Waqf Act, 1995 — Sajjadanashin and Mutawalli — Distinct Offices — Civil Court Jurisdiction — The High Court held that Section 3(i) of the Waqf Act, 1995 subsumes the office of Sajjadanashin within the definition of Mutawalli and that disputes relating to appointment of Sajjadanashin fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Waqf Board under Section 32(2)(g) — Held: The offices of Mutawalli and Sajjadanashin are not the same; a Sajjadanashin is the spiritual superior of a Dargah in charge of spiritual affairs, while a Mutawalli's functions are purely administrative; Section 64(2) of the Waqf Act itself preserves a person's rights as Sajjadanashin even upon removal from the office of Mutawalli, confirming the independent and distinct character of the two offices — Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a dispute relating to the office of Sajjadanashin [Paras 20–31, 42].

Waqf Act, 1995 — Section 32(2)(g) — Scope — Powers of Waqf Board — Board's power to appoint and remove Mutawallis under Section 32(2)(g) is confined to the administrative office of Mutawalli — Held: A Sajjadanashin of a Waqf can discharge the functions of Mutawalli if additionally appointed under Section 32(2)(g), but a Mutawalli cannot function as Sajjadanashin — Declaration of a Sajjadanashin is a religious affair over which the Waqf Board has no jurisdiction — Even the Karnataka Waqf Board (Respondent No. 24) conceded this position; the Board has never appointed any Sajjadanashin [Paras 29, 42].

Jurisdiction — Belated Plea — Second Appeal — The contesting respondent raised the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court for the first time in the second appeal before the High Court, having not raised it before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court — The dispute had also been transferred to the Waqf Tribunal in 2002, but the Tribunal returned the matter to the Civil Court holding it not maintainable, and this order was never challenged — Held: The High Court was not justified in entertaining the belated plea of lack of jurisdiction raised for the first time in second appeal, particularly after 37 years of litigation and after concurrent findings had been rendered [Paras 32–34, 41].

Sajjadanashin — Nature of Office — Succession by Nomination — Khilafatnama — Concurrent Findings — The grandfather of the appellant nominated him as Jan-Nasheen Sajjada through Khilafatnama (Ex. D-1) at a public religious function on 26.02.1981 — Both the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after a 31-year trial, held the nomination valid and decreed the counter-claim in favour of the appellant — Held: The High Court having set aside the decrees solely on the ground of jurisdiction without going into merits, the concurrent decrees of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court are restored; the matter is remitted to the High Court to decide the second appeals on merits in accordance with law [Paras 8–13, 43].

Decision: Appeals partly allowed — Impugned judgment and order of the High Court in RSA Nos. 1004, 1064, 1069 and 1141 of 2023 quashed and set aside — Judgment and decree dated 20.12.2019 of the Addl. Civil Judge & JMFC, Channapatna in O.S. No. 92/1988 and judgment and decree dated 27.02.2023 of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Channapatna in R.A. No. 16/2020 restored — Matter remitted to High Court for decision on merits, excluding the question of jurisdiction, with a request to decide preferably within nine months.

Criminal Law – Murder – Burning of Wife – Concurrent Conviction – Dying Declaration – Reliability – The appellant was convicted under Sections 302 and 342 IPC by the Sessions Judge, Bundi and sentenced to life imprisonment with rigorous imprisonment of one year respectively – High Court confirmed the conviction – Appellant challenged concurrent findings on the ground that the magistrate who recorded the dying declaration had noted that the deceased was not in a position to give a statement and that the certificate of mental fitness was obtained on a blank paper – Held: Scope of interference in concurrent findings of conviction is restricted to cases where the courts below have committed manifest errors in law, misdirected themselves in appreciating evidence, or completely missed crucial pieces of evidence – On examination of the Magistrate's (PW-12) deposition, nowhere did the officer state that the deceased was not of sound mind – The duty doctor (PW-15) examined the condition of the deceased before certifying her fitness to make a statement – The fact that the medical certificate was on the reverse of the same paper as the dying declaration does not affect its sanctity [Paras 7–12].

Dying Declaration – Evidentiary Value – Consistency with Medical Evidence – Eyewitnesses Turning Hostile – The deceased's dying declaration (Exhibit P-20) recorded in question-answer format by the Magistrate was found consistent with the medical evidence adduced by PW-9 and PW-10, both of whom deposed that the deceased died due to septicaemia caused by burning – Eyewitnesses PW-2 and PW-3 turned hostile and supported the prosecution case – Held: Where the dying declaration is consistent with medical evidence, the testimony of hostile eyewitnesses loses significance in undermining the prosecution's case – A medical jurist's testimony cannot be disregarded merely because he was not a practicing doctor, provided he was qualified and his testimony was consistent with the treating medical officer [Paras 12, 13].

Dying Declaration – Allegation of Tutoring – Bald Assertion – Not Accepted – The appellant contended before the trial court that the parents of the deceased had tutored her into making the dying declaration – Held: Such submission was a bald assertion which was rightly rejected by the trial court – No material was brought to establish tutoring either in examination-in-chief or in cross-examination [Para 11].

Postscript – Violence Against Women – Persistence Despite Legislative and Judicial Reforms – The Court noted that the offence was of the year 2012, by which time the Constitution and numerous legislative measures had been in operation for decades – Despite the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Section 498-A IPC, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013, and a series of significant judicial pronouncements expanding women's rights, NCRB data shows more than 4.48 lakh crimes against women were recorded in 2023 and dowry-related violence continues to claim over 6,000 lives annually – Held: The coexistence of legal progress and persistent violence signals a deep paradox — legal and economic advancements are visible on a macro level but patriarchy still permeates the everyday — practices such as domestic abuse persist not as aberrations but as indications of a disease-afflicted social order — the answer to why control over women's bodies and choices still persists lies only with "We, the People of India" [Paras 14–18].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Concurrent conviction and sentence under Sections 302 and 342 IPC confirmed — Pending applications disposed of.

Contract Law — Termination and Blacklisting — Distinct Standards of Judicial Review — Blacklisting Order Set Aside for Violation of Natural Justice — Termination Upheld — While exercising judicial review over administrative actions relating to termination and/or blacklisting of contractors, courts must apply distinct standards of legality, rationality and proportionality, as the conditions for imposing such measures and the consequences thereof differ in gravity — Termination of contract upheld on merits, blacklisting order set aside for patent infirmities including failure to issue a specific show-cause notice for blacklisting and absence of application of mind — Held: Termination and blacklisting are independent decisions operating in separate dimensions; a decision of blacklisting is not the automatic or logical consequence of a decision of termination [Paras 2–4, 18].

Blacklisting — Natural Justice — Requirement of Specific Show-Cause Notice — Rule 10.5 of Contractor Registration Rules, 2012 — The show-cause notice dated 04.06.2024 was issued in the context of explaining negligence and did not purport to be a notice proposing blacklisting — Even accepting the Department's argument that the notice served dual purpose, it fell short of the requirement of a specific, particularised and unambiguous notice indicating the intention to blacklist and calling upon the contractor to show cause against the proposed blacklisting — The final blacklisting order also failed to record reasons why blacklisting became necessary — Held: Show-cause notice and blacklisting order both deficient; blacklisting set aside [Paras 16, 22–23].

Blacklisting — Civil Consequences — Stigmatic and Exclusionary Character — Audi Alteram Partem — A blacklisting order carries severe civil consequences: it deregisters the contractor across all categories (Rule 10.3), stops all subsisting works and forfeits security deposits (Rule 10.4), and bars future government contracts — Such an order assumes the contractor to be an incorrigible entity and cannot be imposed mechanistically; it requires sufficient evidence, clear application of mind and stronger adherence to principles of natural justice — Held: For a show-cause notice to constitute valid basis of a blacklisting order, it must spell out clearly, or its contents must admit of clear inference, that there is intention to blacklist the noticee [Paras 17–20].

Termination — Clause 59 of GCC — Opportunity of Hearing — Termination of contract upheld where findings of negligence were corroborated by multi-level enquiries including inputs from Birsa Institute of Technology and IITs of Delhi, Madras and Bombay — Appellant's offer to reconstruct the collapsed ESR at its own expense treated as an admission of negligence — Held: Appellant had sufficient opportunity at the common hearing, before the Appellate Authority and before the Division Bench; termination unimpeachable on merits and on grounds of due process [Paras 15, 25].

Moulding of Relief — Blacklisting Order — Passage of Time — Although the blacklisting order is set aside, the Court declined to direct fresh show-cause proceedings in view of the fact that more than one and a half years had already elapsed from the date of the order (23.08.2024) without any stay — Held: Order of blacklisting shall cease to operate with immediate effect; directing issuance of fresh show-cause notice would only lead to further litigation [Para 24].

Decision: Civil Appeals partly allowed — Order of termination upheld; order of blacklisting set aside — Blacklisting shall cease to operate with immediate effect.

Bail Cancellation – Non-Compliance of Bail Conditions – Real Estate Fraud – Petitioner, Director of Bhasin Infotech and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (BIIPL), granted bail by the Supreme Court in 2019 in multiple FIRs filed by allottees of the 'Grand Venice' project for non-delivery of units, siphoning of funds, and impropriety in allotment – Bail subject to conditions including deposit of Rs. 50 crores, settlement of allottee claims, and non-commission of similar offence – Allottees filed Miscellaneous Applications seeking cancellation of bail for violation of all three conditions – Held: Petitioner failed to comply with conditions of bail imposed upon him; bail cancelled; petitioner directed to surrender within one week [Paras 1–3, 125–126].

Bail Condition – Deposit of Rs. 50 Crores – Section 185, Companies Act, 2013 – Deposit Condition Violated – Bail condition required the petitioner, in his personal capacity, to deposit Rs. 50 crores as a pre-condition for grant of bail – Petitioner sourced the entire amount from BIIPL and related group entities without passing any board resolution or special resolution as mandated by Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 – Not a single rupee was deposited from the petitioner's personal funds; amount of Rs. 24 crores sourced from group companies and Rs. 26 crores from BIIPL – Held: Deposit made through corporate funds in complete disregard of statutory requirements cannot be sustained; condition treated as violated; IRP's objections under Sections 49 and 66 of IBC (no time limit for transactions intended to defraud creditors) rightly applicable [Paras 41–53].

Construction Incomplete – Bail Condition of Settlement Not Complied With – Despite multiple opportunities spanning over five years from the grant of bail, the Grand Venice project remained substantially incomplete as confirmed by three independent reports: UPSIDA Report (01.05.2025), Observer's Report (15.05.2025), and Court-appointed Committee Report (23.01.2026) – Reports revealed non-functional lifts, absence of fire NOCs, incomplete units on 9th floor and above, no fire hydrants or firefighting equipment, and inadequate basic amenities – Total claims of allottees exceeded Rs. 1400 crores with approximately 670 creditors; petitioner proposed only Rs. 5 crores towards settlement – Held: Petitioner made no genuine or bonafide effort at settlement; bail condition violated [Paras 54–57, 66–67, 122–123].

Conduct Before Court-Appointed Committee – Lack of Bonafides – Petitioner's conduct before the Court-appointed Committee was obstructive: he left the site visit midway; submitted a list of 1764 allottees before this Court on affidavit but only 774 allottees before the Committee; repeatedly failed to furnish a comprehensive list of allottees despite directions – Held: Such conduct reflects absence of bonafide intention to settle with allottees and is inconsistent with the obligations attached to the grant of bail [Paras 57, 97–98].

Fabrication of Documents – Allotment Agreement and Stamp Paper – Prima Facie Finding – Allotment agreement dated 15.04.2015 contained a GST clause, whereas GST was enacted only in 2017, pointing directly at fabrication – Petitioner's explanation that inclusion was "anticipatory" rejected as GST reference appeared only in one clause and not throughout – Further, Assignment Deed dated 10.04.2023 was accompanied by stamp paper (FV 836192 dated 06.03.2023) which RTI revealed was actually sold to a bank on 29.04.2024, establishing post-dated fabrication – Petitioner thereby created third-party rights over 4,25,154 sq. ft. at the expense of genuine allottees and for his own commercial benefit – Held: Prima facie fabrication established; conduct demonstrates lack of bonafide and further justifies cancellation of bail [Paras 100–105].

Commission of Similar Offence – Siphoning of Funds During Moratorium – Section 14, IBC – Bail Condition (i) Violated – After admission of GVCTPL into CIRP by NCLT order dated 04.12.2023 and imposition of moratorium under Section 14 of IBC, an amount of Rs. 74,68,21,277/- was transferred from GVCTPL's account to three entities — Niche Builders, Vinamr Infrastructure, and Bewealthy Properties — prima facie controlled by persons closely related to the petitioner – Petitioner explained transactions as "commercial advances" or "repayment of dues" but produced no loan agreements or financial instruments in support – Held: Transfer of funds during moratorium, without documentary basis and in absence of compliance with Section 186 of the Companies Act, 2013, prima facie amounts to commission of a similar offence; conduct not consistent with obligations of bail; conclusive finding deferred to appropriate proceedings [Paras 107–121].

Jurisdiction – Two-Judge Bench Modifying Three-Judge Bench Order – Clubbing of FIRs – Petitioner contended that the present two-judge Bench lacked jurisdiction to modify orders on clubbing of FIRs passed by a three-judge Bench – Court noted that two-judge Benches have, on occasions, modified three-judge Bench decisions, citing precedent – Held: Question of clubbing/de-clubbing of FIRs left open; any party at liberty to move an appropriate application which shall be decided on its own merits [Para 124].

Forfeiture of Deposited Amount – Direction to IRP and NALSA – Upon finding that bail conditions were intentionally violated, Condition (ix) of the bail order triggered – Held: Entire Rs. 50 crores plus accrued interest forfeited; Rs. 5 crores plus proportionate accrued interest directed to be transmitted to National Legal Services Authority (NALSA); remaining amount with proportionate interest to be transmitted to IRP for purposes of IBC proceedings; Registrar (Judicial) to ensure immediate compliance by the concerned Trial Court [Paras 128–129].

Principles – Cancellation of Bail – Distinction from Appeal Against Grant of Bail – Court reiterated that cancellation of bail operates on different grounds from an appeal against the order granting bail – Grounds for cancellation include: subsequent conduct of the accused, non-compliance with bail conditions, commission of similar offence, and misuse of liberty of bail – Merits of prosecution evidence are not to be gone into at the stage of cancellation [Para 40].

Decision: Miscellaneous Applications allowed – Bail granted to the petitioner vide order dated 06.11.2019 cancelled – Petitioner directed to surrender within one week – Petitioner at liberty to apply for regular bail afresh after twelve months subject to full compliance with orders passed in insolvency proceedings – Passport of petitioner not to be released by the Trial Court without leave of this Court – Entire Rs. 50 crores plus accrued interest forfeited; Rs. 5 crores plus proportionate interest transmitted to NALSA; remaining to IRP – Complete management and affairs of BIIPL to be handed over to IRP at the earliest – Pending applications disposed of.

Waqf — Dargah — Succession to Office of Sajjadanashin — Nomination by Incumbent — Khilafatnama — Validity — The original Sajjadanashin, Peer Pasha Khadri, nominated his grandson (Respondent No. 1), son of his predeceased eldest son, as Jan-Nasheen Sajjada through Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex. P-72) executed at a religious ceremony in the presence of Sajjadanashins, fakirs, murids and community elders — All three courts concurrently held the nomination valid — Held: The Khilafatnama, read as a whole together with oral evidence and surrounding circumstances, clearly conveyed the incumbent's intention to confer his spiritual authority upon Respondent No. 1 and to designate him as successor; the document constitutes a valid act of nomination [Paras 38–40].

Sajjadanashin — Nature of Office — Spiritual Character — Succession by Nomination — The office of Sajjadanashin is primarily spiritual in character, distinct from the secular office of Mutawalli, and is responsible for preserving the spiritual lineage (silsila), guiding disciples and conducting religious ceremonies — Succession is ordinarily determined by custom, usage or nomination by the incumbent — Held: The prevailing practice of the Dargah recognised nomination by the incumbent Sajjadanashin as a valid mode of succession; there is no rigid rule that the office must invariably devolve upon the eldest living son [Paras 35–37, 43–44].

Interpolation — Allegation of — Burden of Proof — Khilafatnama — Appellant alleged that the word "Jan-Nasheen" was subsequently interpolated in Ex. P-72 — Held: Once the appellant admitted the existence and acceptance of the document, the burden shifted to him to establish the alleged interpolation; the appellant neither effectively cross-examined attesting witnesses on this issue nor sought examination by a handwriting expert; mere suspicion cannot displace a duly proved document; at this stage, sending the document for forensic examination cannot be permitted [Paras 41–42].

Documents Relied upon by Appellant — General Power of Attorney (Ex. D-1), Khilafatnama dated 06.07.1969 (Ex. D-13) and Affidavit (Ex. D-23) — Held: A power of attorney creates only an agency relationship, is co-terminus with the life of the principal and cannot operate as a mode of succession to a religious office — The affidavit is not a valid instrument of nomination in the absence of reliable corroborative evidence that it represented a formal act consistent with the traditions of the institution — Participation in managerial or ceremonial activities of the Dargah does not establish succession to the office of Sajjadanashin [Paras 45–49].

Section 100, CPC — Second Appeal — Jurisdiction — Concurrent Findings of Fact — High Court confined its jurisdiction to examining whether a substantial question of law arose — Concurrent findings of three courts that the office is hereditary, that nomination by the incumbent is recognised practice, and that Ex. P-72 is a valid nomination, are purely factual — Held: No perversity demonstrated; no substantial question of law arises; findings cannot be interfered with in second appeal or under Article 136 unless there is manifest illegality or grave miscarriage of justice [Paras 31, 53–55].

Rights of Other Stakeholders — Recognition of one individual as Sajjadanashin does not determine or extinguish the independent legal rights of other beneficiaries under Wakf law; the present litigation concerns succession to the office of Sajjadanashin and not proprietary rights of descendants in Wakf property or income [Para 51].

Decision: Civil Appeals dismissed — Concurrent judgments and decrees of the Trial Court, First Appellate Court and High Court affirmed — Interim orders vacated.

Service Law — Disciplinary Proceedings — Quantum of Punishment — Parity — Co-delinquents of Different Ranks — Respondent, a Senior Manager (MMGS-III), was dismissed from service after being found guilty of conniving with a co-delinquent officer and a gunman to misappropriate customer funds — The disciplinary authority imposed compulsory retirement on the gunman and reduction by two pay stages on the officer — The Single Judge modified dismissal to compulsory retirement on the ground of parity under Article 14, affirmed by the Division Bench — Held: Parity of punishment cannot be claimed merely because charges arise from the same transaction; differentiation in rank and degree of responsibility are compelling grounds for imposing a more stringent punishment on a higher-ranking official — Authority carries accountability; the higher the authority, the higher the accountability — Equating a branch manager of a bank with its gunman is in outrageous defiance of logic and reason [Paras 12–15].

Service Law — Judicial Review — Quantum of Punishment — Scope — Courts must exercise restraint while interdicting orders of punishment in disciplinary proceedings; the disciplinary authority is the best judge of the requirements of maintaining discipline — Interference is warranted only if no reasonable person would impose the punishment in question, or such punishment shocks the conscience of the court — When the court finds punishment disproportionate, it must either remit the matter for reconsideration or, in the rarest of cases, substitute punishment with cogent reasons — Mere statement of disproportionality without reasons amounts to denial of justice — Held: The punishment of dismissal imposed on a Senior Manager for misappropriation of customer funds is neither disproportionate nor shocks conscience; interference by the High Court was uncalled for [Paras 7–11, 14, 17].

Article 14 — Equality — Disciplinary Punishment — Discrimination — Where co-delinquents hold different ranks and exercise different degrees of authority and responsibility, differential punishment does not offend Article 14 — Held: The respondent's higher rank necessarily entailed a higher degree of responsibility and integrity, including supervision of subordinates; the co-delinquents having limited powers could not be equated with the respondent; grant of benefit of parity by the High Court was entirely misconceived [Para 13].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Impugned order of Division Bench and order of Single Judge set aside — Punishment of dismissal from service restored.

FEMA — Section 37A — Seizure Proceedings and Adjudication Proceedings — Independence and Inter-dependence — Competent Authority's Refusal to Confirm Seizure — Effect on Adjudication — The appellants, Directors and family members of M/s. Accord Distilleries & Breweries Pvt. Ltd., were alleged to have acquired and held shares of a Singapore-based foreign entity without RBI approval in violation of Section 4 of FEMA — The Competent Authority, exercising powers under Section 37A(3), refused to confirm seizure of appellants' assets, recording a finding that no proof of payment for shares existed and that the foundational requirement of "reason to believe" was not satisfied — Notwithstanding this, the Adjudicating Authority proceeded with the SCN proceedings, issued a corrigendum and ultimately passed a final adjudication order — Held: The refusal to confirm seizure by the Competent Authority under Section 37A(3) is a substantive evaluation and not an empty formality; such findings necessarily have a bearing on the adjudication proceedings, particularly where the appeal against the order refusing confirmation is still pending [Paras 26–32, 36].

FEMA — Adjudication — Competent Authority's Order — Adjudicating Authority Cannot Override — Appeal Pending — The Adjudicating Authority, while passing the final order under Section 16, extensively relied upon observations of the Division Bench and effectively overrode and contradicted the order of the Competent Authority refusing to confirm seizure, even though the Department's appeal against that order was pending before the Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA — Held: Such course of action tantamounts to abdicating the powers of the Appellate Authority and is arbitrary and contrary to law; the Adjudicating Authority could not have undone the order of the Competent Authority while the same was sub judice in appeal [Paras 37–38].

Writ Petition Against Show-Cause Notice — Maintainability — Exceptions to General Rule — The High Court dismissed the writ petitions on the ground of non-maintainability, holding that a writ against an SCN is not entertainable — Held: This proposition is not an inviolable rule; interference at the stage of SCN is permissible in exceptional circumstances such as where the notice suffers from patent lack of jurisdiction, reflects non-application of mind, is issued with a predetermined approach, amounts to abuse of process of law, or results in violation of principles of natural justice — Rejection of challenge to SCN on ground of non-maintainability was not justified in the peculiar facts of the case [Para 32–33].

Division Bench — Observations Prejudicing Appellants — High Court's observations in paragraphs 32, 33 and 34 of the impugned judgment impliedly effaced the findings of the Competent Authority refusing to confirm seizure and foreclosed the outcome of the appeal pending before the Appellate Authority — The Adjudicating Authority heavily relied upon these observations in the final adjudication order — Held: Such observations were erroneous and have caused prejudice; they are set aside — Adjudication proceedings revived from stage of SCN [Paras 35–36, 39–40].

Suppression of Facts — Allegation of Concealment — No Merit — Respondents alleged that appellants suppressed the fact of the final adjudication order having been passed — Held: No merit in the contention; pleadings in the civil appeals clearly disclosed that the SCN had culminated in a final adjudication order against which statutory appeals had also been preferred; no deliberate concealment or lack of candour established [Para 24].

Decision: Appeals disposed of — Orders of the Division Bench (23.07.2024) and Single Judge (30.11.2023) of the Madras High Court set aside — Final adjudication order dated 26.08.2024 passed by the Adjudicating Authority set aside as arbitrary and contrary to law — Appellate Authority directed to decide the Department's appeal against the Competent Authority's order under Section 37A(5) within two months — Adjudication proceedings arising out of SCN to be taken up thereafter to their logical conclusion, uninfluenced by any observations made in the orders set aside.

Bail – Regular Bail – Prolonged Incarceration – Parity with Co-accused – Appellant in custody since 14.01.2023 in connection with FIR No. 219/2022, Police Station Wagle Estate, District Thane City, for offences under Sections 307, 326, 324, 323, 504, 506, 141, 143 and 149 IPC and Sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act – Trial yet to commence with thirteen witnesses to be examined – Out of eight accused, five already released on bail, one absconding and only one other accused in custody – Held: Considering the length of incarceration, pendency of trial, and parity with co-accused released on bail, case for bail is made out – Appeal allowed – Appellant directed to be produced before the trial Court for release on bail subject to conditions as the Court deems fit.

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 23.06.2025 in Bail Application No. 837/2025 set aside – Trial Court directed to release appellant on bail subject to such conditions as it may impose to ensure his presence – Appellant directed to cooperate fully in the trial and not misuse liberty – Liberty reserved to the State to seek cancellation of bail in case of any infraction or fresh offence.

Referred Cases:

NDPS Act — Sections 8 and 22 — Bail — Grounds of Arrest — Constitutional Mandate — Article 22(1) read with Article 21 — Appellants, senior orthopaedic surgeon and proprietor of pharmacy unit within Corporate Hospital, Amritsar, arrested by NCB on 02.05.2025 following recovery of 2000 Tramadol tablets in sealed condition from hospital pharmacy — Appellants contended tablets were erroneously supplied in excess of order for 200 tablets, and return had been initiated before NCB raid — Punjab and Haryana High Court rejected bail applications — Before Supreme Court, specific plea raised that written grounds of arrest were not furnished to appellants prior to or immediately after arrest, in violation of Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution — Held: Supplying grounds of arrest to accused in writing, before arrest or under exceptional circumstances immediately thereafter, is a constitutional mandate — Any deviation renders the arrest illegal and entitles the accused to be released forthwith [Paras 20–23].

Grounds of Arrest — Arrest Memo — Template Format — Oral Communication Insufficient Without Written Follow-Up — Arrest memo in the present case, prepared in a template format, merely contained a statement that grounds of arrest had been orally explained to the accused before arrest — No separate written memo of grounds of arrest was supplied — Held: Once the arrest memo itself reflects that grounds were orally explained before formal arrest, it was incumbent upon the arresting officer to supply the grounds of arrest in writing at least two hours prior to producing the accused before the Magistrate for remand, as mandated in Mihir Rajesh Shah — This requirement was not complied with — Mention of case details in arrest memo alone does not substitute for mandatory requirement of furnishing written grounds of arrest — Appellants entitled to be released on bail forthwith subject to bail bonds and conditions as imposed by Trial Court [Paras 21–23].

Relied upon: Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, [citation not provided in judgment] — Held: Constitutional mandate of informing arrestee of grounds of arrest is mandatory under all statutes — Grounds must be communicated in writing in a language the arrestee understands — If unable to communicate in writing at time of arrest, same must be done orally and thereafter in writing at least two hours before production before the Magistrate for remand — Non-compliance renders arrest and subsequent remand illegal and the person is at liberty to be set free.

Decision: Leave granted — Appeals allowed — Appellants directed to be released on bail forthwith subject to furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Trial Court and such other conditions as the Trial Court may deem fit to impose — Pending applications disposed of [Paras 23–25].