Facts:

The arbitration proceedings involved Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. (JAL) and Tehri Hydro Development Corporation India Ltd. (THDC). The dispute centered around the arbitrator's authority to grant pendente-lite interest, with objections raised based on clauses 50 and 51 of the General Conditions of Contract.

Issues:

Whether the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to award interest in contradiction to clauses 50 and 51 of the General Conditions of Contract.

The applicability of the Principle of ejusdem generis in the interpretation of statutes.

Held:

Right from the arbitration proceedings to the High Court, it was consistently interpreted that clauses 50 and 51 of GCC barred the arbitral tribunal from awarding interest. Despite this, the tribunal awarded interest, relying on the Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta case. The High Court rightly noted the shift in legal position clarified in the Sayeed Ahmed and Company case, emphasizing that the earlier judgment was under the 1940 Act.

The Harish Chandra case, under the 1940 Act, was explained and distinguished in the Sayeed Ahmed and Company case. The court held that there was no reason to deviate from the construction given by the arbitral tribunal and the High Court, especially considering the consistent application of the Sayeed Ahmed and Company case's ratio.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision to quash the award limited to interest. The key point was that clauses 50 and 51 of GCC barred the arbitral tribunal from awarding interest, and the legal position clarified in the Sayeed Ahmed and Company case was paramount.

Facts:

The case centers around a dispute regarding the classification of a specific property as Wakf or non-Wakf. The primary concern is whether the Wakf Tribunal has the authority to adjudicate on this matter.

Issues:

The interpretation of sections 83, 85, 6(1), and 7 of the Wakf Act, 1995. The court is tasked with determining the extent of the Wakf Tribunal's jurisdiction and the applicability of the limitation period outlined in the proviso to section 6(1).

Held:

Section 83 Jurisdiction: The court elucidates that the restriction on the Civil Court's jurisdiction is confined to matters mandated to be decided by the Tribunal under the Wakf Act, 1995. It does not extend beyond this stipulated scope.

Wakf Property Dispute: Section 6(1) establishes that if there's a question regarding whether a property in the Wakf list is Wakf property or not, a suit can be initiated in the Tribunal. The court underscores that this provision encompasses anyone wishing to dispute the list, excluding those not served notice under section 4(1) of the Act.

Proviso to Section 6(1): The proviso, imposing a one-year limitation from the publication date of the Wakf list for filing a suit, is applicable to individuals interested in the property, provided they were given a fair opportunity to present their case during the relevant inquiry under section 4.

Tribunal's Role: In the specific case (CA No. 92 of 2019) where the query arises about whether the suit property is Wakf property or not, it falls under the specific provisions of sections 6 and 7 of the Wakf Act, 1995. Consequently, the Tribunal is the appropriate body to decide this matter, and the jurisdictional bar under section 85 is applicable to the Civil Court.

Decision: The court concludes that the suit in which the question of the property's Wakf status arises should be adjudicated by the Wakf Tribunal. The perspective that the rights of a non-Muslim in Wakf property cannot be jeopardized is deemed contrary to the statutory framework delineated in Section 6 of the Wakf Act, 1995.

Facts:

The appellants, owners of a property, sought eviction of the respondent under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, asserting a bona fide need for their business operations in the tenanted premises.

Issues:

Whether the tenancy is solely for residential, commercial, or composite purposes.

Maintainability of the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act.

Held:

The respondent did not raise the plea of maintainability before the Prescribed Authority. Consequently, the Prescribed Authority rightly did not decide this issue. The respondent also did not raise the plea before the First Appellate Court, and, therefore, it was not decided.( Para 18-20)

It is a settled law that a plea not raised in pleadings cannot be introduced in later stages of litigation. The nature of the tenancy (residential, commercial, or composite) is a question of fact requiring proper pleading and evidence.( Para 22-23)

If the tenancy is for a composite purpose, the landlord has the right to seek eviction for either residential or commercial needs.( Para 25)

The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering in the concurrent findings of fact without examining their legality and correctness. The findings were based on evidence and not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction.( Para 27-28)

The impugned order is not legally sustainable. The appeals are allowed, and the orders of the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Court are restored. The respondent is granted three months to vacate, subject to conditions.( Para 29-30)

Facts:

The first Respondent-plaintiff claimed to be a tenant and filed a suit in 2004 for permanent injunction against the appellant-landlord.

The appellant contested, asserting that the first respondent handed over possession in a previous suit (RCS No.1004/1988) which was withdrawn after a settlement.

The trial court dismissed the suit, stating lack of proof of actual possession by the first respondent.

Issues:

Whether the first respondent proved actual possession on the date of the suit.

Validity of the withdrawal of the earlier suit and the subsequent possession.

Held:

The trial court rightly dismissed the suit as the first respondent failed to prove actual possession on the date of filing.

The settlement in RCS No.1004/1988 and the withdrawal did not establish continuous possession by the first respondent.

The First Appellate Court and High Court erred in relying on Purshis Ex.-41 to infer possession without concrete evidence.

Lack of rent payment since 1991 and non-compliance with business requirements further discredited the first respondent's claim.

The first respondent's objection to property development, unsupported by evidence, was rejected by the Corporation.

The High Court's decision affirming the First Appellate Court is set aside, and the appeal is allowed. The first respondent's suit is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant filed a Criminal Complaint against the respondent for dishonoring a cheque issued towards repayment of a "friendly loan." The cheque was presented twice and returned unpaid on both occasions.

Issues:

Whether prosecution based on a second or successive default in payment is permissible without a statutory notice after the first default.

Whether the payee is entitled to the presumption under Section 139 despite a fiduciary relationship between the parties.

Held:

The court held that there is no impermissibility in prosecuting based on a second or successive default, even without a statutory notice after the first default.

The presumption under Section 139 applies, and even a blank cheque voluntarily signed by the accused attracts the presumption unless proven otherwise.

The High Court erred in reversing the concurrent factual findings without a jurisdictional error. The burden is on the accused to rebut the presumption under Section 139.

The High Court's finding that the appellant's case was doubtful or not beyond reasonable doubt was erroneous.

The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is confirmed, and the respondent is sentenced to a fine of Rs. 16 lakhs as compensation to the appellant.

Facts:

Plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, claiming 'Charnoi' land used for grazing cattle.

Defendant's father applied for the land, asserting ownership under Section 5(f) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act.

Board of Revenue granted the land to the defendant's father, and subsequently to defendant Nos. 2 and 3.

Plaintiffs challenged these orders, leading to the present appeal.

Issues:

Whether the land recorded as 'Charnoi' vests in the State or is saved as a grove under Section 5(f).

Validity of the Board of Revenue's order.

Held:

The Trial Court decreed the suit, emphasizing 'Charnoi' land's communal use.

The Appellate Court reversed, classifying it as a grove saved under Section 5(f).

The High Court upheld the Trial Court's decision, relying on khasra entries and the communal nature of 'Charnoi' land.

The Supreme Court analyzed Section 4 and Section 5(f), emphasizing the primary use of the land.

'Charnoi' land, being common grazing land, automatically vests in the State under Section 4(1)(a).

Section 5(f) doesn't apply as it pertains to groves, and the use of the land as 'Charnoi' negates its classification as a grove.

The High Court's decision aligns with the law, and the appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 appeared for the preliminary examination for the Grade-I position in Tripura Judicial Service.

The results were declared, and Respondent No.1 was initially qualified but later declared as not qualified after the main examination.

Allegations of incorrect marking and seeking re-evaluation led to the filing of a Writ Petition, which was initially dismissed.

The respondent sought a review, claiming errors in marking and questioning the lack of provision for re-evaluation under the 2003 Rules.

Issues:

Legitimacy of filing a Review Petition after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition.

The absence of a provision for re-evaluation under the 2003 Rules.

Justifiability of court intervention in the absence of a legal right to claim revaluation.

Held:

The filing of the Review Petition after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition is subject to conflicting opinions in legal precedents. The court does not find merit in treating it as an affront to its order and allows the review.

The absence of a specific provision for re-evaluation under the 2003 Rules is acknowledged, and the court discusses the limitations of court intervention in the absence of such provisions.

The court emphasizes that, generally, revaluation should not be directed without a statutory provision. However, in rare and exceptional cases, where a clear error is demonstrated, the court may exercise its power under Article 226.

Decision: The court allows the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment, and dismisses the Review Petition. No order as to costs.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit in Indore concerning two properties (one in Indore and another in Mumbai). The relief sought included declaring a Will in favor of certain defendants as null and void, challenging a sale deed related to the Mumbai property, and contesting transfer documents for the Indore property. Defendant Nos. 7 and 8 sought dismissal of the suit against them, citing territorial jurisdiction and misjoinder of parties and causes of action.

Issues:

Jurisdictional challenges and misjoinder of parties and causes of action in a suit involving properties in different jurisdictions.

Interpretation of Sections 16 and 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Held:

Sections 16 and 17 of the C.P.C. are part of one statutory scheme. Section 16 establishes the general principle that suits are to be instituted where the subject-matter is situated, while Section 17 provides an exception to this general rule.

The word 'property' in Section 17, though used in the singular, can be read as 'properties' by virtue of Section 13 of the General Clauses Act. The expression 'portion of the property' can encompass one or more properties in different jurisdictions, provided the suit is based on the same cause of action.

A suit concerning immovable properties in different courts' jurisdictions can be instituted in any court where any portion of the property or one or more properties is situated, as long as the suit is based on the same cause of action for the properties in different jurisdictions.

Section 39 of the CPC indicates that a decree may include immovable property situated outside the local limits of the court passing the decree. Section 39(1)(c) reinforces the idea that a suit may be filed concerning immovable property outside the court's local jurisdiction.

Section 17 is permissive, allowing discretion in some cases not to file one suit concerning immovable property located in the local jurisdiction of more than one court.

The suit encompassed three sets of defendants, each with different causes of action for properties in two jurisdictions. The causes of action for the Indore and Bombay properties were distinct and could not be combined in a single suit.

Order II Rule 2 prohibits the clubbing of different causes of action in a suit. Rule 3 allows uniting several causes of action against the same defendant or defendants jointly, which is not applicable in the present case involving different sets of defendants.

Defendant Nos. 7 and 8's application rightly highlighted misjoinder of parties and causes of action, and the trial court correctly struck out the pleadings and relief related to the Bombay property.

The trial court rightly allowed the application filed by Defendant Nos. 7 and 8, and the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition was justified.

FACTS:

The appellant filed a Criminal Writ Petition in 2002, seeking registration of a criminal complaint regarding the wrongful killing of his son by the police.

Delhi High Court directed CBI to register a complaint and investigate.

CBI filed a Closure Report in 2008, which was not accepted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

Cognizance was taken against thirteen police officers, and the matter was committed to the Court of Sessions.

Accused filed Revision Petition, leading to petitions before the Delhi High Court.

High Court directed the Magistrate to reconsider cognizance, leading to multiple rounds of petitions and orders.

The High Court eventually dismissed the Appellant's petition in 2014, with the liberty to approach the Sessions Judge.

ISSUES:

The appropriate forum for revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C.

The delay in the legal proceedings.

HELD:

The Court acknowledged the prolonged nature of the case, emphasizing the need for speedy justice.

The Court refrained from deciding on the question of law regarding concurrent revisionary jurisdiction.

The order of the High Court was set aside, and the case was restored before the High Court with a request for expeditious consideration.

The Court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the case.

Liberty was granted to approach the Supreme Court again if any party was aggrieved by the High Court's order.