Facts:

The case involves the petitioners seeking premature release from imprisonment under the Uttar Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938. The respondents, representing the State of Uttar Pradesh, have refused their release without giving proper reasons based on the three-factor evaluation mandated by the Act.

Issues:

The need to strike a balance between public safety and individual liberty while considering premature release.

The importance of reformative principles in sentencing, especially for first-time offenders.

The evaluation criteria for granting premature release under the Uttar Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938.

Held:

The court upholds the principles of reformative theory, emphasizing that a civilized society cannot be achieved through punitive attitudes alone. First-time offenders should be granted a chance to reform and rebuild their lives. The court reaffirms the constitutional provisions and statutory laws that provide for the suspension, remission, or commutation of sentences.

The court criticizes the State's refusal of premature release solely based on the length of the sentence or gravity of the original crime. It stresses that the assessment of the likelihood of committing future crimes after release should be based on antecedents and conduct during incarceration, not on age or apprehensions of victims and witnesses.

The court orders the release of the petitioners on probation under Section 2 of the UP Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938. However, the release is subject to the imposition of conditions by the State to balance public safety with individual liberty. The court cautions that the order of premature release can be recalled in the event of any future misconduct or breach by the petitioners.

Facts:

The prosecution's case was that the appellants, along with others, assaulted two individuals who were returning from the market on bicycles. One of the victims died on the spot, and the other passed away in the hospital. Originally, five accused persons were named, but accused nos. 3 and 5 were acquitted on the benefit of doubt. There was no appeal against their acquittals. The appellants contended that since two accused were acquitted based on the same evidence, their own convictions were unjustified.

Issues:

whether the convictions of the appellants under Section 302/34 were justified given the acquittal of two other accused based on the same evidence.

Held:

The depositions of witnesses P.W. 5, 6, 7, and 9 established that appellant no. 1 stopped the deceased, appellant no. 2 assaulted one of them resulting in his immediate death, and appellant no. 3 assaulted the other victim causing injuries. When the second victim tried to flee, he was chased, caught, and brutally assaulted. He later succumbed to his injuries in the hospital. The court found no reason to doubt the presence and assault on the two deceased by appellant nos. 2 & 3 and refused to grant them acquittal based on the benefit of doubt or parity with the acquitted accused. (Para 11)

The court reiterated that the acquittal of accused nos. 3 and 5 does not raise any doubts about the guilt of the appellants, as the evidence against the appellants was independent and sufficient. (Para 12)

The court explained the concept of common intention, which involves several persons acting in unison to achieve a common purpose, irrespective of their individual roles. The presence of the mental element or intention to commit the act, if cogently established, is sufficient for conviction, without requiring actual participation in the assault. Common intention can be inferred from the cumulative assessment of evidence, and there may not be direct evidence to establish it. (Para 13)

As for appellant no. 1, the court found that he lay in wait with the other appellants, stopped the two deceased, and the assault followed. Since there was evidence of a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert, appellant no. 1's conviction was justified, and there was no need to prove his active participation in the assault. (Para 18)

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellants.

Constitutional Law – Contempt of Court – Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution – The Supreme Court has inherent powers as a Court of Record to punish for contempt – These powers cannot be abridged or taken away even by legislative enactment – Comparison of Articles 129 and 142 shows no restriction on the Supreme Court's powers to punish for contempt, unlike clause (2) of Article 142 which can be subject to any law made by Parliament [Paras 9-10, 31].

Contempt Proceedings – Scandalising the Court – The raison d'être of contempt jurisdiction is to maintain the dignity of judicial institutions – Not a vindictive exercise but necessary when persistent and unwarranted attacks are made against the judiciary – Repeated unjustified allegations and attempts to scandalise the court amount to contempt – Apologies, if not genuine, do not mitigate the offense [Paras 1, 20, 33].

Judicial Precedent – Roshan Lal Ahuja In Re – The Court reaffirmed the principles laid down in previous cases like Roshan Lal Ahuja In Re and others where motivated attempts to malign judiciary's reputation warranted strict action – Apologies must be sincere and demonstrate remorse, not serve as a tactic to avoid consequences [Paras 27-33].

Decision: Contemnor is found guilty of contempt – Conduct aimed at scandalising the court cannot be countenanced – Sentencing deferred to allow the contemnor a chance to be heard on the issue of final sentence [Paras 33-34].

Facts:

The case revolves around a claim for compassionate appointment made by the family of a deceased government employee, who was working as a work-charged employee and had attained the status of a permanent employee after completing 15 years of service. The claim for compassionate appointment was rejected by the government on the ground that there was no provision for compassionate appointment for employees receiving salary from work-charge or contingency funds. However, a policy existed that provided for the grant of Rs. One Lakh as compassionate relief to the wife of the deceased employee.

Issues:

Whether the deceased employee, who was a permanent employee, was entitled to compassionate appointment?

Whether the subsequent circular increasing the compassionate grant amount to Rs. Two Lakhs should be applied retrospectively?

Held:

The Court held that compassionate appointment is not an inherent right, but a right based on specific criteria and policies in place at the time of the employee's demise. The primary purpose is to provide succor to a needy family. However, in this case, 11 years had passed since the demise, and the aspect of immediate succor to the family no longer existed. (Para 14,15)

The Court clarified that there is a distinction between a work-charged employee, a permanent employee, and a regular employee. The late father of the respondent attained the status of a permanent employee after completing 15 years of service, but this did not automatically make him a regular employee. The classification of "permanent" does not amount to regularization under the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963. (Para 16-18)

The Court emphasized that an employee does not acquire the status of a regular employee merely by becoming a permanent employee. The distinction between "permanent" status and "regular" status must be recognized.

Para 24-25: The Court noted the subsequent circular that increased the compassionate grant amount from Rs. One Lakh to Rs. Two Lakhs. However, the circular clarified that pending cases would be decided only in terms of the amended policy dated 29.9.2014, and the present case was pending before the Court and not before the authority. (Para 20-21)

In exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court enhanced the compassionate grant amount from Rs. One Lakh to Rs. Two Lakhs to provide complete justice between the parties. (Para 27-28)

Facts:

The accused was prosecuted for allegedly raping the prosecutrix at knifepoint when she was 14 years old. The prosecution claimed that the accused continued to establish physical relations with her under the pretext of marriage. The lower courts had convicted the accused, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Variation in evidence regarding the age of the prosecutrix.

Casual and perfunctory examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.

Delay of 4 years in lodging the FIR raises doubts about the veracity of the allegations.

Consent given under fear of injury or misconception of fact.

Whether the accused made false promises or intentional misrepresentations.

Held :

The Court noted the variation in evidence regarding the prosecutrix's age and found it difficult to determine her exact age at the time of the incident. The trial court had relied on the prosecutrix's deposition but failed to produce positive evidence of her age. Thus, the benefit of doubt was given to the accused, leading to an acquittal. (Para 7)

The Court observed that the examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was casual and perfunctory, violating principles of natural justice. Circumstances not put to the accused cannot be used against him, and this supported the appellant's case. (Para 8 and 9)

The Court highlighted the delay of four years in filing the FIR and its proximity to the appellant's intended marriage with another girl. This raised doubts about the truthfulness of the allegations. Moreover, the prosecutrix admitted that no incident had occurred on a specific date, further weakening the prosecution's case. (Para 10)

The Court considered Section 90 IPC, which states that consent given under fear of injury or misconception of fact is not valid. However, the misconception should be in proximity to the occurrence, which was not the case here. The Court concluded that the consent of the prosecutrix was a conscious and deliberate choice made over a long period of time, and thus, the accused's conviction could not be sustained. (Paras 13 and 14)

The Court found no evidence to support the claim that the accused made false promises or intentional misrepresentations to establish physical relations with the prosecutrix. Instead, it appeared that the prosecutrix was aware of the societal obstacles in their relationship, and the consent was a result of her deep-seated love for the accused. (Paras 18 and 20)

Considering the acquittal of the accused on other charges and the absence of medical evidence for certain convictions, the Court held that the appellant's conviction was unsustainable and acquitted him. (Para 19 and 21)

Facts:

The prosecution charged the accused with multiple offenses, including murder, robbery, causing disappearance of evidence, and cheating. The trial court acquitted the accused due to contradictions in the prosecution's case. The High Court reversed the acquittal, considering the contradictions minor, and this decision was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal order?

Whether non-compliance with certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) could impact the case when recovery of evidence is seriously doubted?

The significance of motive in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that interference with an acquittal order should occur only in exceptional cases where there are compelling reasons, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse. [Para 5.2.1]

An order would be considered perverse if it is based on no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence that no reasonable person would act upon. [Para 5.2.3]

The findings recorded by the trial court were not perverse and were based on the appreciation of the entire evidence on record. [Para 10]

In cases involving circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must form a complete chain leading to the conclusion that the accused committed the crime and no one else. [Para 5.4]

The contradictions considered by the trial court were not minor and were material to the case. The High Court erred in reversing the trial court's findings solely on this basis. [Para 6.1]

Non-compliance with certain provisions of the CrPC may not be a ground for acquittal, but in cases where recovery of evidence is seriously doubted, non-compliance can play an important role. [Para 7]

The recovery of evidence, including the mobile phone and other items, raised serious doubts due to the lack of proper verification and procedure followed by the investigating officer. [Para 8]

Motive can be a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence, but the absence of motive cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution's case. However, it can weigh in favor of the accused. [Para 9]

In light of the above findings, the trial court was justified in recording the acquittal, and the High Court's decision to reverse it was not justified. [Para 10]

Facts:

On 16 February 2019, the Union Government issued Notification 5/2019 under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, imposing enhanced customs duty on goods imported from Pakistan. The notification was published through e-gazette at 20:46:58 hours. Importers had already presented their bills of entry and completed the self-assessment process before the notification was uploaded. The question was whether the notification was applicable retrospectively and if the importers were liable to pay duty based on the enhanced rate.

Issues:

Whether Notification 5/2019 could be enforced with retrospective effect.

Whether importers were liable to pay duty based on the enhanced rate under the notification.

Held:

The court interprets the statute based on its provisions, purpose, and scheme. In this case, the court is interpreting a fiscal levy under the Customs Act and its relationship with the Customs Tariff Act. (PARA 34)

The court acknowledges the shift from analog to digital gazette publication and the importance of the precise time of e-gazette publication. The notification under Section 8A cannot operate retrospectively unless authorized by statute. The revised rate of import duty under Notification 5/2019 applies to bills of entry presented after its publication on the e-Gazette at 20:46:58 hours on 16 February 2019. (PARA 35)

A notification under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act is akin to delegated legislative power. It must come into operation with reference to the point of time when it was published on the e-gazette. (PARA 39)

Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act does not provide power for increasing duty with retrospective effect, and the notification must be treated as having come into force at the time of e-gazette publication. (PARA 58)

The power under Section 8A does not have retrospective effect as it is not accompanied by statutory entrustment of authority to exercise it retrospectively. (PARA 62)

Section 5(3) of the General Clauses Act, which makes a Central Act effective from the day preceding its commencement, does not apply to notifications, which are forms of delegated legislation. (PARA 68)

Once the notification is found to take effect from its publication, bills of entry presented before the publication will be subject to the rate of duty that prevailed at the time of deemed presentation. (PARA 78)

The power under Section 17(4) of the Customs Act cannot be used to alter the rate of duty at the time of self-assessment following deemed presentation of bills of entry. Para 80

Facts:

The appellant and the second respondent got married in India in 2012 and later moved to the US in April 2015. They had a son who was born in December 2016. In March 2019, the second respondent came to India with the child and decided to stay back. The appellant was granted legal and temporary custody of the minor child by the Superior Court of New Jersey in May 2019. Subsequently, the appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus before the High Court of Karnataka in August 2019, seeking the child's return to the US.

Issues:

Whether the arrangement envisaged by the High Court, allowing the child to return to the US, was in the interest of the welfare of the child.

Whether the conditions imposed by the High Court for the child's return were appropriate.

Held:

The Court considered the sequence of events and found that the appellant acted promptly to secure custody of the child. Given that the child was born in the US, was a US citizen by birth, and the appellant had shown commitment to shared parenting, the court determined that the child's welfare would be best served by accompanying the appellant to the US. (Para 9, 13)

The court exercised parens patriae jurisdiction to determine the child's welfare and concluded that allowing the child to return to the US with the appellant was in the child's best interest. (Para 16)

The conditions imposed by the High Court for the child's return, namely obtaining certificates certifying India's Covid-19 safety and congeniality for the child's residence in New Jersey, were set aside. The appellant's undertaking to comply with prevailing regulations for international travel was recorded. (Para 17, 19, 20)

Facts:

The first respondent, a driver, was driving the vehicle belonging to the appellant-owner for nearly three years without renewing his driving license. During this period, the driver got into an accident while driving a truck and suffered 20% permanent disability. He sought compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

Issues:

The primary issue before the Court was whether the appellant-owner should be held liable for the accident and the driver's consequent disability due to the non-validity of the driver's license.

Held:

The Court, in this case, concurred with the views taken by the Delhi High Court in Tata AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Akansha & Ors., the Allahabad High Court in The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Manoj Kumar & Ors., and the Himachal Pradesh High Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hem Raj & Ors., which culminated in the elucidation of the correct legal principle in the Hem Raj judgment.

The Court observed that the vehicle owner must verify the driving license of the employee and ensure that it is renewed within time. The appellant, in this case, permitted the driver to drive the truck with an expired license for almost three years, demonstrating a lack of reasonable care in verifying the license's validity. Thus, the Court held the appellant responsible and liable for the accident and the driver's suffering.

The Court further emphasized that the owner cannot wash his hands off the responsibility of not checking whether the driver has renewed the license. The lack of care by the driver in not renewing the license was also present, but the appellant-owner's lack of care would also arise. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the judgment of the Delhi High Court, holding the appellant-owner liable for the accident and the driver's disability due to the driver's non-valid driving license.