parties also entered into an agreement dated 31.03.2018, referred to as the "Umbrella Agreement" by the respondent and the "Pricing Agreement" by the applicant.

The applicant filed an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking the appointment of an arbitrator based on Clause 7 of the 37 purchase orders.

The respondent contended that the entire transaction was governed by the agreement dated 31.03.2018, and as per Clause 23 of that agreement, an Arbitral Tribunal had already been constituted by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).

ISSUES:

Arbitration clause was applicable - the one in the purchase orders (Clause 7) or the one in the agreement dated 31.03.2018 (Clause 23) - for resolving the dispute raised by the applicant regarding price, terms of payment, and recovery.

HELD:

In the present case, the Court found that both the purchase orders and the agreement dated 31.03.2018 contained different arbitration clauses.

The Court noted that the applicant's reply notice dated 13.04.2020 referred to the price and terms of payment, including recovery, with reference to the Agreement dated 31.03.2018 (Pricing Agreement).

The Court held that since the dispute raised by the applicant related to the price and terms of payment, it would be governed by the arbitration clause (Clause 23) of the Agreement dated 31.03.2018, under which the ICC had already constituted an Arbitral Tribunal.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the applicant's application for the appointment of an arbitrator based on Clause 7 of the purchase orders was not sustainable.

The Court also addressed the Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by the applicant, challenging the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal by the ICC under the Agreement dated 31.03.2018.

The Court observed that the petitioner had already filed a suit seeking a declaration that the arbitration clause in the Pricing Agreement was null and void and had sought an injunction against the ICC constituted Arbitral Tribunal, which was rejected.

The Court held that since the plea for an interim order was declined, there was no reason to interfere with the decision of the lower court.

The Court dismissed both the Arbitration Application and the Special Leave Petition.

REFERRED CASES:

Olympus Superstructures Pvt. Ltd. vs. Meena Vijay Khetan & Ors. (1999) 5 SCC 651

Facts:

The case pertains to the death of the deceased, initially sought to be passed off as accidental or suicidal due to depression. The filing of the FIR under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was delayed and only done reluctantly after the petitioner and her husband approached higher authorities. Despite a long pendency of investigation, the respondents insisted on the accidental nature of the death, leading to inconclusive investigation. A closure report was filed hastily after the Supreme Court ordered the conclusion of the investigation within a specific period.

Issues:

Whether a fair investigation is a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution and is integral to a fair trial.

Whether the Constitutional Court has the power to direct de novo investigation in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice and ensure the truth is revealed.

Whether the closure report filed by the police lacked bona fide and necessitates a fresh investigation to uphold the confidence of society in the rule of law.

Held:

The Court held that a fair investigation is indeed a part of the constitutional right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, and it is essential for a fair trial. When an investigation has been concluded and a police report has been submitted under Section 173(2) Cr. P.C., further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr. P.C. is the norm. However, the Constitutional Court has the power to order de novo investigation in exceptional circumstances where it is satisfied that the investigation was not conducted properly or was aimed at helping someone evade the law. This power can be exercised even after the trial has commenced, and some witnesses have been examined.( Para 9)

In the present case, the Court observed that the entire investigation lacked bona fide. The death of the deceased was initially attempted to be passed off as accidental or suicidal, and the investigation remained at a standstill. The closure report filed was a hasty action and failed to provide conclusive evidence. The Court held that a de novo investigation was necessary to uphold the interest of justice and to maintain society's confidence in the rule of law.( Para 10)

Therefore, the Court set aside the closure report and directed a de novo investigation to be conducted by a fresh team of investigators from the State Police. This team should be led by a senior police officer and consist of efficient personnel well-versed in modern investigation technology. No officer from the original investigating team should be part of the fresh investigation. The Court mandated that the new investigation must be concluded within a maximum period of two months.( Para 14)

Facts:

The appellant, an unmarried Hindu daughter, sought maintenance from her father under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, after attaining majority. The Revisional Court found that the appellant had no physical or mental abnormality or injury that would render her unable to maintain herself. The appellant contended that, based on Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, she was entitled to claim maintenance until she is married, even without any physical or mental disability.

Issues:

Whether an unmarried Hindu daughter can claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. only until she attains majority or until she remains unmarried?

Can the right to claim maintenance by an unmarried daughter be pursued under both Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956?

Held:

Section 125 Cr.P.C. limits the claim of maintenance of a child until he or she attains majority. However, an unmarried daughter can claim maintenance under Section 125(1)(c) if she is unable to maintain herself due to any physical or mental abnormality or injury. In this case, the appellant was found not to suffer from any such abnormality or injury.

Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, imposes a statutory obligation on a Hindu to maintain his or her unmarried daughter who is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or property. This right of an unmarried daughter to claim maintenance is absolute and can be enforced against her father.

The purpose and object of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to provide immediate relief in summary proceedings, while the right under Section 20 of the Act, 1956, is a larger concept that needs determination by a Civil Court. The Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr.P.C. does not extend to determining claims contemplated by the Act, 1956.

An unmarried Hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father until she is married, relying on Section 20(3) of the Act, 1956, provided she proves her inability to maintain herself. To enforce this right, the application or suit must be under Section 20 of the Act, 1956.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and the appellant is given the liberty to pursue her claim for maintenance under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, if she so desires.

Facts:

The appellant, Jeet Ram, was charged under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. He was initially acquitted by the trial court, but the High Court later convicted him in an appeal. The case primarily revolved around the possession of narcotics (charas) found in the counter of a dhaba owned by the appellant's wife near a temple.

Issues:

Whether the trial court's findings were contrary to the evidence on record and if the High Court's intervention was justified.

Whether Section 50 of the NDPS Act applied to the case and if there was any non-compliance with its provisions.

Whether the depositions of the prosecution witnesses were reliable and consistent.

Whether the appellant's claim of being a priest and the peculiar circumstances warranted a reduction in sentence.

Held:

The court held that the findings of the trial court were not tenable and that the High Court rightly interfered with the same to convict the appellant. It clarified that Section 50 of the NDPS Act applied only to personal searches, and there was no basis for the trial court's finding of non-compliance with this provision.

The court found the depositions of the prosecution witnesses (PW-4, PW-3, PW-1, and PW-2) to be consistent and trustworthy, with no suggestion of tampering with the samples.

The court adopted a functional and flexible approach to interpreting the term "possession" in the context of the NDPS Act, referring to the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan.

The court observed that no defense witness had deposed to support the appellant's version of events provided under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. False answers given during examination under Section 313 could be used against the accused.

The court emphasized that the onus was on the appellant to explain the possession of narcotics, and in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, the presumption under Section 54 of the NDPS Act would apply.

The court concluded that the judgment of the High Court did not suffer from any infirmity and, therefore, there was no need to interfere with the conviction.

Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances, including the appellant's claim of being a priest and his age (about 65 years), the court decided to reduce the sentence from 15 years to 10 years.

Facts:

The appellant-Corporation was established under the NCDC Act and functions as an intermediary providing loans or grants to cooperative societies. The source of funds is through grants and loans received from the Central Government. The interest income earned on these funds has been treated as taxable business income. The issue is whether the interest income on grants disbursed to cooperative societies is eligible for deduction for determining the taxable income of the appellant-Corporation.

Issues:

Whether the interest income on grants disbursed can be considered business income under Section 14 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act).

Whether the disbursement of grants is an allowable deduction under Section 37(1) of the IT Act.

Whether the principle of diversion by overriding title is applicable.

Whether the expenses incurred for the business purpose can be deducted.

Held:

The interest income on grants disbursed is considered business income and falls under Section 14 of the IT Act as "Profits and gains of business or profession." It is not treated as income from other sources under Section 56 of the IT Act.

The disbursement of grants is an integral part of the appellant-Corporation's business and is, therefore, an allowable deduction under Section 37(1) of the IT Act. The source of funds used for the expenditure is not relevant for this purpose.

The principle of diversion by overriding title is not applicable as the grants are disbursed as part of the appellant-Corporation's core business activity, and the funds are not diverted by any superior title.

The scheme of the IT Act requires determination of 'real income' based on commercial accountancy principles. Expenses incurred in the course of business are deductible, and the income tax is imposed on real income.

Facts:

The appellant, a paramilitary officer posted at a local unit of BPCL, was dismissed by the disciplinary authority on charges of corruption. An FIR was registered with the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and the appellant's appeal against the dismissal order was also dismissed by the appellate authority. The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the dismissal, which was also dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the principles of natural justice were violated during the disciplinary proceedings?

Whether the disciplinary proceedings should be exonerated due to the absence of a criminal chargesheet filed by the CBI after the enquiry?

Whether the punishment of dismissal from service was proportionate to the charges of corruption, fabrication, and intimidation proved against the appellant?

Held:

The power of judicial review exercised by Constitutional Courts is distinct from the appellate power of a departmental appellate authority. Judicial review is limited to correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice, or violations of principles of natural justice.( Para 25)

Phe High Court's conclusion was based on evidence and was well-reasoned. The scope of judicial review was not restricted, and the appellate authority addressed all pleas raised by the appellant.( Para 28-30)

The appellant's plea regarding violation of the "nemo judex in sua causa" principle due to the enquiry officer's questioning was rejected. Such questioning is allowed under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, and no specific malice or bias was alleged against the enquiry officer.( Para 31-32)

The distinction between standards of proof in disciplinary and criminal proceedings was discussed, and the appellant's plea for exoneration based on the absence of a criminal chargesheet was discarded.( Para 34-35)

The Disciplinary Authority has discretion in imposing punishment, subject to principles of proportionality and fair play. The punishment of dismissal was not disproportionate to the proven charges of corruption, fabrication, and intimidation, which could have caused substantial harm.( Para 36-38)

Facts:

The appellant, Rizwan Khan, and others were found in possession of contraband articles during a vehicle search. He was charged and convicted under Sections 20(b)(ii)(B) of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Issues:

Whether the evidence provided by the police officials was reliable and trustworthy,

Whether there was compliance with the prescribed procedures under Sections 42 and 55 of the NDPS Act,

Whether ownership of the vehicle was essential to establish guilt under the NDPS Act.

Held:

The prosecution successfully proved the case against the accused by examining police witnesses (PW3, PW4, PW5, PW7, and PW8). Though the two independent witnesses turned hostile, the police witnesses' testimonies were found reliable and trustworthy. The court rejected the notion that evidence of police officials requires independent corroboration and upheld the lower courts' conviction.( Para 8.2)

The court established and proved compliance with the prescribed procedures under Sections 42 and 55 of the NDPS Act.( Para 9 and 9.1)

The court clarified that ownership of the vehicle is not essential to establish guilt under the NDPS Act. It is sufficient to establish and prove that contraband articles were found with the accused in a vehicle purchased by them. The ownership of the vehicle is immaterial, and the crucial aspect is the recovery of the contraband articles and the commission of the offense under the NDPS Act.( Para 11)

In the circumstances, the present appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

The Rajasthan State Agro Industries Corporation Limited was closed by the State Government, and all its surplus employees were absorbed into different corporations. The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (appellant) absorbed the respondent no. 1, offering him the option to choose between the CPF scheme and the GPF and pension scheme. Respondent no. 1 opted for the pension scheme under the Regulations, 1989. The appellant-Corporation directed the transfer of the employee and employer contributions from the Provident Fund Commissioner to the respective funds. However, the Rajasthan Agro Industries Corporation Limited informed that the pension scheme was not applicable in their corporation, and no capital value amount was due to the appellant-Corporation.

Issues:

Whether there was any obligation to transfer a capital amount for the employees to be eligible for the pension scheme?

Whether the appellant-Corporation properly fulfilled the statutory requirements for the respondent's pension entitlement?

Held:

The Court referred to Regulation 43 of the Regulations, 1989 and the Circular dated 02.07.1991, which make it clear that the employer's share should be transferred to the appellant-Corporation Pension Fund, and the employee's share with interest should be transferred to the GPF Fund. The certificate issued by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner confirmed the transfer of both employee and employer contributions to the appellant-Corporation, satisfying the requirement for the pension scheme.

The Court observed that neither the Regulations, 1989 nor the Circular dated 02.07.1991 referred to any capital amount, and there was no obligation on the erstwhile employer to transfer any such amount. The appellant-Corporation had the obligation to credit the transferred amounts to the Pension Fund and GPF Fund, and there was no valid reason for denying the respondent's pension claim after retirement.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed by the Court, upholding the High Court's decision to allow the respondent's claim for pension entitlement.