Facts:

The resolution plan for KS&PIPL and IIL was rejected by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) as it did not secure the required 75% approval from financial creditors. The appellant challenged the rejection, leading to a legal dispute.

Issues:

The main issues revolved around the authority of the NCLT to analyze the commercial decisions of the CoC and the justifiability of rejecting a resolution plan by dissenting financial creditors.

Held:

Upon receiving a rejected resolution plan, NCLT is obligated to initiate liquidation under Section 33(1) and lacks authority to scrutinize the commercial decisions of the CoC.

The jurisdiction of NCLT and NCLAT is limited to reviewing the approved resolution plan, not reversing the commercial decisions of dissenting financial creditors.

The amended provision reducing the threshold requirement of voting share to 66% applies prospectively and cannot be retroactively enforced.

NCLAT's conclusion that the resolution plan lacked approval and liquidation was inevitable is upheld.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the rejection of the resolution plan by the CoC.

FACTS:

The appellant, a "Kanoongo/Patwari" in Didihat, Uttarakhand, was charged under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The charge was based on accepting illegal gratification from Gopal Singh in 1985, promising not to arrest or implicate him in a pending criminal case.

ISSUES:

Conviction under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Quantum of the jail sentence imposed by the lower courts.

HELD:

The court refers to Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which allows imprisonment from one to seven years and provides for the court to impose a sentence of less than one year for special reasons recorded in writing.( Para 14)

Citing the case of K.P. Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), the court emphasizes the factors to consider in determining the adequacy of a sentence, including the reformative, deterrent, and punitive aspects, the age and health of the accused, and the nature of the offense.( Para 18)

The court lists eight special reasons justifying a reduction in the sentence, including the age of the appellant (78 years), the 34-year pendency of the case, the appellant's health conditions, the minimal bribe amount, and the trauma suffered.( Para 20)

The court exercises its powers under the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, altering the jail sentence to the time already undergone (1 month and 10 days) and enhances the fine from Rs. 3000 to Rs. 10,000.( Para 22)

The appellant is not required to undergo any further jail sentence, provided he pays the fine amount of Rs. 10,000 within three months. If Rs. 3000 is already paid, he must deposit Rs. 7000.( Para 24)

REFERRED CASES:

K.P. Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2015) 15 SCC 497.

Facts:

The respondents initiated an Execution Petition seeking delivery of possession of Schedule ‘B’ property. The appellants, claiming to be lessees, filed an application in the District Court for a declaration of their entitlement to possession. The District Court granted their application. However, the High Court dismissed the claim, and a subsequent Special Leave Petition (SLP) was also dismissed.

The appellants, undeterred, commenced fresh proceedings seeking directions for compensation for improvements over the property before delivery of possession. This application was dismissed by the District Court, leading to the appellants' contention that their claims were not subjected to proper scrutiny.

Issues:

Whether the claims asserted by the appellants were barred by the principle of constructive res judicata, considering their failure to raise the claims during the earlier Execution Application.

Held:

The appellants, although strangers to the decree, had the right to adjudicate their claim to remain in possession independently. They were entitled to assert their claim under Order XXI Rule 97 even prior to dispossession. The court had the authority to adjudicate all related questions under Order XXI Rule 101, leading to a decree under Rule 103.

The appellants' present claim for compensation under Section 4(1) of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, was closely linked to their earlier claim to remain in possession. The failure to assert this claim during the initial Execution Application invoked the deeming fiction in Explanation IV to Section 11, applying the principle of constructive res judicata.

The provisions of Order XXI Rules 97 to 103 constituted a comprehensive code, offering the sole remedy for both parties to a suit and strangers to a decree. Failing to raise all pertinent issues during the earlier Execution Application would lead to a multiplicity of proceedings and undue delay in realizing the fruits of the decree.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's conclusion that the claims advanced by the appellants were barred by the principle of constructive res judicata.

Facts:

Six accused initially tried for the offense.

Two accused acquitted; four accused (appellants) convicted under Section 302/34 of I.P.C.

High Court affirmed Trial Court's view of circumstantial evidence.

High Court reversed the observation that a witness (PW-5) was an eyewitness.

Issues:

Whether circumstances are enough to establish guilt under Section 302/34 of I.P.C. for all appellants?

Evidence of common intention or prior meeting of minds lacking.

Medical evidence showing fatal injuries caused by a blunt weapon.

Held:

Prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence.

No evidence of common intention or prior meeting of minds among appellants.

No evidence that appellants Bikash Bora, Atul Bora, and Haren Rautia caused fatal injuries.

Appellant Dipankar Bora implicated due to recovery of the weapon from his house.

Dipankar Bora found guilty; conviction under Section 302 of I.P.C. upheld.

Offense not converted to Section 304(II) of I.P.C.

Three appellants acquitted due to lack of evidence, Dipankar Bora's conviction sustained.

Facts:

The dispute centers around the possession of land under the Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960.

The appellant claimed Sirdari rights based on being recorded as an occupant, citing a Government order and an entry made by the Patwari (Lekhpal).

The High Court set aside the trial court's decree, emphasizing the order of the Assistant Record Officer in 1961 directing the deletion of the appellant's name and challenging the validity of the Patwari's entry.

The exchange of land between the government and individuals under an order dated 05.09.1960 is crucial to the case.

Issues:

Whether the appellant can claim Sirdari rights based on being recorded as an occupant, considering the order for deletion by the Assistant Record Officer.

The validity and authority of the entry made by the Patwari in 1379-1385.

Held:

The Court held that the order of the Assistant Record Officer directing the deletion of the appellant's name is crucial. The statutory benefit conferred under Section 10(e) cannot be obtained if the person is no longer recorded as an occupant. The Court emphasized that the entries in the revenue records cannot confer rights if made fraudulently or surreptitiously.( Para 6)

The Court reiterated that Asami rights could not have been obtained by the appellant as the order for deleting his name from possession was passed during a record operation.( Para 9)

The entry made by the Patwari lacked authority, and the Patwari was not competent to confer any right. The Court upheld the High Court's view that the entries are open to attack if made fraudulently or surreptitiously.( Para 14)

The Court highlighted the exchange of land documented in the order dated 05.09.1960, wherein Plot No.719 was given in exchange to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent.( Para 16)

Amar Singh himself admitted in a document dated 14.05.1956 that the escheated land of Tulsa Devi would be released from his possession, and he would be in possession of only specific plots, excluding Plot No.719.( Para 18)

Facts:

The respondent-Company was covered under the ESI Act and deposited contributions for employees but not for Directors receiving remuneration.

Corporation demanded contribution for Directors' remuneration; the respondent challenged it, citing a lack of precedent.

Issues:

Whether Directors receiving remuneration are considered "employees" under the ESI Act?

Held and Decision:

The definition of "employee" in Section 2(9) of the ESI Act is comprehensive, covering those employed for wages in connection with the work of the establishment.

The Court relies on the precedent in Apex Engineering (1998) 1 SCC 86, where a Managing Director receiving remuneration was deemed an "employee."

The Court rejects the argument that Directors are not employed for wages in connection with the work of the establishment, emphasizing the broad definition of "employee."

The ESI Act covers Directors if paid remuneration for duties entrusted to them, similar to Managing Directors.

The respondent failed to provide evidence disputing the remuneration paid to Directors.

The ESI Court and High Court erred in distinguishing the present case from Apex Engineering; the decision is set aside, and the respondent's application is dismissed.

FACTS:

The incident occurred on 15th January 1998, involving the assault of Guddu @ Shahzad by seven accused while returning from Meenawala Baba's Dargah. The appellant, Pappi @ Mehboob (Accused No.1), and others were charged under various sections of IPC.

ISSUES:

conviction of the appellant, considering the acquittal of co-accused and the credibility of eyewitness accounts.

HELD:

The Trial Court and the High Court both relied on the evidence of Yunus (PW-6) and Rashid (PW-9) in affirming the guilt of the appellant. The Trial Court noted other circumstances, including injuries suffered by the deceased and the recovery of swords, leading to the conviction of multiple accused.( Para 5)

The High Court acquitted co-accused Gyani, Hemu, and Laxman, citing their case similarity to Shamsu and Sabir, despite their names being mentioned in the FIR. The acquittal of Sabir was based on different grounds, including late disclosure by Yunus and the unreliability of a witness.( Para 6)

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the acquittal of co-accused should lead to his acquittal. It emphasized the sufficiency of evidence against the appellant, particularly the direct evidence from eyewitnesses.( Para 8)

The medical report detailed 67 injuries suffered by the deceased, supporting the prosecution's case. The appellant's role in initiating the assault was established through eyewitness accounts, making a clear connection to the crime.( Para 9)

The Court rejected the appellant's argument questioning which injury was caused by him, emphasizing that the collective evidence pointed to a sustained and brutal assault resulting in the death of the victim.( Para 10)

The acquittal of co-accused based on doubt did not invalidate the otherwise reliable evidence against the appellant. The Court affirmed the finding of guilt against the appellant under Section 302 of IPC.( Para 13)

The Court appreciated the assistance of counsel on both sides.( Para 14)

REFERRED CASES:

Durga Burman Roy v. State of Sikkim, (2014) 13 SCC 35.

Sadananda Mondal v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 15 SCC 293.

Facts:

M/s. Prerana Motors (P) Ltd. is a dealer of Tata Motors.

Sales Tax is paid on the vehicles sold.

Warranty provided for free replacement of parts during the warranty period.

The dealer is obliged to keep a stock of spare parts for replacement.

Sales tax is paid on the stock of spare parts purchased from Tata Motors.

Defective parts sent back to Tata Motors, and credit note may be given for the said parts.

The customer does not pay for the replacement of the defective part.

Issues:

Whether sales tax is liable to be paid on the return of spare parts, considering that they are replaced for free and a credit note is issued.

Held:

The assessment order and the appeal went against the appellant/dealer.

Tribunal held in favor of the appellant/dealer, but High Court set aside the order, relying on Mohd. Ekram Khan & Sons case.

The crucial point for consideration is whether, in the case of a warranty for free spare parts replacement, sales tax would be payable on such a transaction based on a credit note.

Mohd. Ekram Khan & Sons case referred to credit notes as consideration for replacement, raising the question of whether credit notes can be treated as a mode of payment.

The matter needs to be considered by a larger Bench to determine if sales tax can be levied on replaced parts when there is no consideration for these parts.

Facts:

The appellant, Mysore Urban Development Authority, filed a civil suit against the respondent for declaration of title and permanent injunction regarding a specific land.

The trial court decreed the respondent's suit against the appellant.

The appellant filed a first appeal, which was dismissed in default due to the non-appearance of their counsel.

The appellant sought the restoration of the appeal under Order 41, Rule 19 of the Code, but the Appellate Court dismissed the application.

The appellant filed a writ petition under Article 227 before the High Court, challenging the order of the Appellate Court.

Issues:

Whether the Appellate Court and the High Court were justified in dismissing the application (M.A.No.77/2014) filed by the appellant-Authority and refusing to restore their first appeal.

Held:

The dismissal of the first appeal in default attracted the provisions of Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code, allowing the appeal to be re-admitted only on making out a sufficient cause preventing the appellant from appearing.

The order of refusal to readmit the appeal under Order 41 Rule 19 is expressly appealable under Order 43 Rule 1(t) of the Code to the High Court.

The appellant's remedy was to file an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(t) of the Code against the order of the Appellate Court, which dismissed their application.

The High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition, as it should have allowed it, giving the appellant the opportunity to have their appeal heard on merits.

The Courts should have recognized the value of the appellant's right to prosecute their appeal on merits and considered imposing costs instead of depriving them of this right.