Civil Procedure – Partition Suit – Preliminary Decree vs. Final Decree – Executability – Decree dated 13.04.2012 declared the appellant entitled to half share and possession of the suit flat, directed payment of mesne profits at Rs. 1,500/- per month, and appointed an Advocate Commissioner to effect partition by metes and bounds or, in default, to sell the property and apportion the sale consideration – Advocate Commissioner reported that the flat cannot be partitioned by metes and bounds – High Court set aside execution proceedings holding that a final decree was a sine qua non for execution and directed the appellant to file a fresh application for final decree – Held: A decree may be partly preliminary and partly final; the Decree dated 13.04.2012 conclusively determined entitlement to possession, mesne profits, and the mode of working out shares including a direction for sale in default of partition – It is not necessary to look beyond the decree itself to determine its character – Termination of execution proceedings was illegal – Execution Case restored; Advocate Commissioner directed to conduct auction and apportion proceeds between the parties [Paras 14-17].

Preliminary Decree – Nomenclature Not Determinative – High Court erred in proceeding merely by the nomenclature of the decree without juxtaposing its clauses to determine whether the executable portion thereof was being executed – A decree is not rendered non-executable merely because it is labelled preliminary if it incorporates self-contained directions that conclusively dispose of part of the suit, including a direction for sale in default of physical partition – In certain circumstances, an order made under Sections 2 to 4 of the Partition Act is also a deemed decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the CPC [Para 16].

Order XX Rule 18 CPC – No Separate Final Decree Application Required – Once a preliminary decree is passed, the trial court must proceed suo motu to draw up the final decree without requiring the filing of a separate application – Directing the decree holder to file a fresh application for a final decree after the Advocate Commissioner's Report had already been received and the bidding process had commenced was itself an error – The very precedent relied upon by the High Court held that there is no need to file a separate application under Order XX Rule 18 CPC seeking a final decree [Para 16 and footnote 5].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of the High Court dated 27.07.2023 and 20.03.2025 set aside – Execution Case No. EX-A-1600007/14 restored – Trial Court directed to entrust warrant to the same Advocate Commissioner or appoint a fresh one for conducting auction and apportioning proceeds, accounting for mesne profits – Proceedings to be completed within 2 months – No order as to costs [Paras 17-18].

Bail – UAP Act – NDPS Act – Narco-terrorism – Prolonged Incarceration – Constitutional Primacy of Article 21 – Appellant, a government employee, charged under Sections 8, 21, 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act read with Sections 17, 38 and 40 of the UAP Act and Section 120B IPC on allegations of drug-funded terrorism – Bail rejected by Special NIA Court and upheld by High Court – On appeal, held: Appellant in custody for over 5 years 11 months with more than 350 witnesses yet to be examined, making early conclusion of trial well-nigh impossible – No recovery of cash or contraband from the person, residence or working place of the appellant – All incriminating statements made before the police and prima facie hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act – Appellant had not misused interim bail earlier granted on medical grounds – Constitutional courts cannot be restrained from granting bail where Article 21 is infringed by prolonged incarceration and absence of any realistic prospect of early trial conclusion – Appeal allowed – Bail granted on terms and conditions to be fixed by Special NIA Court [Paras 2, 3, 52-55].

Judicial Discipline – Binding Precedent – Smaller Bench Cannot Dilute Larger Bench Decision – The judgment raises the important constitutional question of the propriety of smaller Benches of the Supreme Court progressively hollowing out the constitutional force of a larger Bench decision without expressly disagreeing with it – Held: A judgment rendered by a Bench of lesser strength is bound by law declared by a Bench of greater strength – Judicial discipline mandates that binding precedent must either be followed or, in case of doubt, referred to a larger Bench – A smaller Bench cannot dilute, circumvent or disregard the ratio of a larger Bench [Paras 2, 27.2, 41].

Section 43-D(5), UAP Act – Constitutional Limitation – Najeeb Reaffirmed – K.A. Najeeb, a three-Judge Bench decision, held that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) per se does not oust the ability of constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution – The rigours of Section 43-D(5) will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence – Held: K.A. Najeeb is binding law entitled to the protection of stare decisis and cannot be diluted, circumvented or disregarded by trial courts, High Courts or Benches of lower strength – Section 43-D(5) remains subordinate to Article 21 at all times [Paras 21.3, 21.4, 31, 33, 35, 39, 41].

Bail – UAP Act – Two-Judge Bench Decisions in Gurwinder Singh and Gulfisha Fatima – Divergence from Najeeb – The two-Judge Bench decisions in Gurwinder Singh and Gulfisha Fatima held that delay simpliciter cannot eclipse the statutory regime under the UAP Act and formulated a 'twin-prong test' requiring the court to first determine prima facie truth of accusations before considering other bail considerations, effectively treating Section 43-D(5) as a near-conclusive bar – Held: The 'twin-prong test' flows neither from the text of Section 43-D(5) nor from Najeeb and is in teeth of Najeeb – Gurwinder Singh and Gulfisha Fatima, being by Benches of two Judges, cannot depart from the ratio of K.A. Najeeb rendered by three Judges – The attempt in Gurwinder to read Watali as laying down a general rule of denial of bail, notwithstanding the period of incarceration, is irreconcilable with the Court's own subsequent clarification of Watali's ratio – Bail is the rule and jail is the exception even under the UAP Act, flowing from constitutional primacy of personal liberty under Articles 21 and 22 [Paras 26-29, 32-35, 38-41].

NIA Vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali – Correct Reading – Watali arose in a specific factual context where the High Court had conducted a mini-trial by reappreciating evidence and determining admissibility issues at the bail stage; this Court intervened to cancel bail – Held: Watali cannot be invoked to justify indefinite incarceration – It cannot be read as establishing a general rule of near-automatic denial of bail under the UAP Act – K.A. Najeeb confined Watali to the impropriety of extensive evidentiary evaluation at the bail stage [Paras 21.2, 27.3, 27.4, 27.6].

Bail – UAP Act – Conviction Statistics – Poor Conviction Rate as Relevant Factor – Statistical data placed before the Court revealed that the country-wide percentage of conviction under the UAP Act for the period 2019-23 ranges between 2% to 6%, meaning a 94% to 98% possibility of acquittal – In the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the annual rate of conviction under the UAP Act was always less than 1% for the same period, indicating a 99% possibility of acquittal – Held: These statistics further fortify the view that bail should be granted where prolonged incarceration is coupled with no realistic prospect of early conclusion of trial [Paras 42, 42.1-42.3, 53.8].

Bail – Direction to Expedite Trial as Alternative – Not Adequate Remedy – Held: Directing the trial court to conclude trial within a fixed time is neither appropriate nor adequate where more than 350 prosecution witnesses remain to be examined – Constitutional courts should not normally fix a time-bound schedule for disposal of cases in subordinate courts – Such a direction cannot substitute the grant of bail to an undertrial suffering prolonged incarceration [Paras 43, 43.1, 43.2].

Disclosure Statement – Admissibility – Section 25 and 27, Evidence Act – Held: Statements made before police are prima facie inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act – For recovery under Section 27 to be admissible, a valid pointing-out memo signed by the accused and independent witnesses and a proper site map and seizure memo are necessary – Alleged recovery from the bedroom of a co-accused based on disclosure attributed to the appellant, without such documentation, is legally inadmissible and not attributable to the appellant – The charge of terror-funding under the UAP Act, premised on NDPS recovery, collapses in the absence of admissible evidence of recovery of narcotics or funds from the appellant [Paras 9.6, 9.7, 51, 53.2].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Appellant directed to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the Special NIA Court may deem fit, including deposit of passport and reporting to Handwara Police Station once every fortnight – Appellant to be produced before Special NIA Court within 7 days – No order as to costs [Paras 54-58].

Criminal Law – Motor Accident – Negligent Driving – Causing Death – Probation of Offenders Act – Sections 279 and 304-A IPC, Sections 134(b) and 187 MVA – Appellant, a BMTC bus driver, involved in accident on 27.12.2011 in which a pedestrian was fatally injured – Trial Court convicted him under Sections 279, 304-A IPC and Sections 134(b) read with Section 187 MVA – First Appellate Court confirmed conviction – High Court in revision set aside conviction under Section 279 while sustaining conviction under Section 304-A IPC and Sections 134(b) and 187 MVA with sentence of six months' imprisonment and fine – Appellant before Supreme Court sought benefit under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Respondents raised no objection subject to deposit of compensation – Held: Appellant satisfies pre-requisites of Section 3; released after admonition; sentence commuted to fine of Rs. 5,00,000/- payable as compensation to deceased's family – Appellant shall not incur any disqualification in service by virtue of Section 12 of the 1958 Act [Paras 2-9].

Decision: Appeal disposed of – Conviction confirmed – Appellant released after admonition under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Sentence commuted to fine of Rs. 5,00,000/- payable as compensation to the family of the deceased – No disqualification to attach to conviction in view of Section 12 of the 1958 Act – Registry directed to release deposited amount with accrued interest to the family members of the deceased within four weeks of receipt of bank details [Paras 8-11].

Criminal Law - Quashing of Proceedings - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 498A - Appellant-husband sought quashing of FIR No 58/2019 involving allegations of dowry harassment and physical cruelty following a marriage solemnized in 2017 - High Court quashed proceedings against mother-in-law and sister-in-law but refused relief to the husband and father-in-law on grounds of specific allegations - Family Court Bhubaneswar subsequently granted a decree of divorce on 24 08 2021 dissolving the marriage - Appellant since remarried - Supreme Court observed that where matrimonial relationships end by a decree of divorce criminal prosecution emanating from that past relationship ought not to linger as a means of harassment - Held - Continuation of criminal proceedings after the grant of divorce would serve no legitimate purpose and only frustrate the decree - Article 142 invoked to do complete justice - Appeal allowed - [Paras 1-16].

Criminal Law - Extraordinary Powers - Constitution of India - Article 142 - Inherent powers to do complete justice - Quashing of FIR post-matrimonial discord - Reliance placed on precedents in Mala Kar vs State of Uttarakhand and Arun Jain vs State of NCT of Delhi - Court emphasized that while statutory provisions cannot be altogether ignored the Court is a problem solver in nebulous areas and must balance equities by ironing out the creases - Held - Proceedings arising out of matrimonial discord should be quashed when the relationship has legally ended and parties are leading independent lives - To permit such prosecution to linger would be an abuse of process - [Paras 11-15].

Criminal Law - Matrimonial Offences - Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 - Sections 3 and 4 - Allegations of demand for additional dowry including five lakh rupees cash and a motor car - Criminal proceedings were pending despite the dissolution of marriage by a competent court - Appellant submitted that he had moved on and remarried - Held - Continuation of the trial would place the parties under the constant shadow of criminal prosecution and prevent them from moving forward with their lives - FIR No 58/2019 and the subsequent chargesheet quashed to prevent further harassment - [Paras 4-14].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order of the High Court dated 07.05.2024 set aside – FIR No. 58/2019 and chargesheet dated 18.08.2019 quashed.

Civil Law - Hindu Succession — Daughters' Right in Intestate Father's Property — Second Order VII Rule 11 Application — Res Judicata — Section 6(5) as Saving Clause — Independent Right under Section 8 — Propositus died intestate in 1985 leaving three daughters and four sons — Daughters filed suit in 2007 for partition claiming 1/8th share each — First plaint rejection application dismissed by High Court in 2013 holding suit maintainable on ground that daughters had right in father's share under Section 8 — Second application filed in 2021 by legal representatives of one defendant relying on Vineeta Sharma to contend Section 6(5) operates as a complete bar — Trial Court dismissed second application on ground of res judicata — High Court allowed revision and rejected plaint — Held: High Court erred on all three counts; impugned order set aside and plaint restored [Paras 3, 70, 71].

Res Judicata — Interlocutory Res Judicata — Second Order VII Rule 11 Application — Same Issue — Common Interest of Defendants — Section 11 Explanation VI CPC — Issue whether plaint disclosed cause of action notwithstanding registered Partition Deed was directly and substantially decided by High Court in RFA No. 168 of 2009 in 2013 and attained finality — Second application raising identical issue barred by principle of interlocutory res judicata — High Court's reasoning that res judicata did not apply as first application was by Defendants 1 to 3 while second was by legal representatives of Defendant 4 rejected — All defendants share common interest, defend same Partition Deed, assert same plea and litigate under same title within meaning of Explanation VI to Section 11 CPC — Mere invocation of additional sub-clauses of Order VII Rule 11 in second application does not take matter outside scope of res judicata [Paras 35–42].

Change in Law — Vineeta Sharma — Res Judicata Exception — Whether Applicable — Exception that subsequent change in law can render earlier decision on pure question of law ineffective as res judicata applies only where legal basis of earlier decision is undermined — 2013 order proceeded on independent right of daughters as Class I heirs under Section 8, not on coparcenary rights under 2005 Amendment — Vineeta Sharma deals with scope of 2005 Amendment and coparcenary rights; does not alter settled position that upon intestate death of Hindu male property devolves under Section 8 on all Class I heirs including daughters — Basis of 2013 order wholly undisturbed by Vineeta Sharma — High Court's reasoning that Vineeta Sharma constituted change in law overriding res judicata rejected as erroneous [Paras 40–42].

Section 6(5) Hindu Succession Act — Nature — Saving Clause, Not Jurisdictional Bar — Scope of Order VII Rule 11 — Section 6(5), read with its Explanation, saves from retroactive reach of 2005 Amendment only those partitions effected before 20.12.2004 by registered deed or court decree — Does not create jurisdictional bar to institution of suit for partition — Distinction between a bar and a saving clause legally significant: bar prevents court from entertaining suit at all; saving clause provides defence on merits to be proved by party asserting it — Whether a valid partition within meaning of Section 6(5) has been effected and is binding on daughters who were not parties to it are contested questions of fact and law requiring trial — Conflating existence of registered deed with conclusion that partition is valid and binding on all persons impermissible at Order VII Rule 11 stage [Paras 43, 53–58].

Section 8 Hindu Succession Act — Independent Right of Daughters as Class I Heirs — Unaffected by Section 6(5) — Proviso to Erstwhile Section 6 — Upon intestate death of propositus in 1985 leaving behind daughters as Class I heirs, proviso to erstwhile Section 6 attracted — Notional partition deemed to have taken place immediately before death — Deceased's undivided share devolved by intestate succession under Section 8 on all Class I heirs including daughters — This right accrued in 1985 under unamended Act, wholly independent of and predating 2005 Amendment — Section 6(5) saves pre-2004 partitions from retroactive reach of new coparcenary rights under Section 6(1) only; does not and cannot extinguish pre-existing rights of Class I heirs accrued under Section 8 — Plaint need not recite specific section number; suffices that bundle of facts pleaded brings case within Section 8 [Paras 59–67].

Revisional Jurisdiction — Section 115 CPC — Scope — High Court exceeded permissible scope of revisional jurisdiction by conducting independent and de novo appraisal of merits of dispute, scope of Partition Deed and rights of parties under Section 6(5) at threshold stage — Trial Court's order dismissing second application was reasoned, correctly applied res judicata and rightly held Section 6(5) does not bar suit — High Court's interference therewith unwarranted [Para 68].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Impugned judgment and order dated 29.08.2024 of the High Court of Karnataka in CRP No. 144 of 2023 set aside — Order dated 15.11.2022 of the Trial Court dismissing I.A. No. IV restored — Plaint in O.S. No. 5352/2007 restored to file — Status quo with respect to subject properties to continue until further orders of Trial Court — Trial Court to proceed expeditiously — No order as to costs.

Criminal Law — Premature Release — Remission — Non-Speaking Order — MHA Rejection — Petitioner convicted under Sections 120-B/302 IPC for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment — Conviction affirmed by High Court of Uttarakhand and SLP dismissed by Supreme Court — After over twenty-two years of incarceration, State of Uttarakhand recommended premature release — Ministry of Home Affairs by impugned letter rejected the recommendation without assigning any reason — Held: Impugned letter is arbitrary, non-speaking, and unsustainable in law — Set aside and quashed — Petitioner treated as having been prematurely released [Paras 5, 9, 10].

Non-Speaking Order — Natural Justice — Requirement of Reasons — Any order affecting rights of a person, particularly his liberty, must be supported by reasons and must reflect due application of mind — Recording of reasons is not an empty formality but a safeguard against arbitrariness ensuring transparency, fairness, and accountability — Absence of reasons renders an order bald and makes it impossible to ascertain whether relevant factors were duly considered — Impugned letter merely stated that Competent Authority "does not concur" with the proposal without disclosing any basis — No discussion of petitioner's conduct, applicable remission policy, or specific adverse material — Fails minimum requirement of a reasoned order and amounts to complete non-application of mind — Cryptic rejection violates principles of natural justice and frustrates right to seek effective judicial review [Paras 5, 5.1, 5.2].

Remission — Nature and Scope — Distinction from Pardon, Commutation and Reprieve — Remission merely reduces period of sentence without altering its character — Neither the conviction nor the guilt of the offender is affected — Sentence imposed by court remains intact except to the extent convict is relieved from undergoing entire term — Distinct from pardon which affects the guilt itself, amnesty which is a general pardon, reprieve which is a stay of execution, respite which substitutes a lesser sentence, and commutation which substitutes one form of sentence with a lighter one — Executive power of remission abridges enforcement of judgment but does not alter the judgment itself — No convict can claim remission as an absolute constitutional right except under Articles 72 and 161 — Existence of remission policy confers legal entitlement to be considered in terms of that policy — All persons falling within its ambit are entitled to equal treatment [Paras 6, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3].

Remission — Grounds for Grant — Relevant Considerations — Heinousness of Offence Cannot Be Sole Ground for Denial — Factors governing grant of remission: (i) whether offence is an individual act without affecting society at large; (ii) whether there is chance of future recurrence; (iii) whether convict has lost potentiality of committing crime; (iv) whether any fruitful purpose is served by continued confinement; (v) socio-economic condition of convict's family — Denial of remission cannot rest solely on heinousness of crime — Gravity of offence stands exhausted at stage of sentencing — Remission is not an extension of the sentencing process but a distinct executive function concerned with prisoner's present conduct, evidence of reformation, and prospects of reintegration — Assessment of likelihood of reoffending must be founded on antecedents and conduct in custody and not merely on nature of offence — Emotive retribution is incompatible with constitutional values [Paras 7, 7.1, 8].

Remission — Parity — Co-accused Released — Differential Treatment — One co-accused Amarmani Tripathi granted premature release by Government of U.P. after undergoing approximately seventeen years of actual imprisonment and twenty years with earned remission — Petitioner having undergone over twenty-two years denied similar relief — Once a co-accused in the same offence has been granted premature release after undergoing a lesser period, denial of similar consideration to the petitioner requires cogent, rational, and clearly discernible distinguishing circumstances — In absence of such reasons, differential treatment falls foul of constitutional requirement of fairness and non-arbitrariness — No such reasons forthcoming [Para 8.3].

Remission — Reformative Theory — Object of Punishment — Good Conduct During Custody — Object of punishment is not merely retribution but also reformation and rehabilitation of offender to enable eventual reintegration into society — Petitioner's custody certificate dated 16.05.2025 records good conduct during incarceration — State Government's recommendation for premature release indicates satisfactory conduct and rehabilitation — Continued incarceration contrary to reformative object underlying remission policies — Constitutional Court exercising judicial review may itself intervene and secure compliance through mandamus where executive authorities fail to discharge statutory obligations despite judicial directions [Paras 6.4, 8.4].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed — Impugned letter dated 09.07.2025 of the Ministry of Home Affairs set aside and quashed — Petitioner treated as having been prematurely released — Surrender not required as petitioner already on interim bail — Miscellaneous Applications disposed of.

Motor Accidents Claims – Mediclaim/Medical Insurance – Deductibility from MACT Compensation – Conflicting High Court Views – Settled by Supreme Court – Claimant received medical expense reimbursement under a Mediclaim policy and also claimed the same head of loss before the MACT – Three-Judge Bench of the Bombay High Court held that Mediclaim amounts are not deductible from MACT compensation – Insurer appealed – Supreme Court examined conflicting views across multiple High Courts and settled the law – Held: Amount received under a Mediclaim/medical insurance policy is not deductible from compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 including under the head of medical expenses – The two operate on entirely different footings, one being a statutory entitlement and the other a contractual benefit flowing from premiums paid – Appeal dismissed — Matter remanded [Paras 2–3, 15–16].

Double Benefit – Principle Against – Scope and Limits – Just Compensation – The principle against double benefit mandates that a claimant cannot recover twice for the same loss, as that would amount to unjust enrichment – Compensation under the MVA must be "just compensation" and not a windfall – However, where the additional benefit is independent in nature — arising from a contract supported by consideration and not merely triggered by the accident — it cannot be treated as a substitute for the same loss and thus is not liable for deduction – Employment-related benefits such as provident fund, gratuity and pension, being accrued entitlements, are similarly not deductible [Paras 7–7.2.1].

Statutory Benefit vs. Contractual Benefit – Distinction – A statutory benefit flows from legislation enacted by the State and is available to all persons meeting its prerequisites — it requires no negotiation or consent and can only be altered by amending the law – A contractual benefit, on the other hand, flows from private agreement between parties and is enforceable under the law of contract — it is limited to parties to the contract and depends on consent – A Mediclaim policy is purchased voluntarily by a person against the uncertainties of life and is not confined to accidental coverage alone — the contractual reimbursement thereunder is independent of and not eclipsed by the MACT claim – Compensation under the MVA, being beneficial legislation guided solely by the principle of just and fair compensation without strict monetary limits, stands on a higher pedestal than the contractual benefit under a Mediclaim policy [Paras 7.3.1–7.3.3, 9–11].

Helen Rebello – Patricia Jean Mahajan – Shashi Sharma – Sebastiani Lakra – Swaminathan – Considered and Distinguished – In Helen Rebello, life insurance proceeds were held not deductible as they bore no correlation to the accidental death – In Patricia Jean Mahajan, social security and insurance proceeds were held not deductible in the absence of nexus with accidental death – In Shashi Sharma, where both compensation grounds had statutory force, deduction was directed to avoid double payment under the same head – In Sebastiani Lakra, benefits under the Employees Family Benefit Scheme were held not deductible as they were not statutory – In Swaminathan, deduction of medical expenses reimbursed by an employer was affirmed on its specific facts — Court held that Swaminathan does not aid the insurer as its observation arose in a specific context and a Mediclaim policy was not involved therein [Paras 8.1–8.5].

Judicial Inconsistency – Duty of Bar and Bench – The Court noted with concern that single judges and division benches of the same High Court had taken diametrically opposite views on the deductibility of Mediclaim amounts — illustrated with tabular reference to conflicting decisions across the Bombay, Delhi, Kerala, Punjab & Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Madras High Courts – Judicial inconsistency and uncertainty impede counsel, burden courts and undermine definitive outcomes – Counsel have a duty to bring to the Court's notice judgments both favourable and adverse to their case — the Court itself bears an independent tri-fold duty to apply correct law, ensure consistency with precedent, and avoid per incuriam decisions – Both Bar and Bench are jointly responsible for minimising problems arising from inconsistent judicial opinion [Paras 12–14].

Decision: Appeal dismissed as meritless — Mediclaim/medical insurance amounts not deductible from MACT compensation — Matter remanded to the High Court for fresh determination consistent with the judgment — Pending applications disposed of [Paras 15–16].

Rent Law – Eviction – Bona Fide Need – Co-Landlord – Sufficiency of Pleadings and Proof – Appellant filed eviction suit against tenants' legal heirs in respect of Flat No.2, Memorare Building, Chembur, Bombay on grounds of bona fide need under Section 13(1)(g) read with Section 13(2), availability of alternative accommodation under Section 13(1)(l) and change of user under Section 13(1)(k) of the Bombay Rent Act – Small Causes Court decreed the suit; Appellate Bench affirmed – High Court, in revision, set aside concurrent findings holding pleadings insufficient and that no landlord-tenant relationship was established – Held: Plaint contained all material facts establishing co-landlordship and statutory grounds for eviction; evidence adduced by way of affidavit of examination-in-chief constituted proof of facts pleaded and was not required to be independently pleaded – Both tests of pleading and proof stand satisfied – High Court erred in interfering with concurrent findings – Appeal allowed [Paras 35–40, 61].

Pleadings – Distinction Between Pleading and Proof – Facta Probanda and Facta Probantia – Pleading denotes formal assertion of material facts; proof is adduction of evidence to establish those facts – Material facts on which a party relies (facta probanda) must be stated in pleadings; evidence or facts by which material facts are proved (facta probantia) need not be pleaded – Share certificates, family arrangement and related documents tendered in evidence constituted facta probantia and were admissible to prove facts already pleaded in the plaint – No defect in pleadings on that count [Paras 26–34, 40].

Deficiency in Pleadings – Cannot Be Raised for First Time in Appeal – Where parties, despite deficiency in pleadings, knew the case and proceeded to trial by adducing evidence on the issues involved, it is not open to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal – Parties were fully aware of the case throughout trial; objection to pleadings first raised before High Court was, therefore, not entertainable [Para 41].

Share Certificate – Interest in Land Includes Building – Section 8, Transfer of Property Act – Share certificate pertaining to the land of the Suit Building conveys interest in the building constructed thereon as well, unless a contrary intention appears – Appellant held share certificates jointly with her siblings; DW-1 admitted the building was constructed by the Appellant's father – Appellant conclusively proved her status as co-owner of the Suit Building and co-landlord within Section 5(3) of the Bombay Rent Act as on the date of filing the suit [Paras 42–46].

Oral Family Arrangement – Reliance Permissible – Subsequent Events – Family arrangement can be entered into by unregistered oral agreement and is enforceable on principles of special equity – Appellant's deposition regarding the family understanding that flat Nos.5 and 6 were earmarked for her brothers and the Suit Premises for her exclusive use upon eviction was a subsequent development that the Court was entitled to take cognisance of, provided rules of fairness were observed – Technical considerations must yield to peace and harmony in enforcement of family arrangements [Paras 47–50].

Bona Fide Need – Temporary Occupation of Another Flat Does Not Negate Need – Comparative Hardship – Appellant's temporary co-occupation of flat Nos.5 and 6 during pendency of the suit did not negate her bona fide need for the Suit Premises – Said flats were insufficient to accommodate the Appellant's family and her brothers' families in light of the oral family arrangement – Tenants' legal heirs had acquired alternative accommodation; Defendant No.2's sale of alternative flat during pendency of suit indicated deliberate attempt to defeat eviction – Respondent No.1 resides and owns property in Pune; his wife resides in Norway; no genuine need for the flat in Chembur established – Greater hardship lies with the Appellant who has no accommodation in Mumbai [Paras 51–60].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment dated 23.06.2025 of the High Court of Bombay in Civil Revision Application No. 308 of 2019 set aside – Judgment and decree dated 14.09.2007 of the Small Causes Court, Bombay in Rent and Eviction Suit No. 411/861 of 1996 restored.

Criminal Law - MPID Act – Scope of "Deposit" – "Financial Establishment" – Loan Nomenclature Irrelevant – Appellants advanced Rs.2.51 crore to respondents for a resort project with a promise of 24% per annum interest payable quarterly – Respondents failed to repay principal or interest – High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Application holding the transaction to be a "loan" outside the ambit of the MPID Act and that respondents were not a "Financial Establishment" – Held: Definition of "deposit" under Section 2(c) of the MPID Act is wide and inclusive, encompassing any receipt of money to be returned after a specified period with or without interest – Nomenclature of the transaction as "loan" is irrelevant; what matters is whether the essential ingredients of "deposit" are satisfied – All three ingredients of "deposit" satisfied in the present case – Respondents, as recipients of such amounts, qualify as "Financial Establishment" under Section 2(d) of the MPID Act – Appellants entitled to invoke Section 3 and proceed under the MPID Act [Paras 5.2–6.8].

Definition of "Financial Establishment" – Wide Amplitude – Any Person Accepting Deposit – Section 2(d) of the MPID Act defines "Financial Establishment" to mean "any person accepting deposit under any scheme or arrangement or in any other manner" – Private individuals accepting money to be returned with interest fall squarely within this definition – Repeated use of the word "any" in both Sections 2(c) and 2(d) reflects legislative intent to cast the regulatory net broadly and comprehensively – Individual respondents accepting deposits and fraudulently defaulting thereon are "Financial Establishments" within the Act [Paras 5.2.3–5.2.4, 6.2].

IPC Proceedings – Non-Applicability – Independent Remedy under MPID Act – Appellants had earlier failed to secure registration of FIR for offences under Sections 420, 409 and 405 IPC, courts holding no cognizable offence was disclosed – High Court erroneously held that failure under IPC proceedings operated as an embargo against invoking the MPID Act – Held: IPC proceedings and MPID Act operate in distinct statutory fields – Non-establishment of IPC offences cannot be equated with non-applicability of MPID Act – A complaint under Section 3 of the MPID Act is an independent recourse under a special law and is not barred by outcome of IPC proceedings – Plea of civil nature of dispute equally irrelevant once the ingredients of Section 2(c) read with Section 2(d) are satisfied [Paras 6.4–6.7].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment and order dated 14.08.2025 passed in Criminal Revision Application No. 64 of 2024 set aside – Appellants held entitled to invoke Section 3 of the MPID Act and avail remedies thereunder.