Facts:

The Respondent, a small landholder, entered into a tripartite agreement with the Appellant (a seed company) and its franchisee to purchase wet musli seeds, cultivate them, and sell the produce back to the Appellant. The agreement aimed to enable the Respondent to earn a livelihood through the cultivation of the medicinal crop. However, the Appellant failed to buy back the produce, causing a substantial loss to the Respondent due to crop destruction. The Respondent filed a consumer complaint alleging negligence and breach of contract.

Issues:

Whether the Respondent qualifies as a "consumer" under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Whether the cultivation of musli by the Respondent can be considered a "commercial purpose" as per the Act.

Held:

The Court examined the definition of "consumer" under Section 2(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The term "consumer" included a person who buys goods or avails services for a consideration and excludes those who obtain goods for resale or for any commercial purpose. The Court referred to the explanation added in 1993 clarifying that "commercial purpose" doesn't include using goods exclusively for earning livelihood through self-employment.

The Court held that the Respondent, being an agriculturist, purchased foundation seeds from the Appellant to grow and sell the crop, primarily for the purpose of earning a livelihood. Such an activity, even if involving the sale of produce, could not be equated with "resale" or a "commercial purpose" as per the explanation to Section 2(d). The Respondent's cultivation was carried out on a small scale for self-employment and livelihood, and not for large-scale commercial profit.

The Court noted that a buyback agreement, such as the one in this case, does not convert the transaction into a resale. The Respondent was not simply reselling goods; rather, she was growing her own produce to earn a livelihood, and such activity was not excluded from the definition of "consumer."

The Court emphasized that the purpose of the Consumer Protection Act is to provide relief to consumers facing grievances, and excluding farmers from its ambit would defeat its purpose. The Court also expressed concern about the growing trend of seed companies engaging in litigation with farmers, causing unnecessary financial burdens. In this regard, the Court imposed costs on the Appellant and affirmed that the Respondent qualifies as a "consumer" under the Act. The consumer forum was directed to decide the complaints within a specified time frame.

Facts:

The Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF) filed a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court challenging the constitutional validity of specific provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 and the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules, 2011.

INSAF contended that these provisions violated their fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution.

Issues:

Whether Sections 5(1) and 5(4) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 were violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(c), and 21 of the Constitution.

Whether Rules 3(i), 3(v), and 3(vi) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules, 2011 were vague, arbitrary, and overbroad, and thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(1) of the Act, stating that it did not confer unbridled power on the executive. It noted that sufficient guidance was provided in the Act for specifying grounds for declaring an organization of a political nature.

The Court rejected the argument that Section 5(4) of the Act was unconstitutional solely due to the unspecified authority for making representations.

Rule 3(i) of the Rules, which concerned organizations with avowed political objectives, was found not to be vague or unconstitutional.

Regarding Rule 3(v) of the Rules, dealing with organizations with objectives of political interests, the Court applied the doctrine of "reading down" and interpreted it to align with active politics or party politics, excluding organizations primarily working for social and economic welfare.

Rule 3(vi) of the Rules, related to organizations engaged in common methods of political action, was clarified to apply only to methods associated with active politics or party politics.

The Court emphasized that organizations using foreign funds for political parties should not evade regulations if there is concrete evidence. The Central Government must follow the proper procedure before denying organizations the right to receive foreign contributions.

Facts:

Sadhna Chaudhary, a judicial officer, was dismissed from service after allegations of misconduct arising from her decisions in two land acquisition cases. The High Court rejected her writ petition challenging the dismissal, leading to her appeal in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the allegations of misconduct against Sadhna Chaudhary were substantiated and justified based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized the high standard of integrity and probity expected from judicial officers. The court acknowledged that errors in judgment may not necessarily constitute misconduct, but conduct inconsistent with ethical standards must be addressed. The court further discussed the importance of a fair disciplinary process and the necessity for concrete evidence rather than mere suspicion to establish misconduct.

The court reviewed the charges against Sadhna Chaudhary and noted that they were primarily based on the outcomes of her judgments. However, the court highlighted that both judgments were subsequently affirmed by higher courts, which undermined the foundation for the charges. The court emphasized that the charges failed to provide sufficient evidence of extraneous considerations or unbecoming conduct.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and ordered the reinstatement of Sadhna Chaudhary with all consequential benefits.

Facts:

The deceased employee was driving a truck for his employer from Ambala to Meerut. On a hot day, he went to a canal to fetch water and bathe, but tragically slipped into the canal and died. The deceased's legal heirs claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

Issues:

Whether the death of the deceased employee occurred during the course of his employment and whether it arose out of the employment.

Held:

The Division Bench of the Supreme Court analyzed the concept of "notional extension" of the employer's premises, which includes the area a worker passes through while traveling to and leaving the workplace. The Court referred to precedent cases like Manju Sarkar & Ors. vs. Mabish Miah & Ors. and Daya Kishan Joshi & Anr. vs. Dynemech Systems Pvt. Ltd. to emphasize the application of the theory of notional extension.

The Court held that in extreme heat, the deceased's actions of going to the canal to fetch water and refresh himself were incidental to his employment. Given the need to keep the truck cool, ensure a safe journey, and protect his own life by staying fresh, the Court deemed the actions to fall within the scope of notional extension. Therefore, the death was held to have arisen out of and during the course of employment.

Decision: The High Court's decision was set aside, and the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was restored. The Court directed that the compensation payments be made to the deceased's legal heirs within six weeks. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The dispute arises from a practice in Punjab where government agencies allocate paddy for custom milling to rice mills, which then supply processed rice to FCI. Quality issues led to an investigation by the CBI, resulting in blacklisting and recommendations for banning defaulting rice millers from the allocation process. In response, the defaulting millers allegedly leased their mills to new entities to evade the ban. These lease agreements were unregistered.

Issues:

Whether the new lessees of blacklisted rice mills are entitled to allocation of paddy for custom milling, given the unregistered lease agreements and the attempt to evade blacklisting.

Held:

The Supreme Court rules that the unregistered lease agreements do not satisfy the requirements of Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908, and therefore cannot be accepted as evidence of a valid transfer of possessory rights. The Court acknowledges the FCI's argument that these agreements were likely executed to escape liabilities and, while the question of intent is a factual one, the High Court should not have opined on the legal sufficiency of the lease deeds. The Court holds that even if a proprietorship/partnership firm takes over a defaulting mill, it cannot claim allocation of paddy without settling the previous liabilities. Consequently, the Court sets aside the High Court's decision and dismisses the writ petitions filed by the respondent-lessees. However, it grants them the liberty to pay dues with penalty/interest of the original rice millers and seek allocation of paddy after obtaining a 'No Dues Certificate' from the original millers.

Facts:

The appellant (Amyra Dwivedi's mother) filed a petition for custody of her child. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, dismissed the custody petition but granted the appellant visitation rights under specific conditions.

Issues:

Whether the granted visitation rights were in the best interest of the child's welfare.

The adequacy and appropriateness of the conditions under which the visitation was allowed.

Held:

The Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with the granted visitation rights. The Court reiterated the principle that the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration in custody matters, as established in the case of Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan, (2020) AIR SC 577 (Para 4).

The Court emphasized that visitation rights should facilitate a comfortable and natural interaction between the child and the visiting parent. It noted that such an atmosphere could not be created in the office of the District Legal Services Authority, where the visitation was initially directed to take place (Para 5).

Based on the child's circumstances and needs, the Court issued revised directions for visitation and contact rights. These included specific timings, weekends, festivals, summer vacations, and provisions for school functions.The Court granted the appellant the right to attend school functions and participate in the child's education. The school was instructed to recognize her as the child's parent and afford her the same privileges as other parents (Para 6).

The Court acknowledged the appellant's right to seek custody under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and allowed for potential adjustments in visitation rights during the custody petition's pendency (Para 7).

Facts:

The prosecution's case revolved around the complainant's report of his three minor children going missing. The accused was seen with the children near their school. The accused was subsequently found missing from his house and village. His location was traced using mobile phone records, leading to his discovery in the house of another individual. The accused eventually led the police to the recovery of the deceased bodies and their school bags.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution successfully proved the involvement of the accused in the murder of the three minor children based on circumstantial evidence?

Whether the sentencing of the accused to death was appropriate given the circumstances of the case?

Held:

Issue 1: The court found that the prosecution effectively established the accused's enmity with the father of the deceased children through witness testimonies. The accused was last seen with the children before they went missing, and the recovery of the bodies based on information provided by the accused further implicated him. (Para 16, 18, 19, 20)

Issue 2: The court considered both aggravating and mitigating circumstances for sentencing. Mitigating factors included the accused's emotional disturbance due to personal issues, lack of criminal antecedents, and family circumstances. The only aggravating circumstance pointed out was the brutal nature of the crime. The court decided to convert the death sentence into life imprisonment, considering the accused's mental state at the time of the crime and the overall balance of circumstances. The court also directed that there should be no remission of the sentence until the accused completes 25 years of imprisonment. The present appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. (Para 24, 25.4, 25.5, 25.6, 26)

Facts:

The case revolved around the conflict between the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) and the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) regarding their jurisdiction and authority over matters related to pharmacy education. The main issue was to decide whether the provisions of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 or the AICTE Act, 1987 would prevail in the regulation of pharmacy education, including course approvals, education standards, qualification criteria, and professional conduct.

Issues:

Which statute would take precedence in the context of pharmacy education: the Pharmacy Act, 1948 or the AICTE Act, 1987?

Should the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) or the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) have jurisdiction over matters related to pharmacy education?

Held:

The court held that the Pharmacy Act, 1948 is a specialized law exclusively governing pharmacy and is a comprehensive code pertaining to the regulation of pharmacy education and practice. This Act prevails over the AICTE Act, 1987, which is a general law dealing with technical education and institutions. (Para 15)

The court pointed out that the Pharmacy Act, 1948 covers all aspects of pharmacy education, including course approvals, eligibility criteria for students and teachers, examination standards, registration, and more. It is a comprehensive legislation intended to ensure seamless regulation of the profession. Therefore, the Pharmacy Act, being a special law, takes precedence in the field of pharmacy education. (Para 13.2)

The Pharmacy Act has established the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) as an autonomous statutory authority to regulate pharmacy education and practice. The PCI is composed of experts in the field of pharmacy and related subjects. On the other hand, the AICTE Act designates only one member from the field of pharmacy, making the PCI more suitable to regulate pharmacy education effectively. (Para 16)

It was emphasized that the existence of two regulators, PCI and AICTE, in the same field would lead to conflict and confusion. This is undesirable and unhealthy for the education sector and institutions. Given that the PCI comprises experts in pharmacy, it is in the best interest of pharmacy education that the PCI retains jurisdiction in the field. (Para 17)

Consequently, the court ruled that in the realm of pharmacy education, particularly concerning the recognition of pharmacy degrees and diplomas, the Pharmacy Act, 1948 shall prevail. The norms and regulations set by the PCI under the Pharmacy Act must be adhered to by institutions providing pharmacy education. (Para 21)

Facts:

The dispute arose from a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Mankastu Impex Private Limited (Appellant) and AirVisual Limited (Respondent). The MOU pertained to the sale and distribution of air quality monitoring products. The arbitration clause in the MOU stated that disputes would be resolved through arbitration administered in Hong Kong.

Issues:

Whether the parties' choice of Hong Kong as the place of arbitration also signified the seat of arbitration?

Whether the laws of India or Hong Kong would govern the arbitration proceedings and judicial review of the award?

Held:

The Court delved into the interpretation of the arbitration clause and the related clauses in the MOU. It noted that the arbitration clause stated that disputes would be "referred to and finally resolved by arbitration administered in Hong Kong." This phrase indicated the parties' agreement that the arbitration proceedings would be seated in Hong Kong, and the laws of Hong Kong would apply.

The Court emphasized the distinction between the "place of arbitration" and the "governing law" in the MOU. While the MOU was governed by Indian laws, the arbitration proceedings were seated in Hong Kong as explicitly mentioned in the arbitration clause.

The Court further referenced the importance of the seat of arbitration, which determines applicable laws, arbitration procedure, and judicial review. It noted that the term "place of arbitration" was used to indicate the seat, which indicated the intention of the parties to have Hong Kong as the seat of arbitration.

The Court addressed the argument that Clause 17.1 of the MOU specified the laws of India and New Delhi courts having jurisdiction. It held that this did not affect the application of Hong Kong law to the arbitration proceedings since the parties had chosen Hong Kong as the seat.

As per the Court's interpretation, Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not applicable in this case, as the seat of arbitration was in Hong Kong. The Indian courts lacked jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6).