Facts:

Appellant (Prakash Nagardas Dubal-Shaha) and respondent no. 1 (Sou. Meena Prakash Dubal Shah) were married.

Respondents initiated proceedings under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, claiming maintenance for the wife and children.

The appellant and his wife had initiated divorce proceedings by mutual consent, which got dismissed due to the appellant's alleged failure to pay agreed alimony.

Issues:

Whether the unsuccessful divorce proceedings adversely affect the maintainability of the application under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Whether the wife is entitled to maintenance under the Act despite the dismissal of the divorce proceedings.

Held:

Having given anxious consideration to the relevant facts and materials and on careful perusal of orders passed by learned Magistrate, Sessions Court, and the High Court, and appreciating those orders in the light of the submissions advanced before us, we have no hesitation in affirming the views of the High Court. The unsuccessful divorce proceedings cannot adversely affect the maintainability of the application filed by the contesting respondents under the Act. Even on merits of other issues, the views taken by the learned Magistrate are cogent and supported by relevant materials. Hence, the High Court rightly interfered with the order of the Sessions Court and confirmed that of the learned Magistrate. We, therefore, find no good reasons to interfere. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by Ramesh Kumar @ Babla against his conviction under Section 307 IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge, Adhoc, Patiala.

The appellant argued for a lesser offense and punishment.

The incident included a clash between two groups resulting in injuries to both parties.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be convicted under a lesser offense, such as Section 324 or 326 of the IPC.

The severity of the injuries and the appropriateness of the original conviction under Section 307 IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the evidence and injuries, concluding that only two out of seven injuries were caused by a sharp weapon.

The Court held that the appellant should be convicted under Section 324 IPC instead of Section 307 IPC.

Considering the circumstances, including the appellant's age and settlement in life, the Court modified the sentence.

The appellant was released on executing an appropriate bond before the trial court, with directions to appear and receive a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year when called upon.

The appellant was instructed to keep the peace and be of good behavior.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

A contract was in place for the purchase of RLNG at a fixed price.

The Central Government made a policy decision to pool RLNG prices, leading to a unilateral increase in gas prices.

Communication from RLNG sellers to the appellant informed them of the price revision based on the government policy.

Issues:

Validity of the policy decision and its impact on the RLNG contract.

Constitutionality of the policy decision in light of Articles 14, 73, and Schedule VII, List I, Entry 53.

Held:

The power of price fixing, though a legislative function, can be delegated and executed through executive orders. RLNG, being an essential commodity, falls under the ambit of the Essential Commodities Act, and the Executive has the authority to fix prices as necessary .

By virtue of Article 73 and Entry 53 of List I, the Union has the legislative and policy-making authority regarding mineral oil resources and inflammable substances, including RLNG. The policy decision in question was taken after due deliberation and in the interest of the public .

The impugned policy decision aimed to unify RLNG prices on a non-discriminatory basis, treating consumers through long-term contracts as a distinct class. The decision was applied uniformly within this class and was not found to be discriminatory, arbitrary, or illegal .

The Supreme Court, in its jurisdiction under Article 136, does not have the competence to judge the viability of government policy decisions. Judicial review should be exercised cautiously, only intervening if the policy is enacted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or with malafide intent or if it violates constitutional provisions ‘

Decision: The appeals were dismissed as there was no demonstrated reason to interfere with the impugned policy decision .

Facts:

The case involves the withdrawal of a suit where MGG, a German company, entered into a Share Purchase and Cooperation Agreement with the shareholders of an Indian company. The ownership title in MGG's shares is acknowledged until the date of the consent award. Claims by GGL and MHL for title over the shares stem from MGG's prior title and an alleged subsequent transfer pursuant to the consent award.

Issues:

Whether the Ruia family (RUIAS) would be entitled, pursuant to the settlement, to have their names entered into the registers of the BOCL (presumably Bombay Oxygen Corporation Limited) as holders of the shares.

The defendants in SUIT-IV are granted the liberty to raise every available defense in law and fact.

Held:

The existence of title in MGG in the shares is not disputed by GGL or MHL until the date of the consent award. GGL and MHL's claim for title over the shares is contingent on MGG's prior title and the alleged subsequent transfer pursuant to the consent award.

In the absence of any legally established right in any party other than MGG, the entitlement of RUIAS to have their names entered into the registers of the BOCL as holders of the shares is a matter for RUIAS to explore.

The defendants in SUIT-IV are granted the liberty to raise every available defense available in law and fact.

Exemplary costs, quantified at Rs. 25,00,000.00 (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs only), are imposed on each of the three parties involved.

FACTS:

The appellant, M/S Videocon Industries Ltd., and another were facing trial for alleged contravention of provisions under FERA.

Adjudicating authority imposed penalties against the appellant during the trial.

The tribunal, in an appeal, found no contravention of FERA, setting aside the penalties.

Criminal proceedings continued, and the accused sought discharge based on the tribunal's decision.

ISSUES:

Whether the findings in adjudication proceedings are binding on criminal prosecution?

The impact of exoneration in adjudication proceedings on the criminal proceeding.

HELD:

The Court held that the findings in adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution are independent. The exoneration on technical grounds may allow prosecution to continue, but exoneration on merits, where the allegations are not sustainable, should halt criminal proceedings. The High Court erred in considering the merits of the tribunal's decision, which was not under challenge. The appeals were allowed, and the order discharging the accused by the Magistrate was restored.

REFERRED CASES:

B.N. Kashyap Vs. Emperor, AIR 1945 Lah 23.

Collector of Customs Vs. L.R. Melwani, AIR 1970 SC 962.

G.L. Didwana Vs. ITO, (1995) Sup (2) SCC 724.

Iqbal Singh Marwah Vs. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370.

K.C. Builders Vs. CIT, (2004) 2 SCC 731.

K.G. Premshankar Vs. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87.

Radheshyam Kejriwal Vs. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581.

Standard Chartered Bank Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, (2006) 4 SCC 278.

Uttam Chand Vs. ITO, (1982) 2 SCC 543.

Facts:

The appellant, a Director in Devi Polymers Private Limited, faced criminal proceedings under various sections of IPC and IT Act.

The dispute involved the creation of a website and payments made for it, with allegations of criminal breach of trust, forgery, and conspiracy against the appellant.

The appellant, as Director of Unit 'C,' engaged consultants to enhance consultancy services, resulting in the creation of a separate entity, Devi Consultancy Services (DCS).

The appellant's actions were contested as forgery and misappropriation, leading to the initiation of criminal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions constituted offenses under Sections 409, 468, and 471 of IPC and Sections 65 and 66 of the IT Act?

Whether the website's content, specifically mentioning DCS, amounted to forgery and misappropriation of funds?

Held:

The acts of the appellant lacked dishonest intention, and no case was made out under Sections 65 and 66 of the IT Act.

The website's content did not project DCS as an independent entity; hence, forgery allegations were unsubstantiated.

The appellant did not receive any funds individually, and his actions did not fit the descriptions of offenses under Sections 409, 468, and 471 of the IPC.

Quoting the guidelines from Bhajan Lal's case, the court found the criminal proceedings to be an abuse of the court process.

Emphasizing the absence of criminal intent, the court quashed the prosecution against the appellant.

Accordingly, the appeal succeeds. The prosecution is quashed.

Facts:

The case involves a petition filed by the wife (respondent) against the husband (appellant) and his family members under the DV Act, alleging physical and mental harassment, as well as dowry demands. The wife seeks various reliefs under Sections 18 and 20 of the DV Act.

Issues:

Whether the court has the power to allow an amendment to the petition or complaint filed under the DV Act.

Held:

The court, after considering relevant sections of the CrPC, DV Act, and constitutional provisions, holds that the power to amend the complaint/application is available to the court. The DV Act proceedings are essentially of civil nature, and the court has the power to permit amendments to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

The court emphasizes that the purpose of enacting the DV Act is to provide a civil law remedy to protect women from domestic violence. It underscores the significance of Section 28(2) of the DV Act, allowing the court to lay down its own procedure.

In light of this, the Trial Court's decision to allow the amendment is affirmed, and the order of the High Court is upheld. The appeal is dismissed, and the appellant is directed to pay costs.

Facts:

V.N. Public Health & Educational Trust applied for the establishment of a new medical college for the academic year 2016-17.

The Essentiality Certificate issued by the Government of Kerala was found to be invalid by the Medical Council of India (MCI) due to non-compliance with the prescribed format.

The MCI recommended disapproval of the application to the Central Government.

The Trust approached the High Court challenging the invalid certificate and disapproval.

Issues:

Validity of the Essentiality Certificate.

Compliance with the prescribed format and regulations.

High Court's authority to issue directions beyond the established schedule.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Essentiality Certificate issued was conditional and did not fulfill the mandatory qualifying criteria. The MCI, following the Regulations, rejected the application. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the schedule for processing applications. The High Court's directions were set aside. The Trust was given the option to submit a fresh application for the next academic year in compliance with the Regulations and the approved schedule. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Appellant Pallav Sheth convicted for dishonest misappropriation of shares related to a transaction with Canara Bank.

Appellant admitted liability of RS. 83,00,000 for 20,000 shares but failed to honor cheques.

Defense claiming it as a civil liability without criminal intent was rejected by the Special Court.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is guilty of dishonest misappropriation of shares?

Whether the defense of the accused, claiming no criminal intention, is valid?

Held:

The Special Court found dishonest misappropriation on the part of the appellant.

The defense of no criminal intention was rejected.

Appellant convicted under Section 409 of the IPC, sentenced to six months RI, and fined RS. 1,00,000.

A settlement was suggested, and the appellant agreed to pay RS. 2,03,10,400 with a modified interest rate of 12% per annum in two installments within six months.

If the settlement is not paid within six months, the original sentence will stand.

The Appeal is disposed of accordingly.