Service Law – Resignation – Withdrawal Before Acceptance – Acceptance of Resignation – The appellant tendered his resignation on 05.12.2013, but later sought to withdraw it. The respondent corporation claimed that the resignation was accepted on 15.04.2014, with effect from 07.04.2014, and rejected the withdrawal request on 23.06.2014. The appellant contested that the acceptance was never communicated and that he had continued to work even after the resignation date. Held: The Supreme Court found that the letter dated 15.04.2014 was an internal communication not served to the appellant. Additionally, the corporation's own conduct, including requesting the appellant to report for duty and considering his absence, indicated that the resignation had not been finalized. Therefore, the resignation was effectively withdrawn before its acceptance. The Division Bench's ruling was incorrect in not considering this fact [Paras 10-12].

Service Law – Reinstatement and Back Wages – The appellant was entitled to be reinstated into service. However, to balance equities, the salary payable for the period during which the appellant did not work was restricted to 50%. Held: The appellant is to be reinstated within thirty days of the order, with 50% back wages from 01.07.2014 to the date of reinstatement. This period shall count towards pensionary benefits, if any [Paras 13-13.2].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in Bengaluru in Writ Appeal No. 3982 of 2019 (S-RES) is set aside. The appellant is directed to be reinstated into service within thirty days. He shall receive 50% of the salary for the period from 01.07.2014 to the date of reinstatement. This period shall be counted for pensionary benefits [Paras 13, 13.1].

Municipal Law – Development Control Regulations – TDR Entitlement – Retrospective Application of Amendments – The appellants surrendered lands and developed amenities like DP Roads, seeking additional TDR/FSI under the provisions of the MRTP Act and DCR. The High Court ruled in favor of the Municipal Corporation's stance that the amendment to Regulation 34 of DCR in 2016 was not retrospective, thus impacting the appellants' claims. Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the 2016 amendment could not be applied retrospectively to nullify the vested rights acquired under the previous regulations. The appellants were entitled to TDR/FSI as per the unamended regulations, consistent with the ruling in "Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Company Limited v. State of Maharashtra" [Paras 4.8, 4.9, 12.1–12.7].

Land Acquisition – Compensation – Delay and Laches – The appellants faced denial of relief by the High Court based on delay and laches in claiming additional TDR/FSI. Held: The Supreme Court emphasized that compensation for landowners, especially in cases of public acquisition, is a constitutional right. The Municipal Corporation, as the custodian of public interests, cannot deny compensation without establishing a substantial change in circumstances or prejudice caused due to the delay. The mere passage of time does not extinguish the landowners' rights. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not right in dismissing the writ petitions on the ground of delay and laches [Paras 8.2, 9.3, 18, 18.1].

Godrej & Boyce I: The Court reiterated the scheme of development rights under the MRTP Act, stating that it allows the acquisition of land required for public purposes through three modes: by agreement, by granting FSI or TDR, or by acquisition under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 [Paras 12, 12.1].

Decision: Appeals partly allowed. The appellants were entitled to the additional TDR/FSI as per the unamended regulations before the 2016 amendment. The Mumbai Municipal Corporation was directed to consider each appellant's case on its merits, ensuring compliance with the regulations as they stood at the relevant time. The High Court's dismissal of writ petitions on the ground of delay and laches was set aside. The Municipal Corporation was directed to consider the cases of the writ petitioners/appellants and release the balance FSI/TDR within three months [Paras 4.7, 4.11, 20, 20.1].

Criminal Law – Arrest and Bail – Allowed - High Court Judgment – Appellant Arvind Kejriwal's arrest upheld by the High Court for alleged involvement in manipulation of the Excise Policy for undue gains. High Court denied regular bail. Appellant challenged arrest procedure under Sections 41(1) and 41A of CrPC. Held: Arrest not illegal, but continued incarceration pending trial violated personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The prosecution failed to show a clear need for custodial interrogation after 22 months of investigation. The appellant had cooperated with the investigation, and there was no risk of tampering with evidence. Bail was granted with conditions. Paras23,40−42​​.

Arrest Procedure – Compliance with Section 41A CrPC – The appellant alleged non-compliance with Section 41A notice procedure. CBI interrogated the appellant while in judicial custody, then sought arrest without issuing a formal notice under Section 41A. The Court ruled that a formal notice was unnecessary as the appellant was already in custody. The CBI complied by seeking the court’s permission for interrogation and arrest, following the appropriate legal framework. Held: Arrest procedurally valid; Section 41A notice does not apply to individuals already in judicial custody.  Paras17−27​​.

Bail – Triple Test – Appellant granted bail as the CBI possessed all relevant evidence, reducing the risk of tampering. The appellant was neither a flight risk nor a threat to witnesses. The High Court erred in denying bail, as the appellant's continued detention served no substantial purpose. He should not be penalized for exercising his right to remain silent during interrogation. Bail was granted with strict conditions, including a prohibition on public comments about the case. Paras41−42​​.

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court order set aside. Bail granted with conditions, including a Rs. 10 lakh bail bond and prohibition on discussing the case publicly. Appellant to be released if no other charges are pending. Paras42−47​​.

Public Examination – Denial of Handkerchief – Re-Examination Denied – The petitioner, suffering from Hyperhidrosis, was not permitted to take a handkerchief into the NEET-2024 examination hall, allegedly affecting his performance. The High Court found that the petitioner was allotted the full examination time, and the denial of the handkerchief would not have materially affected his performance, as he could have wiped his sweat on his clothes. Held: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no merit in the Special Leave Petition and emphasizing the need for circumspection in individual grievances regarding public examinations, which can delay finalization of results and affect larger public interest [Paras 4, 7]​.

Decision: Special Leave Petition dismissed – No merit found in the claim for re-examination due to the non-availability of a handkerchief during the examination [Paras 7, 8]​.

Trust Law – Ownership of Property – Interpretation of Decree – Nature of Trust Property – The appellant contended that the property in question was not a trust property and was under his absolute ownership, whereas the respondent claimed it was trust property meant for the upkeep of the respondent temple and the Guru Manicka Prabhu Temple. Held: The Supreme Court found that the properties in Schedules 'A' and 'C' continued to be part of the trust property. The Compromise Decree dated 26.11.1929 explicitly stipulated that the properties were vested in the head of the Guru Manicka Prabhu Temple for specific purposes, including the maintenance of the respondent temple. The appellant could hold the property only as a trustee and not as an absolute owner. The Division Bench's judgment declaring the property as trust property was upheld [Paras 15-23].

Civil Procedure – Res Judicata – Distinct Nature of Claims – The appellant argued that the current suit was barred by the principle of res judicata, given previous proceedings determining the nature of the respondent temple. Held: The Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that the previous proceedings dealt with the nature of the respondent temple as public or private, whereas the present case related to the declaration of title over the suit property. The nature of the respondent temple did not affect the obligations under the Compromise Decree regarding the suit property. Therefore, res judicata did not apply in this context [Paras 24].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – The judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court is upheld, confirming that the suit property remains trust property vested in the head of the Guru Manicka Prabhu Temple for specific purposes. The appellant can hold the property only as a trustee, not as an absolute owner [Paras 25-27].

Civil Procedure – Second Appeal – Scope under Section 100 CPC – High Court's Jurisdiction in Second Appeal – The High Court allowed the second appeal by answering in the affirmative on the question of whether the suit was liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties. However, the High Court erred by overturning the First Appellate Court’s findings without properly framing a substantial question of law concerning the lack of evidence or subletting. Held: The Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is limited to hearing appeals based on substantial questions of law. The High Court is obligated to frame these questions at the time of admission and must decide the appeal based on them. The High Court’s judgment was set aside for not adhering to these principles [Paras 14-20].

Landlord-Tenant Law – Subletting – Evidence Required – The First Appellate Court had decreed the suit in favor of the appellants, finding that the respondent had sublet the premises and was therefore liable for eviction. The High Court, however, set aside this finding, stating that there was no evidence of subletting. Held: The Supreme Court found that the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction in a second appeal by reassessing the evidence without framing a substantial question of law. The High Court’s judgment was thus set aside [Paras 13, 20].

Decision: Civil Appeal allowed – The judgment and order dated 24th August 2023 passed in S.A. No. 100 of 2021 by the High Court of Calcutta is set aside. The judgment and order dated 12th December 2019 passed by the City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Appeal No. 14/2018 stands affirmed. The respondent is directed to hand over vacant possession of the suit property by 31.12.2024. [Paras 21-24].

Arbitration Law – Extension of Time under Section 29A – Post-Expiry Applications – Maintainability – Appeals concerning whether an application for extension of time under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, can be filed after the expiry of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal. The Calcutta High Court held that such an application must be filed before the mandate expires, a view supported by the Patna High Court. However, High Courts in Delhi, Bombay, Kerala, Madras, and Jammu & Kashmir took an opposite stance, allowing post-expiry applications. – Held: The Supreme Court accepted the broader view that applications for extension could be filed after expiry, as long as sufficient cause was shown. A narrow interpretation of “terminate” under Section 29A(4) would unduly restrict arbitration proceedings, contrary to legislative intent. The Court emphasized that flexibility is inherent in the provision, allowing extensions both before and after the tribunal’s mandate ends [Paras 1-9, 20].

Interpretation of “Terminate” – Conditional Nature – Purpose of Section 29A – The expression “terminate” in Section 29A(4) of the Act was interpreted in the context of ensuring efficient arbitration, not to impose strict finality. The word “terminate” is followed by “unless,” implying that the tribunal’s mandate can continue if the court grants an extension. The Court noted that a strict literal interpretation would lead to unnecessary disruptions in arbitration, forcing parties to restart proceedings. This interpretation would also undermine the legislative goal of expediting arbitration and reducing litigation costs. The Court reiterated that judicial discretion, as envisioned in Section 29A(5), provides sufficient safeguards against abuse of process [Paras 15-19].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Application for extension of time under Section 29A(4) maintainable even after expiry of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate – The High Court’s restrictive interpretation overturned – The matter was remitted for final hearing and disposal – Parties directed to proceed in accordance with the decision.

Criminal Law – PCPNDT Act – Illegal Search and Seizure – Reversal on Appeal – The appellant, a radiologist, was convicted under Section 23 of the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, for allegedly conducting illegal sex determination tests. A raid conducted solely by the Civil Surgeon at the appellant's clinic led to the seizure of evidence. The trial court convicted the appellant based on this evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the raid and search were unauthorized, as they were not sanctioned by the full District Appropriate Authority as required under Section 30(1) of the Act – Held: The search and seizure were illegal, vitiating the entire prosecution case [Paras 1-14].

Search and Seizure – Legality of Raid – Section 30(1) of the 1994 Act – The raid on the appellant’s clinic was conducted by a team formed solely by the Civil Surgeon without the approval or involvement of other members of the District Appropriate Authority, as mandated by Section 30(1) of the Act. The Court observed that the procedural safeguards requiring the full Authority’s approval were ignored. The Civil Surgeon acted unilaterally, rendering the search illegal. Since the raid did not comply with the law, all evidence obtained through the raid was inadmissible, and the FIR was quashed [Paras 10-12].

Offence under Section 23 of the 1994 Act – Illegality of Evidence – The Court found that the prosecution’s case rested entirely on the evidence obtained from the illegal search. Since the search was unauthorized, the evidence collected was inadmissible. Consequently, continuing prosecution based on this tainted evidence would amount to an abuse of the legal process. The conviction and the FIR were quashed, and the appellant was acquitted [Paras 13-14].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction under Section 23 of the 1994 Act set aside – FIR and complaint quashed – Appellant acquitted [Paras 13-14].

Criminal Law – Preventive Detention – COFEPOSA Act – Detention order quashed due to procedural violations – The appellant, wife of the detenu (Shaji A.K.), challenged the preventive detention of her husband under COFEPOSA for allegedly engaging in illegal foreign exchange transactions – Detention based on statements, WhatsApp chats, and documents linking the detenu to hawala transactions – Detention order passed on 31st August 2023 and confirmed on 28th November 2023 by the Central Government – Supreme Court quashed the detention on the grounds of (i) non-supply of crucial documents (statements of a key witness) relied on by the Detaining Authority, and (ii) excessive and unjustified delay of nearly nine months in considering the detenu’s representation – Held: Both procedural lapses violated the detenu’s fundamental rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which mandates the earliest opportunity for making an effective representation [Paras 1-72].

Constitutional Law – Article 22(5) – Right to make effective representation – Non-supply of key documents – The Detaining Authority had relied upon multiple statements, including those of Preetha Pradeep, in arriving at its subjective satisfaction for the detention order – These statements were not provided to the detenu, violating his right to make an effective representation – Supreme Court emphasized that the right to representation under Article 22(5) requires the supply of all material documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority – Citing precedent from cases such as M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India (1990) and Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu (2000), the Court held that failure to supply such documents vitiates the detention [Paras 17-44].

Preventive Detention – Delay in consideration of representation – The detenu’s representation, submitted on 27th September 2023, was not transmitted or decided until June 2024, despite repeated judgments stressing the importance of expeditious consideration of such representations – The delay of almost nine months, largely due to jail authorities sending the representation via ordinary post, was deemed excessive – Supreme Court held that such delay infringes the detenu’s constitutional right under Article 22(5) – Referencing earlier cases such as Tara Chand v. State of Rajasthan (1981), Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab (1981), and Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (1982), the Court reaffirmed that even delays of 20-27 days in considering a representation can vitiate the detention [Paras 45-63].

Failure of Prison Authorities – Negligent transmission of representation – The Court criticized the prison authorities for their negligent handling of the detenu’s representation, which was sent via ordinary post without any tracking mechanism – Supreme Court expressed the need for authorities to adopt modern communication methods (e.g., email, speed post) to ensure that representations are promptly transmitted to the Detaining Authority and Central Government – The failure to promptly forward the representation deprived the detenu of his valuable constitutional right to a speedy decision, thereby invalidating the detention [Paras 60-70].

Preventive Detention – Procedural lapses – Inadequate explanation for delays – The Court noted the lack of any plausible explanation for the delay in deciding the representation even after it was received by the Central Government and Detaining Authority – Despite receiving the representation on 14th/15th May 2024, the authorities delayed its consideration by 20-27 days without any justification – Relying on Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik v. Union of India (1989) and B. Alamelu v. State of Tamil Nadu (1995), the Court reiterated that such unexplained delays violate constitutional guarantees and render the detention unlawful [Paras 63-71].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Detention order set aside – High Court’s order in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1271 of 2023 quashed – Detenu to be released forthwith if not required in any other case [Paras 72].