Urban Planning – Transferable Development Rights – Additional Amenity TDR – Section 126(1)(b) MRTP Act – Landowner surrendered land reserved for garden under the Development Plan to the Corporation and received TDR against the land area – Landowner also developed the garden at its own cost but had signed an LOI, Undertaking and Maintenance Agreement stipulating it would not claim additional amenity TDR – Corporation rejected claim for additional amenity TDR citing contractual waiver, delay of 17 years, supersession of DCR 1991 by DCPR 2034, and non-amenity character of the garden – High Court allowed the writ petition – Held: Corporation's appeal dismissed; Landowner entitled to additional amenity TDR under Section 126(1)(b) of the MRTP Act [Paras 2–4, 38–71].

Constitutional Law – Right to Property – Article 300A – Statutory Compensation – Section 126(1)(b) of the MRTP Act provides a two-fold compensation: TDR against land surrendered and additional TDR against development or construction of amenity on the surrendered land – Such compensation is a manifestation of the right to property under Article 300A – Once fair compensation is prescribed by statute, no deprivation of land without strict compliance thereof is permissible – State cannot contractually derogate from the statutory right of the landowner to receive fair compensation [Paras 41–44].

Waiver – Contracting Out of Statute – Inequal Bargaining Power – Corporation portrayed the condition of non-claim of additional amenity TDR as a pre-requisite for grant of DRC against the land itself – Held: Statutory right to compensation under Section 126(1)(b) cannot be waived by contractual conditions imposed by the acquiring authority, particularly where there is inherent inequality of bargaining power between the authority and the landowner – What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly – LOI, Undertaking and Maintenance Agreement cannot override the statutory scheme [Paras 43–51, 57].

Maintenance Agreement – Independent Transaction – The Corporation itself had pleaded in its counter affidavit before the High Court that the entitlement to TDR and the grant of garden on adoption basis were two separate transactions having nothing to do with each other – Held: High Court erred in holding that the right to maintenance was in lieu of the right to additional amenity TDR; the maintenance agreement is entirely independent of the statutory right to compensation under Section 126(1)(b) – Alleged misuse of the garden cannot affect the Landowner's statutory right to fair compensation [Paras 52–57, 70].

Delay and Laches – Compensation Claims – Continuing Cause of Action – Claim for additional amenity TDR made approximately 17 years after surrender of land – Held: Delay and laches cannot defeat a claim for statutory compensation against acquisition of land – Duty is cast on the State to pay compensation even without a representation or request by the landowner – No third-party rights shown to have been created – Corporation has not demonstrated prejudice on account of delay – Distinction drawn between delay in challenging acquisition proceedings and delay in seeking fair compensation; only the former may attract non-condonable laches [Paras 58–66].

Applicable Regulations – DCR 1991 vs DCPR 2034 – Right to receive additional amenity TDR crystallised on the date of surrender of land in 2002 when DCR 1991 was in force – DCPR 2034 which came into force in 2018 cannot be applied to extinguish rights that had already accrued – T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning Member held inapplicable on facts [Paras 58].

Nature of Amenity – Garden – 'Garden' falls within the definition of 'amenity' under Section 2(2) of the MRTP Act and Regulation 2(7) of the DCR 1991 – Corporation itself certified completion of the garden and made its development a pre-requisite for grant of DRC – Corporation estopped from raising at a late stage a plea that the garden was not an amenity, which was neither part of the rejection order nor the counter affidavit – Development of amenity prior to formal surrender cannot disentitle the landowner from claiming additional TDR [Paras 67–69].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court's order allowing the Landowner's claim for additional amenity TDR under Section 126(1)(b) of the MRTP Act upheld – Corporation directed to comply with directions of the High Court within two months.

Service Law - Dismissal from service - Suppression of higher qualification - Respondent appointed as Temporary Attender - Requisition stipulated candidate must pass 8th standard but must not have passed 12th standard or higher qualification - Respondent was a graduate but disclosed only 10th standard in application and attestation form - Disciplinary authority dismissed respondent on 30.10.2018 - Single Judge of Madras High Court set aside dismissal on 16.04.2025 and ordered reinstatement - Division Bench affirmed the same on 09.09.2025 - Appellants contended suppression amounted to foundational fraud - Respondent argued appellants knew of qualification as he sought permission to pursue graduation while in service - Supreme Court found respondent deliberately omitted entire educational record to stay within eligibility - Held - Suppression of material facts rendered the appointment illegal - Conduct of seeking permission later was an attempt to project non-possession of degree at entry - High Court orders set aside - Dismissal restored - [Paras 1-14].

Service Law - Recruitment - Upper Limit of Qualification - Constitution of India - Article 309 - Rationale for maximum qualification - State as model employer is justified in prescribing an upper limit for certain posts to provide opportunities to persons who could not pursue higher education - Prevents such candidates from being compelled to compete with highly qualified individuals - Policy consistently upheld by courts - Held - Permitting over-qualified candidates to secure such posts deprives genuinely deserving candidates with lower qualifications of the opportunity - No universally accepted rule that a higher qualified candidate is always to be preferred - [Paras 9-11].

Service Law - Equity - Misplaced Sympathy - Illegal Appointment - Respondent sought sympathetic view due to length of service and family hardship - Court cited Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India (2007) 4 SCC 54 - Held - If an appointment is illegal it is non-est in the eye of law and a nullity - Principles of equity have no role to play and sympathy should not be misplaced in cases of foundational fraud or illegality - [Paras 8-10].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgments of the High Court set aside – Order of dismissal dated 30.10.2018 restored.

Bail Jurisdiction – Scope of Powers under Section 483 BNSS – Constitutional vs. Statutory Power – Limits of Bail Court's Jurisdiction – High Court, while rejecting appellant's second bail application in a case under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC, directed the Trial Court to issue summons under Sections 62 and 69 Cr.P.C. and take coercive measures against persons delaying proceedings, and further directed compliance with earlier bail orders in Bhanwar Singh @ Karamvir and Jitendra – Appellant released on interim bail by Supreme Court vide order dated 26.11.2025 – Held: Jurisdiction of a High Court or Sessions Court under Section 483 BNSS is limited to adjudicating whether the accused should be released on bail or remain in custody pending trial – Constitutional power of the High Court cannot be invoked to enlarge the scope of statutory power under bail jurisdiction – Directions issued by the High Court in exercise of bail jurisdiction, mandating systemic administrative compliance, were beyond the statutory power and hence not sustainable – Impugned directions set aside [Paras 2, 5, 7 and 8].

Constitutional Power vs. Statutory Power – Distinction – Constitutional powers are self-sustaining, sovereign, and foundational, emanating directly from the text and spirit of the Constitution, and cannot be abridged except by amendment under Article 368 – Statutory powers, in contrast, are derivative, conditional, and circumscribed strictly by the language, purpose, and legislative intent of the enabling statute – Exercise of statutory power beyond its express or implied authority is ultra vires and void – One power cannot usurp the ambit of another – High Court cannot invoke its constitutional character to expand the scope of a statutory power such as bail jurisdiction – Followed: State of U.P. v. Anurudh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 40 [Para 7].

Summons Execution – Administrative Directions – State Action – Even though the directions issued in earlier bail orders are set aside for jurisdictional infirmity, the steps actually taken by the State authorities pursuant to those directions shall remain unaffected and continue to operate independently – State at liberty to modify the same in consonance with the prevailing law – No comment made on the merits of grant or denial of bail in the earlier orders [Para 8].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned directions issued by the High Court while exercising bail jurisdiction set aside for jurisdictional error – Order dated 26.11.2025 granting bail to appellant confirmed – Administrative steps taken by State authorities to remain unaffected – Pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law – Sections 120-B, 109, 302, 341 IPC - Murder – Criminal Conspiracy – Reversal of Acquittal by Supreme Court – Nine accused persons convicted by Trial Court for criminal conspiracy and murder of Dr. Subbaiah arising from a land dispute in Kanyakumari District – High Court reversed conviction and acquitted all accused – Supreme Court, on re-appreciation, restored Trial Court's conviction – Held: High Court committed grave error in appreciating evidence on artificial and subjective standards detached from objective explanations furnished by prosecution – Trial Court's findings legally sustainable and stand restored [Paras 44-45, 97, 100].

Approver's Evidence – Contradictions with Section 161 Cr.P.C. Statement – Weight and Corroboration – Approver PW12 (originally A10) turned approver after grant of pardon and made full disclosure of conspiracy, money trail, and execution of murder – High Court rejected his evidence citing contradictions with earlier Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement recorded when he was an accused – Held: Statement of an accused recorded during investigation qualifies as a Section 161 statement and may be used for contradiction if he subsequently enters the witness box; however, contradictions between a pre-pardon police statement and a post-pardon deposition carry limited weight, as the very object of pardon is to elicit true and full disclosure which inherently acknowledges prior concealment – High Court adopted an infirm approach – Evidence of PW12 substantially corroborated by independent public witnesses PW2, PW3, PW4, PW5, and PW53 [Paras 58-68].

Judicial Bias – Grant of Pardon – Suo Motu Exhibition of Administrative Letter – High Court suo motu placed on record Ex. C6, a letter written by the Sessions Judge to the High Court on the administrative side disclosing a potential conflict of interest, and used it to cast doubt on the credibility of PW12 – Held: Voluntary disclosure of conflict by the Sessions Judge was a positive act to avoid bias, not an indicator of it; matter was thereafter transferred and trial conducted by successor Judge before whom PW12's evidence was recorded – High Court erred in imputing bias without affording prosecution opportunity to question the document; Trial Judge who granted pardon played no role in adjudication [Paras 59-61].

Eye-Witness Testimony – Credibility – Public Witnesses – PW2 witnessed the assault on the deceased directly and remained consistent on material particulars through extensive cross-examination – PW3, present near the scene, overheard the assailants discuss the target, reward, and prior failed attempt, and corroborated PW2's account including the words "do not cut brother" – Held: Testimonies of PW2 and PW3 wholly incriminating and natural; their presence duly explained; no prior association with either deceased or accused shown; minor contradictions do not demolish credibility of public witnesses – High Court proceeded on presumption of falsehood unsupported by concrete doubts [Paras 47-51, 63, 70].

Criminal Conspiracy – Direct Evidence – Chance Witnesses – PW4 and PW5 (real estate agents approached to find buyers for disputed land) witnessed conspiracy meetings at A5's residence where conspirators openly discussed elimination of Dr. Subbaiah – PW53 witnessed first conspiracy meeting in July 2013 – High Court rejected these witnesses as chance witnesses introduced to suit prosecution – Held: Their delayed disclosure explained by circumstances of discovery; no motive to depose falsely shown; their testimonies inter-corroborated and consistent with approver's account – High Court incorrectly applied a blanket rule that conspiracy can never be discussed before strangers [Paras 52-58, 97].

Electronic Evidence – Call Detail Records – Proof under Section 65-B – CDRs exhibited by PW45 (Sub-Inspector, Cyber Crime) who received them by email from telecom companies and produced printouts with his own Section 65-B certificate – Nodal officers of telecom companies not examined; emails through which CDRs were sent also not proved; CDRs filed in editable format – Held: CDRs not proved in accordance with law; certificate under Section 65-B must be issued by competent person having lawful control over the system that generated the electronic record – CDR rejection, however, does not affect outcome as ample direct evidence of conspiracy exists [Paras 79-82].

Electronic Evidence – CCTV Footage – Gait Analysis – Admissibility – Chain of Custody – CCTV footage extracted from Shreshta Subhashree Apartment; hard disk sent to FSL returned unexamined for want of DVR; DVR destroyed due to inaction; hard disk thereafter sent to private lab Truth Labs which prepared truncated copy; cloned copies could not subsequently be produced due to hard disk corruption – Held: Serious mishandling of electronic evidence and broken chain of custody render CCTV footage unreliable; gait analysis report based on such footage equally unreliable – High Court rightly rejected this evidence; rejection does not affect conviction as identity of assailants established through credible eye-witness accounts [Paras 80, 92-94].

Re-enactment of Crime – Article 20(3) of Constitution – Testimonial Compulsion – High Court held that compelling accused to re-enact the occurrence amounted to personal testimony and confession in police custody, hit by Article 20(3) and Sections 25-26 of Evidence Act – Held: A crime scene re-enactment directed by the investigating officer, requiring accused to walk or act in a certain manner without disclosing personal knowledge, does not per se amount to testimonial compulsion – The thin line between "re-enactment" and "evidence based on re-enactment" must be acknowledged; gait analysis derived therefrom is analysis of physical attributes and not personal testimony – Re-enacted evidence is not substantive evidence of commission of offence and can only serve corroborative purposes [Paras 83-90].

Money Trail – Circumstantial Evidence – Money transferred from A1 and A3 to A5, then to DW2 (brother-in-law of A6) who withdrew and handed cash to A6, who distributed to assailants A8, A9, and PW12 – Transfers confirmed by bank statements; handing over witnessed by PW37 – Accused persons presented conflicting explanations (missionary purpose, textile company investment) without leading any supporting evidence – Held: Money trail consistent with timeline of conspiracy; accused failed to discharge burden of proving alternative purpose; DW2 not implicated as prosecution evidence shows he was unaware of purpose of transfer [Paras 73-74].

Motive – Land Dispute – Significance of Proved Motive – Prolonged land dispute between deceased and A1's family; multiple criminal complaints; cancellation of anticipatory bail sought; frustration of accused led to conspiracy to eliminate deceased – Held: Proved motive fortifies prosecution case; while absence of motive may weigh in favour of accused, proved motive lends credence to the finding of guilt – Motive consistent with eye-witness accounts of conspiracy meetings [Paras 95-96].

Appellate Court Powers – Reversal of Acquittal – Scope and Limits – Respondents contended High Court's acquittal should not be disturbed as it reflected a legally plausible view – Held: Limitation on appellate powers applies equally to High Court sitting over Trial Court; High Court must demonstrate perversity, illegality, or erroneous findings before reversing Trial Court – High Court in present case replaced a legally possible view of Trial Court with its own without demonstrating any such infirmity – Loose acquittal of a guilty person as dangerous as conviction of an innocent [Paras 45, 99-100].

Sentence – Life Imprisonment – Pardon – A1 to A9 convicted under Sections 302 read with 120-B and other provisions of IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment; death sentences not pressed by State – A1 and A2 (parents of A3 and A4, advanced in age, limited role) permitted to file petitions for pardon before Governor of Tamil Nadu under Article 161 of Constitution within eight weeks; sentence of A1 and A2 suspended till petitions decided – All other respondents directed to surrender within two weeks [Paras 100-107].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court's order of acquittal set aside – Trial Court's conviction and sentence restored – All accused convicted under Sections 302 read with 120-B, 120-B, 341 and 34 IPC as applicable; sentenced to life imprisonment – Sentences to run concurrently – A1 and A2 granted eight weeks to petition Governor under Article 161; arrest suspended till then – Remaining respondents to surrender within two weeks.

Banking Law – SARFAESI Act – Section 14 – Possession of Secured Asset – NPA – Petitioner-company availed loan of Rs. 8.09 crores from SBI in 2019 but defaulted on the very first instalment; account declared NPA on 29.07.2019; District Magistrate, Yamuna Nagar passed possession order on 29.05.2024; High Court directed implementation of possession order within two months – Offer to repay principal amount made after six years held too little too late – Held: Conduct of petitioners wanting; no ground to interfere with High Court's order; SLP dismissed [Paras 3-4, 6, 8].

Banking – Loan Sanction – Due Diligence – Negligence of Bank Officials – Court observed that SBI's sanctioning of a loan of Rs. 8.09 crores to a borrower who could not repay even the first instalment prima facie indicates absence of proper assessment of repayment capacity by bank officials – Court noted a general tendency of banks to be casual in granting large loans to bigger entities while being disproportionately demanding and tedious towards smaller borrowers seeking personal loans, which may amount to borderline harassment in certain cases – Court declined to pass specific orders, reserving the issue for a more appropriate case, while requesting senior counsel to convey the Court's opinion to SBI [Para 7].

SARFAESI – Statutory Remedy – DRT – Petitioner-company having independently approached DRT via Securitization Application No. 556 of 2024 and sought interim relief without success, simultaneous invocation of writ jurisdiction viewed adversely – Petitioners accorded final opportunity to press prayer for interim relief before DRT; status quo on properties maintained for two weeks till 02.06.2026 by way of extraordinary indulgence [Paras 5-6, 8].

Decision: Special leave petition dismissed – Petitioners granted two weeks' status quo on properties till 02.06.2026 as extraordinary indulgence – Liberty to press interim relief before DRT, Chandigarh in Securitization Application No. 556 of 2024 – Present order not to aid petitioners on merits nor prejudice SBI's case before DRT or DRAT – Pending IAs disposed of.

Public Safety – Stray Dog Menace – Suo Moto Jurisdiction – Article 21 – This Court, vide order dated 7th November, 2025 [(2026) 1 SCC 774], had issued pan-India directions mandating removal of stray dogs from institutional areas such as schools, hospitals, sports complexes, bus stands and railway stations, prohibiting their re-release at the same locations, and requiring municipal authorities to shift such animals to designated shelters after sterilisation and vaccination — A large number of interlocutory applications were thereafter filed by animal welfare organisations seeking modification, clarification, vacation, recall or stay of the said directions — Rival applications also filed seeking continuation and expansion of directions to other public spaces — Held: Continued unchecked presence of stray dogs in institutional spaces directly violates the fundamental right to life and safety guaranteed under Article 21 — Directions affirmed in their entirety [Paras 1-9, 75-76].

Statutory Interpretation – Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 – Rule 7(2) and Rule 11(19) – "Gated Campus" – "Same Place or Locality" – Principal contention of applicants seeking modification was that direction prohibiting re-release of stray dogs to original institutional locations contravenes Rule 11(19) of ABC Rules, 2023 which mandates release of sterilised and vaccinated dogs to the same place or locality from where they were captured — Held: Rule 7(2) classifying "street dogs" as those found on streets or within gated campuses is a classificatory provision, not declaratory of any enforceable right — "Gated campus" under Rule 7(2) cannot be construed to include sensitive institutional spaces such as hospitals, schools, colleges, sports complexes and transport hubs — "Same place or locality" under Rule 11(19), read with the definition of "street" under Section 2(i) of the PCA Act, 1960, must be confined to publicly accessible open spaces and cannot extend to controlled-access institutional premises — ABC Rules, 2023 do not mandate continued presence or re-release of stray dogs within such institutional areas [Paras 39-49, 75].

Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Plenary Powers – Validity of Directions – Complete Justice – Whether directions issued by this Court vide order dated 7th November, 2025, excluding institutional areas from operation of Rule 11(19) of ABC Rules, 2023, are consistent with the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 — Held: Power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level from ordinary statutory provisions and cannot be fettered by them — Article 142 is curative in nature and cannot be used to supplant substantive law, but can bridge gaps where statutory framework does not adequately address emergent situations — Directions issued herein do not supplant the statutory scheme but supplement and tailor its application in a manner consistent with constitutional imperatives of public safety — No principle of general or specific public policy mandates the continued presence of stray dogs in sensitive institutional areas — Exercise of power under Article 142 held valid and within permissible limits — Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584 and Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 — Followed [Paras 50-62, 75].

Standard Operating Procedures – Animal Welfare Board of India – Ultra Vires Challenge – AWBI issued SOPs dated 27th November, 2025 in compliance of Direction (J) of order dated 7th November, 2025, extending applicability to religious places, parks, tourist sites and recreational areas beyond the institutional areas specifically mentioned in the order — Applicants challenged SOPs as ultra vires and beyond the scope of the Court's directions — Held: The enumeration of institutional areas in the order dated 7th November, 2025 was illustrative, not exhaustive — Emphasis was on functional character of spaces witnessing substantial public movement and congregation — Extension of SOPs to religious sites, parks and tourist locations is in furtherance of the object of the directions — SOPs upheld — Challenge dismissed [Paras 77-85].

Accountability – Tortious Liability – Animal Welfare Organisations – Feeding of Community Dogs – Animal welfare groups and student-led bodies in institutional campuses claimed right to care for and feed stray dogs — Held: Assertion of rights or interests in favour of stray animals cannot operate divorced from corresponding responsibility to safeguard human life and safety — Any such group or body operating within institutional campuses shall mandatorily furnish an undertaking/affidavit to the Head of the Institution accepting tortious liability for any incident of stray dog bite occurring within campus — Failure to comply shall entail suitable action against the Head of the Institution — NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad permitted to carry out CSVR activities experimentally subject to undertaking of tortious liability — No animal welfare group or body shall feed stray dogs in institutional premises without such undertaking [Paras 71-74].

NGOs – Due Diligence – Concerns of Fraudulent Billing – Municipal Authorities – Court noted alarming reports that certain NGOs engaged in CSVR activities were raising fraudulent and repetitive bills for procedures never carried out — Held: Municipal authorities are well-advised to undertake rigorous due diligence including background checks, credential verification, and assessment of past performance before awarding contracts to NGOs — Execution of work to be subject to continuous supervision, periodic inspections and independent financial and performance audits — Court declines to issue further directions regarding NGO involvement, leaving it to municipal authorities to decide [Paras 66-67].

Compliance – States and Union Territories – Systemic Administrative Failure – ABC Framework – Court found pervasive inadequacy of infrastructure across States and UTs — ABC centres grossly insufficient; sterilisation and vaccination programmes sporadic and underfunded despite the framework having been in place since 2001 — Tamil Nadu recorded 2.63 lakh dog-bite cases and 17 deaths in the first four months of 2026 alone; Karnataka recorded over 2 lakh dog-bite cases and 25 deaths in the same period — Held: States and UTs are under a continuing constitutional obligation under Article 21 to take all effective measures to prevent threats to public safety — Financial constraints and logistical inconvenience cannot constitute constitutional alibis for executive paralysis — Where safety of human beings is weighed against interests of sentient animals, the constitutional balance must tilt unequivocally in favour of preservation of human life [Paras 86-104].

National Highways Authority of India – Stray Animals on Highways – NHAI cannot absolve itself of responsibility for road safety by placing exclusive reliance upon States and Union Territories — NHAI possesses requisite administrative, financial and logistical wherewithal to address hazards from stray cattle on National Highways and Expressways — Directed to formulate and implement a comprehensive mechanism including specialised transport vehicles, holding facilities, and structured arrangements with animal welfare organisations and gaushalas — Monitoring and coordination framework to be established [Paras 106-108].

Further Directions – Augmentation of ABC Infrastructure – Each district shall establish at least one fully functional Animal Birth Control Centre with veterinary infrastructure, trained personnel and surgical facilities — States to ensure availability of anti-rabies vaccines and immunoglobulin in all Government medical facilities — Euthanasia of rabid, incurably ill or demonstrably dangerous/aggressive dogs permissible strictly in accordance with PCA Act, 1960 and ABC Rules, 2023 — Officers implementing directions bona fide entitled to protection from FIRs and coercive proceedings — Erring officials shall face contempt, disciplinary proceedings and tortious liability for non-compliance [Para 108].

Decentralised Monitoring – Transfer to High Courts – Compliance monitoring of directions issued vide orders dated 22nd August, 2025, 7th November, 2025 and present order transferred to jurisdictional High Courts — All High Courts directed to register suo moto writ petitions styled "In Re: Compliance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No(s). 5 of 2025" as continuing mandamus — States and UTs to file compliance affidavits before jurisdictional High Courts by 7th August, 2026 — Consolidated reports to be forwarded to this Court every four months — First report to be placed before this Court one week prior to next date of hearing i.e. 17th November, 2026 [Paras 110-114].

Decision: All interlocutory applications seeking modification, clarification, vacation, recall or stay of directions issued vide order dated 7th November, 2025 dismissed — All interlocutory applications challenging the validity of Standard Operating Procedures issued by AWBI on 27th November, 2025 dismissed — Further directions issued for augmentation of Animal Birth Control infrastructure — Compliance monitoring transferred to jurisdictional High Courts — Matter listed on 17th November, 2026.

Service Law – Higher Education – Appointment of Principal – Waitlisted Candidate – Change of Place of Posting – Appellant placed at Sl. No. 59 in waitlist pursuant to Advertisement No. 49 of 2019 – Recommended on 03.08.2022 for appointment as Principal of PG College, Ballia under Section 13(3) of the Old Act – Appellant did not join, citing family circumstances, and submitted representation on 26.06.2023 seeking posting at another college including Meerut College – Director clarified on 17.08.2023 that no provision exists for changing place of posting under applicable law – Subsequent orders dated 13.12.2023, 12.01.2024 and 15.01.2024 issued after commencement of New Act purporting to recommend appellant for Meerut College – Single Judge quashed the said orders; Division Bench confirmed – Held: Appellant's deliberate non-joining does not attract Section 13(4) of the Old Act; impugned orders unsustainable – Appeal dismissed [Paras 2, 5-9, 25, 28].

Statutory Interpretation – Section 13(4) of Old Act – Meaning of "Otherwise" – Ejusdem Generis Rule – Section 13(4) applies where vacancy arises due to death, resignation or otherwise during validity of the list – Word "otherwise" must be read ejusdem generis with "death" and "resignation", covering only unforeseen vacancies and not voluntary non-joining by a recommended candidate – A candidate who, after recommendation, consciously refrains from joining and seeks posting at a preferred college cannot invoke Section 13(4) to compel authorities to treat the situation as an "otherwise" vacancy – Such interpretation would frustrate Section 13(3) and permit filling of vacancies never advertised – Held: Appellant's case does not fall within Section 13(4); wider interpretation impermissible [Paras 20-22].

Repeal and Savings – New Act – Effect on Pending Actions Under Old Act – New Act came into force on 21.08.2023 repealing the Old Act – Section 31(2) of New Act saves acts done or actions taken under the Old Act as if done under the New Act – The only "act done" under the Old Act prior to repeal was the recommendation dated 03.08.2022, which remained valid but unimplemented – No further action for change of posting was sanctioned prior to repeal – Orders dated 13.12.2023, 12.01.2024 and 15.01.2024 passed after commencement of New Act based on lapsed Old Act list are wholly without jurisdiction – Authorities duty-bound to follow Sections 10 and 11 of New Act for fresh appointment process – Held: Post-repeal orders cannot be sustained under Section 31(2) savings clause [Paras 17, 22-24].

Effect of Repeal – Section 6, UP General Clauses Act, 1904 – Repeal does not revive anything not in force at the time of repeal and does not affect anything duly done under the repealed enactment – The recommendation dated 03.08.2022 was the only completed act; the Director's letter dated 17.08.2023 expressly stated no change in posting was permissible – Repeal therefore did not revive the Old Act list or authorise any fresh action thereunder – Held: Section 6 of the UP General Clauses Act, 1904 confirms that lapsed list cannot be revived to support impugned orders [Para 24].

Locus Standi – Officiating Principal – Right to Challenge Appointment – Respondent No. 6, Officiating Principal of Meerut College, challenged the orders recommending appellant's appointment – Contention of appellant that Officiating Principal had no locus to file writ petition – Held: When illegality of the authorities is writ large, the issue of locus standi is not germane to the facts of this case – Question of locus left open for decision in an appropriate case – Kamlesh Kumar Sharma (Supra) noted to have upheld locus of Officiating Principals in similar context [Para 27].

Conduct of State Officers – Censure – Court observed that State officers filed affidavit and argued before the Court in support of the appellant contrary to law and facts – After having itself clarified on 17.08.2023 that no change of posting was permissible, the State vociferously supported the unlawful orders – Court observed that duty of State and its officials is to render assistance based on facts and applicable law, not to support any party contrary to law – Chief Secretary of State of UP directed to look into conduct of concerned officers and take recourse in accordance with law if necessary [Para 26].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Orders of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court confirmed with additional reasoning – Parties to bear their own costs – Pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law - Criminal Misappropriation - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 409 and 477A - Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 - Sections 13(1)(c) - 13(1)(d) and 13(2) - Appellant Secretary of Service Co-operative Society accused of misappropriating Rs 1,500 and Rs 14,000 - Conviction based on receipts Ext P1(b) and Ext P3(ab) allegedly signed by Appellant - Trial Court and High Court affirmed conviction while acquitting Appellant of forgery under Section 465 IPC - Supreme Court noted the prosecution case rested on testimony of PW2 and PW3 who were politically affiliated and where PW3 was a previously implicated co-accused - Prosecution failed to produce independent material like disbursement registers or treasury records - Held - Entrustment is a foundational jurisdictional fact that must be established affirmatively beyond reasonable doubt - mere absence of entries in cash books cannot establish misappropriation without proof of lawful entrustment - conviction set aside - [Paras 1-22].

Evidence Law - Interested Witness - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 3 - Scrutiny of testimony - PW3 was originally arrayed as Accused No 1 in the FIR and subsequently acquitted - Defence alleged collusion between PW2 and PW3 to shield PW3 from vigilance proceedings - Held - Testimony of an interested witness who derives benefit from the litigation must be subjected to careful scrutiny and examined with caution - courts can rely on such testimony only if it is found to be intrinsically reliable or corroborated in material particulars - [Paras 11-13].

Evidence Law - Handwriting Identification - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Sections 45 and 47 - Non-expert opinion - Courts below accepted PW2’s testimony identifying Appellant’s signature based on acquaintance - No forensic or expert examination was conducted - Trial Court acquitted Appellant of forgery under Section 465 IPC for the same documents - Held - Opinion under Section 47 is not conclusive by itself - once the prosecution failed to establish authenticity for the purpose of forgery the same documents could not be treated as unimpeachable evidence of entrustment - reasoning of lower courts suffers from inherent inconsistency - [Paras 14-16].

Criminal Law - Public Servant - Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 - Section 2(1)(c) - Prosecution failed to establish Appellant met the description of a public servant - Courts below assumed Society was an aided institution because subsidies were routed through it - Held - No cogent evidence demonstrating that the Society was receiving financial aid from the Government in the manner contemplated by the statutory provision - [Para 19].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Conviction and sentence set aside – Appellant acquitted of all charges – Directed to be released if in custody – Appellant not entitled to service benefits or pension per affidavit undertaking.

Civil Procedure – Partition Suit – Preliminary Decree vs. Final Decree – Executability – Decree dated 13.04.2012 declared the appellant entitled to half share and possession of the suit flat, directed payment of mesne profits at Rs. 1,500/- per month, and appointed an Advocate Commissioner to effect partition by metes and bounds or, in default, to sell the property and apportion the sale consideration – Advocate Commissioner reported that the flat cannot be partitioned by metes and bounds – High Court set aside execution proceedings holding that a final decree was a sine qua non for execution and directed the appellant to file a fresh application for final decree – Held: A decree may be partly preliminary and partly final; the Decree dated 13.04.2012 conclusively determined entitlement to possession, mesne profits, and the mode of working out shares including a direction for sale in default of partition – It is not necessary to look beyond the decree itself to determine its character – Termination of execution proceedings was illegal – Execution Case restored; Advocate Commissioner directed to conduct auction and apportion proceeds between the parties [Paras 14-17].

Preliminary Decree – Nomenclature Not Determinative – High Court erred in proceeding merely by the nomenclature of the decree without juxtaposing its clauses to determine whether the executable portion thereof was being executed – A decree is not rendered non-executable merely because it is labelled preliminary if it incorporates self-contained directions that conclusively dispose of part of the suit, including a direction for sale in default of physical partition – In certain circumstances, an order made under Sections 2 to 4 of the Partition Act is also a deemed decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the CPC [Para 16].

Order XX Rule 18 CPC – No Separate Final Decree Application Required – Once a preliminary decree is passed, the trial court must proceed suo motu to draw up the final decree without requiring the filing of a separate application – Directing the decree holder to file a fresh application for a final decree after the Advocate Commissioner's Report had already been received and the bidding process had commenced was itself an error – The very precedent relied upon by the High Court held that there is no need to file a separate application under Order XX Rule 18 CPC seeking a final decree [Para 16 and footnote 5].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of the High Court dated 27.07.2023 and 20.03.2025 set aside – Execution Case No. EX-A-1600007/14 restored – Trial Court directed to entrust warrant to the same Advocate Commissioner or appoint a fresh one for conducting auction and apportioning proceeds, accounting for mesne profits – Proceedings to be completed within 2 months – No order as to costs [Paras 17-18].