Facts:

The case involves a fatal motor vehicle accident where the deceased, a government school teacher, and a pillion rider were involved in a collision with a bus driven negligently. The tribunal awarded compensation, but the High Court reversed the decision based on the perceived unreliability of witnesses and a hyper-technical approach.

Issues:

Validity of the tribunal's compensation award.

Reliability of witnesses and the hyper-technical approach adopted by the High Court.

Standard of proof in motor accident cases.

Held:

The High Court's reversal of the well-considered tribunal judgment was criticized for its hyper-technical and trivial approach. The tribunal's finding of negligence by the bus driver was upheld.

In motor accident cases, the standard of proof is of preponderance of probability, not beyond all reasonable doubt. The tribunal's role is to determine compensation based on established facts.

The tribunal's just approach was contrasted with the High Court's strict interpretation of evidence. The court emphasized the importance of fair cross-examination and rejected the High Court's undue emphasis on witness lists.

The inability of a witness to identify the age of the pillion rider doesn't undermine the evidence's veracity. The tribunal's reliance on evidence, including FIR and charge-sheet, was deemed justifiable.

Non-examination of the pillion rider is not fatal to the case, given the sufficient evidence on record. The tribunal's acceptance of the appellants' claim was deemed appropriate.

The bus driver's failure to provide any statement and the tribunal's reliance on evidence established the driver's negligence. The High Court's disregard of evidence was criticized.

The site plan lacked proper explanation and evidence, making it unreliable for establishing negligence. The tribunal's reliance on evidence was justified.

The evidence of a witness unequivocally established the bus driver's negligence. The High Court's rejection of this evidence was deemed unjust.

The appellants did not challenge the High Court's rejection of their appeal on the adequacy of compensation. The tribunal's award, including income tax deduction, was restored.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 applied for the position of Assistant Teacher in 1985.

Appointed on probation from April 1, 1995.

Approval sought for appointment, delayed process.

Writ petition filed for approval, followed by suspension and termination.

Legal proceedings initiated against the termination order.

Issues:

Maintainability of the writ petition against a private school receiving grant-in-aid.

Legality of the termination order based on insubordination and breach of discipline.

Held:

Examining maintainability, the court referred to Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, emphasizing procedural safeguards for employees, concluding that the writ application is maintainable. Citing precedents, the court rejected the argument against maintainability.

Regarding the termination, the court found the order stigmatic and arbitrary. Emphasizing the lack of approval for termination, it held that the dismissal was illegal and void. Quoting Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, the court highlighted the need for a proper inquiry before punitive actions.

Given the arbitrary nature of the termination, the court dismissed the appeal and allowed reinstatement with full entitlements and back wages.

Facts:

The writ petitions were filed under Article 32 challenging the procedure for calling candidates for the final examination of Civil Judge (Junior Division).

The contention was that the Rule 5A(3) of the Bihar Civil Service (Judicial Branch) (Recruitment) Rules, 1955, was in violation of the Supreme Court's previous decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan vs. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, (2008) 17 SCC 703.

Rule 5A(3) limited the candidates for the final written examination to 10% of the total number of candidates who appeared for the preliminary examination.

Issues:

Whether Rule 5A(3) is in violation of the precedent set in Malik Mazhar Sultan?

Whether the limitation of calling only 10% of candidates for the final written examination is arbitrary and unreasonable?

Held:

The Court held that Rule 5A(3) violates the precedent set in Malik Mazhar Sultan, where a specific ratio of 1:10 for calling candidates for the final examination was specified.

The Court found the provision of calling only 10% of candidates for the final examination to be arbitrary and unreasonable, restricting the number of candidates unreasonably.

It was noted that Rule 5A(3) lacked a provision for minimum passing marks in the preliminary examination, and the Court emphasized the need for such criteria.

The Court struck down Rule 5A(3) and directed the concerned authorities to ensure minimum passing marks are fixed for future examinations.

The Court allowed the writ petitions and clarified that it was not addressing other issues as the High Court was considering a proposal for amending the Rules.

Facts:

Appellant unit's industrial effluents, after partial treatment at another company (JETL), are let into the Water Supply and Sewerage Board's sewer line.

The Board levies sewerage cess on the appellant based on Section 55 and Clause 16 of the agreement between the appellant and the Board.

Issues:

The appellant contests the levy, arguing it is not directly connected to the Board's sewer line.

The appellant claims it is covered under the proviso to Section 55.

Held:

Section 55 of the Act contemplates the levy of sewerage cess on the occupier, irrespective of whether the area is served by the Board's sewerage system.

The appellant, being an occupier of a "non-domestic premise," is liable to pay sewerage cess as it discharges sewage effluents into the Board's sewer line.

The agreement with JETL is an internal contractual arrangement, and the appellant remains liable for statutory sewerage cess.

The appellant's effluents, after partial treatment at JETL, are ultimately let into the Board's sewer line, justifying the imposition of sewerage cess.

The proviso to Section 55 does not exempt the appellant, as its premises are ultimately connected to the Board's sewer system.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, upholding the levy of sewerage cess on the appellant.

The appellant is directed to pay any arrears of sewerage cess with interest as per the stipulated period.

Facts:

The complainant alleged that on March 29, 2007, the accused formed an unlawful assembly, trespassed into the complainant's land, cut and removed the wheat crop, and abused the complainant and his family.

Issues:

The trial court acquitted the appellants, finding a dispute over land possession and lack of cogent evidence. The High Court reversed the acquittal, leading to the appeal.

Held:

The Trial Court carefully analyzed the testimony, highlighting discrepancies in the complainant's account and the absence of independent witnesses. It concluded that the offense was not established.

The High Court's judgment lacked an application of mind to the basic facet that it was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. No perversity of approach by the Trial Judge was found. The well-considered findings of the Trial Court were maintained, and the judgment of acquittal was upheld.

Facts:

The case involved an application for an extension of the period for investigation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Investigating Officer (IO) filed two applications on the same day – one for the extension of the investigation period and the other under s.43D of the Act, enumerating detailed grounds, signed by the Public Prosecutor. The respondents challenged the order before the High Court, arguing that the Public Prosecutor did not apply his mind, thus failing to fulfill the mandatory requirement of the proviso to s.43D(2)(b).

Issues:

Whether the requirements of the proviso to Section 43D(2)(b) were met in the application for extension of the investigation period.

Held:

The proviso to Section 43D(2)(b) sets out specific requirements for its proper application. These include the inability to complete the investigation within 90 days, a report by the Public Prosecutor indicating progress and reasons for detention, and the satisfaction of the court. The document, in the form of an application under Section 43D, detailed the development and progress in the investigation, meeting the requirements of the proviso. (Para 1)

The grounds for extension included the respondents' alleged involvement in a banned organization, voluminous electronic records, funding investigations, a conspiracy spread across cities, and telephonic interconnections with other accused persons. The material in the document fulfilled the proviso's requirements.( Paras 15-16)

An analysis of the document purporting to be the report of the Public Prosecutor revealed a thorough consideration of the extension request. The Public Prosecutor's signature and changes in the second application indicated an application of mind, satisfying the essential condition for the report.( Para 2)

The second document, as the report of the Public Prosecutor, was filed on the same day as the IO's application, demonstrating the application of mind. The State of Maharashtra was represented through the Assistant Commissioner of Police, and the document clearly outlined the grounds for seeking an extension. (Paras 19, 22)

The first document provided reasons for the extended period, while the second detailed grounds extensively. The public prosecutor scrutinized both documents, showing an application of mind and expanded reasons for the extension. The second document was not a mere reproduction but an analysis of the first.( Paras 36, 37, 39)

Conclusion: The infirmities in the form of the documents did not entitle the respondents to default bail, as there was a substantial application of mind by the Public Prosecutor. The High Court's order was set aside.

Facts:

Appellants were employees under the Kerala Water Authority.

Three pay revisions occurred on 13 February 1990, 24 April 1995, and 19 August 1999.

An intermediate post of Senior Operator was created during the third pay revision, altering the pay scales of Head Operators.

The creation of the intermediate post was challenged in a writ petition, leading to a Single Judge's decision.

Issues:

Legality of creating an intermediate post without amending the Special Rules.

Impact of the abolition of the intermediate post on the pay scales of Head Operators.

Held:

The High Court held that the creation of the intermediate post required a statutory amendment and couldn't be done administratively.

The State Government, complying with the judgment, deleted the post and restored the pay scales of Operators, Head Operators, and Mechanical Superintendents.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and no costs are awarded. The High Court directed no recoveries to be made.

Facts:

The settlement between the employer-Board and the workers stipulated the revision of Dearness Allowance rates twice a year based on the All India Consumer Price Index Numbers. The State Government, facing financial constraints, revised the rates later than the Central Government. The employer-Board adopted the State Government's decision in revising Dearness Allowance rates.

Issues:

The workers' union sought direction to align Dearness Allowance payments with those of Central Government employees, challenging the Board's decision to adopt the State Government's rates.

Held:

The payment of Dearness Allowance was governed by the 1998 Wage Settlement and Board Proceedings BP (FB) No.58. Revisions were in line with State Government decisions, and subsequent settlements reiterated this practice. (Para 1-19)

The union, having agreed to Dearness Allowance alignment with State Government employees, cannot demand a higher rate. The court stressed the employer's dependence on financial ability and the State Government's difficult financial position. (Para 19-28)

The High Court erred in not considering the financial constraints and principles governing wage revisions. The Board's decision to adopt State Government rates was not arbitrary, given the challenging financial situation.(Para 28-31)

The Board did not unilaterally alter the settlement terms. The respondent union cannot selectively challenge parts of the Board's proceedings. The court affirmed the Board's decision to set a cut-off date for revised Dearness Allowance, considering financial constraints. (Para 31-166)

Facts:

The case involves a civil appeal (No. 1577 of 2019) arising from a service law matter related to the promotion of C. Girija and others. The notification inviting applications for filling up of 05 posts under the 30% LDCE quota, the declaration of the panel on 09.01.2001, and subsequent events form the factual backdrop. C. Girija, a general category candidate, sought the inclusion of her name in the panel for promotion as APO.

Issues:

The timeliness of C. Girija's claim for inclusion in the promotion panel.

Legality of the notification regarding the reserved vacancy.

Tribunal and High Court's jurisdiction in entertaining the applicant's claim.

Held:

The claim for inclusion in the panel, first raised on 25.09.2007 after more than six and a half years, is deemed stale. The filing of a representation does not provide a fresh cause of action. The delay and laches persist even though the representation received a reply from Railways on 27.12.2007. The tribunal and High Court overlooked the staleness of the claim.

C. Girija participated in subsequent selections under the 30% LDCE quota, including the one in 2005 where she was declared unsuccessful. The delay and laches are not erased by filing a representation in 2007 regarding the 2001 selection. The tribunal and High Court should not have entertained the stale claim.

The tribunal and High Court's observations regarding vacancies after the relevant period are clarified. The Railways' explanation for the bifurcation of vacancies and determination of reserved vacancies is deemed plausible. The applicant, having participated in the selection process, cannot challenge the bifurcation after the fact.

C. Girija retired on 31.05.2015, and there is no impediment to computing and paying her retirement benefits. The delay in payment warrants compensation through interest. Respondent Nos.1 to 4 are directed to determine and pay the retirement benefits within the stipulated period with an 8% p.a. interest from 01.07.2015.